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Robert Chambers writes in his paper  
Responsible well-being – a personal agenda for development: 
“For responsible well-being, it is then especially individuals who are powerful and 
wealthy who have to change. [...]  For this, one need is for a pedagogy for the non-
oppressed (including ourselves, the sort of people who read World Development), 
to enable us to think and act differently. There are many disparate domains for 
analysis and action among them: how we treat and bring up children; how to 
achieve reconciliation after conflict; how donor agency staff behave on mission 
[...]; how to rehabilitate those who have suffered a PhD”. (my italics)  
(Chambers 1997;2750). 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This work is about how international housing assistance to societies affected by war contrib-
utes toward long-term recovery. Or does not. Current wars are characterized by large, often 
identity specific population movements causing an extreme and urgent need for shelter. This 
research does not deal with (emergency) ‘shelter’, but with (permanent) ‘housing’, which 
has come to be one of the largest funding sectors of international aid to countries ravaged by 
war.  
 
It is my contention that housing re/construction, because of its socio-material nature and 
high economic value may contribute towards long-term recovery. My research is therefore 
focusing on the relationship between the overall process of recovery and the way interna-
tionally funded housing projects are implemented. Recovery is conceptualized as a time lim-
ited, complex and reflexive activity, i.e. guided by past experience, both of pre-war condi-
tions, and of the war itself. This makes recovery an endogenously driven process. In exam-
ining the implementation of foreign funded housing programs I submit, aided by prevailing 
theory, three chief attributes of housing: 1) that of physical object with its technical determi-
nants and functional responsiveness, 2) that of object of meaning, i.e. symbol, which allows 
for, or even determines human action, and 3) that of vehicle of development, both by its 
backward linkages. i.e. creating demand and employment, but also by forward linkages, i.e. 
what people with housing will be able to do. All these attributes refer back to “what houses 
can do”, not only to “what houses are”.  
 
The New Wars create a new and extremely complex context for international housing inter-
ventions. Unlike the indiscriminate mass destruction of housing of former wars, today hous-
ing is destroyed as a function of the owners’ identity. The destruction of housing has become 
an integral part of ethnic cleansing. This fact has lead donors to concentrate on rebuilding 
the destroyed housing as a means of reintegrating the displaced, an idea that seems simplis-
tic given the meaning of recovery, the nature of housing - and the grave political complexity 
of the new wars.    
 
Ideology as well as practical considerations have made the international NGOs the major 
agents of international aid. Their new role comes from that fact that most of the NGOs now 
receive substantial parts of their income from governments – to carry out government spon-
sored projects. Housing is a favored sector of intervention in war affected areas. Yet very few 
NGOs have any experience with housing. They make up for it by hiring building professionals 
on short-term field contracts. What little there is of theoretical writing that on housing 
re/construction after current wars, indicate that the NGOs – guided by their donors – apply 
an emergency approach also to permanent housing. Housing is conceived as shelter, which 
makes it a logistical challenge to fulfill basic short-term needs. If such an approach is  
applied, will it still contribute towards societal recovery? 
 
Within this frame I have examined three multi-phased housing projects in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. I explore their performance and capacity to enhance long-term recovery. Ac-
knowledging the endogenous, reflexive nature of recovery, I had to approach it qualitatively, 
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yet be able to draw theoretical conclusions on a broader scale. I have investigated how the 
housing projects are performing as physical entities, as generators or inhibitors of social and 
socio-material interaction, and I have examined how the housing projects have impacted 
local markets, production and the buildings industry. I do this by applying a societal capital 
approach which holds (re)development a function of beneficial flows from four societal capi-
tals, i.e. fixed, environmental, human and social capital. Recovery is supported when hous-
ing investments also replenish the other capitals modes so that the inhabitants may draw 
benefits from their enriched interaction. 
 
My cases are 1) set at different times in the reconstruction process, 2) set at different places 
and 3) executed differently by different NGOs. They yielded different, yet consistent conclu-
sions within the three aspects of housing: physical object, symbol and strategy: 
• The long-term nature of housing construction is ignored in that technical solutions, 
workmanship – and not least – the choice of location reflect an emergency attitude 
where inappropriate solutions are accepted “because it is war”. There is a reluctance to 
plan beyond the immediate even for structures that can last generations. 
• The symbolic power of housing is reconfirmed for those who are able to reestablish liveli-
hood networks at their place of origin. Return does not make strategic sense, hence is 
not a “durable solution”, for those whose networks are irreparably destroyed. For those 
who can return, housing reconstruction becomes a symbolic act, both to reestablish on-
tological security, but also to demonstrate against former perpetrators. Housing recon-
struction in itself is therefore not a vehicle towards reconciliation.  
• Housing re/construction in times of war is a way of disseminating purchasing power 
through employment. There is no production, no social or financial institutions by which 
the building industry can develop. Internationally funded reconstruction therefore relies 
on large scale – and tax free - imports of buildings materials. However, my cases show 
that domestic demand more often than that of NGOs draws upon imports.  Recovery 
momentum is lost in not supporting the (re)establishment of the local building materials 
industry.  
• My cases confirm the recovery powers of local agency. When substantive decisions on 
reconstruction are transferred from the NGO to the local community as part of the mate-
rial support to housing re/construction, the community is also entrusted with support 
from external agents, like their own diaspora. This combination replenishes all capital 
modes of the community. The validity of this observation is inversely confirmed by an-
other case where the inhabitants were not at all entrusted with decision-making powers, 
i.e. their human and social capitals were depleted. This also becomes apparent in that 
fixed and environmental capitals are also eroded. 
 
I have concluded by presenting implications for policy, practice and research.  
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RESYMÉ PÅ NORSK 
 
Denne avhandlingen handler om internasjonal bistand til boligreisning i krigsherjede områder, og 
hvordan slik bistand kan bidra til langsiktig gjenreisning. Eller hvordan den ikke bidrar. Dagens 
kriger preges av store demografiske forkastninger, ofte knyttet til befolkninggruppers etniske 
tilknytning. Dette fører til enorme boligbehov. Foreliggende forskningsarbeid dreier seg ikke om 
nødboliger slik vi finner dem i flyktningeleire, men på permanent boligbygging/boligreising. Hjelp til 
bolig(gjen)reising er ett av de største internasjonale innsatsområdene i krigsherjede områder. 
 
Mitt utgangspunkt er boligbygging og boliggjenreisning, i kraft av sin sosio-materielle natur og 
betydelige økonomiske verdi, er spesielt egnet som innsatsområde for langsiktig gjenreisning. Min 
forskning fokuserer derfor på forholdet mellom de overordnede gjenreisningsprosessene og måten 
internasjonalt finansierte boligbyggingsprosjekter blir gjennomført på. Gjenreisning blir konsep-
tualisert som en tidsbegrenset, kompleks og refleksiv aktivitet. At den er refleksiv innebærer at den 
er formet av tidligere erfaringer, både av forhold før krigen brøt ut og av selve krigen. Dette gjør 
gjenreisning til en prosess som drives fram av 'egne erfaringer', til en ’deltakende’ prosess. Ved 
hjelp av ledende teori fokuserer jeg på tre hovedattributter ved boliger i studien av gjennom-
føringen av internasjonalt finansierte boligreisningsprosjekter: 1) at det er fysiske objekter med 
teknisk determinanter og egenskaper for funksjonell tilpasning; 2) at de er meningsobjekter, de er 
symboler som lager rom for, eller til og med er bestemmende for, menneskelig handling; og 3) at 
de er investeringsobjekter, eller verktøy for utvikling, både gjennom å skape etterspørsel og 
sysselsetting, men også gjennom hva mennesker med bolig vil kunne utføre. Alle disse attributtene 
er knyttet til ”hva boligen gjør”, ikke bare ”hva boligen er”. 
 
De såkalte 'Nye Krigene' skaper nye og svært komplekse betingelse for internasjonal bistand til 
boliggjenreisning. Til forskjell fra tidligere krigers masseødeleggelser av boliger, ødelegges boliger i 
nåtidens kriger som en funksjon av eierens identitet. Ødeleggelsen av boliger har blitt en integrert 
del av etnisk rensning. Dette har ført at de internasjonale giverne har konsentrert seg om 
gjenoppbygging av ødelagte boliger som redskap for å gjenintegrere de fordrevne – og gjennom 
det skape fred. I lys av gjenreisningens forutsetning, boligen flerdimensjonale natur og den 
grunnleggende politiske kompleksiteten ved de nye krigene, kan dette virke dette rett så forenklet.  
 
Både ideologi og praktiske hensyn har ført til at internasjonale ikke-statlige organisasjoner (NGOer) 
har blitt hovedaktører i internasjonal bistand. Deres nye rolle kommer av at de fleste NGOene får 
hovedparten av inntekten sin fra regjeringer – for å utføre regjeringsstøttede prosjekter. Til tross 
for at boligbygging er en foretrukket innsatssektorsektor i krigsherjede områder, er det svært få 
NGOer som har boligreisningsefaring. Dette kompenserer de ved å hyre inn profesjonelle byggfolk 
på kortidskontrakter. Det lille som finnes av teori om gjenreisning etter nye kriger, indikerer at 
NGOene – støttet av sine statlige finansieringskilder – anvender en nødhjelpstilnærming også hva 
angår permanent boligbygging. Bolig blir forstått som om ’husly’. Det retter innsatsen inn mot å 
umiddelbare behov.  Men kan man bidra til langsiktig gjenreisning av krigsskadde samfunn ved å 
benytte innsatsmidler som varer i generasjoner til først og fremst å løse akutte, men midlertidige 
boligbehov?  Det vil i hvert fall fordre planperspektiver som strekker seg ut over nødfasen. 
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Innenfor dette rammeverket har jeg undersøkt tre større boligprosjekter i Bosnia-Herzegovina. Jeg 
undersøker deres egenskaper og kapasitet til å kunne fremme langsiktig gjenreisning. Med 
utgangspunkt i at gjenreisning er refleksiv og styrt av lokale prosesser, har jeg måttet tilnærme 
meg feltet kvalitativt, men samtidig være i stand til å trekke teoretiske konklusjoner i større skala. 
Jeg har undersøkt hvordan boligreisningsprosjekter oppfyller krav som stilles til boliger som fysiske 
objekter, og hvordan de genererer eller hindrer sosial og sosio-materiell samhandling. I tillegg har 
jeg undersøkt hvordan boligreisningsprosjekter har påvirket lokal etterspørsel og tilbud, produksjon 
og den lokale byggeindustrien. Dette gjør jeg gjennom å benytte en kapitalforståelse av samfunnet 
som ser på utvikling og gjenreisning som en funksjon av positiv samhandling mellom fire 
samfunnsmessige kapitalformer, nemlig fysisk kapital, miljøkapital, menneskelig kapital og sosial 
kapital. Gjenreisning skjer når økonomiske investeringer i boligbygging (vekst i fysisk kapital) også  
fører til vekst i de andre kapitalformene, og der innbyggerne kan trekke fordeler av denne veksten. 
 
Prosjektene jeg har studert er gjennomført til ulik tid i gjenoppbyggingsprosessen, på ulike sted, og 
gjennomført av ulike agenter, (NGOer). Studiet av prosjektene førte til forskjellige, men likevel 
konsistente konklusjoner angående de tre attributtene som boliger innehar: fysisk objekt, symbol 
og strategi:  
• Boligens langsiktige egenskaper blir ignorert ved at tekniske løsninger, utførelse og, ikke 
minst, valg av lokalisering reflekterer en nødhjelpsholdning, der mindreverdige løsninger 
blir godtatt ”fordi det er krig”, ikke nødvendigvis fordi det ikke fins alternativer. Det er 
motstand mot å planlegge utover det umiddelbare. 
• Boligens symbolske kraft blir bekreftet for de som klarer å gjenopprette sosiale og 
økonomiske nettverk på sine opprinnelsessteder. For de som opplever at nettverkene er 
ugjenkallelig ødelagt, blir det ’å flytte tilbake’ meningsløst og oppfattes ingenlunde som en 
”varig løsning”. Selve boligreisning blir en symbolsk handling for de som kan reise tilbake, 
både ved at det gjenoppretter ontologisk trygghet, men også som demonstrasjon mot 
deres overgripere. Boliggjenreisning i seg selv er derfor intet egnet redskap for forsoning.  
• Bolig(gjenopp)bygging i krigstid er en måte å formidle og fordele kjøpekraft på. I 
krigsherjede land der produksjonsmidlene er ødelagt, og der sosiale og økonomiske 
institusjoner har kollapset, fint det ingenting for byggebransjen å utvikle seg gjennom. 
Derfor må den internasjonalt finansierte gjenoppbyggingen i stor basere seg på (skattefri) 
import av byggevarer. Likevel viser de prosjektene jeg har studert at lokalt generert 
etterspørsel i enda større grad enn den som genereres gjennom NGOene, retter seg mot 
import. Gjenreisningskraften tappes i vesentlig grad av at ikke bistandsinnsatsen også 
rettes inn mot (gjen)opprettelse av lokal produksjon av byggematerialer. 
• Prosjektene jeg har studert bekrefter gjenreisningskraften hos lokale aktører i lokale 
handlingsrom. Når vesentlige beslutninger som gjelder den materielle støtten til bolig-
gjenreisningen blir overført fra NGOene til lokalsamfunnet, gir det lokalsamfunnet en 
legitimitet som utløser støtte også fra andre eksterne aktører, som deres egen diaspora. 
Dette forsterker alle kapitalformene i lokalsamfunnet. Der slik beslutningsoverføring ikke 
finner sted, hindres en gjenreisning av menneskelig og sosial kapital. Det fortærer i sin tur 
både fysiske kvaliteter ved boligen og miljøet. 
 
Jeg har konkludert ved å presentere implikasjoner for planlegging, praksis og forskning. 
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PREFACE 
 
This work was initiated for no other reason than to explore a field nobody knew 
much about. My interest was aroused after having seen housing solutions and re-
construction programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina that I felt were highly inappropriate;  
inappropriate in serving the people they were built for, and inappropriate in serving 
as ‘vehicles of recovery’. With the better part of my professional career behind me 
there was no academic ambition underpinning my PhD work. It was simply to learn 
more about housing in post-war reconstruction contexts, and thereby hope that the 
added knowledge would be used to improve subsequent housing interventions.  
 
I went into this work with 20 odd years of practice as architect. In addition to hav-
ing worked on architectural design, my practice also comprised other sectors of the 
trade, also from working in other countries. It was therefore self-evident to me that 
approaching post-war housing as an architectural challenge alone would critically 
weaken my understanding on how housing works in reconstruction. It was neces-
sary to approach the topic in a multidisciplinary way. 
 
I received a grant from the University of Science and Technology (NTNU) to do a 
PhD, or what at NTNU is called a “Dr.Ing” thesis, within their strategic program on 
multidisciplinary studies. This way I came to work in a field where architecture, 
planning and human geography touch. A most rewarding place to be, full of knowl-
edgeable and inspiring people.   
 
But it all started long before I touched upon these fertile cross-disciplinary grounds.  
It started with my contacts and subsequent friendship with Sultan Barakat, the di-
rector the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit at the University of York, 
UK.  This further led to the establishment of a training program at NTNU, funded by 
the Directorate of Immigration, on post-war reconstruction planning for exiled Bos-
nian professionals. This this I got to know Mirjana Nikolic a exiled Bosnian civil en-
gineer whose strength and courage I have come to respect immensely.  
 
But it is my chief advisors, my collaborators, my friends and matchmakers, profes-
sor Ragnhild Lund and professor Sven Erik Svendsen, who stand the tallest. 
Although they came late into the project, as replacements as it were, I have been 
lost without their patient role as academic navigators. Their patience is admirable. I 
will remain grateful for their support and guidance as long as I live, nothing less.  
 
Furthermore gratitude is lavishly bestowed upon the Department of Urban Design 
and Planning who took me in and truly included me in their inner circles. So did the 
Faculty of Architecture and Fine Art. I cannot name their staff individually, they are 
all there and I owe my work to them all. Just as much I owe it to the faculty library. 
They have helped me beyond any call of duty. 
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Then there are the agents of the field. There is Marianne Øen of the Norwegian 
People’s Aid, the HQ and field staff of the Norwegian Refugee Council, in particular 
Lars Silseth, one of the first Norwegian field officers in Tuzla, and there is Kaj Gen-
nebäck of Swedish Rescue Service Agency in Tuzla. This thesis could simply not 
have been made without their kind cooperation and their letting me rummage 
through their files and papers. In addition there is Per Iwansson one of the most 
informed and constructive representatives of the corps diplomatique I have ever 
met. 
 
My alter ego, my assistant, the ‘me’ of my interviews, Mr. Adnan Ahmedbegovic 
represents so much I am not; he is calm, skeptical, and levelheaded. Perhaps it 
was because of him and his ways that we were able to extract so much information 
and understanding out of the people we interviewed. He will always be part of my 
Bosnia. So will many of the people I met through my interviews. Some of the peo-
ple I – via Adnan – got to know in Grapska are among my most revered contacts in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ekrem Buljabasic must be named. He is unique. 
 
I want to thank my language cleaning lady, Catriona Turner. Her work is commend-
able, her comments constructive. The same is to be said of my daughter Pernille’s 
assistance. She helped me immensely as I approached the end, and so did my son 
Henrik who wrestled a book of sorts out of my stubbornly incongruent files embed-
ded in incomprehensible formats. A feat given the circumstances. 
 
Opening addresses always close by presenting some ‘practical information’. Here is 
my list: 
 
• Local names are written without the letters ć, š, etc. I only use the base letters. 
• The term ‘Bosniak’ is being used throughout the thesis. The term is old but its 
revival is in fact the result of the war. ‘Muslim’ was the term used until recently.  
• Cost figures are given in the currency denomination of the source, otherwise 
either the new Bosnian currency, Convertible Marka, KM, or German Marks, DM, 
are used. The latter two, of equal value, stood at about US$ 0,6 at the time in 
question, or EUR 0,5.  
• Quotations given from net versions of articles do not have page references, only 
the overall reference. 
• Wherever a primary source’s name is used in the text, it is used by consent. 
• All pictures are my own where no other credit is given 
 
Trondheim, March 2004 
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ACRONYMS 
 
BiH  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
CC  Collective Centres 
CRI  Cross Roads International  
DAC  Development Co-operation Directorate 
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency 
DETR  Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions 
DFID Department for International Development 
ECHO  European Community Humanitarian Office 
EU  European Union 
GDP  Gross domestic product   
GFA General Framework Agreement (The Dayton Agreement) 
GNI Gross National Income 
GTZ German Technical Cooperation  
 (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Teschnische Zusammenarbeit) 
HVO  Croat National Defense  
ICAHD  Israeli Committee Against House Demolition 
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICVA  International Council of Voluntary Agencies 
IDP  Internally Displaced Person 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IMG  International Management Group 
INCORE Initiative on Conflict Resolution & Ethnicity,  
 University of Ulster & United Nations University in Londonderry/Derry 
IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting 
JNA  Yugoslav National Army 
KM  Convertible Marka 
LWF  Lutheran World Federation 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCA Norwegian Church Aid 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
NMFA Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
NORAD Norwegian Agency for International Development 
NORBAT The Norwegian Battalion in BiH 
NOREPS Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System 
NPA Norwegian Peoples Aid  
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council 
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Agencies 
ODA  Official Development Aid 
ODPR  Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OHR  Office of the High Representative 
PIOOM  Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights 
Violations, Leyden, Netherlands 
PTSD  Post-traumatic Stress Disorder 
RRTF  Reconstruction and Return Task Force 
RS  Republika Srpska 
SDA  Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party for Democratic Action) 
SDP  Social Democratic Party  
SDR Swiss Disaster Relief 
SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serb Democratic Party) 
SEA Scottish European Aid  
SFOR  Stabilization Force 
SIDA  Swedish International Development 
SRC Swiss Red Cross 
SRSA Swedish Rescue and Services Agency 
UNDP  United Nations Development Fund 
UNDRO United Nations Disaster Relief Organization, later to be named:  
 DHA, The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, now: 
  OHCA, The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
VRC  Bosnian Serb Army 
WB  The World Bank 
WFP  World Food Program 
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 ‘TENTS IN CONCRETE’: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This work is based on the assumption that permanent housing re/construction funded 
by international donors in areas affected by present-day wars do not fully exploit the 
recovery potential embedded in housing re/construction. They remain ‘tents in con-
crete’. 
This research sets to find out how such housing projects actually contribute towards 
long-term recovery. I do so by examining housing projects implemented in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
‘Tents in concrete’ is a term highlighting the incongruence between permanent 
houses being built to solve temporary or partial needs, either to build shelter for IDPs 
while in displacement (with little or no consideration as to the projects’ long-term 
urban or regional development potential), or to rebuild houses to enable the dis-
placed to return to their homes (with little or no consideration as to the livelihood or 
development potential presently available in the region of return).  
For references, please see the main text.  
 
PART ONE 
The Research Challenge 
Few studies have been made on wartime and post-war housing interventions.1 Em-
pirically based recommendations, ‘theory’ by any other name, have not been able to 
inform policy and current practice of housing re/construction to any substantial ex-
tent. In practical terms, this means that the underlying concepts, i.e. the under-
standing that guides actions, may fall short of what the current situation in war-
ridden fields calls for. Action requires some theoretical structures, beliefs or relevant 
references within which it can be placed and generated. This often leads to action 
being informed by inadequate or plainly incorrect theories, simply because this is 
preferable to having nothing at all to guide action.  
At the other extreme there is the process of implementation. Vedung has shown how 
this carries consequences beyond its perceived instrumental nature. The approach to 
implementation may shape the outcomes. Given the context of violence, societal dis-
integration and endemic uncertainty, the action of the implementer, normally an in-
ternational non-governmental organization (NGO), therefore seems to take on added 
importance.  
I pose the following research question:  
How do internationally funded housing projects implemented in war-
ravaged areas affect the recovery processes of the societies assisted?  
                                          
1 As my work approached its conclusion, ODI published a Network Paper written by Sultan Barakat on 
Housing Reconstruction after conflict and disaster which has not been included in my references because 
my writing was complete by the time of its publication. I was a member of ODI’s Board of Referees. 
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This overarching question is supported by three sets of sub-questions related to: a) 
the physical setting, present performance and future adaptability of the buildings 
themselves; b) the strength of local agency, i.e. the social and human capacity of the 
people affected; and c) the project as a long-term social and economic investment 
and its impact on local economy and local institutions. I will use Bosnia-Herzegovina 
as my arena for investigation. 
In this thesis ‘recovery’ is conceived as a time-limited, extremely complex (‘messy’ 
would probably be a more adequate term), and reflexive set of processes. It is in-
variably guided by past experience, both that of pre-war conditions and that of the 
violence of war itself. This marks it as an endogenous endeavor, making the en-
gagement of local agency a precondition for an efficient and sustainable outcome.  
 
PART TWO 
Theoretical Foundations and Current Practice 
HOUSING AS A SOCIO-MATERIAL CONCEPT 
Housing constitutes part of the very structure that is society. Consequently, the 
terms and concepts associated with housing are broad. It is therefore necessary to 
define the terms, since we have come to see how words such as ‘housing’ and ‘shel-
ter’ guide different actions. 
Definitions help in conceptualizing ‘the duality of housing’: housing as both a product 
and a process, as indicated in the famous statement by Churchill, “We shape our 
buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us”. Housing as an object and a consti-
tuting part of social processes and not only backdrops to these processes, gives rise 
to three core attributes of housing, echoing the subsidiary research questions: 
• Housing as material object. This covers housing’s physical properties: how hous-
ing interacts with nature  i.e. how it stands up to the climate and the physical quality 
of the site; how it interacts with people and their wear and tear. In other words, how 
the construction masters time. It is also about housing interacting in space, i.e. on 
location. Lastly, it is about how housing physically responds to changing human re-
quirements. 
Housing as physical object is analyzed through the ‘Shearing Model’, which layers the 
building according to the lifespan of the layer. It is layered into site, structure, skin, 
services, space plan and stuff, with ‘site’ being the most permanent and ‘stuff’ the 
most transient. 
• Housing as symbol. This is about the dweller as agent, about the reciprocity be-
tween housing and inhabitant. It deals with housing as a physical imprint – and 
printer - of worldviews and values, of status, of aspirations, of daily practices, etc. 
This is how housing becomes home , the central node in people’s network of life. 
When the dwelling is destroyed and people are expelled the place and the things lost 
or saved subsequently emerge as true symbols of (lost) home relationships. Choice is 
a key concept in the context of home, because making choices makes sense, and 
making sense of a place is necessary for acknowledging it as home. Displaced people 
have been robbed of this choice. 
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Recovery will then be about regaining that control. It is about returning to a state of 
choice, rather than a place, where displaced people are able to choose how  - and 
where - to reestablish their ‘systems of activities within a system of settings’, as 
Rapoport defines ‘home environment’. 
• Housing as strategy or vehicle of development. This attribute, as the one above, 
rests on the familiar Turner quote about ‘what housing does’. It is about the proc-
esses activated by housing, about housing as node in the network that constitutes 
society.  
The economic impact of housing works through backward and forward linkages. The 
former refers to direct employment generated by housing investment and the pro-
duction of materials, tools transport, etc. Forward linkages refer to the economic ac-
tivity that stems from the use of housing following its construction.  
Housing’s backward linkages, i.e. their multiplier effect, is normally very high, most 
often more than two, primarily because of the labor intensity of housing construction. 
This means that ‘for every unit of currency spent directly on house construction, an 
additional unit of currency is added to demand in the economy’, as stated by UN 
Habitat. Regarding housing’s forward linkages, studies worldwide indicate that 10–
25% of all housing is used for income-generating activities.  
Forward and the backward linkages are combined in assisted self-help housing, a 
housing strategy with a strong post-war related legacy. As John Turner said 30 years 
ago, ‘Housing achievements consist not only of houses and other material parts of a 
dwelling environment, but also of the ways and means by which they are sponsored, 
designed, built, used and maintained’.  
 
WAR AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HOUSING 
‘New wars’ are different from the former ‘world wars’. Mary Kaldor has identified 
goals, methods of warfare, and the economy of current wars as the three chief differ-
ences. To these, I add the engagement of international actors as a fourth such differ-
ence. These characteristics carry consequences for housing, both in terms of their 
destruction and as a basis for their re/construction.  
A) Goals of New Wars 
These wars are not fought to ‘build nations’. They are about ‘identity politics’, where 
the state is relevant only in so far as it affects the identity policy. Identity politics are 
retroactive and emerging in part as a consequence of the loss of power, even rele-
vance, of the state. They emerge in the world’s left-over spaces, the ‘black holes of 
globalization’ to use an image from Castells. Since, by and large, ethnicity and terri-
tory are overlapping issues, wars of identity specifically target housing to ensure ex-
pulsion of ‘the other’.  
B) Methods of Warfare 
Rather than ‘winning hearts and minds’, the new wars rely on ‘sowing fear and ha-
tred’. This entails mass killings, expulsion and various forms of intimidation directed 
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at the civilian population, i.e. the very acts that the ‘laws on war’ are set to prevent. 
Once started, these wars are extremely difficult to end.  
True to the nature of these wars, houses are targeted individually, ‘executed’ as it 
were. The ferocity by which ‘the dwellings of others’ are destroyed acknowledges the 
symbolic properties of housing.  
C) The Economy of the New Wars 
New wars are financially organized through international networks where enclaves 
within the ‘black holes of globalization’ interact with the international trade network 
on diamonds, timber, ivory, drugs, and the like. This is totally different from the old 
wars which were by and large financed without external resources. The national eco-
nomic outcomes are devastating: destruction of the economic infrastructure, endemic 
unemployment and extreme poverty – with small networked enclaves of immense 
‘clever people wealth’. It is into these war-ravaged economies that international 
agents are sent to provide housing.  
D) The Attraction of International Response 
However peaceful in intent, as a matter of economic logic, international interventions 
create a local economy concentrated in the major urban areas with high international 
presence. International agents provide food and employment opportunities. All this 
results in a process of war-pulled urbanization, supported by a rural push due to fal-
ling food prices. Subsiding violence is not followed by a corresponding ‘return’. People 
whose lifestyles have been urbanized tend to stay put in the urban areas. 
In new wars dwellings become ‘identity targets’. They are ‘killed’ rather than ‘de-
stroyed’. This selective demolition of housing in the new wars is therefore not so 
much about their destruction as it is about the challenge of their reconstruction. This 
is also totally different from the reconstruction challenges following the old interna-
tional wars of the last century.  
 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO WAR 
There are two principally different sources of, and causes for, international interven-
tion in areas of conflict: the morally grounded, yet media-dependent public urge to 
help others in need, and the strategically dependent governmental support provided 
to regions or countries of geo-political importance to the donor country. The former is 
primarily channeled through private non-governmental organization (NGOs). The 
latter is political and may take on any form from aerial bombardment to large bilat-
eral material and financial aid packages. In real life these two modes of assistance 
overlap.  
The International NGOs  
The new wars have left the aid establishment in disarray. Out of the many causes 
behind the present uncertainty, two stand out: the nature of the present wars, and 
the privatization of aid. The former has already been commented upon. The latter 
refers to the ‘new policy agenda’ that emerged in the late 1980s along the lines of 
neo-liberalism. Civil society was a term brought to the fore, which in its most rudi-
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mentary definition is held to be ‘not of government’ and ‘not of the private sector’. By 
definition, this leaves a pivotal role to the NGOs.  
Theories exist claiming that NGOs emerge where there is a gap in services; they are 
an institutional response to state and/or market failure. However, Terje Tvedt has 
shown that the NGOs have reached their present position by acting as organizational 
vehicles for donor countries’ foreign aid; They became the aid channel of the neo-
liberal world. This is not a homogeneous channel. They may be categorized along 
three dimensions: 
a) Categories of Tradition 
The ‘Wilsonian’ organizations are characterized by their ‘special relationship’ to their 
home government. This group is basically composed of US organizations. 
The religious organizations emerged out of church-based charitable or missionary 
work. This group consists some of the biggest NGOs presently working in the field.  
The ‘Dunantist’ organizations constitute a group of independent secular organizations 
trying to stay financially and politically independent.  
 
b) Categories of Urgency 
The categories above deal with strategies, these categories deal with tactics: how the 
organizations address the issues they are set to resolve. In the case of NGOs we dis-
tinguish between a relief approach and a developmental approach. Housing is by na-
ture a long-lasting investment, i.e. an developmental object, whereas the reason for 
it being built in areas of war is one of urgent need, i.e. a relief object. Housing is 
squeezed between these two approaches. 
The attempt in the 1990s to link, in conceptual and practical terms, relief and devel-
opment rested on the notion of disasters being temporary set-backs on the develop-
mental road to economic progress. The applied concepts had strong references to 
theories on recovery after natural disasters and traditional state wars of the WW II 
type. The New Wars seem to have rendered ‘developmental relief’ a term rather than 
a reality. However, when the chosen approach stands inappropriate to the nature of 
intervention, failure looms, as was documented in the UNHCR’s housing program in 
Rwanda.  
c) Categories of Staff: Specialist versus Generalist 
There has been a watershed in the NGO world since the war on the Balkans. They 
have now become ‘a force for transformation in global politics and economics’, dis-
bursing US$ 12–15 billion per year according to some sources. Little is known about 
how the competence and capacities of the NGO staff impacts the implementation – 
and hence the outcomes – of projects on the ground.  
Although there is a tendency in the NGO channel to specialize and professionalize, 
there are very few  NGOs specializing in housing. Therefore most of the housing pro-
grams are carried out by cover-all NGOs. They become specialists simply by hiring 
short-term staff with relevant qualifications. This invariably takes place within a ‘relief 
framework’ which also entails short-term contracts, frequent changes in personnel, 
and lack of institutional memory. The more stable environments of the NGO head-
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quarters are staffed by all-rounder managers and administrators. What effects this 
dichotomy in professional qualifications and the apparent tension and frustration this 
causes, has not been investigated to any length. We know nothing of its possible im-
pact on project outcomes. 
 
PART THREE 
Methods and Tools of Analysis 
FRAMING RECOVERY 
Recovery denotes change that comprises ‘development-like’ activities and processes 
aiming at creating conditions of predictability, comprising political and institutional 
growth, economic development, physical reconstruction, and the (re)formation of 
human and social capital. Recovery thus defined rests within the endogenous growth 
theory, where the presence of social capital is acknowledged as decisive in terms of 
efficiency, governance, and in issues of location. 
Recovery is distinguished from ‘development’ in basically three different ways: reflex-
ivity, temporality, and complexity. 
1) Recovery is Reflexive, Guided by the Past 
Whereas ‘ordinary development’ focuses on improving an unknown future, recovery 
takes place among people who have ‘been there – done that’. This a fundamental 
difference between ‘recovery’ and (intended) ‘development’.  
2) Recovery is Time Limited 
Recovery is a phase of ‘development-like’ change borne out of war’s societal and ma-
terial breakdown. When these no longer determine politics or policies, the recovery 
phase is over. However, in areas of chronic political emergencies, this phase may 
simply not be reached through current relief-development approaches. 
3) Recovery is Extremely Complex 
Recovery is characterized by embedded political bias and psychological tension fol-
lowing violence, personal loss and humiliation, in addition to the many-faceted chal-
lenges of the institutional and material reconstruction. At least in degree, this is dif-
ferent from ‘regular development’. 
From this, the concept of recovery emerges similar to the term ‘re-development’.  
DEVELOPING A FILTER OF ANALYSIS 
Entering into the very recovery processes I am to investigate, it is crucial that I find a 
way of analyzing the dynamic of these processes, not only their components. For this 
I examine the Capacity-Vulnerability Approach developed by Anderson & Woodrow, 
the Sustainable Livelihood Approach currently applied by DIFID2, and what I call the 
Sustainable Neighborhood Approach, borrowed from research on housing in York-
shire, UK. I argue for the choice of the latter because it structures society in four in-
teracting capital modes, where the fifth mode, financial capital, is seen as an exoge-
                                          
2 Department for International Development 
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nous resource set to transform the others. The constituting capitals, the layers of my 
filter, are as follows: 
Human Capital represents the skills, knowledge, and health, i.e. the ability to work.  
Environmental (natural) Capital refers to the wide array of the natural assets, from 
environmental beauty and biodiversity to divisible assets used in production.  
Fixed (physical) Capital comprises the infrastructure, buildings, plants and machin-
ery, and other means of production required to support livelihoods.  
Social Capital is defined by the World Bank as, ‘the institutions, relationships, and the 
norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions’.  
 
This approach is chosen because it allows for an understanding of the societal dy-
namics through the notion of interacting capitals. Capital replenishment without in-
teraction cannot sustain itself. Depreciation in one invariably leads to depreciation of 
the others. It is back to the ’agency of housing’: what housing does, not what it is. If 
we rephrase this by referring to societal capitals: it is not what they are, it is how we 
make them interact that brings about lasting developmental change.  
 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND APPLIED METHODS 
Justifying Bosnia-Herzegovina 
There are two basic reasons for choosing Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter, ‘Bosnia’ or 
‘BiH’) as an arena for research. First and foremost, Bosnia’s war was ‘paradigmatic’ in 
that it held so many of the features found in the ‘new wars’. Secondly, Bosnia is geo-
graphically close, also in practical terms. 
Research Approach 
Investigating housing projects calls for different methods within a multidisciplinary 
approach. It is a matter of counting and measuring size, cost, numbers, etc. But in 
order to understand the motives and perceptions underpinning the actions on which 
these quantities rest, a qualitative approach had to be applied. Close examination of 
the perceptions, opinions, and experiences of the people directly and indirectly as-
sisted is necessary in order to grasp what long-term effects, or potential, these for-
eign housing interventions have had, or will have on a broader societal recovery. It is 
not a matter of what is ‘correct’ or ‘objectively true’, it is a matter of understanding 
what initiates action, and what gives action meaning.  
The Case Studies 
This research is designed as a case study research. It is part evaluative, trying to find 
out ‘how’ housing projects do or do not render support to the overall recovery proc-
esses, with a ‘why’ extension that seeks to explain the reasons for people acting in 
ways that support or impede these processes. 
The Choice of Cases  
The cases reflect the central constituents of context, i.e. time, place and agency. We 
act differently during war than we do after war, hence the time constituent. Place is 
similarly important in war, particularly in the new wars since they affect different ar-
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eas so differently, creating different platforms for recovery. Thirdly, whoever 
(agency) decides what and how things are to be done may make projects signifi-
cantly different in terms of their recovery contribution.  
I have chosen three cases, two in Tuzla and one in Grapska 12 km north of Doboj, in 
what is now Republika Srpska. 
Collecting Data 
It is well worth quoting Cato Wedel’s simple equation data = observation + concept. 
We record what we experience, but our senses are calibrated according to our own 
‘cultural categories’, or to our own ‘habitus’. Collecting qualitative data becomes con-
structing data. The reflexivity required in this process of construction, acts like road 
signs or a rear-view mirror which guide and control the collecting of data as the re-
searcher passes through the social landscape. 
 
There were two types of data collected: physical data (maps, photographs, reports, 
statistics, etc) and interactively gained data (direct observation and participatory ob-
servation). Observation is about using all the senses to make sense of what is ob-
served, because what is observed is interpreted from the observer’s own referential 
history or preconceived notions, which also implies a central validity challenge in re-
search. Observations remain hypotheses to be confirmed or falsified by other means 
or sources of information.  
 
To enter into a participatory dialogue depends on trust, which in turn depends on 
some sort of symmetry. Working with an interpreter makes the interpreter your al-
ter-ego in this dialogue. The role of my assistant and interpreter was therefore crucial 
in achieving the required symmetry. He was unemployed, and had served in the Bos-
nian army during the war. It was thus possible for the displaced interviewed to relate 
to his position. 
 
PART FOUR 
Three Cases in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
THE WAR 
The war was the ultimate backdrop to all my data. The profound shift in people’s per-
ceptions caused by the violence and ethnic cleansing is hard to underestimate. The 
nature of being Bosnian, as Bringa says, is living ‘with others’. These very ‘others’ 
became mortal enemies in the early 1990s, when the war ripped Yugoslavia apart. A 
combination of the rapidly collapsing economy and its uneven distribution, the lack of 
democratic outlets, and the shift in referential frames from that of cooperation to that 
of the WW II infested identity fear, destroyed the legitimacy of the central state insti-
tutions. Yugoslavia collapsed, accompanied by vicious ethno-religious violence.  
The war in Yugoslavia, and in Bosnia in particular, allows for two basic interpreta-
tions. It was either a war of Serbian aggression, which had to be countered – or it 
was a war driven by ‘ancient hatred’, which made the war contagious and could, in 
the worst of cases, spread to other parts of Europe. The international funding for the 
reconstruction of Bosnia was linked to these two sets of causal explanations. They 
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were to guide the policies, the priorities and the operational regulations employed by 
the foreign donor governments and the implementing agencies. My cases were con-
ceived within this twin, or rather double, frame of mind. 
 
Housing in Displacement, Tuzla 1993 – 1996 
Tuzla is (still) Bosnia’s third largest city, located in Central Eastern Bosnia and the 
country’s major industrial hub. Its industrial legacy created a non-nationalistic politi-
cal climate resulting in the SDP, a non-nationalistic party, rising to power in Tuzla’s 
first elections in 1991. In other respects, Tuzla is a typical Bosnian town with a town-
scape characterized by high-rise housing in the urban center.. The building of these 
large-scale projects fed a parallel process. Unregulated, often formally illegal, small-
scale private housing was constructed throughout fringe areas on plots of private 
land. Many of these private houses were often left incomplete. These were the very 
resources utilized by NRC3 when they initiated their housing scheme in 1993. 
The war – and the displaced – come to Tuzla 
The war came to Tuzla in the beginning of May 1992. By the summer, already more 
than 50,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) had already sought refuge in Tuzla 
proper. By the time the fighting stopped in 1995, the Mayor claimed that the Tuzla 
region held one-third of the total population of the country.  
The administrative and material challenges of managing the IDP influx during 1992 
and early 1993 were exclusively handled by local agencies. When the UNHCR4 estab-
lished offices in Tuzla in the spring of 1993, foreigners took charge. The displaced 
were by then either ‘self sheltered’ in some private accommodation (c.80%) or they 
were placed in ‘collective centers’, i.e. public buildings, schools, hotels, sport halls, 
etc. The undignified housing conditions available to the incoming IDPs were so ap-
palling that housing came to be the key sector of external intervention.  
 
CASE I 
A SHELTER SCHEME FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA  
Implemented by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 1993-1995 
In 1993 NRC proposed a program of completing the many half-finished private 
houses in the area so that they could be used for temporarily sheltering IDPs. This 
opportunity was not the result of any NRC-initiated capacity assessment, it was a 
combination of the professional capasity and a field-based perspective of their Head 
of Office in Tuzla. In no way could new housing be constructed in time for the 1993-
94 winter to shelter the steady flow of displaced people – unless what was there al-
ready could be used. This was to become NRC’s ‘Tuzla Model’ where the owner of a 
‘half-way’ house was given funds and technical advice to complete the building 
against allowing IDPs to move into the premises for 30 months. Each IDP was al-
lowed 5 m2 per person, which meant that the structure and the technical installations 
                                          
3 Norwegian Refugee Council 
4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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were strained way beyond capacity. This was to carry dire social effects, between 
tenants and between tenants and houseowner. 
The Tuzla Model was slightly changed over time, from a purely ‘contractor-built’ 
scheme, to an ‘assisted self-help’ one. They retained the 30-month contract period, 
irrespective of how it was affected by the seasonal conditions. Contracts signed in 
summer resulted in IDPs being evicted in mid–winter, causing strain and humiliation 
to the evictees, and bringing additional burdens to the local authorities. Although the 
war was over, very few former tenants were able to return. They were simply forced 
to move somewhere else. 
In total, 647 houses were completed and c.13,000 IDPs were temporarily sheltered. 
This projects holds a major contradiction. Housing being a long-term investment, it is 
the long-term owners who reap the benefit of the NRC projects, not the IDPs. In this 
respect, it is the house owner who is the primary beneficiary, not the displaced living 
within. Nevertheless, it was an extraordinarily efficient, albeit short–term, emergency 
housing scheme. 
Contribution Towards Local Capital Formation  
The Tuzla Model houses were in effect an extension of fixed and environmental capi-
tal already in place, i.e. houses, infrastructure, urban fabric etc.  
The implementation processes did not produce noteworthy spillovers onto the social 
capital base. There were however, some areas where the social and human capital 
was affected: 
 
a) The scheme reinforced the differences between those who received help and those 
who did not. This individualization of reconstruction assistance might in fact have 
contributed to the erosion of trust and thereby deflated the social capital on which 
recovery rests. This conclusion is all the more plausible considering Tuzla’s legacy of 
solidarity. 
b) The scheme caused social strain through overcrowding. There is an apparent link 
between the attitude of the house owners and the tangible effects on the physical 
environment caused by the sheer number of displaced people living in the houses. 
c) Contextual constraints did not allow the contractors to generate any human capital 
gains from their engagement, beyond being kept financially and organizationally 
afloat. Human capital gains were, however, the chief benefits drawn by the tenants, 
as was the case for the children who were able to return to their schools once the 
IDPs had moved out. 
d) The capital gains achieved by the house owners will in the long run be the pro-
ject’s most important recovery contribution. In the current situation, most owners 
are able to draw substantial earnings from the completed flats. Several others have 
arranged for family or relatives to move in instead. 
The long-term recovery contribution, as filtered through the Sustainable Neighbor-
hood approach, brings ambivalent results. In due course, it is to be expected that the 
highly efficient replenishment of the physical and environmental capitals will nurture 
the expansion of the other capital modes as well – over time. But it will take place in 
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an overall recovery context in which many of the targeted IDPs are still left without 
means, yet knowing fully well that it was their plight – their suffering – that initiated 
the program. 
 
CASE II  
MIHATOVICI, A SETTLEMENT FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA 
Implemented by the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 1994 – 1996 
When the NPA was called upon to enter the housing scene in Tuzla in mid-1993, the 
organization was probably the most experienced ‘housing NGO’ in Bosnia. They had 
provided Norwegian pre-fabricated housing, which by the time NPA moved to Tuzla 
had proved untenably expensive. They retained the ‘settlement model’, but did so by 
using local resources whenever possible. This ‘IDP village’ approach made the loca-
tion a hot political issue because the municipalities in the region envisioned these 
settlements as permanent settlements of ‘refugees’ who were not likely to return. So 
far, they have been proved right.,None of the settlement projects made any serious 
planning provisions for their post-war use. This is most evident in their highly inap-
propriate location, which has made most of them into misallocated social or financial 
investment. 
Mihatovici was the biggest of these settlements, placed 12 km west of Tuzla. The 
Mihatovici settlement, as a project, falls into a different category when compared to 
my other two cases. The other two were implemented as support to private house 
owners, whereas Mihatovici is a public housing project in the traditional ‘provision 
mode’. It is designed in the garden city mode and consists of 220 flats. In January 
2002, there were c.1250 living there. It is large and it is remote. People live close 
together but ‘far away’, its uncomfortable location remaining one of its most promi-
nent features.  
Constructing Mihatovici did not seem to contribute towards the enhancement of local 
capacities beyond that of being a channel for disseminating purchasing power and 
keeping contractors afloat. In this sense, the Mihatovici experience supports the find-
ings from the NRC case: the emergency context itself hampers any significant indus-
trial or institutional capacity building. 
A run-through of the physical properties of the settlement shows a material decay, 
with the weaknesses situated in its most permanent layers, first of all in its location, 
but also in the roof and floor slab construction, leakages and bad sound insulation. If 
the structural weaknesses are not tended to within a few years, Mihatovici will inevi-
tably descend into an arena for the truly marginalized The decay is in part due to 
‘unfortunate’ planning, however much ‘it was done in war’, and is further exacerbated 
by extreme wear and lack of maintenance. But the degrading physical assets merely 
reflect the general low level of all societal assets. 
Contribution Towards Local Capital Formation  
The contribution of the Mihatovici settlement towards recovery shows conflicting ten-
dencies, yet indicates clear tendencies of capital depletion. They affect all the capital 
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modes, and the registered outcomes reconfirm the interdependence of the capital 
modes.. The impact on the various capital assets comes as follows: 
1) Environmental capital has been both depleted (in total 12,000 fruit trees were cut 
down) and enhanced (large areas have been successfully cultivated and provide a 
means of livelihood for a large number of settlement families). The visual impact of 
the deteriorating built environment gives character to the place, and the spillover 
onto the other capital modes signifies poverty and marginalization. This is reinforced 
by the settlement’s unconnected location.  
2) The recovery potential stems from the capacity of the settlement as fixed capital 
to replenish the other capital modes. During construction, the employment of people 
from Mihatovici proper contributed to a certain level of trust between the new arrivals 
and the old inhabitants. This process seems to have been strengthened through the 
sharing of public facilities built in the settlement.  
However, the physical structures are deteriorating due to the technical solutions ap-
plied, and the lack of care and maintenance, which in turn is inextricably linked to the 
lack of social cohesion within the settlement. This, in part, is linked to physical over-
crowding combined with the lack of privacy: a potential hotbed for conflicts.  
3) Human capital gains are not easily detected. The residents’ health is generally 
bad, in part due to the high population density, and the highly inadequate water and 
sewerage systems. 
4) The social cohesion and mutual trust is not a notable feature in the settlement. 
Staying in Mihatovici makes no sense to a large part of its population; and staying in 
a place with no meaning, makes action meaningless. 
For Mihatovici to render any contributions towards the future, two issues have to be 
tended to in order to regenerate inter-capital cross-fertilization: different terms of 
tenure, and reinvestment into its physical fabric. Both are required in order to make  
Mihatovici a meaningful place in which to live. Otherwise, Mihatovici will hamper 
rather than enhance the recovery processes.  
 
CASE III  
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE VILLAGE OF GRAPSKA 
Implemented by the Swedish Rescue Services Agency 1999 – 2000 
The village of Grapska, located close to Doboi, is a village where there used to live 
2.800 Bosniak and Serbs. The Bosniak population was violently expelled in May, 
1992. The displaced Grapskanians were scattered throughout the world, although the 
majority ended up in nearby municipalities on the Federation side of the division line 
with Republika Srpska. Seven years after the expulsion, and four years after the for-
mal closing of the war, a large number of Grapska’s Bosniaks returned to start re-
building their village. They were given material support by SRSA (The Swedish Res-
cue and Services Agency), were guarded by SFOR, and financially bolstered by their 
own diaspora.  
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The support for housing reconstruction was validated by the fact that the village had 
agricultural fields that were large enough to sustain a major part of the returning 
population, although making a (meager) living from farming was new to most of 
them.  
During displacement Grapska’s Village Board came to play an important role as a 
social and administrative focal point, very much in line with its pre-war role. There-
fore SRSA decided to transfer most of the decision making authority regarding the 
reconstruction to the Village Board. The Board developed the selection criteria and 
made the final selection of beneficiaries as well as administered all formal approvals 
from the local (Serb) political.  
The housing reconstruction was done on a assisted self-help basis. The SRSA pro-
vided building materials for 188 houses, with all necessary fittings sufficient to 
(re)build a house with a floor area reflecting the size of the returning family. For 
most people this meant smaller houses than before, upon which they used whatever 
means thay had, primarily through remittances,  to extend the houses to reflect the 
pre-war situation. About 95% of all the SRSA model houses were altered and ex-
tended at the owners’ expense. It had to do with the symbolic content of the house. 
It was a sign (of warning) to their Serb neighbors saying ‘we’re back, just as strong 
as before’ It was an attempt to re-establish some of the objective structures of their 
‘habitus’.  
SRSA spent about 2.8 million KM in building materials in Grapska. In addition, it is 
estimated that 1.5 million KM has gone into extensions and alterations, funded by the 
owners. Initially, just about all of these funds originated from abroad. Adding the 
value of their own labor, the endogenous contribution almost matched the foreign 
investments into Grapska’s reconstruction, including the school and the infrastructure 
investments.  
Contribution Towards Local Capital Formation 
No other case shows such a consistent interactive capital reformation as that regis-
tered in Grapska. It was the result of common sense on the part of the SRSA’s head 
of office, underpinned by Sida’s5 principles of support.  
1) The housing contribution carried a transforming impact on the visual environment, 
by supporting the reconstruction of so many houses, almost one-third of the pre-war 
total. In addition, more than 50 private houses were under construction. All this 
shifted the character of Grapska from destruction to construction. However, the do-
nors’ focus on housing neglected two other nodes in the environmental network: 
a)the agricultural land could have been much more intensively exploited by providing 
more machinery (for instance, by two more tractors rather than the two last houses); 
b) the water system was merely replaced, not extended into the Serbian part that 
relied on individual pumps for water. Reconciliation comes only through mutual bene-
fits. 
                                          
5 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
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2) Housing as ‘shelter’ was not a highlighted issue. Housing as symbol was much 
more apparent. Hence much effort went into housing quality, particularly the interior 
finishing, into its appropriation as it were.  
The consistent capital interaction rests on two issues, the high number of houses 
reconstructed, and the principle of self-help. In turn, this led to a parallel private in-
vestment flow through which many of the returning Grapskanians gained employ-
ment, and purchasing power which funded further economic activity.  
3) Human capital was replenished from the housing program in three ways: a) confi-
dence was gained by organizing their own return, ,and administering their own build-
ing works; b) the returned tradesmen were again able to practice their skills; and c) 
the physical and psychological well-being of the population had improved compared 
to when they were living in displacement, according to the medical doctor.  
4) The Grapska community maintained a relatively high level of social capital, even 
during displacement. This was further enhanced by the responsibilities transferred to 
their elected Village Board by SRSA. By successfully undertaking the task of selecting 
those who get materials for a houses, and are thus able to return, their authority and 
legitimacy within the community was reconfirmed. The selection process enhanced 
social capital formation, as did the re/construction strategy of self-help. As the chair-
man of the Village Board said, ‘It would have weakened the village – or the spirit, if 
the houses were to have been built by contractors – while the villagers stood watch-
ing’. 
The social capital within Greater Grapska has been totally eroded because of the war. 
There were no signs that the housing investments in the Bosniak part, seen as re-
plenishment of fixed capital, had any rub-off effects on any of the other capital 
modes of Greater Grapska. Reconciliation is definitely beyond housing.  
 
PART FIVE 
Closing The Circles’ 
COMPARING CASES 
The cases were chosen on merit of when the project was executed, where it took 
place, and who managed and/or implemented it. These criteria respond to  charac-
teristics of new wars, that of simultaneously being enacted at different stages in dif-
ferent places. The international housing response follows suit. Linking these parame-
ters, time, place and agency, to my three attributes of housing, that of physical ob-
ject, symbol and vehicle of development, we have a 9-cell matrix which show how 
the three cases compare. These concluding comparisons do not come out as a net 
sum of ‘findings’. Qualitative research do not come out that way. Their conclusions 
are argumentative, not additive (although arguments add to each other), much like 
in legal practice. The arguments have to build on the evidence uncovered, be consis-
tent and intra-supportive, and yet able to convincingly explain possible inconsisten-
cies.  
 
The main contents of the 9-cells matrix 
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1)  Physical Object & Time: During the war years the emergency culture entailed a 
practice as if  construction was exempted from laws of building physics, the way wars 
exempt human behaviour from normal social contracts. Initially practically no provi-
sions were made for future alterations and alternative use.  
 
2) Physical Object & Place: Evident in all three cases is the impact of location. Case I 
enabled IDPs to integrate, in  CASE II its inhabitants are socially segregated, while in 
Case III the high number of houses rebuilt contributed successfully to recreate a de-
stroyed village.  
 
3) Physical Object and Agency: All cases show how the extraordinary power vested in 
the NGO’s local Head of Office brought about different physical solutions, partly 
based on how the agency of the main beneficiaries were engaged. 
 4) Symbol & Time: Meaning changes over time. Things come to mean different 
things (for different people) as time passes. The two Tuzla cases were seen (by NRC 
and NPA respectively) as a dignified alternatives to living in collective centers, yet 
now Case I represents a successful investments for the private house owners. Case II 
has now become a Collective Center which it was built to replace. Grapska now car-
ryies an unequivocal signal of collective and personal return to the place of expulsion.  
 
5) Symbol & Place: The meaning of the houses changes with the place. Place and 
house are interlocked. This is most easily shown when comparing the Grapska and 
The Mihatovici cases. For the Grapskanians it is about returning home, for the Miha-
tovicians it is about segregation and marginalization. 
 
6) Symbol & Agency: The different approaches of the NGOs brought different sym-
bolic powers into the projects. Whereas Case III enabled the Grapska returnees to 
saturate their rebuilt houses with symbols, the Mihatovici settlement had the sym-
bolic imprint of a peaceful Norwegian suburb as interpreted by the implementing 
agency, which once built took on a totally different meaning.  
 
7) Strategy & Time: The availability of building materials is time dependent, neces-
sarily much more difficult to obtain in the early Case I years than in the Case III. The 
early housing interventions were unable to play any significant role in developing a 
building industry in BiH because of the absence of financial and industrial infrastruc-
tures, - and the lack of international support for that sector.  
 
8) Strategy & Place: The (re)developmental processes initiated or strengthened by 
the projects were of different orders, much of which depended on place. The Tuzla 
cases were primarily urban development projects with seamless integration (NRC-
Case I) and spatial and social separation (NPA-Case II). The high number of houses 
funded by SRSA in Grapska was a strategic move so powerful that it set in motion 
the construction of more than 50 privately funded houses, confirming the power of 
place, the power of hope.  
 
9) Strategy & Agency: The power vested in gifts, channeled through international 
NGOs, normally ignores the agency of the people assisted, displaced, destitute and in 
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dire need of these very gifts. Acknowledging the engagement of local agency as pre-
requisite for sustainable (re)development, we see a stark difference between the 
three cases, with the SRSA’s Case III at one end of the scale, and NRC (Case II) at 
the other. NRC (Case I) sits with Case III when viewed as support to house owners, 
but lies beyond Case II when viewed as long-term support to the  true victims of war. 
 
For recovery to be sustained the primary actors must secure agency in the processes 
initiated by these international gifts. My three cases show different levels of such par-
ticipation – and different long-term effects because of it. 
 
 
Re-Approaching Theory and Practice of Housing Re/Construction 
 
REVISITING THEORY 
Based on the findings presented above and  filtered through the Sustainable Neigh-
borhood approach theoretical conclusions may be drawn. These are theories of post-
war housing, i.e. theories on the role of housing in current post-war contexts, and 
theories in post-war housing, i.e. theories on how to go about implementing post-war 
housing in today’s settings. My research deal with both both. I present my small con-
tribution structured as in my theoretical introduction, according to housing’s chief 
attributes, wars, and international response to conflicts . Theories in housing will pri-
marily follow as implications for policy and practice.  
 
Housing as Physical Object 
What I found in all of my cases, but primarily in my wartime cases, was a tendency 
to neglect common peacetime practices of good workmanship – even basic laws of 
physics. Physical construction is contextualized beyond anticipation. It is exposed in 
three ways: 
• The “But-it-was-war” syndrome focuses solely on timely requirements and neglect 
the – inevitable – physical deterioration, and the importance of location. 
• Very high density of people – inevitably – leads to physical, social and psychologi-
cal deterioration of and in the physical environment.  
• Because implementing bodies (contractors or managing NGOs) do not stand ac-
countable towards the beneficiaries, the quality of workmanship tend to suffer.  
 
Housing as Symbol 
My research confirms that home is a matter of choice, or discovery. This means that 
‘return’ may in fact not be the most ‘durable solution’ – for those who chose other-
wise. The choice seems to rest on the perceived ‘geographical capital’ of the place, 
not on housing condition alone.  
 
The dwelling or the house is a symbol in the conflict; houses are not destroyed, they 
are killed. Therefore housing when rebuilt stands as a symbol of ‘fighting back’, not 
symbols of reconciliation. 
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Housing as Strategy 
Housing re/constructions chief effect is to distribute purchasing power. The efficiency 
of this distribution is embedded in the chosen housing approach. There seems to be a 
general negligence on the recovery powers embedded in the high multiplier effects 
carried by housing construction, although their effects were clearly observed. Much is 
lost because of (tax-free) imports.  
 
The recovery powers vested in the self-help approach has been confirmed, whereas 
housing as ‘objects of reconciliation’ were not. The Commons were the arena for 
ethno-religious communal co-operation. 
 
Housing and New Wars 
Recognizing the power of place and the personal and intimate character of the dwell-
ing, looting and eventually destroying it, is to administer the ultimate humiliation and 
punishment to the residents and owners. In present-day identity wars, the killing and 
destruction is individualized, partly to punish, and partly to cleanse and secure terri-
torial supremacy.  This continues long after the war has formally ended. Using hous-
ing re/construction to strengthen the process of recovery cannot be done without 
political will and hence military support. Peace cannot be built by houses. 
 
The International Housing Response 
My work confirms that housing is conceived as ‘shelter’ or ‘protection’, causing a con-
ceptual, but also practical discrepancy between ends (temporary and urgent) and 
means (permanent and long time in implementing). ‘Tents in concrete’ as it were. 
 
My research has come to highlight the pivotal role of the implementing agent, the 
head of office of the NGO’s local office. Their capacity to grasp opportunities in an 
extremely volatile and insecure context is crucial in projects being efficient or not. It 
will all depend on his ‘professional intuition’. The headquarters staffed by administra-
tive personnel are very much sidelined. The independent role of the field questions 
the very nature of the “NGO-thing”.  
 
REVISITING THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND APPLIED METHODS 
The Sustainable Neighborhood Approach has been extraordinarily important in un-
derstanding the dynamics played out in the communities I investigated. My observa-
tions have reconfirmed the importance of the linkages between its four societal capi-
tals (fixed, environmental, human and social capitals).  However, in filtering my find-
ings I have found that housing projects which directly enhanced or extended the en-
vironmental capital were those in which human and social capital was replenished the 
most.  This would entail that where the housing project makes up part of a ‘place’ as 
perceived by the primary actors, the immediate impact of the housing project on 
people’s physical and social well-being seems all the stronger. It is the meaning at-
tributed to the houses and the location that determines how well they replenish or 
sustain the other capital modes. Since housing may be defined as both fixed and en-
vironmental capital, and since meaning is invariably infused in a similar way into both 
of them, (which is not the case with the other two capital modes, in fact they are 
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source of these projections), the recovery interaction would better understood if en-
acted within a three-node field: fixed (physical and environ-mental), human and so-
cial capitals. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
In forging a practical approach to housing re/construction in war affected areas there 
are three basic premises: 1) housing with its symbolic and strategic capacities is 
about permanent physical structure that will outlast the contingent needs that called 
for its urgent re/construction; 2) recovery is an indigenous endeavor; an act of re-
flexive development on the part of the affected society; and 3) internationally funded 
housing will always be exogenous assistance, which at best will support local agency. 
In combining the premises, the first one touches upon issues pertaining to profes-
sional planning and construction, the second on tactical issues handled by the imple-
menting agency primarily in the field, and the third on policies and strategies set by 
donors and NGO headquarters.    
 
The Object  
Because housing construction is such a prevalent activity there is always bound to be 
building resources available beyond what the formal structures can provide.  
• Use these, and use the field based opportunities to improvise! 
 
There is an astonishing lack of building management routines within the NGOs. 
• Develop organization wide quality assurance regimes, and through inter-agency 
institutions bring forth a uniform cost reporting regime so that costs may be com-
pared!  
 
My cases all reveal the pivotal role of the field office and the manager-in-charge. 
• Managing the tactical level requires capacities to seize opportunities and avoid 
risks not detectable by HQ or donor. This requires people with ‘professional intui-
tion’! 
 
In the light of the endless settings where home environments and housing are to be 
(re)created or new ones established there are principles and approaches needed 
rather than case-bound empirical references. They come out like this: 
• If there is no local and institutionalized policy on housing , housing re/construction 
should follow in the footsteps of what was there before, bar the issue of location.  
• Under emergency conditions or under conditions perceived as urgent, construction 
should strive for simple, basic solutions in line with what local artisans do well.  
• There is no such thing as an ‘emergency house’ (or tent of concrete): ‘emergency 
shelter’, yes, but not ‘house’. Houses are permanent structures capable of re-
sponding to changing needs over time, and are in need of upkeep.  
• Houses normally last lifetimes. The single most important issue on post-war hous-
ing is location, i.e. where new housing is being built, or destroyed ones recon-
structed. This issue is fundamental to recovery. 
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The Tactical Approach 
Housing is about agency. My cases tell me that for displaced people, housing, per-
haps more than any other issue, is saturated with symbolic powers. Meaning is the 
fundamental basis for action. That is why instilled meaning will determine the poten-
tial recovery powers embedded in housing. 
• There seems to be no better way of achieving this than through aided self-help. 
• Concentrate investments to areas of potentially high geographical capital, to 
places that can sustain themselves through a sufficiently strong material and so-
cial momentum that may also be recognized by others. 
• Housing is too personal a symbol to enhance reconciliation between former an-
tagonists. To aim for that, provide investment funds for communal utility func-
tions! 
 
THE STRATEGY 
In identity wars dwellings are looted and destroyed in recognition of their symbolic 
character – their identity. Houses are being desecrated and killed. These realities 
make up the ‘field’ for any war – and for any ‘post-war’ housing intervention. 
 
Recovery comprises processes of reflexive development. Any housing intervention 
must therefore be organized in ways that engage the agency of the people for whom 
housing is being funded to ascertain the necessary spillover from housing invest-
ments onto other societal capitals, a necessary prerequisite for sustained 
(re)development.  This implies:  
• The practice of housing as free gifts (to the lucky few) must be altered.   
• Some sort of housing policy guidelines will have to be developed in order to frame 
the housing reconstruction, and allow for long-term strategic choices to be made. 
International assistance must be rendered for these purposes.  
 
In practice the NGO ‘channel’ works more like a ‘string’ with two semi-independent 
units at either end. The field taking on tactical and operational, and at times strategic 
challenges, and HQ active in lobbying for funding. The following could be done to 
widen the string into a channel to enhance the outcomes: 
• The NGO HQ forges a strategic partnership with an established housing co-op.   
• Provide incentives for expatriate staff to stay on in the field.   
• Cleanse the channel for empty words, NGO speak and selected truths.  
• State donors should delegate their strategic decisions to diplomatic stations in the 
field.  
 
THE DONOR 
Within the ‘Wilsonian’ tradition, and in particular in Scandinavia where governments 
fund most of the emergency activities of the NGOs in full, governments have a strong 
impact on strategies of assistance. 
• Housing support should be provided in a principled way, not by chance as is the 
case today. Societal recovery is a collective effort and support should enhance a 
sense of fairness among the people who have lost their property 
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• Support programs should be established to assist physical planning institutions in 
furnishing planning guidance on long-term housing investments.  
• Housing re/construction should be carried out in ways that maximize its high mul-
tiplier potential. This means: Instigate programs for the production of building 
materials.  
• Housing re/construction should be conceived as a community affair rather than a 
series of individual housing projects. This would entail the funding of community-
wide livelihood projects. 
 
The last two issues are for governments only 
• Government should refrain from immediately returning refugees from countries 
ravaged by war because of their important role in providing support, through re-
mittances, to their relatives and to the needy in their home country. 
• In post-war reconstruction settings the presence of international military forces 
may be necessary in creating the level of security required for housing re/-
construction to be carried through. 
 
• When in doubt, stick to tents, or at least stick to genuinely temporary arrange-
ments until housing can be provided within a local setting, reflecting its potential 
powers.  
 
 
This thesis ends with a series of proposals for possible further research. 
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THE RESEACH CHALLENGE 
 PART ONE 
 THE RESEARCH CHALLENGE 
 
1
 
 
 
THE RESEACH CHALLENGE 
 
1 THE PREAMBLE 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This work is about the construction and reconstruction of housing in and after vio-
lent conflict. It is about housing’s possible contribution in the recovery processes. 
To that end, I will investigate how the international assistance to housing recon-
struction may have affected the recovery processes after the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
 
Post-war reconstruction is a mess. In material terms this is obvious. But it is the 
fall-out from war’s annihilation of the social contracts, the contracts that constitute 
the very nature of society, that makes reconstruction such a complex challenge. 
Reconstructing houses is a simple task in comparison. And yet houses, more than 
any other physical construction, are manifest parts of the societal web. As homes 
they are what some writers denote “an extension of the body”1 or “symbol of the 
self” (Cooper 1974), and thus the embodiment of the society we are part of. Our 
dwellings constitute part of life’s ‘objective structures’ in the Bourdieuian sense 
(Bourdieu 1977), or part of our identity (Korosec-Serfati 1985, Porteous & Smith 
2001) – which becomes so horribly manifest in war. This makes rebuilding houses 
into a process much wider than the mere physical. When the destruction of houses 
has such a devastating impact, does housing re/construction hold the opposite po-
tential? Does it help reestablish the societal web torn by war and thus contribute 
towards the social and psychological recovery of society? Or is that beyond the ca-
pacity of housing? Since housing is also the largest private investment sector of 
most societies (Habitat-ILO 1997), its destruction represents a national economic 
disaster, and housing reconstruction, on the face of it, a significant contributor to-
wards economic recovery. 
 
This investigation into the power of housing sets out on the shoulders of other re-
searchers who have dealt with similar issues (Haas et. al. 1977, Davis 1978, 1981, 
1995, Barakat 1994, Zetter 1995, 1999, Ellis 1996, CPCC 1998, Elkahlout 2001). 
Compared to housing’s large share in international post-war assistance, there are 
surprisingly few scholarly investigations into this field. Even the claim that housing’s 
capacity to impact social, psychological and economic recovery – even soothing 
conflict itself - seem to rest in part on inferences rather than on confirmed research 
findings. The most recent research shows failures to confirm this assumption – and 
validates reasons why it did not. Housing’s central role is thus derived at, rather 
than confirmed through research. Others confirm this linkage either from recon-
struction after natural disasters or from reconstruction after national or intra-
national wars in political and economic contexts very different from the present day 
era of ‘post national wars’, as Ulrich Beck calls them (2003). 
 
                                          
1 From HFH’s Web Site (http://www.habitat.org./hw/dec-jan02/feature_4.html). HFH (Habitat for Hu-
manity) is one of the very few NGOs that specialize in housing construction and that have built more 
than 100,000 housing units throughout the world (Fuller 2000). 
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This change in political and economic context has changed the nature of war, how it 
is fought, how it is institutionalized and financed, and why current wars are fought. 
These post-national wars have made external actors, be they state or private, into 
players in these new theatres of war. Regarding housing reconstruction, this is to a 
significant degree taken on by the growing number of international non-
governmental organizations, the international NGOs. 
 
Current wars are complex conflicts in an even more complex political context that 
emerge from a globalized world. They come out as bandit- and identity driven in-
ternal wars aimed at and sustained by the control of resources and trans-border 
trade. There is not much left of the inter-nation Clausewitzian wars waged as a 
“continuation of politics2 by other means”. They are ethnic, not necessarily by ori-
gin, but definitely by operation. They are not the “9th of April 1940 – 8th of May 
1945” type of wars. They develop gradually, are activated intermittently, and taper 
off often without any one party being decisively victorious. This may be the result 
of external political and sometimes military intervention; at least that is what some 
researchers claim (Gurr & Marshall 2003). These are the “new wars”, the “spectacle 
wars”, in the lingo of Mary Kaldor (1999, 2002). They are what the practitioners 
label “complex political emergencies”, and Mark Duffield has relabeled ‘emerging 
political complexes’ (Duffield 2000;74). 
 
These fields of emergency warrant international assistance. This rising international 
engagement, itself a constituent of the new wars, is partly due to the demise of the 
bi-polar world, and partly due to the weakening of the nation state. This has 
opened up the field to a growing number of private organizations, the so-called 
‘NGOs’,3 and their conscientious interaction with the media, to call attention to the 
plight of the true victims of war: the civilian non-combatants4 (Rieff 2002). The 
latter are terrorized, maimed, and if not killed, forced to flee – or participate. Their 
homes are destroyed, or taken over by others. They become internally displaced 
within their own countries (IDPs), or, when crossing an international border, ‘refu-
gees’. There are an estimated 40 million uprooted people in the world, the vast ma-
jority of them displaced by acts of war5. 
 
                                          
2 A.J.P. Taylor’s translation is ‘continuation of policy – by other means’ (Taylor 1971). Noel Malcolm 
refers to Howard and Paret’s translation where the famous dictum is presented thus: ”war is a true po-
litical instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means” (cf. Magas & Zanic 
2001; xxiii). 
3 Non-Governmental Organization. INGO would be the proper acronym, as they in effect are Interna-
tional Non-Governmental Organization, i.e. Northern-based NGOs acting internationally. However, since 
other writers reserve the ‘I’ for Transnational Northern NGOs, I will retain the traditional NGO term. I do 
so also because of the term’s general usage (most writers use the NGO term directly), and because 
many of the INGOs are also NGOs in the sense that they also act domestically. In this thesis, however, 
the term NGO does not apply to local NGOs, only to those engaged in international activities. 
4 According to Dan Smith (2003), 75% of new war casualties are civilians. For years now there has been 
what amounts to an ‘urban tale’ pertaining to civilian casualties in war: “During WW I 10% of the casual-
ties were civilians, now 90% are civilians”. Whereas the WW I figures are correct, there is no evidence to 
back the latter. 
5 US Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 2003 
<http://www.refugees.org/WRS2003.cfm#statistics> 
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The plight of the civilians in these violent emergencies, and in particular the dis-
placed, has triggered a shift in international aid. Short-term, immediate impact re-
lief has taken a growing share of ODA (Official Development Assistance) at the ex-
pense of the long-term development aid. 
 
 
Figure 1.1.1 Humanitarian aid as a share of total ODA constant (2000) prices ($US millions)  
 
 
Figure 1.1.2 Total humanitarian aid from DAC donors, constant (2000) prices $US millions. 
The abrupt increase in 1991 was due to the crisis in Iraq and the Balkans – but also the fact 
the DAC countries started to include the domestic cost incurred by refugee influx (caused by 
the Yugoslavian crisis). In 2001 32.5% of DAC’s humanitarian aid was spent domestically. 
 Source: Development Initiatives (2003) Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003.  
 
The often desperate lack of housing due to forced displacement and destruction 
directs much of the growing emergency aid and international media born attention 
onto housing re/construction . This makes housing part of the immediate, short-
term relief aid regime, in spite of its physical longevity, its investment nature and 
its permanent qualities as ‘nests for human life’. By neglecting these constituting 
properties, housing becomes victim of perceived short-term benefits. 
 
Here lies an apparent contradiction that merits clarification: long-term means are 
used to solve short-term needs. Are the short-term needs governing the way we 
conceive and implement permanent housing? Are we building tents in concrete? 
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This is where this research sets out. It challenges the blanket assumption that there 
is an imminent causation between housing reconstruction and development. Given 
the theoretically based proposition that there is a significant link, what is needed is 
to uncover the conditions required for it to materialize. I will therefore investigate 
the field, the tactics applied and the implementation. Not only what is done so 
much as how and why it is done. This work rests on John Turner’s claim that what 
matters is not so much what housing “is”, but what housing “does”. From this fol-
lows that a social science approach is required along with examining and explaining 
the physical and architectural qualities and consequences of international housing 
interventions. 
 
Ideally, this should not be such a great leap for an architect, placed as s/he is be-
tween the technical and the social sciences. Architecture has not developed a theo-
retical platform of its own. Most of it is borrowed and translated from other disci-
plines into normative theories - often to the level of ideology, according to Støa 
(1996), “fashion”, claims Steward Brand (1994). Their research approach is there-
fore inherently vague (Lund 2001, Mo 2003) when compared to the natural sci-
ences or the traditional social sciences. 
 
1.1.1 The Duality of housing 
Housing as a pure physical entity is an abstraction. It only exists because someone 
intended it to be built. Building it takes place under conditions defined by place and 
time. Acting within a certain context is what gives that action importance, gives it 
meaning. This is all the more so since the physical nature of housing, being built or 
being lived in, extends into the future, beyond our own life time. This very process 
establishes a certain relationship between man and house (Støa 1996, Sartre 2001; 
457-532). As agency we have to deal with housing in an ‘irreversible time’ perspec-
tive, i.e. strategically, according to Giddens (1984). This alone will shape the rela-
tionship between man and dwelling. Housing exists as a physical object because it 
is a meaningful object – and visa versa. Even for those only professionally involved, 
a completed building is a manifestation of work done, and will forever be part of the 
participants, and thus shape future action. My own experience tells me so. 
 
This leaves the house, or any building, in a duality between the physical and the 
symbolic. The physical adheres to the laws of nature, while the symbolic links up to 
what is meaningful, emotionally or rationally, for the people involved. The ultimate 
benefit will be achieved when these two aspects support each other. Not only does 
this represent the ultimate challenge to any planner-architect, it also represents the 
criterion of excellence for any building. 
 
1.1.2 Housing as vehicles of recovery 
Houses are to be lived in, that is their ’function’. In fact, houses are for homes: for 
generations, for life – or in cases where houses are provided for displaced people, 
for an interim period, “until they go back home”. But a house is still, however tem-
porary, a “still point” of life. There is this very special relationship between housing 
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and its people, born from meaning projected into matter. This is what makes hous-
ing reconstruction seem such a potent vehicle for recovery. 
 
The other reason why housing interventions are presumed important for recovery is 
the financial weight and labor intensity of housing construction. It contributes sig-
nificantly to any country’s GDP, by 2–8%, according to Habitat-ILO (1997). And it is 
generally low-tech. Both of these characteristics support the assumption that hous-
ing could be a key start-up sector in war-ravaged economies. 
 
This is further supported by the fact that a significant portion of the emergency 
assistance rendered by donor nations to countries ravaged by war is in support of 
permanent housing re/construction. In the late 1990s about 20% of all aid to Bos-
nia was for housing re/construction. Even in Rwanda, where housing destruction 
was hardly noted in the press, the UN administered 100,000 housing repair and 
construction cases in the latter half of the 1990s (UNHCR 2000). 
 
For these assumptions to materialize depends on the implementation process. 
When things turn out as they do, they are not merely the result of prior planning 
decisions and a straight follow-through on the part of the implementer (Vedung 
2000). The forces acting upon the situation will determine tactical and operational 
choices. From these will come outputs that are the results of the way the context is 
perceived by the people making these decisions. There are risks and opportunities 
available in all situations of uncertainty. Project failure is most often the result of 
not contextualizing the tactics in project planning and implementation (Samset 
1998). Contextualization is therefore the very essence of working in the field under 
extreme uncertainty – as in a war-affected society. 
 
Most of the direct funding for emergency aid including housing reconstruction to 
war affected regions comes from the North, from the 30 member states of the 
OECD.6 Not only do mostly Western donor countries provide the funding for these 
activities, they are also the ones to manage its implementation. Since the Biafra 
conflict in the 1960s, there has been a steady growth in numbers of international 
relief and development organizations (NGOs) that have been entrusted with the 
responsibilities of executing the work in the field. By being field-oriented and thus 
able to report from crisis areas, their appraisals have become influential in donor 
policies and strategies of assistance. Anyone reporting back after having experi-
enced the plight of the displaced, calls for the provision of shelter. The plastic 
sheeting, various ‘housing kits’ and other short-term rickety constructions that 
emerge as relief provisions are not what my research is about. My work is about 
permanent housing, housing meant to last beyond the emergency phase. 
 
Beyond the financial inputs, the outcome of an international housing intervention 
depends on three contributing elements. Firstly, the validity of the intervention the-
ory, or the assumed causation between a specific intervention and the resultant 
change; re. the popular assumption that rebuilding houses directly or indirectly in-
                                          
6 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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duces peaceful behavior between former adversaries. The second element is the 
nature of the setting, in our case the theatre of war; the way it is conducted, the 
structure of the actions, the nature of the violence, the part played by external ac-
tors, etc. Framing the project within such a context will guide its implementation. 
The third element is the ability, knowledge and commitment of the intervention 
instigators and implementers – international donors and NGOs in carrying out the 
intervention.   
 
This means, in theory, that in any international intervention it is the donor’s inter-
vention theories, their assumptions, that forge the strategies, make the choice of 
weapons, as it were. When, say, a housing program has been decided upon, it is 
normally left to some NGO as the implementing agent to develop suitable tactics and 
undertake the practical realization. For this the NGO will have to rely on its field 
staff’s professional competence and perception of the situation to ensure that pro-
jects are carried through according to the donor’s set goals. In contexts as uncertain 
and as complex as those of present-day wars, it would seem improbable that such a 
straight structure would prevail. This is also part of the challenge of this work: to 
examine how projects on housing - within a war-torn context - are born, set up, and 
carried through, and how decisions in this multi-staged process affect the long-term 
outcomes.  
 
1.2 FRAMING THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The arguments for entering this field of research was submitted in the previous sec-
tion. It is worth adding that as I was completing this work, I was given some new 
‘facts from the field’ to further support the relevance. I was informed from Bosnia 
that out of the 116,000 internationally funded houses physically identified by Feb-
ruary 2003, 8,000 were completely abandoned.7 One would imagine that the do-
nors providing millions of their own public funds, as well as the country in question, 
plunged into poverty by a devastating war, would have made sure that the funds 
available were spent to enhance recovery. But, in the case of housing, something 
like $US 75 million have been made into symbols of waste8. Now why is that? 
 
The preceding chapter ended by focusing on the overall implementation, what 
guides the international actors working with housing in areas of conflict. It is their 
theories or perceived ‘truths’, professional competence and mode of interaction 
with the people they are to serve that guide the action. Executing internationally 
funded housing re/construction in areas affected by war depends, in other words, 
on understanding 1) the nature of housing, 2) the context with its embedded risks 
and opportunities, and 3) the management of the building operations.  
 
This leads on to a set of propositions:  
                                          
7 Confirmed by the Housing Verification Mission of the Office of the High Commissioner in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH), February 2003. The number of empty houses is expected to rise as the counting 
continues. Perhaps as many as 160,000 houses have been built as part of the international housing 
reconstruction efforts in BiH. There are other claims for higher numbers, but no one knows for sure. 
8 Based on IMG’s figure of KM 18,000 per housing unit (IMG 1999). 
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• WHAT 
Housing encompassing a range of reciprocal psychological, social, economic 
and technology bounded attributes. Together, they hold the potential of cre-
ating social and economic dynamics conducive of recovery. 
• THE CONTEXT 
War in a ‘post-nation’ world where wars are waged just as much out of pri-
vate gain as for building nations; where peace is just as much the outcome 
of international intervention as from conflicts being resolved by its antago-
nists, all of it taking place under the duress of economic hardships and di-
luted social cohesion. 
• THE IMPLEMENTER 
International implementing agencies acting within the professional field of 
housing and housing construction, a field where there seemingly exists little 
institutional capacity beyond what, at best, is brought in by short-term field 
staff. 
 
From this I am now able to state the main research question: 
How do internationally funded housing projects implemented in war-
ravaged areas affect the recovery processes of the societies assisted? I 
will use Bosnia-Herzegovina as my arena of investigation.  
 
The answer is sought through posing three sub-questions: 
The physical 
a) - How does housing perform as physical objects? How are houses located, de-
signed and constructed to accommodate immediate objectives and inevitable 
change, be it caused by expanding internal needs and or new external require-
ments? Who made what decisions and why? 
The social - internal 
b) - How has the housing project extended the human and social capacities of the 
people directly involved? How have they participated in and how have they commit-
ted themselves to the planning and execution and the subsequent management of 
the project? To what effect and why? 
The social & socio-economic - external 
c) - How has the housing project interacted with the context? How has the project, 
its planning, implementation and its prime beneficiaries interacted with the host 
community, local markets and political institutions? To what effect and why? 
 
The recovery processes are the key parameters of my investigation. Within the 
realm of housing these are conceived to depend on the physical setting, present 
performance and future adaptability of the buildings themselves (sub-question a), 
the strength of local agency, i.e. the social and human capacity of the people af-
fected (sub-question b), and on how the project as a long-term social and economic 
investment has impacted the local economy and local institutions (sub-question c). 
 
Whatever else is required to ensure a successful recovery is beyond the capacity of 
externally funded housing. But then, how is recovery to be defined, particularly in 
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reference to ‘development’ and other terms used in the post-war reconstruction 
context? 
 
Recovery is a process or a series of interacting processes where people, or socie-
ties, having had their normal societal development processes broken or perverted, 
regain their capacities to function on their own. It is a healing process that might be 
self-ordained or made dependent on support from others, to borrow from the field 
of medicine which also uses the term in a similar manner. It is limited in time and 
affects all of society’s’ constituent capitals, although the cause of the breakdown 
may be related to specific ones. The recovery process is therefore not limited to 
merely social or material, economic or political, it encompasses the whole body of 
society, and depends, as will be shown below, on how the various elements, or 
capitals, interact in these processes. 
 
In the literature, ‘reconstruction’ is often used for these processes, but I see the 
recovery processes as wider and overarching societal and material processes fol-
lowing war or disaster, i.e. both the material and institutional reconstruction – and 
the subsequent spill-over processes following these initial activities. This brings the 
term “recovery” to the level of its sibling, “development”. 
 
Recovery is related to, but not the same as, ‘development’, “this shapeless 
amoeba-like word [which] cannot express anything because the outlines are 
blurred”, as Sachs describes it (Sachs 1992; 6).9 In her recent book, Joanna Macrae 
argues that, as has Terje Tvedt done before, applying a long-term developmental 
approach to war ravaged societies is impossible where no state or other legitimate 
institutions are functioning. And these are in among the current wars’ very targets 
according to Tvedt (1996), Macrae (2001), Duffield (2002) and others. This comes 
as a response to what was the reigning conceptual model during the 1990s: ‘devel-
opmental relief’ (IDS bulletin 1994), a concept framed within the continuum model, 
indicating a temporal string of stages from the first emergency stage through in-
termittent reconstruction stages on to the final development stage. This linear time 
model draws on experiences from natural disasters10 or traditional inter-state war 
where reconstruction could be organized without the vulnerable political complexity 
of present-day intra-state wars. 
 
By definition, recovery comprises ‘development-like’ activities and processes that 
take place after war, or in cases during war, when action is aimed at enhancing the 
post-conflict state. This is irrespective of whether institutions are functioning or not. 
Recovery  is distinguished from ‘development’ in basically three different ways: 
 
                                          
9 Cowen & Shenton (cf. Nustad 2003) have tried to reshape the amoeba by defining development as 
either ‘imminent’ or ‘intentional’. Imminent development is what takes place as a matter of course over 
time, whereas intentional development is an intervention into a certain situation made in pursuit of in-
tended results. 
10 Kates & Pijawka define four stages of recovery: 1. emergency response; 2. restoration of the restor-
able; 3) reconstruction of the destroyed for functional replacement; 4. reconstruction for commemora-
tion, betterment and development, each phase lasting 100 times longer than the preceding one (Kates & 
Pijawka 1977). 
9
 
 
 
THE RESEACH CHALLENGE 
• Recovery is time limited. It is a phase of development where the activities are 
borne out of the consequences of war’s societal and material breakdown. When 
these no longer determine politics or policies, the recovery phase is over. This 
may be long after the material or purely economic setbacks have been sur-
mounted.11 The constituting activities will hence change with time. So too will 
appropriate interventions, but not necessarily in a linear fashion as the conse-
quences of conflict are spatially and temporally dependent. Timeliness will be 
crucial. Yet the interventions in themselves will change the context and thus af-
fect what is appropriate and timely. 
• Recovery is reflexive, guided by the past. Whereas ordinary development fo-
cuses on an unknown future, recovery takes place among people who have 
‘been there - done that’. Recovery will be directed, guided or influenced by pre-
war/pre-disaster perceptions – either to recreate, or make new. International 
assistance normally holds no formal political mandate to make choices for future 
change, therefore assistance tends to be biased in favor of restoring the past – 
as perceived (or intentionally interpreted). The informed references held by the 
people directly affected by the conflict represent a strategic platform for partici-
pation not present in ordinary development assistance. 
• Recovery is extremely complex. It is characterized by embedded political bias 
and psychological tension following violence, personal loss and humiliation, in 
addition to the many-faceted challenges of the institutional and material recon-
struction (Barakat 1994, Zetter 2001). The complexities are all the more appar-
ent in a society at war with itself. Interventions must in some way reflect and 
address these complexities. Borrowing tactics from non-violent conflict, planning 
in these circumstances would subscribe to small projects addressing practical 
improvements where few value-based decisions are required (Sager 1994). 
 
To reiterate: these processes interact. Any reconstruction project is either shaped 
by, or has its outcomes shaped by them. The complexity of the situation is time 
dependent but also dependent on how the post-war intervention is perceived in 
respect to the pre-war conditions or vice versa. 
 
Building permanent housing is a physical intervention contributing to the commu-
nity’s fixed capital base. But it is much more than that. Its very existence and 
physical constitution is inextricably linked to human choices in pursuit of some de-
fined or ideal goal (Støa 1996, Rapoport 1969). What houses is capable of doing 
beyond providing physical shelter, may be exemplified by the following: if houses 
are planned and built by local people, the fixed capital provision also enhances hu-
man capital by way of enabling people to work, to maintain and perhaps improve 
their skills. If the project in question is located in response to environmental re-
quirements or efficient resource husbandry and without depleting visual or biologi-
cal properties, the project positively links up to and in effect replenishes the envi-
ronmental assets of the area. If the permanent housing projects are planned and 
                                          
11 In Norway, the recovery phase following WW II was officially over by 1960 (Danche 1986). By then, 
Norway’s economy was way beyond the pre-war level. The 1939 figures were already surpassed by 
1948, according to Maddison (1982). 
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implemented in response to needs and priorities set by people or legitimate au-
thorities, and the projects are perceived by most of the local population as trans-
parent without kick-backs or hidden agendas, then the physical projects have sup-
ported social capital (re)formation of the affected society. This is but a simple ex-
ample of how the concept of recovery is operationalized through a societal capital 
approach. I will use this approach, what I call a ‘capital filter’, in assessing the re-
covery gains and recovery potential in the housing projects I examine.  
 
The research challenge is hence focusing on how international housing projects af-
fect the (re)formation of societal capital, and in determining the flow from their 
interaction. If the intervention has contributed towards capital formation in all 
modes of capital in a manner that provides what the affected people consider to be 
long-term benefits, then the intervention has contributed positively to the recovery 
of the communities in question. 
 
This is an analytical approach that seriously simplifies the complexities of society, 
but which is required in order to make investigations into isolated interventions – 
and in trying to understand their output and outcomes. Its almost mechanistic na-
ture requires an alert observation as to what segment of society is empowered by 
the interventions. During my investigations the people concerned were never ad-
dressed about this capital model, only on what seemed relevant and important in 
order to understand the ever-changing context and the reasons behind decisions 
made and actions taken: first the ‘what’, then the ‘how’ – and so the ‘why’ (Kvale 
1996). 
 
This ‘capital approach’ rests on the writings of Anderson and Woodrow (1989), In-
stitute of Development Studies’ work for DIFID (2001-ongoing), and housing stud-
ies done by the Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam 
University & York Research Partnership (Stafford et al. 2001). Their writing gives 
rise to a ‘filter’ through which the response to the research questions will be ana-
lyzed. This will be further clarified in a later chapter. 
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Figure 1.2.1 A conceptual sketch showing how housing as material (object) is shaped 
through meaning (symbol) by way of strategy within a contextual flow. The outcome is being 
analyzed by means of a four-split target, or filter, comprising four societal capitals. 
 
 Cf. Figure 8.2.3, page 302 
 
12
 
 
 
 
 
 PART TWO 
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND  
 CURRENT PRACTICE 
 
13
 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
 
2 HOUSING 
 
2.1 HOUSING AS A SOCIO-MATERIAL CONCEPT 
 
2.1.1. APPROACHING HOUSING RE/CONSTRUCTION THROUGH THEORY  
 AND PRACTICE  
During the first year of WW II, while the Nazis were victoriously advancing on all 
fronts, journals and pamphlets started to appear in the UK on the ‘Post War Ques-
tions’.1 In “Reconstruction of Bombed Buildings” from 1941, the author looked for 
lessons learnt, and presented what he considered two ‘outstanding examples’: the 
Great Fire of London in 1666 and the reconstruction of French and Belgian cities 
after WW I (Townroe 1941). Townroe’s pamphlet highlights two pertinent issues 
regarding reconstruction of housing after war: context and practice. 
 
The early planning of post WW II reconstruction was part of a professional and pub-
lic discourse on an anticipated post-war state, but at the same time creating that 
very anticipation. In most armed conflicts today, there is no one opening up that 
kind of discourse, let alone visioning a post-war state.2 The wars are different. They 
are mostly internal, protracted and in poor countries, or in countries impoverished 
by war. It is also worth noting that these early British WWW II initiatives came from 
UK nationals. In current wars no similar role is played by the nationals. That is the 
very nature of current wars. Today, due to the collapse of the domestic institutions, 
most post-war visioning, accompanied by concrete reconstruction activities, is exe-
cuted by foreigners, by foreign agencies and humanitarian organizations – under 
the watchful eye of external governments. 
 
The second issue raised is on the weight of practice. Townroe had looked back at 
the reconstruction of London almost three centuries earlier, analyzed what was 
done, compared it to what the French did a mere generation earlier and presented 
his conclusions in a set of recommendations – just the way most research and lit-
erature on post-war reconstruction do today. It is mostly a matter of choosing valid 
cases. Post-war reconstruction is an urgent endeavor, involving people often un-
prepared and personally affected by the violence. This sharpens the focus on prac-
tice, on issues of implementation and management. Theory in this field, however, is 
often normative, focusing on outcomes, similar to what architectural theory is held 
to do (Lund 2001). As the nature of conflicts change with developments in geopoli-
tics, technology, and economic development, and modulated by local idiosyncra-
                                          
1 In 1941 these included "Castles in the street" by E. Mannin, "The post-war reconstruction of Liverpool" 
by A.E. Shennan and "Reconstruction of bombed buildings" by B.S. Townroe. In 1942 came "Post-war 
homes" by H.V. Lanchester, and somewhat later the Labour Party issued “Your home planned by La-
bour". During WW I the Labour Party also published pamphlets on housing. "A million homes after the 
war” was issued as early as 1917. Re the LSE library 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/library/pamphlets/SocialPolicy/socialpolicypamphlets/housing.htm 
2 The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) together with the Post-War Reconstruc-
tion and Development Unit (PRDU) of the University of York, UK, held a workshop on Post-War Recon-
struction in Colombo, Sri Lanka in 1999. The feedback from the participants concentrated on the fact 
that this was the first time since the internal fighting began that the participants allowed themselves to 
systematically imagine an after-war state. 
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sies, it becomes more difficult to compare one post-war scene with another, across 
time and across space. It has also become apparent that the nature of recovery, be 
it post-war or post-natural disaster, restricts comparative theoretical applicability.3  
 
Theory is logically argued propositions backed by empirical evidence, made within a 
mutually held paradigm. It is a way of understanding phenomena and their interre-
lationship. It is commonly accepted that architectural theory is normative, border-
ing on ideology (Lund 2001, Støa 1996), which, as do ideologies and fashion, 
change with the ‘vibes of the times’ (Brand 1994; 54). However, Preston contends 
that this is also the case with development theory, highly relevant in a post-war 
recovery discourse. Political change changes intervention modes and funding poli-
cies, ‘inspiring’ or requiring a change in theory, either to legitimize the changes, or 
as a result of new experiences or new interpretations. This must be so. Theory is 
ideally informed by practice just as much as the other way around. (Preston 
1996).4 Our understanding of what is observed is guided by our theories, our ob-
servations are ‘theory-laden’, as Sayer would say (Sayer 1992; 73). The set of 
theories we apply in our quest for understanding, is discreetly chosen according to 
our world view, as seen from our ontological observation post. 
 
It is also necessary to emphasize the over-arching and consistent experiences, also 
raised in Townroe’s pamphlet. Take housing, for instance. Houses, places where 
people live, have always been tactical targets in war. The advent of aerial bombing 
allowed for their mass annihilation (Lindqvist 2000, Glover 2001). Firebombing of 
Japan’s major urban centers during WW II destroyed 40% of their housing, some 
3.1 million homes, made 15 million homeless, and killed about 1 million people, 
mostly civilians (Weber 1997). Housing was the chief target in the recent war in 
former Yugoslavia, where some 35% of Bosnia’s housing was damaged or de-
stroyed (IMG 1999). Aside from the horrible killings in Rwanda in 1994, houses 
were destroyed to such an extent as to leave almost half million families without a 
place to stay (UNHCR 2000). 
 
This was because housing holds such a fundamental place in the lives and liveli-
hoods of man. Housing constitutes part of the very structure that is society (Oliver 
1969, 1977, 2003, Danto 1990). Consequently the terms and concepts associated 
with housing are broad, and all-encompassing. The same term may mean different 
things for different people in different circumstances, much the same way as ‘cul-
ture’, a central feature of human life, has come to mean so much. It is therefore 
necessary to define the terms – before entering the world of housing. 
 
                                          
3 By comparing, say, Blaikie et al. (1994) At Risk and Macrae (2001) Aiding Recovery. 
4 In the field of current post-war reconstruction, however, it seems that practice is almost exclusively 
being informed by practice. 
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2.1.2 HOUSING: A CLARIFICATION OF TERMS 
Housing is a term in an enigmatic family of words like ‘shelter’, ‘dwelling’, ‘house’, 
‘habitation’, ‘home’, ‘residence’, ‘building’, ‘abode’, ‘domicile’, etc. It is necessary to 
define them relative to each other and in absolute terms; particularly for those of 
us not having English as our mother tongue. Since these terms carry different 
meanings; their use might lead to different actions.5  An etymological clarification is 
a way of defining these vague terms. This I shall do in the following. Such an ety-
mological run-through also illustrated how words change, how they take on new 
meanings with changing contexts over time. Arguing for the reintroduction of their 
root meaning is like reintroducing pre-industrial society (– which sometimes seems 
to be the call). Heidegger is close in his writings on dwelling, building and being, 
yet he transcends time: “What, then”, asks Heidegger, “does ‘Bauen’, building, 
mean? The Old English and High German word for building, ‘buan’, means to dwell” 
[…] Bauen, to which the ‘bin’ belongs: ich bin, du bist, mean ‘I dwell, you dwell’” 
(Heidegger 1971 cf. Leach 1997; 101).  
To be is to dwell. ‘Dwell’ and ‘dwelling’ are the core concepts. To dwell means to live 
in or in a place,6 referring both to the process of living and the physical structure 
embodying this process. The ‘house’, deriving from the concept of ‘domus’, primarily 
takes on a meaning of ‘ruling place’, in the ‘my-home-is-my-castle’ vein. “To have a 
house is to possess symbolic authority. […] The house is the embodiment of our 
dominance”, according to Danto (cf. Taylor 1990; 9). ‘Housing’ holds a dual mean-
ing. It is both a functional category referring to houses as physical objects in plural, 
but also to activities “which are important to personal life; i.e. those which can act 
as vehicles for personal fulfillment” (Turner 1972; 153).  
‘House’, as in the Old English term ‘hus’,7 translates exactly into the word ‘shelter’ 
according to Arthur Danto. “It cognate (sic!)8 with ‘huden’ – to hide, conceal, cover; 
and it expands into […] terms [that are] tied to dwelling as a condition of survival” 
(Danto 1990 cf. Taylor 1990;9). In the context of this particular research, the way 
he further defines the ‘hus’/shelter term is particularly pertinent: “This is the fragile, 
threatened, exposed side of our self-image as dwellers; beings that need protection, 
a place to crawl into if only a hole or cave – and our walls announce our vulnerabil-
ity” (ibid). 
‘Home’ is a highly emotive word referring to place, be it house, village, even country 
(as in ‘homeland’); it can also connote refuge or asylum. Different languages lead to 
slightly different meanings, highlighting the fact that ‘home’ conveys a multitude of 
meanings. While ‘place of residence’ primarily refers to physical structures, ‘home’ is 
                                          
5 This was the key message in the evaluation report on UNHCR’s shelter program in Rwanda. The fact 
that there was no conceptual demarcation between ‘housing’ (which was the nature of their activity) and 
‘shelter’ (which was what their mandate contained), a confusion appeared which led to an emergency 
(shelter) approach when in fact 69% of the $38.6 million budget referred to housing construction 
(UNHCR 2000; v, 4).This lead to a significant loss in developmental spin-offs (ibid; 25-28). All this in 
could, in turn, be a ‘language problem’, in that the officer responsible was not English, but then neither 
were the evaluators, although they were the ones who discovered the discrepancy. 
6 Paul Oliver adds: “To dwell is to make one’s abode: to live in, or at, or on, or about a place” (Oliver 
1987; 7). 
7 For the record: ‘hus’ is the present-day Norwegian word for ‘house’. 
8 I interpret this obvious printing error as ‘conforms with’ or ‘refers to’  
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held by many to refer to “home as territory or a locus in space [or] place of self-
identity or as a social or cultural unit” (Hayward 1975 cf. Porteous & Smith 2001). 
Since ‘home’ is such an emotive word, it has been hijacked by moralists, claims John 
Berger, by the bourgeois defending the sanctity of family life and property,9 and by 
the political elite of the ‘homeland’ where men were left to fight wars defending the 
privileges of the ruling few (Berger 1983): 
"Home", Berger says, "was the center of the world because that was the place 
where the vertical line crossed with the horizontal. The vertical line was a path lead-
ing upwards to the sky and downwards to the underworld. The horizontal line repre-
sented the traffic of the world, all the possible roads leading across the earth to oth-
ers". (ibid;462) 
This is a most illuminating description in the context of this research. Listen: “With-
out a history of choice no dwelling can be a home” (ibid; 463). People displaced by 
war have no such choice. It is a matter of dispute whether they have one when re-
turning. Their benefactors, i.e. ‘the international community’, may be among Ber-
ger’s hijackers, disallowing the choice a second time. This will be discussed in due 
course. 
Many of these terms have dual meanings: both as objects and  processes, both as 
nouns and verbs. As nouns, they refer to the physical construction with certain 
properties (- water leakages, for that matter). As verbs, they comprise two interact-
ing processes; one relates to the dweller, “the act of dwelling” gives the physical 
object meaning, or symbolic stature; the other relates to the object’s embedded 
external spillovers, giving the object developmental stature. In all circumstances 
they are place specific. 
2.1.3 THE SOCIO-MATERIAL DUALITY OF HOUSING 
This etymological exploration has uncovered the socio-material nature of dwelling 
and housing.10 This duality lies at the heart of most architectural research. To what 
extent the physical determines emotional and social action has always been con-
tested. It always will be. The famous statement by Churchill, “We shape our build-
ings, and afterwards our buildings shape us”11 is as far as architecture comes. 
Bourdieu comes to our rescue. 
 
                                          
9 In the US, ‘homes’ are what the real estate agents deal with, not houses, highlighting Berger’s claim. 
The recent introduction in the US of the term ‘homeland’  (as in Department of Homeland Security) is 
etymologically consistent, yet politically opportunistic by the logic of Berger. 
10 From the presentation above, the two terms are not synonymous, although they substantially over-
lap. In the following I will only use the term ‘housing’ except where ‘dwelling’ refers to “the act of dwell-
ing”, 
11 This  Churchill statement has been slightly ‘edited’ over time. According to Brand, the initial statement 
was put forward by Churchill at an award ceremony at the AA School of Architecture in 1924. Here he 
said: “There is no doubt whatever about the influence of architecture and structure upon human charac-
ter and action. We make our buildings and afterwards they make us. They regulate the course of our 
lives”. He used the Parliament building as a case in point. This was even more pertinent in 1943 when he 
used the same statement to propagate the rebuilding the Parliament exactly as it was. He said: “We 
shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings shape us” (Brand 1994: 3). 
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.1)Habitus 
Bourdieu’s concept of habitus may help explains this duality. ‘Habitus’ is a system of 
long-lasting (but not permanent) transposable dispositions12 acting as schemes or 
schemata that structure perception, conception and practice of a given group or so-
ciety. Habitus consists of a network of historical relations ‘deposited’ within each of 
us. These deposits, invisible to outsiders as well as to ourselves, empower us to act 
and interact in a way that makes sense to us and to others within the ‘social field’ in 
question. ‘Field’ is the second concept Bourdieu developed. The social field is the 
environment which structures a specific habitus and which, in turn, is structured by 
it. Societies are composed of numerous social fields, a few fairly autonomous, most 
interacting and overlapping. Such fields may be a social class, a village, a ‘home-
land’, a family or a clan. A professional guild is another such field.13 Each field is tied 
to a habitus guiding our perceptions and steering our motivations. It is what under-
pins the pertaining ‘rules and regulations’. The relations of the field are determined 
by prevailing bundles of ‘capital’.  The notion of ‘capital’, initially ‘symbolic capital’ 
(Bourdieu 1996), is the third element in Bourdieu’s conceptual system. ‘Capital’ will 
not be further explored here, but examined when I analyze my cases, cf. Chapter 
5.2. 
Habitus deposits objective structures or relations in society, be they tangible or in-
stitutional, buildings or rituals. These objective structures ‘celebrate’ the field and 
reproduce and reinforce the group’s habitus. The built environment, and in particular 
the dwelling, constitutes an essential objective structure. Callewaert describes the 
relationship between habitus and the objective structures of the dwelling thus: “It is 
[…] most of all the dwelling that is the foundation for the generative schemata be-
cause the dwelling, both physically and culturally has been shaped by these sche-
mata” (Callewaert 1992; 181). He goes on to show how the physical elements, 
down to the most minute objects, the structuring and zoning of the house make the 
schemata manifest through the accompanying practices which again reproduce the 
schemata,14 i.e. Churchill all over again. Bourdieu explains Churchill by stating that 
objective structures tend to produce subjective dispositions that produce structured 
action which tends to reproduce the objective structures that tend to produce …, and 
so forth. (Bourdieu 1990; 52-65) The notion of habitus/field/capital is set to explain 
why a society begets the buildings it does. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (and field 
and capital) emerged from studying life in a Berber village, and he fully acknowl-
edged the difficulties in transferring the concepts to modern, highly (mostly upward) 
mobile, post-industrial societies. Such “complex” societies are characterized by a 
multiplicity of fields with an accompanying set of embedded heterogeneous habi-
tuses. 
                                          
12 In his own notes, Bourdieu further explains the word ’dispositions’ much to the benefit of those whose 
mother tongue is not English. “The word disposition seems particularly suited to express what is covered 
by the concept of habitus (defined as a system of dispositions). It expresses first the result of an orga-
nizing action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates a way of being, 
a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or 
inclination” (Bourdieu 1977; 214). 
13 The world of architects seems like a perfect social field, a little broader, as does the University. 
14 Dwelling takes on this central role particularly in societies without “the symbolic-product-conserving 
techniques associates with literacy”, says Bourdieu (1977; 89). 
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John Friedmann has raised a number of critical and clarifying issues pertaining to 
habitus and the growing intra- and international mobility, and the uncertainty and 
conflicts stemming from the development of new habituses. Friedmann says that 
“whether the culprits are called modernization, urbanization, “development” […] the 
evidence suggests that the twinned concept of habitus/field is a great deal more 
malleable than Bourdieu suggests” (Friedmann 2000; 9). Bourdieu seems not to 
have worked actively with the physical environment beyond investigations into social 
space, not so much physical space, according to Friedmann. Friedmann does ac-
knowledge, though, Bourdieu’s explanation for the ‘slow progress’ of social change: 
the historically bounded collective habituses are, and will always be, part our lives.15  
An example would be the immedediate public reaction in the aftermath of the Janu-
ary 2003 fire in Trondheim, Norway, where a large area of the center of town was 
destroyed. In most surveys and interviews, inhabitants of the city wanted the old 
buildings rebuilt,16 or at least the ‘old atmosphere’ recreated. ‘Progress’ will not ren-
der recreation economically feasible. The reconstruction of the burnt-out villages in 
Northern Norway after WW II is another case in point. Those were times with stable 
communities, stable habitus and fields, which brought about a recreation-like recon-
struction as a matter of course. The policy of the international agencies to rebuild 
war-destroyed villages is grounded in the same perceptions (cf. my case on the re-
construction of Grapska, chapter 4.5). But habitus changes as the physical environ-
ment changes (and vice versa). Habitus is the product of history, and so may be 
changed by history.17 
.2) Man-Made Environments as Social Constituents: What Housing Does 
In his writing on urban sociology, Dag Østerberg (1998a, 1998b) highlights the in-
teractive role of the built environment on social life. “The material structures are not 
simply something primordial and physical”, says Østerberg,  “They are socio-
material, i.e. they carry a social signification mediated through materiality” (1998; 
3). The structures are active participants, not simply a backdrop or ground (Petti-
grew 1990; 268). The material structures are constituent and active parts of “real 
life”. Again, the recent fire in Trondheim and the call for rebuilding ‘the way it was’ 
exemplifies this. The buildings took on the role of participant in the discourse on 
urban development in Trondheim – even as burnt-out shells. This was not as physi-
cal objects, but as objects of meaning, albeit somewhat different for different peo-
ple, depending on their ‘field of reference’ to paraphrase Bourdieu. 
A somewhat similar concept was brought forth by John Turner in the 1960s and 
1970s, on ‘what housing does’. “To those for whom housing is an activity [it is ab-
surd not to] distinguish between what things are, materially speaking and what they 
                                          
15 Bourdieu underpins Zetter’s contention that refugees try to make sense of their lives through percep-
tions of the past projected towards the future, or visa versa, but always modulated by their present life 
conditions, not least their housing conditions (Zetter 1999).  
16 Some of the smaller political parties even made recreation part of their election manifestos. With time 
the public fervor of recreation diminishes, leaving the reconstruction debate to the politicians. 
17 “It may be changed by history, that is by new experiences, education or training (which implies that 
aspects of what remains unconscious in habitus be made at least partially conscious and explicit […] 
They may be changed by historical action oriented by intention and consciousness and using pedagogic 
devices (Bourdieu 2002; 29). 
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do in people’s lives”, says Turner (1972: 152). Turner, on the shoulders of other 
self-help ideologues before him, in particular Jacob L. Crane, saw housing as a vehi-
cle of personal, family and social growth or development emerging in the relation-
ship between the physical object and the user and “the roles which the process 
plays in their life history” (ibid; 159): “Ich bin, I dwell!”. 
Duncan Maclennan (1988) has approached housing in industrialized countries in a 
somewhat similar manner but with different references, taking his cue basically from 
the endogenous growth theories,18 which give prominence to innovation as a source 
of development and industrial location. Innovative environments are also social en-
vironments (Maskell et al. 1998), and as such are wide, complex, and by nature 
somewhat unpredictable as they are non-codified systems19 linked to human reflex-
ivity and thus make systems interact in a manner of ‘spillovers’. These systems im-
pact upon each other and often cause subtle and powerful feedbacks over time. “The 
integrated perspective on housing”, says Maclennan, “has to consider who else will 
be involved and what else will be required. There is no longer interest in ‘housing’ 
but in ‘housing and’ (the actors) and ‘housing with’ (the outputs)” (Maclennan 
1998;11). This echoes John Turner – although not so elegantly phrased. Whereas 
Turner’s ideas were tested and informed by working in the barrios in Latin America, 
Maclennan tries to impact contemporary British housing policies through research. 
On the one hand, his research shows “positive effects of housing investment on sub-
sequent industrial investment at more local levels” (ibid; 6). On the other, he still 
has to acknowledge that there is no confirmed causation in the relationship between 
poor housing, bad health, crime, drug abuse and the like. So how can housing be 
part of, and contribute towards, an increase in human and social capital? Maclennan 
confirms only what others have said before: strategic location, participation in deci-
sion-making, mixed income groups and tenure, all for the purpose of creating trust 
and good neighborliness. His contribution is not these suggestions, but his showing 
how housing – within the emerging economic paradigm, is ‘connected’ through spill-
overs to economic development. He shows ‘what housing does’, or rather, ‘what 
housing is capable of doing’ in modern Europe.20 And he has been heard. In dealing 
with regeneration, the “Principles for a New Housing Policy” as presented by De-
partment of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) marks a “significant 
shift […] away from simply improving the physical fabric of the dwellings and imme-
diate environment to increasing the opportunities for the households living in the 
area” according to Kleinman & Whitehead (1999;79). At least in the UK there is an 
emerging appreciation for ‘joined-up thinking’ that encompasses more than the 
                                          
18 These theories focus on innovation rather than technology, innovation being deemed an endogenous 
activity, while technology has been regarded as an exogenous one. 
19 ‘Systems’ as in the Giddens’ sense: “Reproducing relations between actors of collectivities, situated in 
time-space’ (Giddens 1981 cf. K. Knorr-Cetina 1981: 172). 
20 Underpinned in part on Maclennan’s writing, Stafford et al (2001) undertook an investigation into 
former mining communities in Yorkshire, UK, on the regenerative effects of housing investments in these 
communities. They brought unequivocal conclusions to the table: “Housing investment is at the heart of 
any strategy to improve the asset base of a neighbourhood. It directly improves residents’ quality of life 
and indirectly enhances the other forms of capital necessary to sustain community life”. Further, “Hous-
ing investment contributes to endogenous economic growth. It helps to increase labour productivity and 
participation and to improve income, employment and performance of a regional economy”. I will return 
to this research when presenting my analytical framework. 
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house per se. It is about “promoting social cohesion, well-being and self depend-
ence” (ibid; 79).21 It is about what housing does. 
Starting out this chapter by clarifying terms with reference to their etymological ori-
gin has inadvertently exposed how habitus changes. Language is a constituent 
property, an objective structure, of habitus, the way buildings may be.  So when 
words ever so slowly take on new meanings, this simultaneously signifies a change 
in habitus  – and yet, the origin may still be traced. It is like families who move from 
their ‘place of origin’ to new environments where they see their children adjust and 
change. Over the years so much of the old is ‘lost’ that it may be difficult to com-
municate across generations22: “The past is another country, they do things differ-
ently there”.23 
I have dwelt with the ‘habitus’ concept at some length because it enters the socio-
material field trying to explain the reciprocity between man and his environment. 
This is the central issue in architecture and planning, if there ever was one.  The 
reason for introducing the concept of habitus (and those of field and capital) is that I 
believe it will help us understand how external housing interventions in post-war 
circumstances may interact with the people assisted24. 
2.1.4 SUMMARY 
All the authors I have discussed above are proponents of ‘joined-up thinking’, where 
interventions in one sector have broad, often unforeseen and time-lagged, impacts 
on other sectors. They emphasize different aspects across the spectrum from the 
baseline statement of Heidegger, “I am = I dwell”, through Bourdieu’s relationship 
between the dweller and his dwelling, on to Turner’s housing as strategy for devel-
opment depending on and enhancing social capital. This is further exposed by 
Maclennan in the context of housing in the post-industrial world, with Østerberg 
overarching all by revealing the interactive role of our material environment in con-
stituting social life. These theories overlap in understanding and they are informed 
by practice that spans time and space. 
To extract the more applied attributes of housing from the ‘joined-in thinking’ of the 
writers above, three overlapping arenas of interaction emerge which echo the sub-
sidiary research questions developed earlier: 
                                          
21 Regeneration has become a hot issue in British politics. National newspapers carry separate sections 
on the issue. It’s relevance to post-war reconstruction is so obvious that the Post-War Reconstruction 
and Development Unit at the University of York makes their students do field studies in marginalized 
areas in Manchester and Newcastle. 
22 The debate on ‘integration (‘domestication’ seems sometimes to be a more appropriate term) of immi-
grants’ contains such issues (see Wikan 1995). 
23 The quote is initially from the Go-Between by J.P.Hartley, yet the substance of the statement is better 
exemplified in V.S.Naipaul’s In a Free State (Norwegian translation I en fristat 1973). Here, V.S. Naipaul 
tells about growing up as a grandchild of Indian immigrants in the West Indies. His family was very 
conscious about not reproducing any traits of the old caste system they left behind in India. But still, 
Naipaul refers to his  inexplicable reverence for water and cleanliness, and toward certain groups of 
Indians (people of high casts it later proved). These were attitudes guiding his everyday, un-reflected 
childhood behavior, as inherited from his family – in spite of their persistent attempts to crush these 
remnants of the ‘past country’.  
24 It certainly explains why ‘technology transfer’ – and the theories behind it - has proven such an ex-
tremely difficult challenge in all development arenas. 
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• Between housing and the environment: housing as material object. This cov-
ers the interaction between housing as a physical entity and elements of na-
ture and people as physical bodies. It deals with how housing stands up to 
the climate with its changing physical and functional requirements, in effect, 
how the construction masters time. It is also about housing interacting in 
space, i.e. on location. Lastly, it is about housing as a physical object in 
terms of ‘utility’, how it stands up to wear and tear, how it accommodates 
change, maintenance and changing human requirements. This attribute is 
primarily on the formation or depletion of fixed and environmental capital. 
  
• Between people and their dwelling and immediate environment in the sense 
of housing as carrier of meaning: housing as symbol.  It is about the dweller 
as agent, about the reciprocity between housing and inhabitant. It deals with 
the appropriation of the environment, it encompasses housing as a physical 
imprint – and printer - of worldviews and values, of status, of aspirations, of 
daily practices, etc. And it deals most of all with housing as home, as the 
central node in people’s network of life. Since symbols are material represen-
tations of meaning, what happens when the reference object is destroyed, 
and what guides its recreation? Much will depend on the bundle of human 
and social capital the people commands.  
 
• Between the wider society and housing, i.e. housing as vehicle of develop-
ment. To realize the duality of housing, a building has to be constructed. 
Through this, housing activates processes beyond those of the dweller, it is 
about reciprocal relations to livelihoods, to economic development, to re-
gional development. In effect, it is about housing as node in the network that 
constitutes society where “everything is linked to everything”, as Mrs 
Brundtland25 once quipped. It is about activating and extending capacities, 
either through contingent spillovers, or focused economic and material tar-
geting. All modes of capital are affected and all modes of capital provide in-
puts. 
 
 
Attributions of housing differ among writers. Housing, being such an over-arching 
constituent of human life, lends itself to being categorized in many ways. To me, the 
categories above present the most potent attributes when examining what housing 
does – ‘does’ in terms of contributing towards the reformation of societal assets 
necessary for a lasting recovery to take hold. 
 
 
                                          
25 Bruntland of the Brundtland Commission, Norwegian Prime Minister, and later Head of WHO. 
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2.2. HOUSING AS PHYSICAL OBJECT 
 
2.2.1  INTRODUCTION. ON ARCHITECTURE 
Any building is a piece of architecture as all buildings are physical – and all build-
ings are built for a purpose. Any building is the result of human action however 
much it still remains a physical object. This duality of matter and meaning is what 
constitutes architecture. We do not need architects to make architecture. But in the 
best of cases architects are able to make architecture that better serves the in-
tended purpose; they are able to use the opportunities better in order to make 
cheaper, more adaptable, more efficient – and more beautiful buildings (Hamdi 
1995): “Bad architecture is a violation” says professor Brantenberg (cf. Nuttgens 
1998;4).1 But to insist that only architects make good architecture, is in itself, if not 
a violation, a gross overstatement (Støa 1996). Rudolfski, with his “Architecture 
Without Architects” exhibition in 1964, made that fact abundantly clear (Rudolfski 
1964). And besides, as will be made just as evident throughout this work, “Archi-
tecture, to state the obvious, is a social act – social both in method and purpose” 
(Kostof 1995;7). 
 
When post-war housing reconstruction is perceived to be a social act alone, which is 
very often the case (Zetter 1995, Solberg 20022), there is a deficiency in profes-
sional inputs; “A knowledge embargo”, says Nimpuno (1995) after visiting settle-
ments for refugees and displaced people in the Great Lakes region in the mid-
1990s.  In the North architects and planners are engaged as a matter of course in 
large-scale housing projects because there is value added from their contribution.  
There are but a handful of architects engaged in the field of post-war reconstruction 
in spite of the enormous volume and impact of the housing reconstruction taking 
place in all over the world. In Bosnia successive heads of UNHCR’s ‘Shelter Unit’ 
were military officers and economists.3 Sida made an exception by heavily relying 
on architect-planners in developing their assistance strategy on housing reconstruc-
tion. Their contribution was favorably evaluated (Sandgren 1999). 
 
Architecture as such will not be dealt with in this work. Although it will come out as 
a composite of my three designated housing attributes: physical object, symbol, 
and strategy for development. These attributes overlap the constituent parts of 
architecture as presented in the first treatise on architecture, “De Architectura”, 
written around 25 BC by the Roman architect-engineer Vitruvius. The three con-
stituents of architecture ‘firmitas’, or ‘structure’, and ‘utilitas’ or ‘function’ ( covered 
by my ‘physical object’) and ‘venustas’, ‘beauty’ (in part covered by my ‘symbol’).4 
                                          
1 In his introductory notes to the Norwegian edition. 
2 Solberg, a political scientist evaluated NRC’s housing activities in the Balkans undertaken without archi-
tect-planner competence at HQ. In 2001 NRC employed a seasoned architect, Terje Bodøgard, who sub-
sequently initiated the Solberg-report. 
3 In 2002, with activities down, a Swiss architect was engaged. Prominently posted on the wall behind 
him, was written: “Construction is my religion, the site is my church, the tender is my bible” – not much 
of a socio-material approach in that. 
4 These English terms were reformulated at the early 17th century by Sir Henry Wotton into what today 
is acknowledged to be the three pillars of architecture : “Firmness, Commodity and Delight”. Vitruvius’ 
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Architectural discourse and education still recognize these as their grounding prin-
ciples, which tend to leave ‘the obvious’, that architecture is a social act, outside 
their main concern. In architecture there is more room for ‘joined-up thinking’ as 
Maclennan would have said.5 In his reader on architectural theory Neil Leach (1997) 
made his selection of texts to show that there is more to architecture than what 
architects are primarily concerned with, namely physical design. 
  
2.2.2 PHYSICAL PROPERTIES AND TIME: HOUSING SHEARED 
Architecture in terms of physical object/’firmitas’ is determined by ‘action’, ‘time’ 
and ‘space’, according to Thiis-Evensen (1992).  Since the ‘action’ is already de-
fined as the many ‘acts of dwelling’, this particular section will focus on ‘space’ and 
‘time’, i.e. locally available materials, prevailing technology, tradition, ‘styles’ – and 
how these are affected by time.  I will do so by applying the ‘shearing layers’ 
model6 initially proposed by Francis Duffy (1990) and further developed by Steward 
Brand (1994). This will clarify both the interaction between building and the exter-
nal elements acting on the specific site, and the reciprocity between the building 
and the user as physical, or rather, physiological body. 
 
 
Figure 2.2.1 Brand’s Shearing Schemata, (From Brand 1994) 
 
Brand is primarily concerned about how buildings interact with time, “how buildings 
learn”, as it were. To quote Duffy again “The unit of analysis [...] isn’t the building, 
but the use of the building through time” (ibid:13). In so doing, we first have to 
examine the outset, the site, or ‘space’ in the time-space perspective. 
 
                                                                                                                         
book in English is titled: “Ten books on Architecture”. About 1500 years later Leon Battista Alberti came 
up with another ‘ten books’, “On the Art of Building in Ten Books”, while the great renaissance architect, 
Palladio, made do with four a century later, in 1570: “Four Books on Architecture”. All these books are 
still in print and are still central texts in architectural discourse.  
5 The Aga Khan Award for Architecture has therefore included ‘social relevance’ as a key criterion in their 
architectural competition. The Aga Khan Award  this largest architectural award in the world in terms of 
competing entries. 
6 These layers have different rates of change.  In Brand’s schemata, the layers of a building comprises, 
in descending order of permanence: 1 Site, 2 Structure, 3 Skin, 4 Services, 5 Space plan, 6 “Stuff”. 
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.1) Site 
This is the permanent geographical setting, with its lasting characteristics, the cli-
mate and the environmental features. Traditional architecture has shown the myr-
iad of different physical responses the act of dwelling has entailed in various cli-
matic zones in the globe (Rudolfski 1964, Oliver, 1969, 1977, 1987, 1997, 2003).7 
‘Industrialized architecture’ tends to uniform these responses along a Mid-European 
template.  In the ‘development-aided’ housing projects of the 1960s this was often 
the case.  Even in the late 1990s the Word Bank’s housing projects on the Palestin-
ian territories bore the imprint of the ‘international housing model’ (Elkahlout 
2001). 
 
Choosing and building on a site is a decision where consequences will normally out-
last the decision maker. Building on a site is a reflexive act.  It will irreversibly alter 
the site, and thus be the basis for subsequent decisions, making new premises for 
yet other decisions to follow. Choosing sites therefore stands out as the principal 
strategic act in urban or regional land-use development. Yet, in due course, the 
‘functions’ that initiated the building are outmoded, leaving the physical building 
alone to act as guardian of the site.  In this way the purely physical structure (ob-
jectifying memories and (changing) habituses) starts acting as agent of develop-
ment.  Both Aldo Rossi (1982) and Spiro Kostof (1992) see this tension between 
the physical building and ‘changing functions’ as a major developmental force in 
urban, and undoubtedly also in regional, development. Places will be abandoned, be 
‘reborn’, and be gentrified.  The way old abandoned industrial structures and sited 
have been utilized recently in support of urban development is a case in point. 
When time is brought into the equation, “form” - does not – “follow function”, as 
the Modernist slogan would have it. With time, it is just as much a matter of “func-
tion follows form”.8 
 
‘Sites’ become places through social constructions, just as much as anything physi-
cal and environmental. This will not be discussed here, but dealt with later.9 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
7 It is a shortcut to conclude that the indigenous response is superior to ‘modern approaches’. The tradi-
tion of using horizontal boards as cladding on houses along the Norwegian West coast tend to rot much 
more easily than the modern vertical boards introduced as a result of building research. 
8 There is a hitch to this though. With increasing site costs in the major cities, developers destroy build-
ings rather than re-use them. New structures are in most aspects much more ‘efficient’ than the old. The 
high-rise Phillips Building in Oslo was torn down to be replaced with a building of about the same size 
and shape, but built and run in a way that made economic sense of the demolition. Other examples 
abound. Probably the most famous example of this ‘function follows form’ has been the art colonies in 
New York, starting out with the Village in downtown Manhattan, passing through Tribeca and East Vil-
lage, and presently making Brooklyn the hot spot of art in New York. Along the way, the old structures, 
warehouses and cheap apartment blocks, were converted, first to artist studios and flats, than into gal-
leries, fancy shops and restaurants, and then upper class housing. 
9 ‘Site’ refers to specific geographical and physical properties of a point in space, whereas ‘place’ is 
space perceived. 
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.2) Structure 
These are the foundations and the load-bearing components, including the roof, 
which normally last the lifetime of the building. There are basically two ways of 
constructing buildings: either with load-bearing walls, i.e. the walls carry the weight 
of the floor(s) and the roof above, or by means of a primary structure of columns 
and beams with independently placed external and internal walls. Nature makes for 
an apparent congruence between available indigenous materials, mode of building 
and the requirements set by the climate. In hot and arid climates houses are built 
with solid, load-bearing walls with large heat-capacity (releasing stored heat at 
night, remaining cool inside during day), whereas in hot and humid climates, the 
construction is made out of wooden poles: light and open, allowing for maximum 
air circulation. 
 
The two construction principles entail two different ways of accommodating change. 
With load-bearing walls change must come either through rooms changing function, 
or external add-ons. With an independent load-bearing structure, room sizes and 
functions may also be changed within the building: ‘Additive’ and ‘subtractive’ 
change as Rapoport calls it (1994; 555-562). The Modernist movement made the 
latter their trademark. Within a steel-concrete structure walls were to be disman-
tled and shifted. This is most elegantly exemplified by the Domino House from 1915 
by Le Corbusier.10 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2.2 Le Corbusier’s Domino House, first proposed in 1915, see fig. 2.2.4 for the ‘con-
temporary vernacular’ version. 
 
The choice of principle is basically a matter of location and context. Rural buildings, 
at least the traditional ones, primarily depend on add-ons for change, whereas ur-
ban structures confined to a set perimeter depend on internal re-division, and verti-
                                          
10 He had visions made long before the concept of habitus was introduced into development discourse: 
“If we eliminate from our hearts and minds all dead concepts in regard to the house, and look at the 
question from a critical and objective point of view, we shall arrive at the “House-Machine”, the mass-
production house, healthy (and morally so too) and beautiful in the same way that the working tools and 
instruments which accompany our existence are beautiful” (Le Corbusier 1987;7). The Domino House 
was actually proposed as a mass production housing system for housing reconstruction after WW I. 
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cal add-ons, i.e. added floors. In crowded cities both principles of growth and 
change are implemented often with detrimental effects on spatial and functional 
qualities. The encroachment of open spaces and the humiliating and structurally 
unsound vertical add-ons in Palestinian refugee settlements in Beirut is a case in 
point. 
 
 
Fig.2.2.3 From the Palestinian refugee settlement in Shatila, Beirut 1999 
 
Buildings in which the structure is flawed gradually degrade the other ‘layers’ of the 
construction. So when the roof are allowed to leak or structures allowed to subside, 
floors, windows, walls, etc. will be damaged.  This will inevitably lead to inferior 
living conditions. We are now in a house that make people sick (Whitehead 1998, 
Marsh et al. 2000 cf. Bratt 2002;6). 
 
For housing to be structurally safe and yet adaptable to future alterations it has to 
be planned and prepared for future change.11 This is where the skills and experi-
ence of architects and planners come in, and it is at its most decisive at the ‘struc-
ture’ layer. 
 
Two aspects related to structure destruction are worth mentioning. The first is on 
the recycling of materials. This has been done throughout time. Castles or fortifica-
tions of the conquered have been reused for other purposes, or the materials sim-
ply lifted from the site by the general public. Many a new symbolic building is built 
                                          
11 A most relevant example is the “Svenskehusene” (The Swedish Houses) that were built in Norway 
(and Finland) during the war. They were two-storey wooden pre-fabs covering a ground area of 50m2 .  
Initially they sheltered two families, but gradually changed into one-family houses.  Today, most of 
them, in cities like Molde, Bodø, Åndalsens, and Narvik, have add-ons defaming their architectural quali-
ties, but are sought after dwellings as most of them were initially integrated into the then existing village 
or urban fabric.  (Rikskommittén 1942) 
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from materials of similarly significant buildings of the conquered.12 Nowadays, the 
recycling of building materials from bombed or destroyed buildings has been sys-
tematically done since the post WW II reconstruction, partly for logistical reasons, 
partly for reasons of resource scarcity. The new Central Business District of Beirut is 
built on debris, so too was the 1962 Olympic complex of Munich.  
 
The other aspect relates to the way housing is built and the type of materials used 
– as a response to the natural hazards of the region, recurrent storms, and floods 
or earthquakes. This has been an intrinsic part of traditional architecture, but often 
wavered in the present-day, high-activity building works (Jigyasu 2002; Oliver 
1987, 2003). This has brought forth a ‘domesticated’ yet international Domino 
House tradition, best labeled ‘contemporary vernacular’: a primary structure of 
concrete columns, beams and slabs with non-bearing walls and partitions of bricks 
of blocks makes up much of today’s man-made environment throughout the world. 
This building type appears in the Katmandu valley as it does in Iran, in Lebanon 
and in the Balkans. I have seen them all. This is an inevitable consequence of mod-
ernization, and in effect amounts to a kind of ‘architectural entropy’. This ‘uniforma-
tion’ is, as a matter of course, evident in most post-war reconstruction environ-
ments, where so much is to be accomplished in a short time – and by international 
agents. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.2.4 Contemporary Vernacular. The Domino House principle applied in Grapska, 
Cf. Chapter 6.5  
 
 
.3) Skin 
The skin is the outer layer of the house which is set to protect the load-bearing 
structures, ensure their capacity, and to enclose the building as such. This also al-
                                          
12 The Quwwat ul-Islam mosque just outside Delhi built in the 13 Century was built using beautifully 
carved stone from a number of destroyed Hindu temples.  There are numerous other examples (Kostof 
1992;234-265). 
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lows for signaling contended status to outsiders13:  “By choosing to live in a home 
having a certain external appearance, a person may also be expressing how they 
wish to be seen” (Porteous 1976;384). 
 
Traditional architecture is often constructed with composite layers. The skin is part 
of the structure, is part of the space plan, etc.  But as the skin has to fend against 
both the natural elements and the wear and tear of people, it requires constant 
maintenance in order to prevent destruction of the underlying, composite struc-
ture.14 The skin is therefore normally changed much more often than the structure.  
This way, the physical and aesthetic quality of the skin, and the house, may be im-
proved when conditions allow. This will also permit new status signals to be played 
out. It is a well-documented phenomenon in true vernacular architecture (Larsson 
& Larsson 1984, 1996; Bourgeois & Pelos 1983; Guidoni 1978; Oliver 1977, 
2003),15 and when its prevalence in contemporary American architecture was finally 
recognized, the issue of the skin, became an important constituent in the theory of 
post-modern architecture. (Venturi et al. 1972; Jencks 1977, 2002). 
 
The ‘contemporary vernacular’, referred to above, add their skin incrementally 
much in the same way as the building is constructed: according to economic capac-
ity and personal capability.  External plastering, i.e. the skin, is often the last addi-
tion to the building, making these buildings, as a type, so easily recognizable 
throughout the world. 
 
.4) Services 
Services are the “working guts” of the building as Brand describes it (1994;13).  
This refers to piping, wiring, ventilation systems, and all the ‘intelligent compo-
nents’ that make up more and more of buildings built in the North.  In Norway the 
services layer makes up some 20% of an urban housing project’s total costs, ex-
cluding site.16 Since it comprises components that are easily outmoded,17 the ser-
vices are therefore laid out in such a way as to make upgrading and renewals easy 
to realize. 
 
In other areas of the world, this layer is not that important, although running wa-
ter, sewerage and electrical power are the manifest symbols of progress. In these 
cases it is not so much an issue of preparing for renewal as for its very installation 
and easy access of maintenance. This is brought to head in reconstruction projects. 
Implementing agencies are squeezed between upgrading (where previously there 
                                          
13 In Gaborone, Botswana, there used to be a housing area called “the white city”, where the front walls 
of the perimeter houses were painted white along the route of visiting dignitaries. 
14 The walls facing the sea of Norwegian log houses had a skin of horizontal boards. As these inevitably 
rotted, they were inevitably changed. The same pertains to thatched roof structures where these were 
used, not to mention the continuous ‘reskinning’ of adobe or mud walls. These tasks were in fact part of 
the ‘objective imprints’ of (gender specific) habitus in many traditional societies, to revisit Bourdeiu. 
15 In our part of the world, the solid status of brickwork housing has often been alluded to by plastering 
a fine mesh fixed to the outside of a ‘basic’ wooden construction. These are still evident in the Balkans. 
16 Figures collected from architects in Trondheim, June 2003. 
17 The Phillips Building demolition (cf. footnote 8 above) was demolished not least because of the large 
investments required to modernize the ‘services’ layer. 
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was no water or electricity) – and reducing the number of potential beneficiaries 
(because of increased unit cost). 
 
.5) Space Plan 
This refers to internal walls, ceilings, doors, corridors, etc., what in effect make up 
the spaces for ‘the many acts of dwelling’. Particularly in non-industrial societies, 
housing is spatially organized in a set way, as an imprint and printer of habitus, not 
to be easily changed,18 re. Bourdieu’s Kabyle house (1977). In urban settings in the 
industrial world present-day housing is also built and spatially organized in ways 
that may make alterations difficult, primarily because of ‘housing market priorities’, 
i.e rather change address than modify the building (Røe 2001). Where capacity and 
technology allow, there is still a constant flow of changes in most housing through-
out the world (Tipple 2000, Rapoport 1994;533-562, Goldstein 1998).19 
 
Space plans reflect the relative importance paid to the different functions of the 
dwelling. As these change, the house changes with it.  If not, conflicts arise, like 
overcrowding and conflicts of privacy. These are relative to cultural and personal 
perceptions – but also related to time. Privacy means the ability to control un-
wanted interaction, be it visual, smell, sound, heat, physical presence. Beyond 
physical barriers, relative to cultural modes, these may be handled through man-
ners, rules, time scheduling – and spatial organization (Rapoport 1994;184-186). 
The latter is what space plans do.20 According to Bratt (2002;18), there is little re-
search on the consequences of (over)crowding and the associated effects of con-
flicts of privacy. What little there is points in different directions: that negative so-
cial behavior stems from overcrowding (Fisher et al. 1975 cf. ibid), and that “no 
effect of aggregate density on the behavior of individual people” (Shlay 1995;696 
cf. ibid). That crowding increases the wear and tear of the dwelling is self-evident.  
This calls for increased maintenance or – where this does not take place – to a 
gradual dilapidation of the environment. 
 
Housing in high uncertainty situations call for flexible space plans. There are admi-
rable examples from the WW II reconstruction in Norway. The “Svenskehusene” 
(The Swedish Houses) were pre-fabs donated by Sweden, initially built for two 
families but in such a way as to allow one family to take over when circumstances – 
and the economic conditions – allowed. By the end of the 1950s most of them were 
converted to one-family houses. (Rikskommittén 1942, Brantenberg 1996). A simi-
                                          
18 It does not mean that traditional housing is not altered. The ability to modify is a requirement to 
achieve this congruence between housing and people. It is just that it takes place on a much slower 
scale than it does in industrial societies of today. 
19 Normally when structuring a flat, the spaces requiring services by means of piping, heavy wiring, air 
extraction and the like (kitchen, bathroom, etc.) are fixed together in order to allow maximum free al-
terable space in the other rooms.  A recent master’s thesis at NTNU shows that in a large housing estate 
built in the early 1970s it was these heavily serviced spaces that were changed and extended, not the 
changeable ones (Kyllo, 2001). This is part of a national trend. Each year well over 4 billion USD is spent 
on home improvements, alterations and extensions in Norway, mostly on improving bathrooms and 
kitchens (Aftenposten/Prognosesenteret 22.09.03). 
20 And these, of course, come out differently, for example in Norway where dwelling area pro capita 
stands at more than 50 m2 as compared to Hong Kong where is stands at about 7m2 (Sullivan & Chen 
1997). 
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lar approach was applied in recent proposals for housing for refugees and asylum 
grantees in Norway. They address the uncertainty their residents face by proposing 
flexible floor plans (Husbanken 2001). Rapoport (1994) rather prefers the term 
‘open-endedness’ for this potential of change where he takes in the dialectic proc-
ess between people and setting over time. But focusing on the physical, ‘flexibility’ 
is a more feasible term.21 
 
 
Fig 2.2.5 a  “Svenskehusene” showing the  initial floor plans from 1941.  
 
 
Fig.2.2.5 b ....and as built on the farm of the my parents during the summer of 1941 
                                          
21 Rapoport distinguished six different reasons why people would choose to change their setting: in-
strumental, expressive/latent (e.g. meaning), social, cultural, demographic, economic (Rapoport 
1994;533-562). 
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.6) Stuff 
“God is in the details”22 may be reinterpreted to refer to Brand’s ‘stuff’. This is the 
rest, the stuff that can be moved about: chairs, tables, pictures, lamps, rugs, beds, 
utensils, and all sorts of memorabilia.  In this context it is about the place they take 
and how they interact with the inhabitants.  This ‘stuff’, these ‘things’, are constitu-
ent parts of people’s identity. Sartre presented this claim in his “Being and Noth-
ingness”,23 and has been further studied by Belk (1992 and earlier). Still, stuff re-
quires space and certain physical settings to function and to serve their intrinsic 
role (ibid, Sullivan & Chen 1997).  In a telling moment of a film shown on Norwe-
gian television,24 a displaced Serbian professor presents his dearest belongings: a 
row of books lined up in a wet windowsill: “I have a home, but no house to put it 
in”. For people made to flee their homes, the things they are able to bring with 
them take on incalculable importance (McCracken 1988 cf. Belk 1992). 
 
In the evolution of the Western dwelling, it was the change and development of 
these items, be they bedpans or washing machines, that in effect made the pre-
sent-day dwelling what it is, thereby what a dwelling means in the lives of people in 
the Westernized world (Rybczynski 2001).  Only when acknowledging how our ‘acts 
of dwelling’ have changed and how these relate to the introduction of ‘new stuff’, do 
we fully recognized the impact of stuff on housing. From a totally different perspec-
tive, Bourdieu explains the importance of ‘stuff’ in organizing space in the Kabyle 
houses. It is as if the house is constructed around the stuff.25 So when stuff is not 
accounted for in the planning of housing, we witness yet another of Brantenberg’s 
violations. In housing for displaced people in war zones we are more than mere 
witnesses (Cf. my Mihatovici case, Chapter 6.4). 
 
                                          
22 Attributed to Mies van der Rohe in extension to his “less is more” slogan. In the architectural world of 
van der Rohe, ‘stuff’ was a bore. 
23 They become part of peoples’ self, 1)when we master of control them, 2)when we create (or pur-
chase) them, or 3) through knowing them. Belk (1992) adds a fourth: through habituation. 
24 As part of a TV campaign for the Norwegian Refugee Council September 1999. 
25 All architects have stories to tell of clients who want their new house built around a particular set of 
furniture, a special table, an inherited cupboard or the like. 
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Fig. 2.2.6 Invaluable ‘stuff’ brought along by displaced people in Kosovo 1999.  
Courtesy of the UNHCR. 
 
2.2.3 SUMMARY 
When it comes down to it, housing does not exist as a physical object. All the con-
stituting physical layers are embedded with meaning. But for it to retain or serve a 
meaningful purpose the physical solutions must abide with the physical laws that 
act upon the building. The most painstakingly cared for space can be defamed with 
sinking floors or leaking roofs. And what good are separate rooms when the divid-
ing walls are so thin as to allow no privacy? What good are housing units that do 
not allow for alterations to accommodate new ‘stuff’ or small children? These are all 
related to the physical capabilities of the housing construction in question. And the 
question is addressed to the planner-architect. As the late Samuel Mockbee told his 
students: “It’s got to be warm, dry and noble”, (cf. Dean & Hursley 2002; cover). 
 
The Shearing Model that has been used here to describe the physical constituents 
of a building is also a model for change: how to prepare for the inevitable.26 The 
way the layers are assembled determines the capabilities for physical change. What 
                                          
26 “We limited rebuilding to the available resources. In the future, I am going to add another floor on 
the roof”, said MR Y when he first reconstructed his house in al-Burjain after it was destroyed in the 
1975-1991 war in Lebanon (El-Masri 1999) 
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drives them and how they will be interpreted and accommodated will be left to the 
inhabitants. They, and not the planner-architect imbues the construction with 
meaning27 and carry out the alterations they deem meaningful. “Alterations are 
communal acts within the family” says anthropologist Margrethe Aune.28 They are 
manifestations of who we are, or rather what we now want to be. The house has 
become a symbol of ourselves.  This is what the next chapter is about. 
 
                                          
27 This is actually not correct. Buildings carry meaning for architects, very much so, sometimes to the 
extent that any change by the user is interpreted as an interference with the architect’s property. 
28 Associate Professor Aune of NTNU, Trondheim in an interview in Adresseavisen 22 September 2003. 
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2.3 HOUSING AS SYMBOL 
 
2.3.1 A SYMBOLIC INTRODUCTION 
 
A house is a physical object endowed with meaning. The object stands for some-
thing else, or rather, something more than a mere object. It becomes a symbol.  It 
is symbolic because it represents a (positive or negative) quality recognized and 
comprehended by the observer. Housing may carry a message on behalf of the 
greater society, or most commonly, on behalf of its owner as part of that greater 
society. The capacity for housing to do so confirms its ‘socio-material’ or ‘socio-
physical’ nature. When housing as a physical entity is destroyed, the duality of this 
relationship is also destroyed, threatening the affected people’s self-definition 
(Brown & Perkins 1992). “I have a home but no house to put it in”, as the professor 
said in the previous chapter. 
 
2.3.2 HOUSING AS SYMBOL OF PROGRESS AND PERCEIVED 
          ACCOMPLISHMENT 
 
From the post WW II reconstruction of Europe and well into the 1970s housing was, 
in most countries, a political matter.  What was achieved in the housing sector was 
treated as a symbol of national progress, national pride. When countries presented 
themselves internationally, their achievements in housing were part of that very 
image. Housing achievements were symbols of progress (Diefendorf 1990, Ras-
segna 1993 , Reiersen & Thue 1996, Nygaard 1984, Gligoric 1974, The Housing 
Directorate 1947, Bullock, 2002). This was later repeated by the governments of 
the newly independent states as they, albeit for a brief period, took on the role as 
providers of housing or at least executors of housing policies (Obondo-Okoyo 
1986).  As governments left housing to the market – or rather, when governments 
entered the market,1 housing still remained a collective symbol, not for govern-
ments, but for the various lifestyle segments.2 The promotion of ‘gated communi-
ties’ is directed at one such segment, the prospective inhabitants/investors of 
places like Seaport3 may be another. At the very opposite, at the end where the 
homeless, the displaced and ethnically cleansed reside, there are also symbolic op-
portunities. A plethora of Annual Reports from the world’s major NGOs who have 
been active in war zones depict the contributions they make by showing houses 
being built or completed. DIFID even presented Mithatovici, the very case study 
settlement I investigated, as a celebratory example of the housing achievements 
reached by ‘the international community’.4 In the case of Mihatovici, cf. Chapter 
6.4, we shall see what it symbolizes for the inhabitants of the settlement. 
                                          
1 In the open global economy of today governments are left to present themselves as inviting ‘environ-
ments of investment’.  When my hometown of Trondheim celebrated its millennium in 1997 the mayor – 
at the very opening – primarily proclaimed the event as a gigantic “public relations opportunity” aimed 
at future investors. 
2 Rapoport referred to 47 housing market segments being used (Land Use Digest 1994 cf. Rapoport 
1985). 
3 A famous settlement in Florida based on the principles, or rather the ideology, of “New Urbanism”. 
4 Developments, Fourth Quarter 2002; 6-7 
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The traditional theories on urban development, on urban form, deal with housing as 
a matter of course since housing makes up most of the land in urban areas. They 
start out with von Thünen of 1826 go through Hallett, Hudson and Rhind, Maclen-
nan and others (see Balchin et al. 1995 for a detailed summary of these theories). 
In these theories the location of housing is primarily explained as being a function 
of travel cost/housing cost trade-offs. This does not directly take into account the 
role of status embedded in the “location, location, location” mantra of real estate 
agents. Phe & Wakely (2000)5 find that instead of economic trade-offs, residential 
location seems more to be determined out of perceived housing quality and status.  
New urban hierarchies emerge that reflect, and tend to reproduce, economic as well 
as symbolic capital strength. This may be the way cities are zoned in the minds of 
their inhabitants. This is what upward mobility is about. Hummon (1990) holds that 
it is not a particular place people are seeking, they are seeking a type of environ-
ment that corresponds to their present life-style or to the one they strive for. This 
is how status is created and made manifest, not by the house or place as such. It is 
the address of the house that holds status, - for those on top, and those at the bot-
tom. Those with no address – no choices – have no status at all.  People displaced 
by war easily fall into this category. 
 
2.3.3 HOUSING AS (SYMBOL OF) HOME 
The many meanings of home are symbolized in the house, in the dwelling unit. 
Home is tangible, socio-material reality however enigmatic in essence. It comprises 
our everyday behavior, our cognition and our affection. It seems that in all of litera-
ture, be it in research, reflections, fiction or poetry, home is about affection or is 
being described with affection. Herein lies housing’s symbolic powers. Home is in 
some profound way about emotions, and thus about attachment, attachment to 
people, to places, to things. Home is at the core of the relationships that emerge 
from the meanings projected into these nodes of affection. These are, on the one 
hand, larger than yourself in time, they are your own memories, memories inher-
ited6 and memories of the people involved in your network of home; they are larger 
than you in physical terms, they are buildings built, landscapes created and culti-
vated, and there is memorabilia stemming from times or places beyond your reach.  
Home is making up what you are and who you are, echoing the earlier discussion 
on habitus. “It is not only an area for everyday life [it also] provides meaning to 
that life” (Eyles 1989 cf. Altman & Low 1992;109). An illustration is by way of “af-
fordances” a term introduced by Gibson (1979 cf. Werner, Altman & Oxley 1985;5). 
It is not the rocking chair as a functional object, it is the act of sitting and the 
                                          
5 Recipients of the Donald Robertson Memorial Price 2000 for their work on the new theory on residen-
tial location based on status and quality. 
6 Cf. the Palestinian student visiting NTNU in 1997, telling about her home in what is now Israel. It was 
the home of her grandparents which she herself has never seen. But it was still home (her place, her 
people, her things). The tragedy of the matter is that most probably there is no place, no things, as it 
has been the policy of the Israeli government to erase all traces of previous Palestinian settlements 
within Israel. According to Fallah (cf. Porteous & Smith 2001;90) about half of all Palestinian villages 
were depopulated and about a third of these were destroyed, of which about 15% of which were totally 
obliterated, leaving no trace of anyone having ever lived there. “My home” said the Palestinian student. 
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meaning of that act, be it in the repetitive way of everyday life – or, say, the first 
time it was left empty after your father died. So it is with the functional object we 
call home, “the furniture of self”, as Erikson calls it (cf. Brown & Perkins 1992;292): 
“Something you somehow haven’t to deserve”, as Robert Frost said.7 
 
.1) The Attributes of Home 
The academic literature on home is vast and varied, although much of it reflects a 
Western middle class, even North American, way of life. It seems biased in favor of 
a culture that in John Berger’s view speculates in the emotive dimensions of home 
for political and commercial purposes (Berger 1983).  This is also why home and 
house (dwelling, dwelling unit, housing unit, etc) even in academic papers are arbi-
trarily used, and catchphrases like “home is where your heart is” and “home as a 
mirror of self”8 are being replicated in much of this literature. So are the many ty-
pology lists (see Altman & Werner 1985, Altman & Low 1992, Porteous & Smith 
2001). Rapoport takes issue with most of this writing on home. He calls attention to 
the fact that the wide, almost idiosyncratic definitions applied are harmful for re-
search (Rapoport 1995;28). Some of it retains its validity, however, by presenting 
lay people’s perceived attributes of home, thereby revealing the plethora of mean-
ings held on the term or the concept. These perceptions (misguided or nor) are real 
in the sense that they underpin real life action, also when it comes to housing 
choices and tenure alternatives (Hiscock et al. 2001). This comes to head when the 
dwelling – as home – is being destroyed; desecrated as in war, obliterated as in 
natural disasters. These perceptions guide both desecrator and victim. The follow-
ing attributes associated with ‘home’ stem from a US study done in the late 1980s, 
but might as well have been a list of the reasons for selectively destroying houses 
in areas of identity conflicts:  
 
security and control 
reflection of one’s ideas and values 
acting upon and modifying one’s dwelling 
permanence and continuity 
relationship with family and friends 
center of activities 
refuge from the outside world 
indicator of personal status 
material structure in a particular location 
place to own9 
 
Home is not about attributes as such, but about their relationships. This does not 
mean an a priori relationship to a place or to a house or dwelling.  Rapoport points 
                                          
7 Robert Frost, Death of a Hired Hand (Untermeyer 1961). 
8 Which is the title of a book by Clare Cooper Marcus (1995). 
9 From Depres’ PhD dissertation 1991 (cf. Rapoport 1995, cf. Porteous & Smith 2001).  Although this is 
a listing of attributes, they inherently contain the relational character of these attributes on the part of 
the respondents. Security and control is to most people a major feature of home, as is permanence and 
continuity.  When Rapoport objects it is because these qualities cannot be seen as fundamental and 
constituting elements of home irrespective of setting, - of location, time, culture, life-style, religion, etc. 
- and that they by nature are relational; they emerge from meaningful interaction. 
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to other cultures where this would not be the case (Rapoport 1995), as does Kent 
(1995) pertaining to the homes of nomads. The same may be said about a growing 
number of citizens of the industrial West, many of whom are authors and research-
ers on books about homes and place attachment.10 In these cases the growing mo-
bility basically stems from people’s own choices.. 
 
.2) Home as Choice 
The problem arises when there is no choice, when mobility is the forced result of 
violent expulsion. For the expelled the house, the place and the things lost or saved 
subsequently emerge as true symbols of (lost) home relationships.  Berger’s claim 
that “without a history where choice was possible a house can not be a home” 
(1983;463) supports Rapoport’s statement that “it seems characteristic of [home 
environments] that they are chosen.  One could almost argue that if they are not 
chosen they are not home” (Rapoport 1985;256).11 Choice becomes a key concept 
of home, because making choices make sense.12 Without choices, action becomes 
meaningless. Peter Marris sees ‘meaning’ as: 
“a crucial organizing principle of human behavior.  It is a structure, which relates 
purposes to expectations so as to organize actions - whether the actions are taken 
or only thought about.  Meaning, that is, makes sense of action by providing rea-
sons for it; and the collapse of compelling reasons to act constitutes the trauma of 
loss." (Marris 1986;vii) 
 
When your dwelling is violently destroyed and you have been banished from your 
home ground at gunpoint, your home is lost. The loss is seriously eroding the 
meaning of life with home acknowledged as “a symbol of self and self-identity” 
(Porteous & Smith 2001;54), a claim supported by findings from a study made by 
the US Department of Health in 1966 which “makes it clear that housing affect per-
ception of one’s self” (Schorr, 1966 cf. Bratt 2002;20). ‘Perception of self’ is what 
Giddens labeled ‘ontological security’, which he saw as “the confidence that most 
human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of 
their social and material environment” (Giddens 1991 cf. Hiscock et al. 2001;50). 
Having had that continuity severed, the most immediate way of regaining it, and 
thus re-establish some sense of your life, is to reconfirm your choice of home being 
the very place you were expelled from (Zetter 1999). 
If we revisit Habitus, we see a consistency on the part of the displaced in their pro-
jection of ‘home’ onto the building or the place that once constituted the physical 
                                          
10 In the US, 20% of the population changes address each year. On average a US resident will move 14 
times during their lifetime, twice as many times as the Japanese and about 5 times as often as the Irish 
(used to move) (Long & Boertlein 1976 cf. Altman & Werner 1985). According to RiskWorld data for 
1998, each French household moved every 10.04 years 
(http://www.riskworld.com/Abstract/1998/SRAEUR98/eu8ab218.htm). The scale of inter- and intra-
national mobility is difficult to work out in detail, hence the use of old data. 
11 Note that Rapoport never, or rarely, uses the term ‘home’ as a single term, because home is a rela-
tional concept. “Home is a useless term”, he said in Trondheim (Rapoport 1995;44). He uses the term: 
“home environments”. 
12 The argument could be extended or refined in stating that ‘home’ is not only ‘chosen’ it is also ‘dis-
covered’. It seems obvious that when children ‘grow into a place’ they discover home, they are in no 
position to chose, Only when a choice is possible, is home chosen,  
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imprints of their habitus.  For any observer, it is important to bear in mind that 
these imprints initially emerged as a result of all the activated systems constituting 
the home, or ‘home environment’ as Rapoport would have it, not only what is re-
lated to the dwelling. For Rapoport: ’home environment’ (‘home’ for the rest of us) 
is conceived as systems of activities within systems of settings.13 Housing (the 
house, dwelling, dwelling unit) representing home is thus part of a much wider 
network. ‘Home’ may be where you work, or where you go to work from, where you 
master the landscape, where the rituals are familiar, where you master the tacit 
social codes. 
 
Two examples show opposing interpretations of this, both determined by choice 
and structure. Firstly, Returning Eritreans made their homes where the livelihood 
options were the best. After years in exile in Somaliland, the place they once left 
seemed to hold no properties they could not reestablish or compensate in the place 
where they now chose to settle (Kibreag 2002). There are several findings of simi-
lar nature (Allen & Morsink 1994, Blakewell 2000) that make place attachment a 
relative notion, whereas much of the writings, especially those of environmental 
psychologists (cf. the book series on Human Behavior and Environment14), deal 
with it in absolute terms.  There are however, several noted exceptions, such as for 
instance, Hiscock et al. (2001), who fully acknowledge the ‘security of home’ being 
related to employment, tenure, neighbors, place of ancestors, etc.  In effect it is 
these issues that constitute ‘security’. The second example deals with ‘home’ for 
people not able to return. Even for grandchildren of Palestinian refugees ‘home’ 
may be a village within Israel – a village they many never have seen and which 
probably has long since been destroyed.  For those with no choice no other proposi-
tion provides ontological security. The uncertainty of the present does not. Only 
when “meanings of home changes [and] the strength of the emotional attachment 
weakens [do] those involved begin to see that it is possible to have another life” 
(Thompson 2001;14). In due course, choices may therefore emerge which eventu-
ally will bridge the impossible divide between perceived, yet lost, home, present 
residence – and prospects for the future (Zetter 1999). But for many of those ex-
pelled, there is no bridge. The displaced remain with no ‘permanent address’, no 
status, no choices.. 
 
 
                                          
13 “Home environments are parrot of larger, culturally variable systems of settings (the house-
settlement system) and are themselves best understood as that system of settings within which a par-
ticular set of activities takes place (disregarding the variability of activities and, especially, their latent 
aspects”. Rapoport continues: “Different groups choose very different combinations of elements as the 
home environments. The nature of a given home environment cannot be decided a priori but must be 
discovered (as must the nature of the relevant group” (Rapoport 1985;264). For a more extensive 
framework of home, see Rapoport 1995;44. 
14 Human Behavior and Environment; Advances in Theory and Research, Plenum Press, New York and 
London. Most of the writers are part of group of people that as a matter of academic advancement move 
house more often than most others – but by choice. 
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.3) Housing as Control 
The house (or village, or town) becomes a symbol of home by representing the systems of 
activities within a system of settings.  And in this network of settings and activities now lost, 
stands the dwelling as primary node. The house becomes a symbolic anchor in life with no or 
little choices. The term or the concept has different connotations for different people at 
different times of their lives. When the dwelling so persistently stands out as the main node 
in people’s ‘network of home’ it could also rest on the aforementioned ‘affordances’: it is 
what takes place “behind the walls of home” that gives meaning to the dwelling.  Could it be 
that it is the back stage properties of the ‘Goffman house’ that makes a house a home 
(Goffman 1969). 
 
 
Fig.2.3.1 This gate pole may be one of the few tangible items left from this man’s farm. He 
was displaced by war, and everything he was forced to leave behind has been totally obliter-
ated. He has been living in displacement for many years, without knowing what will become 
of him and his family. He is in no control, in no position to make choices, with no permanent 
address, and in no position to return ‘home’ to his remote mountain farm.  From the Ozren 
Mountains, BiH, summer 2001. 
 
In general terms, the dwelling may have been downgraded as symbol of home. But 
for those who have lost it against their will, violently as in war, occupation, or ‘de-
mocratically’ as in public planning, housing remains the true symbol of home 
(Porteous & Smith 2001).  In addition to the lost dwelling, is it the lost choices that 
underpin the meaning of the house as home. This comes to head when planners 
and politicians decide to ‘demolish slums’ while the residents experience a ‘destruc-
tion of homes’ (e.g. the well-documented Boston West End demolition (see Porte-
ous & Smith 2001;109-112 for references). It is because of having lost control of 
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one’s dwelling, viz. one’s life, that so many do not survive removals and resettle-
ments (Lieberman 1983).15 
 
We are back with Heidegger, only that instead of “Ich bin = I dwell”, we hear the 
displaced ask: “What am I then, if I don’t dwell?” John Turner joins in with his claim 
that housing is about “being in control of your life”, about being able to make 
choices. 
 
Recovery will then be about regaining that control. This seems to be housing’s cen-
tral challenge. In terms of post-war recovery this might not automatically mean 
‘return’ to rebuild your burnt out house. Instead, it might imply a return to a state 
of choice where displaced people are able to choose how to reestablish their ‘sys-
tems of activities within a system of settings’.  For some, it may entail a return to 
home grounds, for others to choose to settle elsewhere. 
 
2.3.4 SUMMARY 
Housing is about living. It may be ‘a machine for living’ as Le Corbusier would have 
it, but from the discussion above it is more a ‘place for making sense of life’.  It is 
not merely a Corbusierian tool people use for living. It is an integral part of that 
very living. Meaning is projected into the dwelling, making it a symbol. Since it con-
stitutes such a central place in peoples’ lives, the symbol also becomes politically 
powerful, not least because the symbol is tangible and the result of economic in-
vestments. Therefore the location, the address, as discussed in the previous chap-
ter, becomes decisive in projecting meaning into the building. Housing becomes a 
status symbol – for those on top, and those at the bottom with no house at all. 
Refugees and IDPs make up a large contingent of that group. 
 
All man-made objects are products of action, and action requires meaning, a pur-
pose of sorts, to be released. For meaningful action to take place there must be 
choices. In this chapter, the power of choice has been highlighted by claiming that 
the concept, or symbol of home is related to choice, where to live, how to live, with 
whom, surrounded by what ‘stuff’, etc. Choice gives control over one’s life. When 
people are deprived of these choices, they lose control over their lives. This is what 
happens when people through meaningless enforced action are expelled from their 
houses, from their homes. This research deals with the physical environment for 
people whose life networks have been severed, and whose choices were stolen. 
 
The literature has touched upon these losses not so much as loss of choice as loss 
of place.  This may be because home as place attachment is oriented towards the 
physical environment, whereas home as a network is less focused on the place and 
more towards the relationships associated with it.  Both of these approaches de-
pend on and are shaped by the action associated with the physical environment, by 
the strategy chosen to realize the dwelling that is destined to be (part of) ‘home’. 
                                          
15 In his study of 639 elderly people, Lieberman found that one year after having had to change their 
living arrangements, half of them were either dead, physically impaired or had deteriorated psychologi-
cally into a passive state of withdrawal. 
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In the next chapter, realization will be the issue. It will examine how the physical 
object imbued with meaning by the people using, or relating to it, also has a wider 
economic and social potential that may recoil and re-shape the meaning instilled.  
There exists no man-made physical object void of meaning. All building is inten-
tional, hence instilled with meaning. But for it to materialize it has to be con-
structed.  Building is a reflexive act in that how what is done will shape the output, 
but also affect the project’s very rationale. This is very much the point in Vedung’s 
theory on implementation (2000;209-245). It is the choices made through the 
process of implementation, i.e. its tactics that will determine the wider economic 
and socio-material impact of the housing project. 
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2.4. HOUSING AS STRATEGY 
 
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION. ON HOUSING’S POTENTIAL 
Housing represents a major sector of investment, for any country, for any citizen. It 
is impossible to imagine housing as physical object and-or symbol, indeed as in-
vestment, without it affecting society materially, socially and economically. In what 
way and to what extent, is a matter of strategy, irrespective of it being conscien-
tiously chosen or not. Something happens when housing is realized. 
 
This section will look into the generation of economic activities caused by such in-
vestments and also what activities that may be rooted in the completed projects.  
World wide housing in the 1980s constituted between 2% and 8% of the annual 
GDP, and between 10 and 30% of the annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), 
with the industrial North holding the higher figures (Buckley and Mayo cf. Habitat-
ILO 1997). Throughout the world, housing as a sector of investment has decreased 
somewhat since then (ibid). Yet housing’s present contribution to Germany’s GFCF 
still stands above 30%, i.e. housing makes up about a third of the value of all new 
fixed capital in Germany comprising more than half of all construction (D-STATIS 
2002).1 In the developing world 40% of all WB and IMF funds go into construction 
of which housing accounts for anything from 35% to 40% (Habitat-ILO 1997;32). It 
is thus evident that housing and housing construction takes on a macro economic 
role in any nation’s real, financial and fiscal sector (World Bank 1993).2 The sheer 
volume of the housing sector impacts the balance of payments, the level of inflation 
- the very temperature of a nation’s economy (ibid). In all advanced economies the 
level of investment in housing is an indicator not only influencing the interest poli-
cies of the few still existing state housing banks, but also countries’ base rates. “In-
terest rates – not need, not planning, not social priorities – have […] been the 
prime determinant of how much new housing is supplied in the US”, says Peter 
Marcuse (1990;7); and Saegert continues “Federal housing programs have often 
been justified as stimulants to the economy rather than as merely ways of produc-
ing housing” (1985;303). In spite of this referring to the US, it is paradoxically in 
line with the Keynesian economic template from the 1930s which were to guide the 
reconstruction policies of the war ravaged countries after WWII (Diefendorf 1990, 
Reiersen & Thue 1996). And it persists into the open, neo-liberal economies of to-
day. The relationship between construction and economic growth still holds true, 
although the correlation is circular: construction causes economic development – 
causes construction – causes … (Ofori & Han 2003). This could give externally 
funded construction interventions a crucial opportunity to break into a ‘virtuous 
circle’ of enhancing recovery processes and aiding economic development. But this 
circle only holds true under certain, rather old-fashioned conditions (Habitat-ILO 
1997). We are closing in on the core of housing as a strategy for economic devel-
opment. 
                                          
1 This is substantially higher than in France, the UK and the US (Lau & Pain 2001) 
2 Throughout the post-war years housing has also been the largest sector of capital formation in Bosnia 
(OHR Economic Newsletters, Vol. 1 & 2, ). 
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The core of housing is Janus-faced. The face on one side views housing as a hard-
core investment, an arena for pure reason.  The other face looks at housing as 
home guided by passion. So developing policies and forging strategies will take 
place with both faces looking in. Which face makes the biggest impact is a political 
issue resting on the worldview and ideology of those most powerful. Housing of the 
first generation after WW II was conceptualized mostly through the eyes of the lat-
ter, as a basic need, a right, a consumption good outside the market. With the ad-
vent of neo-classical economic liberalism housing was conceived a market commod-
ity forging new policies, but also new relationships between people and their dwell-
ing. The house as home, as the pole between heaven and earth, to paraphrase 
Berger, is losing ground to the house as strategic investment (Røe 2001).  Gov-
ernments have pulled out of housing in order “to enable markets to work”.3 But the 
other face of Janus may still be influencing policies and local strategies. 
 
The economic impact of housing works in two different ways: Through backward 
and through forward linkages.  The former refers to direct employment generated 
by the housing investment and the production of materials, tools transport etc used 
in the realization of the construction. This is ‘what housing does’ to the local econ-
omy.  Forward linkages are the indirect (economic) activity generated by housing 
as an intermediate product, as a means to achieve something else. These latter 
linkages are contentious as will be discussed later. First the backward linkages. 
 
2.4.2 BACKWARD LINKAGES 
When a house is built on funding from abroad, irrespective from whom, the poten-
tial impact on local economic growth is at its maximum. When houses are flown in 
as pre-fabs (pre-fabricated houses), the potential impact of the investment is at its 
minimum.  In both cases, the ‘basic need’ for shelter in the target area is satisfied, 
but the direct effects on the local economy are significantly different. With the cur-
rent international engagement in housing these basic economic realities stand cen-
ter stage. The difference is due to the different direct ‘multiplier effect’ of the inter-
vention and the backward linkages in the production of the house.4 The ‘multiplier 
effect’ can be defined as the ratio of change in national income to the initial change 
in the sectorial investment, in this case housing. More directly, the multiplicity fac-
tor indicates how many times you are able to have the same money circulate within 
a defined area, normally within a country, before it is taken out of circulation as 
taxes, savings, or spent on imports.  Backward linkages describe the pattern of 
these regressive demands, how they go, where they go  More formally, backward 
linkages are measures of the demand from one sector, in our case housing, into 
other sectors of the (national) economy. 
 
                                          
3 “Enabling markets to work” was the title of the very influential book by the World Bank (World Bank 
1993), published following the UN Habitat Istanbul Convention.  These guidelines from the World Bank 
have shaped the policies of housing privatization in the former communist economies.  The last country 
to ‘leave housing to the market’ was Serbia. “In Serbia the government considers housing to be a pri-
vate sector activity with only limited direct government intervention” (Wegelin 2003). 
4 This is what I mean by ‘rather old-fashioned conditions’ (above). Multiplier effects are not what policy 
makers or economic research deals with in the age of Free Trade. An investigation (Jan 2002) into gov-
ernment and private institutions dealing with economic planning in Norway made that evident. 
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Housing has proven, with some noted exceptions, to be a very effective ‘sector of 
investment’ with a very high multiplier effect, larger than manufacturing (Grimes 
1976 cf. Habitat-ILO 1997;32). This is basically because of the labor intensity of 
housing construction. According to findings from the 1970s, the income multiplier 
alone stands at about 2 on low-cost housing. This means that “for every unit of 
currency spent directly on house construction, an additional unit of currency is 
added to demand in the economy” (Habitat-ILO 1997;31).  There are indications of 
this figure being significantly higher if generating effects of the ‘virtuous circle’ are 
reached, and already ILO and the World Bank claim that in developing countries, 
there are about two, not one, additional jobs generated from each job in housing 
construction (ibid;93). These are difficult effects to measure in the first place and 
more so, since they are highly contextual.  Two such contextual exceptions are the 
formally built single family house in the developing world, and the externally funded 
housing in conflict areas or in areas damaged by natural disasters.  The former re-
quire substantial imports. Klaassen et al. (1987) has found that the income multi-
pliers were inversely related to the cost of the house primarily because of the im-
port levels. In the case of post-war or post-disaster countries, the production appa-
ratus for building materials may have been damaged (with no strong inducement to 
have them reconstructed since the international agencies can import building mate-
rials tax-free).5 In both cases, a smaller portion of the construction cost was taken 
by direct wages.6 In Bosnia the figures were down to about 30% during the mid-
1990s.7  The same figure is put forward for high-income housing in Kenya (Syagga 
1989 cf. Habitat ILO 1997;53). Similar, if not worse, are the labor-materials ratio in 
formally built single-family housing funded by overseas remittances (Goffe 2002). 
 
Both of these exceptions are examples of practices that impede the process of eco-
nomic growth or economic recovery.  In both cases, import substitution would have 
contributed towards economic growth through employment and value creation. The 
much cited study from Sri Lanka from the 1980s show that by only using locally 
produced building materials and components the employment within the sector 
would increase by about 20%, reducing the national unemployment by one-third. 
The implications are obvious.  Take any book, policy paper or any internet site 
dedicated to ‘development’ or ‘reconstruction’.  There is a universal call for utilizing 
local resources.  But in the ‘reconstruction’ business, where most of the housing 
(re)construction is funded by external governments or multilateral agencies, there 
are donor interests to consider. In East Timor, only 20% of the total funds granted 
were left behind in the domestic economy (Hill & Saldahna 2001). Mossberg et al. 
have shown that one expat carpenter of those brought to Bosnia to complete Swed-
ish pre-fabs cost the same as 150 local carpenters8 (Mossberg et al. 1997;74). To 
utilize the intrinsic potential of housing as a vehicle for economic development in 
                                          
5 Organizations providing material assistance to Palestine, however, have to pay ’security charges’ – to 
Israel. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency, UNRWA; had to pay US$ 2,5 million to Israel for theis im-
ported relief supply (http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/aid/2002/095israel.htm)   
6 This figure is much lower than the full cost, which for emergency projects also are to cover HQ over-
heads in the donor country and the expat and local staff of the organization. 
7 These are from cost figures presented in project reports from Norwegian People’s Aid. 
8 And we are talking about Bosnia, a country with traditions of excellence in modern construction. 
45
 
 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
countries where housing-related production is down or destroyed, and bearing in 
mind the materials-labor ratio, efforts to raise the production capacity of the build-
ing materials industry, is at least as important as the (re)construction of housing 
itself., Because these activities thrive on each other. 
 
2.4.3 FORWARD LINKAGES 
‘Forward linkages’ of a housing investment are similar to its economic ‘impacts’ 
(NMFA 1993), i.e. what housing indirectly does once built. Whereas backward link-
ages, however laid out, are actual inputs into the housing construction, forward 
linkages are assumptions about possible future gains once the housing project is 
being used.  Take health, for instance. One of the most prevalent claims is the link-
age between ill health and ill housing. Modern political movements have been 
rooted in this, so has the very ‘modern movement’ in architecture and urban plan-
ning (sun, air, green spaces)  
 
 
Fig.2.4.1The New Healthy Housing environment was to replace the old, unhealthy, dark and 
crowded housing of yesterday. Le Corbousier’s assumptions on forward linkages; sketches 
from the 1920s.  
 
The very notion of public planning is very much indebted to this claim; even Plato 
posed it, according to Kostof (1992).  The problem with such ‘forward linkage 
claims’ is that it is difficult to present a rigorous causation between better hous-
ing/better health with, for instance, higher productivity as indicator of a forward 
linkage. The elements are “next to impossible” to isolate in a way that makes rigor-
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ous research possible (Moavenzadeh & Hagopian 1983 cf. Habitat-ILO 1997;125).9 
The lack of positive causation is, however, compensated by basic findings of the 
type presented by Burns & Ferguson (1987), that shelter and settlement programs 
as such have no special qualities for promoting economic progress, merely that 
they accommodate such progress.  In the UK, Maclennan found that on a national 
scale housing investment does not induce long-term increases in capital formation 
or productivity (Maclennan et al. 1997 cf. Maclennan & Pryce 1998;6).  But Maclen-
nan maintains that, supported by “wide practitioner belief”, at local city or regional 
levels, housing investment appears to have endogenous growth effects on job-
related investments: “Cut housing investment locally and growth will fall” (ibid;6). 
So research has to be content with the ability to falsify zero-hypothesis with find-
ings like “in no case did better housing make matters worse for the rehoused popu-
lations studied” (Burns & Grebler 1977 cf. Habitat-ILO 1997;15). Bearing in mind 
crucial effect of choice in the housing-home-health relationship, such findings may 
in effect be sufficient to undergird housing strategies and inform reconstruction 
guidelines. They are to housing improvements as the Pareto Principle and the writ-
ings of Rawls (1973) were to the social democratic ideology and the theoretical un-
derpinning of the welfare state. In simple terms, they hold that as long as no one is 
worse off, a policy is deemed fair (Rawls 1973) and socially preferable (Pareto)10 if 
one person is better off because of it.  
 
In forward linkages housing is a means. Whether it is appropriate as a means to 
some chosen goal or not is a matter of assumption. Take reconciliation, a strategic 
goal in most post-war reconstruction work undertaken by INGOs and multilateral 
agencies (Slim 2000, Schloms 2001, CPCC 1998). Housing as a major reconstruc-
tion input cannot confirm this assumption. Yet housing as such was brought into 
Guatemala’s peace accord in that the government committed itself to spend 5% of 
their annual revenue on housing.11 Reportedly, this pledge has not been realized. 
Mary Anderson (1999) presents a case where housing did affect reconciliation – 
detrimentally. Her case showed how easily housing can exasperate a conflict. This 
housing case was among those used to underpin the “do no harm” principle; a so-
ber reminder of the frailty of these forward linkages, how they may be misunder-
stood, politicized, made victims of empty claims – or how they may do harm. 
 
But there are forward linkages that are possible to ascertain, even plan for. Housing 
as place for work is one that makes housing an intermediate means. This is, how-
ever, such a basic issue that time might have come to incorporate it into housing 
proper. It started out that way. The emerging post-industrial era again opens up for 
‘work from home’. In the developing world, work hardly left home. Numerous stud-
                                          
9 On the other hand, there are statistical correlations between bad housing, bad health, poverty and the 
like. But does bad housing cause bad health or is bad health and poverty the reason people end up in 
bad housing?  When investigating housing mobility we often end up with the latter. Housing is a slippery 
tool indeed. 
10 “When professional economists think about economic policies, they generally start with the principle 
that a change is good if it makes someone better off without making anyone else worse off. That idea, 
first suggested by the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, is referred to as the Pareto principle” (Public 
Interest, No 137, Fall 1999 http://www.nber.org/feldstein/pi99.html) . 
11 Verbal information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, May 2001 
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ies covering most countries of the world indicate that 10–25% of all housing is used 
for income-generating activities (Habitat-ILO 1997;190). Housing being a means of 
production has made tenants in government housing alter and extend their flats to 
accommodate business requirements (Tipple 2000, Dasgupta 1987 cf. Habitat –ILO 
1997;126).  The most visually distinctive, and by number the most common, aside 
from rooms to let (Tarekegn 2000), is that of the shopkeeper trading from his 
house front.  Such a house is transformed into a ‘home shop’ due to its location. 
High frequency and high prevalence of prospective customers are key location fac-
tors.12 In new constructions or in upgrading projects these can be planned for.13 
How housing links up to services, to public facilities, to places of employment and 
available communication options, are crucial forward linkages of any housing in-
vestments (Chatterjee 1987 cf. Habitat-ILO 1997;37, 81, Green et al. 2001). This, 
of course, is planning basics, seemingly universal, reconfirmed by Linn in his stud-
ies on urban development in cities of the South14 (Linn 1983), embraced by David-
son & Payne in their Urban Projects Manual (2000), and in post-disaster reconstruc-
tion recommendations (Davis 1978, UNDRO 1982). In terms of planning, it would 
be expected that such preferences are valid also in post-war settings. 
 
Housing generates forward linkage economic benefits in a more direct way. On the 
one hand is the consumption and renewal of ‘stuff’, on the other hand is future 
maintenance, conversions, extensions etc., future backwards linkages, as it were. 
The level and impacts of these can never be quantified in advance. More than any-
thing they depend on the mode of tenure. 
 
It was the post-WW II housing boom in the USA which instituted home-owner sub-
urbanization which in turn gave rise to, and depended on, the Do-It-Yourself (DIY) 
movement, a business sector of significant proportions in most industrialized coun-
tries. (Goldstein 1998). More than 30 years ago, John Turner documented from 
Latin America the commonly accepted fact that security of tenure is a prerequisite 
for personal commitment – willingness, by any other name – of investing into your 
dwelling (Turner & Goetze 1967). DeSoto has in two recent books been advocating 
the rights of tenure and privatization of housing in order to achieve the dynamics of 
the ‘forward linkages’ (De Soto 2000, De Soto & Abbott 2002).  His work has been 
very influential in forging the World Bank’s ‘enabling approach’.15 In addition to the 
willingness underpinned by secured tenure, ability and knowledge are required on 
the part of the dweller to enter into these activities, either for entering them 
                                          
12 As was beautifully exemplified by Oscar Hansen and Svein Hatløy in their proposal for a large-scale 
housing scheme (never realized) on the outskirts of Lima (Hatløy 1991). 
13 What happens when they are not will be examined in my second case, The Mihatovici settlement (Cf. 
Chapter 6.4). 
14 He identified five decisive attributes on housing demand: access (to employment opportunities, public 
services, communication, etc), space (lot size to cater for urban farming, work space, etc), on-site ser-
vices (quality of infrastructure), shelter (the quality of the dwelling, privacy, space for possible rent or 
work), and security of tenure, by many seen as the most important in terms of reaping forward linkage 
benefits from housing. 
15 “Enablement strategies seek to improve the functioning of markets which supply the five major com-
ponents in the housing process; land, finance, the skills of the labor force, infrastructure, and building 
material; and to provide an appropriate regulatory framework” (Habitat-ILO 1997;6). 
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him/herself or to organize others to do so.16  UN/Habitat sees the latter as the fu-
ture scenario in reaping sustainable benefits from housing (Habitat-ILO 1997).  The 
operational nature of these activities links back to the capacity of the housing to 
accommodate change and allow for a maintenance regime that is materially and 
financially possible to sustain. We see the merging of ‘forward linkages’ with the 
physical nature of housing. Now let us see if we can make the backward linkages 
join in. 
 
2.4.4 FORWARD LOOKING BACKWARDS LINKAGES 
In the literature the various aspects of housing are dealt with separately. Hence 
backward linkages are the concern of economists, whereas the forward linkages, so 
dependent on assumptions, are also within the realm of architects. But, as we shall 
see, there are issues that span both the backward and the forward linkages, issues 
that are at the very center of post-war housing. Two of these stand out: they are 
innovation and self-help. The former refers to opportunities opened by the produc-
tion or the needs behind it, and grasped by someone realizing that things “could 
have been done otherwise”, to quote the essence of Giddens’ agency definition. The 
other is about how the future linkages emerge from the very process of building, 
from realizing the backward linkages, as it were. 
 
.1) Innovation 
When disaster suddenly strikes, new ways of dealing with housing are required, or 
at least opportunities are opened to do so. Housing viewed merely as a low-tech 
object naturally attracts outside designers and innovators.  Throughout recent his-
tory a plethora of ‘innovative’, but totally unsuitable, unsustainable and even harm-
ful solutions have been advocated. They range from the famous polystyrene sheds 
from BASF (Davis 1978) via ‘modern’ concrete structures (Barakat 1994) to the 
recent emergency housing for Kosovo.17 So far, it is only the paper drum emer-
gency housing designed by Shigeru Ban, built after the Kobe earthquake that 
represents appropriate innovation (GG Portfolio 1997). 
 
It is the experience from WW II and the ensuing reconstruction that is most often 
cited to exemplify the potential for innovation in permanent housing construction.18 
New materials, new production schemes, new designs were launched to cater for 
the enormous demand for housing. It was the modernists’ heyday. Pre-fabricated 
housing came to prominence during the war to cater for the housing needs of the 
US war industry and was studied by most European governments (Danche 1986, 
Diefendorf 1990, Albrecht 1995). Architectural design-production experiments were 
                                          
16 Hence the massive level of do-it-yourself books and periodicals, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, 
but still prevalent, now also as TV entertainment. 
17 This was a highly publicized, and heavily sponsored international architectural competition held in 
1999 in response to the plight of the houseless Kosovars.  It was arranged by “Architecture for Human-
ity”, established by a US architect who, guided by his good intentions, thought he “could do otherwise” 
on behalf of the people of Kosovo. Apparently no house was built as a result of the competition. 
18 Although most of the ‘innovative’ emergency housing referred to still stands, either as shelter for 
animals, for storage or as housing for the society’s outcasts, like the romani people, the gypsies. In 
Skopje, the ‘temporary’ asbestos paneled housing erected after the 1963 earthquake have become 
homes for middle class families due to their central location (Spangle, W. 1991). 
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tried out, such as the “Case Study Houses” in California19 and the “Selvaag-hus” in 
Norway.20 Similar efforts were undertaken in most countries at the time (Diefendorf 
1990, Rassegna 1993).  But pre-fab housing never made it beyond the immediate 
post-war years.21 The other face of Janus was probably looking in. 
 
.2) Self-help 
That face was looking at self-help housing, or ‘aided self-help’ as it is known as a 
housing strategy term (Harris 1999a).22 Although this is the generic way of housing 
construction, as a ‘housing approach’ or ‘housing strategy’, it first took off in the 
wake of WW I; “The First World War was a watershed”, writes Harris.23  It was 
about making the most of the meager resources then available. Programs were 
initiated throughout most of Europe. Architects were engaged to produce designs 
that could cater for anticipated incremental growth; Ernst May24 was among them. 
But it was not until the post-WW II years that self-help took off into a movement. 
The war veterans sustaining their wartime bonding led the way, highlighting the 
social capital foundation for the movement. The veterans and their families had the 
greatest needs and the moral high ground in arguing for government support in 
building their own homes. This led to an extraordinary activity.  In 1949, a third of 
all new one-family houses and a quarter of all dwellings in the US were made by 
their owners (US Department of Labor, 1954 cf. Harris 1999b;297). In Greece even 
more.  By 1950 three-quarters of all post-war housing in Greece was produced this 
way (Speer 1951 cf. Harris 1999a;297).  Although not at these levels, assisted self-
help or self-provided housing, prevailed. In the early 1990s, Duncan & Rowe held 
that self-provided housing still made up “a major form of housing supply in nearly 
all the developed countries in Western Europe, North America and Australasia” 
(Duncan & Rowe 1993;1331). If that remains unrecognized, so does the fact that 
self-help housing is applied in programs like ‘urban homesteading’ in cities like New 
York (Coit 1994). It is, of course, fully acknowledged as the most prevalent ap-
proach in the developing world, although the UN has now come out in favor of pro-
moting small and medium-sized contractors taking on the construction of housing, 
rather than people doing it themselves (Habitat-ILO 1997). In post-war and post-
disaster housing (re)construction this is gradually growing into an acknowledged 
                                          
19 The “Case Study Houses” were sponsored by the Californian journal Arts and Architecture. Their aim 
was to seek out new design ideas—particularly in the use of new materials and techniques—and to 
propagate good design.  We are talking 1945 - 49.  One of their houses, the Eames House became very 
influential.   
20 Constructed in 1948 as a proposal for a cheaper, more rapidly built family house than the building 
regulations allowed for. The regulations were changed.  The housing crisis after the war had brought a 
genuine improvement to housing in Norway. 
21 In the UK more than 150,000 pre-fabs were produced during the war and the early post-war years. By 
the late 1960s at least one-third of them were still in use.  Some are still in use, many of them as regis-
tered landmark buildings (Vale 1995). 
22 Another label is ‘self-provision’, comprising ‘self-build housing’, where the household do most of the 
actual building works, and ‘self-promoted housing’ where the household acts as promoter and developer 
(Duncan & Rowe 1993). 
23 Although “the earliest documented argument [for aided self-help] was made by the Christiania (Oslo) 
Worker’s Association in Norway in 1874 (Umrath, 1952;9)” (Harris 1999b;283). 
24 Ernst May was an architect and urban planner, very active in Germany up until 1930, when he left for 
the USSR.  He worked there for some years before emigrating to Tanzania.  He returned to Germany in 
1957, and died 1980. His major contribution was planning for and implementing new housing, particu-
larly in the Frankfurt area in the late 1920s. 
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practice. But Janus makes sure the arguments between the merits of the contrac-
tor-built and the self-help built continue unabated (Ward 1982, UNHCR 1998, SIDA 
2001). 
 
“Housing achievements consist not only of houses and other material parts of a 
dwelling environment, but also of the ways and means by which they are spon-
sored, designed, built, used and maintained”, said Turner 30 years back (Turner 
1972; 161). What makes self-help into more than a way of production is that it 
rests on ‘participation’, to the level of ‘community control’.25  Turner saw aided self-
help as a strategy towards autonomy, of control, of ‘who decides - we or them’ 
(Turner & Goetze 1967;11-34).26  It is about mutual aid between families, between 
members of communities, about “helping ourselves”. It constitutes and relies on 
‘community participation’, the omnipresent mantra of all development literature 
(see references to central papers in Barakat & Chard 2002). Participation as a way 
of transferring perceived ‘ownership’ of a project is required to secure its sustain-
ability. As long as projects are funded by outside sources true participation on the 
upper levels of Arnstein’s ladder is apparently extremely difficult to achieve: “The 
inequalities introduced by money appear to be indestructible”, writes Lalaye 
(1996;140). Introducing “sweat equity”, as done in aided self-help, will balance this 
relationship and thereby allow for top-flight ‘citizen power’ as envisioned by Arn-
stein (1969). Turner was convinced this to be the case (1967, 1972). At the utilitar-
ian end we have findings like “[people] maintain their buildings better when there is 
an element of self-help” (Coit 1994;123), or that there is a better repayment rate 
in these schemes than in traditionally government-run housing projects (Shah in 
Payne 1984 cf. Coit 1994;123). 
 
At the other end, we have findings on place attachment through appropriation of 
the environment; having ‘produced it’ as Sartre would have said (2001/1956). This 
way, the builder has strengthened his relationship to the place; the place or the 
environment in question being defined as complex and systematic organization of 
space, time, meaning and communication (Rapoport 1982 cf. Werner et al. 
                                          
25 Sherry Arnstein’s “Ladder for Participation” was written with the realities of the US in mind, but the 
ladder has been used throughout the world to guide and analyze planning and development projects. 
The lower two steps are non-participatory, they merely aim at rallying support; steps 3, 4, and 5 indi-
cate a ‘level of tokenism’; the three upper steps, a ‘level of citizen power’. 
8 - citizen control 
7 - delegated power  
6 - partnership 
5 - placation 
4 - consultation  
3 - informing 
2 - therapy 
1 - manipulation 
26 This gives away Turner’s indebtedness to Geddes and Kropotkin.  But it also alludes to the political 
independence of ‘assisted self-help’, to anarchism, by any other word.  Thus, assisted self-help housing 
had support from the US (long before Turner) as and when assisted self-help was perceived to promote 
home ownership, or in quelling discontent from supporting communism. In the USSR, assisted self-help 
constituted a major part of the housing policy until Stalin went Baroque in 1936. From then on it was 
part of a Western conspiracy.  In the West, the organized labor effectively lobbied against any assistance 
to the self-help approach, years before Turner was reproached in academic circles the 1980s by Marxist 
scholars (Harris 2003). “Aided self-help is a political chameleon”, said Harris (1999;280), making obvi-
ous that assisted self-help is more than a method of constructing houses.  
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1985;3). The strengthening of place attachment thus enhances the relationship to 
other ‘people of the place’, affecting the trust and solidarity, or social capital, which 
stand tallest of the capital modes necessary for developing and sustaining democ-
ratically oriented communities (Putnam 1993,163-176; 1995; Grootaert 1998). This 
is the sort of capital that displaced people value, to the extent of living in provi-
sional, plastic-covered shacks rather than disperse and thus loose their social net-
work.27 It is the sort of capital that tends to reproduce itself.28 This is a capital 
mode, which can not be provided, nor acquired in general terms. 
 
It is impossible to lay out any secure, trans-historical generalizations on how aided 
self-help may impact economic, social or political life. “Its merits must be assessed 
with unusually close reference to place and time”, says Richard Harris (1999;280). 
 
2.4.5 SUMMARY 
This section has focused on the implementation phase. How housing becomes what 
it sets out to be, a physical structure imbued with meaning and functional possibili-
ties. Take the physical structure, for instance. It has been made quite obvious that 
using domestically produced materials, i.e. applying a high labor multiplier, consti-
tutes a significant development potential compared to importing materials. Ignoring 
this is, in effect, squandering opportunities of enhancing recovery. 
 
However, it might not only be ignorance that causes building materials to be im-
ported.29 Prevailing free trade policies make any preferential agreements with do-
mestic producers difficult, if not impossible, partly because of international trade 
agreements signed, or because of fear of reprisals or refused access to markets in 
the rich nations.30 This is further emphasized by the fact that international agencies 
and INGOs do not pay import duties. Unit cost was therefore the decisive argument 
when the UNHCR chose to import roofing sheets for 100,000 houses in Rwanda, in 
spite of economic logic showing the developmental potential in applying localized 
solutions (UNHCR 2000a). 
 
Re/constructing housing through the ‘aided self-help strategy’ has community 
strengthening as one of its presumed by-products. This strengthening of social 
capital through administering and building together represents a major contribution 
                                          
27 This was the case for bulldozed community temporarily located in a park in Nairobi.  They stayed 
together for 12 years under extreme conditions rather than accept offers of dispersal and thereby mov-
ing out to other areas (Andreasen 1987). 
28 In Trondheim, Norway, two suburbs were constructed through organized self-help during the 1960s. 
From this, emerged a social network so strong that now a number of the participants are about to build 
a large self-promoted retirement home together in the same neighborhood. 
29 Or is it ignorance? The EU presented their Essential Aid Programme to Bosnia-Herzegovina thus: ”The 
essential aid programme allowed Bosnia Herzegovina to import the products and equipment necessary to 
start the reconstruction process. Building materials, piping, seed, agricultural machinery, medical sup-
plies, mine detectors, buses, trams, electrical equipment, coal and all sorts of other equipment and raw 
materials were brought in and distributed” (EC 1997;3). 
30 Roger Zetter (1992) has documented how housing was made an instrument in support of post-war 
recovery in the aftermath of the partition of Cyprus.  That was probably the last time preferential trade 
policies were strategically used in support of post-war recovery, in a manner similar to how the post-WW 
II reconstruction of Europe was conducted. 
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towards development (DIFID 2001-02, Stafford et al. 2000, Grootaert 1998, Put-
nam 1993). 
 
The strategy chosen, or the strategy dictated is a matter of context and profes-
sional perceptions.  Implementing housing in areas affected by armed conflict must 
necessarily pay attention to the ‘realities on the ground’, the overall context com-
posed as it is of material constraints and extreme social vulnerability. This will be 
the topic of the next chapter. 
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3  WAR, AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HOUSING 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is the ‘killing’ of housing in war that has initiated this research project. It is the 
effects of war that make up the context into which housing is reconstructed. The 
very process of recovery support is guided by the experience and outcomes of war 
as interpreted by those who fund and organize the reconstruction projects – modu-
lated by the strategic goals they set for their own political and economic engage-
ment. The way we set out to implement our housing interventions will thus be in-
formed by our understanding of the conflict, and ultimately guide how we act in the 
field. That understanding is ‘theory laden’, in the Sayer sense, was poignantly pos-
ited by Hanna Arendt in reference to the US engagement in Vietnam:  
 
“The fact is that very few of the sophisticated intellectuals who wrote the Pentagon 
Papers believed in this [domino] theory. Yet everything they did was based on this 
assumption […] because it gave them a framework within which they could work. 
[…] People find such theories in order to get rid of contingency and unexpected-
ness.” (Arendt 1978)  
 
But before examining the theories in more detail let us go through some definitions 
and basic facts on current wars.  
 
3.2 CURRENT WARS AND TRENDS OF VIOLENT CONFLICT 
There are several research centers presenting datasets on war-related issues,1 
numbers, origin, type, etc.2 Currently there are general indications on a decline 
from the peak 1984–1988 period both in numbers and in societal impacts (Marshall 
2002). Figures show around 30 ongoing armed conflicts worldwide. There are some 
sobering qualifications to these figures. All but three are intra-state wars,3 and by 
far the most take place in non-industrial countries.  In fact, in the late 1990s three-
quarters of all armed conflicts were taking place within the poorest nations in the 
world (ibid.; 78). According to Stewart, eight of the ten lowest ranking countries, 
both on the Human Development Index (HDI) and in GNP/pc, have been ravaged 
by internal wars in the recent past. In fact half of the least developed countries 
have been subject to serious political violence between 1970 and 1996.  More seri-
ous still, over one-third of all the world’s countries (54 out of 158) have had serious 
internal wars during the 90s and one third of those conflicts were running for more 
                                          
1 See Worldwatch (2003; 74) and Collier et al. (2003) for references to some of these institutions. 
2 There is no codified definition on war/armed conflict or on properties defining their gravity or impact.  
The Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) defines ‘armed conflict’ as: “contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. This is further sub-
grouped into:  
• ‘Minor Armed Conflict’ with at least 25 battle-related deaths and fewer than 1000 battle-related 
deaths during the course of the conflict”, 
• ‘Immediate Armed Conflict’ with at least 25 battle-related deaths p.a. and at least 1000 deaths 
in total, but less than 1000 p.a. 
• ‘War’ with at least 1000 battle-related deaths p.a. 
(http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/current/Codebook_v1_2a.pdf) 
3 Two involve the US, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the third is the conflict on Kashmir. 
54
 
 
 
 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
than 7 years (Stewart 2002; 105). According World Bank findings there is a strong 
correlation between GNP/pc and prevalence of civil war,4 with risks rising with dete-
riorating economies (World Bank 2003; 58; UNDP 2000; 58). Current wars are con-
centrated – but by no means exclusively – to Sub-Sahara Africa, South Asia and to 
the island states of the Asian Pacific (Gurr & Marshall 2003; 12–13). 
 
Furthermore, PIOOM5 has listed 300 “political tension situations” where human 
rights violations, inequalities and environmental destruction may – or may not – 
end up as tomorrow’s wars (Worldwatch 2003; 74). Research at Harvard on 20 re-
cent civil wars6 showed that no apparent signs of the oncoming conflict were de-
tectable five years prior to its outbreak: “The considerable efforts by academics and 
others to predict where war will break out next have been largely futile (see Mar-
shall 1997 for a review)” says Haughton (1998; 9).  But Haughton’s research did 
not focus on the political tension situations where peace prevailed.7 Why there is an 
apparent decline in the number of wars is not generally agreed upon. Gurr & Mar-
shall claim this is due to improved efforts by the international community to medi-
ate, deploy military forces and develop peace-building mechanisms and thus foil the 
conflicts before they turn nasty (2003). This is contested by others (Hampson & 
Malone 2002).8 
 
3.3 IN THE SHADOW OF ANCIENT WARS 
“Honor, fear and interest” are held to be the fundamentals of war. The Greek histo-
rian and general, Thucydides, presented these in 395 BC as the ultimate causes of 
the Peloponnesian War. This claim on war’s origin was reiterated two thousand 
years later by Thomas Hobbes. He held that the nature of man made him wage war 
for three reasons: “first competition, then suspicion, and lastly, honor” (cf. Stor-
heim 1993;79). All these causes are perceived notions, real yet often irrational, 
ancient, yet contemporary.9 In current political and historical discourse, Thucydides 
                                          
4 ‘Civil war’ is defined in the World Bank report as taking place when “an identifiable rebel organization 
challenges the government militarily and the resulting violence results in more than 1000 combat-
related deaths, with at least 5% on each side” (World Bank 2003; 10). 
5 Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM), Leiden, Nether-
lands. 
6 These were the most severe civil conflicts since 1970, where at least 0,5% of each country’s popula-
tion had been killed. In the worst case, that of Cambodia, 13% had died.  
7 Johan Galtung’s proposal for a Nature Park in the contested border area between Ecuador and Peru is 
an innovative case in point. And there are some encouraging cases referred to in “People Building Peace” 
(Tongeren 1999). This stands in contrast to much of the academic writing on ‘conflict prevention’, much 
of which is conceptually fuzzy as to proactive or reactive interventions (Lund 2002). The fact that much 
of the writing is normative rather than empirical reveals the prevailing academic – and operational – 
adolescence of ‘conflict prevention’. 
8 The plethora of “Peace, Conflict Management, Mediation and Prevention Units” and the like, popping 
up at most universities of the world raises critical focus on the ethics of research. Many of these are 
established on the basis of Good Intentions and in response to a “market demand” for knowledge on 
how to prevent conflicts and enhance peace. Findings that confirm the importance of these new research 
institutions must therefore be rigorously scrutinized. There is self-promotion in the air. INCORE of Derry 
even looked into how these activities of ‘conflict resolution’ and the like may be evaluated, but acknowl-
edge difficulties in finding mutually accepted benchmarks (Church & Shouldice, 2003). 
9 In this perspective the US-UK war on Iraq actually started in the fall of 2002, when withdrawing the 
troops and equipment already deployed would be perceived an unacceptable loss of face, or honor, for 
the leaders who sent them. 
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and Hobbes hold sway (Kagan 1995, Keegan 1998, Glover 2001, Howard 2001,). 
After a lifetime studying contemporary wars A.J.P. Taylor claimed that “men do not 
fight in modern wars because they like it. They fight because they are told that it is 
their duty to do so. The clever people invent the excuses for war” (1971).  The 
‘clever people’ are those who have highjacked the notion of ‘home’, and made war 
a project of defense of the homeland, as John Berger (1984) was saying (see previ-
ous chapter).   
Defending your homeland, your territory, your house is easily extended into de-
stroying those of the others. In line with the sort of ‘pre-emptive arguments’ cur-
rently in vogue, ‘defending Serbia’ means burning other people’s houses, or ‘de-
fending Israel’ means destroying Palestinian homes.10 These are the type of political 
rhetoric, grounded in the Hobbesian ‘interest, fear and honor’, that are used by the 
‘clever people’ to shape public perceptions – and support for war.   
Waging war is the ultimate collective act. It can only be realized through mass mo-
bilization. This is why the means of mass communication are fundamental to wag-
ing war: it was ‘the talkies’ of the 1930s in Nazi Germany,11 Serbian National Tele-
vision in the years before and during the war in former Yugoslavia (Silber & Little 
1996, Magas & Zanic 2001), and it was the radio in the years leading up to the 
slaughter in Rwanda (Metzl 1997).12  News media, particularly in the US, were in-
strumental in mobilizing public support for the Iraqi invasion. By ‘embedding’ jour-
nalists with the invading troops, the public in the West was informed in ways that 
maintained a high support throughout the campaign.13  
It is only through the creation of ‘the other’, the enemy, that the notion of ‘we’ or 
‘ours’ emerges (Beck 1998, 2003). This notion of “we”-“they” is most easily estab-
lished – and exploited – where there exists “severe horizontal inequalities, that is, 
inequalities in political, economic, and/or social conditions among culturally and/or 
geographically distinct groups”, according to Stewart (2002). For these inequalities 
to explode into violence, group leaders, or ‘smart people’, have to be able to mobi-
lize the ‘distinct groups’ (Brown 1993 cf. Deng 2002; 10). This often takes place 
where there is a power struggle in the group’s leadership (Hampson & Malone 
2002), a phenomenon often referred to in explaining Milosevic’s role in the break-
up of Yugoslav (Malcolm 1996). 
It is in this context that the Hobbesian ‘honor, fear and competition’ still makes 
sense. War waged on behalf of – and on premises set by - the ‘smart people’ sup-
                                          
10 10,000 Palestinian houses and flats have been destroyed by the Israelis since they occupied the West 
Bank and Gaza, according to The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD). 
11 Kevin Brownlow’s 2002 television program “The Tramp and the Dictator”, shown on Norwegian Na-
tional Television, August 3, 2003, claimed that without the newsreel sound, Hitler would have been but a 
comic figure in German history. 
12 The radio station was actually run by a Kigali university professor. The role of academia was also 
crucial in legitimizing Serbian nationalism and subsequent mobilization through its famous ‘Memoran-
dum’ (http://www.beograd.com/sanu/images/memo.pdf). 
13 It worked significantly. British papers presented opinion surveys showing a rise in support of the war 
of about 20 percentage points after the invasion.(The Guardian, March 25, 2003). 
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ported by the impoverished, the bored, the opportunists – and the armed, mobi-
lized as a ‘culturally and/or geographically distinct group’.14 
3.4 UNDERSTANDING NEW WARS 
One of the most recent titles in the reading list on military theory at one US military 
college,15 ends like this: 
“Nothing known or predicted about the Information Age provides conclusive evi-
dence that the development or strategy in the 21st century will be remarkably dif-
ferent than in the past” (Johnson et al. 1995). 
The authors see more of the same old wars, only with more sophisticated technol-
ogy, more surprise, more shock and awe. They projected what Mary Kaldor came to 
label “spectacle wars” (2000, 2002), a mode of warfare employed in Kosovo/Serbia 
1999, in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, and partly in Afghanistan in 2002. It is state war-
fare that relies on total technological supremacy – and no body bags on the part of 
the supreme power.16 The label refers to the media spectacle these wars construct. 
“Their actual military objective is less important than satisfying public opinion”, 
says Kaldor (2002), touching bases with both Hobbes and Boudrillard.17 These 
wars, produced for television audiences of the Western world as it were, are also 
changing the way the West perceives post-spectacle war reconstruction18 - as a 
task requiring a linear efficiency based on clearly stated goals much like the way 
the military operates. Hence the growing role of de facto military units involved in 
reconstruction (World Disasters Report 2001, Macrae 2002).19 
Spectacle wars are sophisticated ‘old wars’. They merit presentation for two rea-
sons. Firstly they shape Western public perceptions of war, and by implication make 
manifest the humiliating helplessness of ‘the others’.  Secondly, they make up part 
                                          
14 However, Stewart (2002) points to the fact that mobilized masses will not easily be held back even if 
the ‘clever people’ do. In such cases new ‘clever people’ may be elected or appointed.  Enzensberger is 
on to the same when refusing to acquit common people from acting as members of a warring collective: 
“Who was it who fed and nourished the perpetrators, who applauded them and prayed for them, if not 
the ‘innocent civilians’” (Enzensberger 1994; 51).   
15 http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-thry.htm (downloaded July 28 2003). 
16 Of the c.350,000 US soldiers and reservists involved in Iraqi invasion by May 1 2003, 115 have died 
in combat-related deaths (duly specified in race/ethnicity by the US Defense Department, 
http://web1.whs.osd.mil/diorhome.htm). According to Iraqi Body Count 6000–8000 Iraqis have been 
reported killed and some 20,000 wounded (http://www.iraqbodycount.net/) (Norwegian National Radio 
News 07.08.03). 
17 Boudrillard in his three essays on the First Gulf War rhetorically asked if the Gulf War actually did take 
place.  His point was that none of war’s fundamental constituents, death, pain, cruelty and fear, were 
present. We saw nothing of it. The war we (“the allied forces”) fought was a different war “specula-
tive[ly] unfolding in an abstract, electronic and informational space” (1995; 56). What we saw through 
the (controlled) media was not a distorted or misleading representation, but a simulacrum, says Boudril-
lard.  John Pilger writes in the New Statesman August 4, 2003: “Like the American-driven, mediaval-
type siege that destroyed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives over 12 years, there is no knowledge of 
this in America; therefore it did not happen”. 
18 This was the case in Afghanistan and in Iraq. “Building will Follow the Bombing”, writes Jack Straw, 
the British Foreign Minister, in The Guardian, October 21, 2001. 
19 Christian ethics on war going back to the writings of Augustin and Thomas of Aquinas only acknowl-
edge war as legitimate when 1) it is a war of defense, 2) it is declared by a legitimate authority, 3) it is 
fought to reestablish peace, 4) it is to be limited in time (between it being declared and the signing of a 
cease fire/peace treaty). These points underpin all international conventions regulating the Laws of War 
(Trond Bakkevig, Dagbladet 24 January 2003). 
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of the complex causes underlying the proliferation of the new wars in the poor 
world. Waging war as a way of fighting back, of coping with living in ‘the black 
holes of informational capitalism’, as Castells (1996) might have described it.  
 
3.5 WAR IN THE BLACK HOLES OF GLOBALIZATION 
The ‘new wars’ are significantly different from the state wars of old. To TV audi-
ences of the North these new wars appear senseless, gruesome and endless. To 
make sense of these often extremely violent conflicts will depend on the concepts 
we apply, how we frame our questions - ultimately on our world view. Somewhat 
superficially it is possible to distinguish between the ‘Hobbesians’, or the ‘realist’ 
school of thought which informs most of the political decisions taken by Western 
governments,20 and the group of writers and thinkers much indebted to Manuel 
Castells, who sees the new wars invariably linked to the process of globalization.  
These new wars “are breaking up the cultural and social-economic divisions that 
defined the patterns of politics which characterized the modern period” (Kaldor 
1999;70).  
Contrary to popular opinion, the globalized liberal world does not spread its wealth. 
It concentrates it (Hoogvelt 1997 cf. Duffield 2002;3, Weisbrot & Baker 2003). “The 
architecture of the global economy features an asymmetrical interdependent 
world”, writes Castells in the mid-1990s, “organized around three major economic 
regions” (1996; 145), i.e. North America, Europe and East Asia. Generally speaking 
commercial investment in Africa has dried up since the 1970s (Duffield 2002; 28–
30, Weisbrot & Baker 2003). These and similar regions are in fact superfluous in 
today’s globalized economy.  Yet within all these ‘black holes’ there are scattered 
islands of relative wealth.  These affect the horizontal inequality, and represent 
linkages to the globalized world. As such they take on crucial bloodline functions in 
the new wars. As we shall see later these islands are also where the international 
aid interventions locate. 
Inextricably linked to this process is the reign of economic liberalism, which has 
directed the development of the countries excluded by globalization.  Downsizing 
the state has been a conditioning premise for international aid or credit, opening up 
the economy and the borders to free trade have been others (Munslow & Brown 
1999).21  In line with this policy shift, a paradigm shift in fact, has been the privati-
zation of the North-South linkages, i.e. the rise of the non-governmental organiza-
tions (Tvedt 1996, 1998).  As conflicts appear these organizations have become the 
piano players of globalization, administering the emergency relief and the humani-
tarian aid, in a way Robert Cox calls “global poor relief and riot control” (Cox 95; 
41).  
The New Wars may thus be seen as a consequence of this global restructuring, ex-
clusion of the South or globalization, by any other name (Litan 2001 cf. Winer 
                                          
20 See the influential writing of Professor Huntington (1996, 2002) where he reinterpreted the ‘state’ in 
realist political thought to that of ‘civilization’. 
21 There is, however, no evidence to support a correlation between economic growth of poor countries 
and their level of tariffs (Rodrik 2001, 61). 
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2002; 9). The expansion of transborder and shadow economic activity linking on to 
the globalized networks are forging “new patterns of actual development and politi-
cal authority, that is, alternative and non-liberal forms of protection, legitimacy and 
social regulation”, according to Duffield (2002; 9). As such, they function as wars 
always have: as extremely brutal means of social restructuring (Howard 2001), 
giving prominence and power to new groups of ‘smart people’, to reiterate A.J.P. 
Taylor’s term. These are not state representatives.  They are, on the face of it, an 
emergent group of new pre-Westphalia, anti-liberal leaders, “war-lords” by any 
other name, whose role is more related to CEOs of multinational corporations than 
to political leaders. On the basis of local resource exploitation, they link up to – in 
fact depend on – the globalized networks of the liberal North to market their sought 
after goods and purchase the machinery required to uphold the violent ‘restructur-
ing process’.22,23 On the quantitative level this is all confirmed by the World Bank’s 
data sets (World Bank 2003) and in line with their focus on these wars indeed being 
“wars of greed, rather than grievance” (numerous World Bank reports, e.g. Collier 
et al. 2001). In principle they reflect legitimate international economic network re-
lations. Not relations between states.24  
This is the complex arena for the ‘new wars’.25 These “can be contrasted with ear-
lier wars in terms of their goals, the methods of warfare and how they are fi-
nanced”, says Kaldor (1999; 6).  
 
3.6 NEW WARS AND THE DESTRUCTION OF HOUSING 
Housing destruction in war is not only caused by shelling, bombing or other inten-
tional damage. In order to understand the housing deficiency, in numbers and qual-
ity as experienced during and after war, we have to include causes like lack of 
maintenance, halted construction and geographical shifts in demand.   
Before discussing the new wars and housing I will briefly sweep through these indi-
rect agents of destruction, which are present irrespective of war label: 
 
• Lack of maintenance.  Due to financial, material or staff shortages26 caused by 
the security situation, dysfunctional logistics and production stand stills, build-
ings are left to crumble.  
                                          
22 Charles Taylor of Liberia is assumed to have made $400–450 million/year on illicit diamond trade 
during the early 1990s (Reno 1996 cf. Duffield 2000; 82) and profits in the millions from illicit logging 
trade for which he bought military equipment (The Observer May 27, 2001). Up until 2000 Savimbi had 
extracted diamonds worth up to US$ 3.7 bill to finance UNITA’s war (Reno 1996 cf. Duffield 2000,  also 
Malaquias 2001). The network work both ways: Republika Srpska acknowledged selling arms to Iraq 
recently and previously to The Real IRA (The Guardian, April 5, 2001). 
23 Moises Naim of Foreign Policy identifies five areas of market transaction, ‘scenes of war’, he calls it, 
where these networks “empowered by globalization” aspire to take global control. It is in the trade of 
drugs, arms, intellectual property, people and money (Naim 2003). At the same time, Eric Schlosser (cf. 
The Guardian, May 2, 2003; 3) reports that marijuana, pornography and illegal labor now account for 
about 10% of the US economy, and the black market reaches 13% of the UK economy (Sunday Times, 
April 22, 2001). These are nodes in the same network. 
24 It is therefore a conceptual short circuit when the new wars are explained – as they often are – in the 
Clausewiztian mode, like “current wars are the extension of economics, rather than politics – by other 
means. 
25 A term allegedly coined by Mary Kaldor, based on studies of the early post-Cold War conflicts, Bosnia 
being the central case. 
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• Lack of new construction. Little new or no new construction taking place to 
renew or replenish the housing stock which for the above-mentioned or ‘nor-
mal peace time reasons’ are lost. In addition comes the perpetual housing 
backlog that exists in most societies.  
• Forced urbanization. Urbanization is widely experienced in countries of war as 
part of its embedded ‘modernization’ or ‘reorientation’ (Howard 2001), or for 
security reasons. The pre-war rural population moves on to the cities where 
no surplus housing is available, only anticipated employment. So even if the 
number of housing units may be sufficient in the country, they are located in 
the wrong places, not where the demand is.  
 
Consequently, when Norway set in motion her post-war housing program in 1947, 
the target was 100,000 new housing units, although only about 20,000 had been 
destroyed and damaged during the war (Ustvedt 1978;222–247). 
 
In the remaining part of this chapter I will link housing and housing destruction to 
the three characteristics of the new wars. As these wars are part of the globalized 
economy, and hence world politics, they also are affected by the international re-
sponse they cause. It has long been accepted that this response, primarily as 
emergency relief, also may affect the unfolding of the war. (Anderson 1999, Kaldor 
1999). For this reason I add a fourth characteristic to the new wars: the type of 
international response they attract. This attraction will be extensively dealt with in 
the following chapter on reconstruction, but will also be dealt with here as it affects 
the housing demand chain even during war. The new wars thus affect housing 
through their 1) goals, 2) the way the wars are fought, 3) financed, and 4) the in-
ternational response they attract. 
 
3.6.1 GOALS OF NEW WARS 
These wars are not fought to gain political control as such, or ‘build nations”. It is 
about ‘identity politics’ where the state is relevant only in so far as it affects the 
identity policy. Identity politics are retroactive and emerging in part as a conse-
quence of the loss of power, relevance even, of the state (ibid.). Beck therefore 
labels these wars ‘post-national wars’ (Beck 2003;93–108), whereas they are being 
served to the public as ‘tribal wars’ and ‘ancient hatred’.27 Since ethnicity and terri-
tory are, by and large, overlapping issues, wars of identity have tremendous demo-
graphic impacts.  Half of Bosnia’s population of 4 million was sent on the move dur-
ing the recent war.  
Worldwide the displacement by force or choice due to violent conflict creates a 
housing shortage of immense proportions. Presently there are some 35 million 
                                                                                                                         
26 Housing maintenance is often gender defined, at least in traditional societies (Oliver 1987). In indus-
trial countries males have normally done building work. With the male population engaged in primary or 
supportive warfare, there is no-one around to ‘fix the roof’. 
27 Both the British Prime Minister John Major and Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd carried this ‘theoretical 
framework’ into their handling of the Balkan crises of the early 1990s, as did many others (Simms 
2002). 
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refugees and internally displaced people in the world.28  Most of these have had to 
flee their homes, either banished, or from not being able to cope with the social and 
economic misery caused by war and conflicts. 
 
The particularist goal of the wars’ protagonists entails large-scale housing destruc-
tion in the cleansed areas. According to the Israeli Committee Against Housing 
Demolition (ICAHD), 10,000 Palestinian housing units have been destroyed in the 
territories occupied by Israel since 1967 (Halper 2003). Whereas this has happened 
without the world watching or caring, the mass destruction of housing in other 
theatres of war, particularly in the Balkans, was duly recorded.29 In Bosnia alone, 
about 35% of its total housing stock was damaged or destroyed during the war 
years30 (IMG 1999).  
 
When civilians fleeing by the thousands, by the hundreds of thousands, and flock 
into areas of relative calm, an extraordinary strain is put on the housing stock, the 
people and the institutions of these areas. The literature is full of stories on the of-
ten antagonist nature of the relationship between the host community and the in-
coming displaced (Blakewell 2000, Kibreag 2002, Brun 2003, Malkki 1995) however 
much they are ‘of their own kind’.31  
 
The perceived goals of ‘clean areas’ rest on nationalistic imagery hard to maintain 
over years if cracks appear in the particularist expectations. Uncertainty replaces 
conviction and fervor. This is both time and place related if the demographic shift is 
not acknowledged as a ‘fait accompli’. 
 
Two examples highlight the issue of this spatial-temporal uncertainty, one regard-
ing the Muslims displaced from India, the other refers to the Palestinians. Following 
the Pakistan/India Partition a large contingent of Muslim refugees from India settled 
in makeshift shantytowns around Karachi, Pakistan’s first capital. When the initial 
uncertainty and confusion gave way to the fact of no return,32 the refugees – with 
only scant external assistance – organized the Orangi Pilot Project which systemati-
cally realized infrastructure upgrading and building. It can be assumed that the up-
grading work itself not only improved living standards, but was the act that settled 
the inhabitants into the Pakistani society. Today, the Orangi Project stands as one 
                                          
28 Whereas the refugee statistics show 14.9 million as of December 31, 2001, the number of IDPs, cur-
rently acknowledged to be the much larger group, is set at 21 million by the US Refugee Committee. 
They qualify their assessment thus: “Estimates of the number of internally displaced persons are often 
fragmentary and unreliable. This list includes more than 21 million people; the total number of internally 
displaced persons may be much higher” (http://www.refugees.org/world/statistics/wrs01_table5.pdf). 
29 The assessment of housing destruction in Bosnia undertaken by the International Management Group 
established by the UNHCR, developed a methodology in destruction assessment that has since become a 
standard. (Cf. Appendix 10.3). 
30 Destruction and damage in Mostar and Sarajevo was not part of the IMG’s assessment mandate. 
31 Cf. Nils Røhne’s story in Dagbladet, July 22, 2003, on the Serb refugees from Croatia living ‘among 
their brethren’ in Serbia – yet unwelcomed, destitute and sheltered in a most undignified way. 
32 But it takes time. For the refugee settlement to become the Orangi Pilot project more than a genera-
tion passed! Most of the Greek Cypriots displaced form Northern Cyprus in 1974, are still in the transi-
tion stage, 30 years hence. 
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of the true success cases in participatory development, presently showing higher 
societal scores than Karachi proper (Hasan 1999).  
 
 
Fig.6.3.1 Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan. A most successful upgrading and develop-
ment project created by agency of the inhabitants, with outside help on management and 
technical advice. The settlement initially started out as a refugee settlement. Courtesy of 
Mr.Arif Hasan 
 
 
Fig.6.3.2 The environment for Palestinian refugees by Shatila refugee settlement south of 
Beirut. They are prohibited from doing any improvements on their house destroyed during 
the civil war in Lebanon. Courtesy of The Norwegian People’s Aid. 
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In the Palestinian refugee camps in countries outside Palestine, such changes have 
been made impossible. The continued conflict with Israel sustains the hope of re-
turn, which subsequently – politically at least – legitimizes the host states treating 
the Palestinians in the camps as foreign refugees, 55 years after their arrival. They 
are denied basic citizens’ rights, like the right to work, thus perpetuating the uncer-
tainty. This uncertainty is made manifest in the increasingly ‘densified’ and envi-
ronmentally degraded refugee camps.  
 
3.6.2 THE METHODS OF WARFARE 
Rather than ‘winning hearts and minds’ the new wars are relying on ‘sowing fear 
and hatred’. This entails mass killings, expulsion and various forms of intimidation 
directed at the civilian population, the very acts that the ‘laws on war’ are set to 
prevent (Kaldor 1999). The dramatic increase in the number of refugees and inter-
nally displaced during the last decade is but one of the more quantifiable conse-
quences of these tactics.  Whereas inter-state wars are fought within the frame-
work of legitimate hierarchies, the new wars are carried out through networks of 
state organizations and private bands.33 Hoods becoming heroes, becoming the new 
‘smart people’, with unarmed civilians become tactical pawns in a mutually reinforc-
ing conflict of particularist hatred. Once started these wars are extremely difficult to 
end. They become endemic conflicts where visioning a post-conflict settlement, not 
to mention peace, seems, if not illusive, extremely difficult (Kaldor et al. 1995). 
When opting for ways of providing permanent housing for the victims of these wars, 
how is that work to be implemented? 
True to the nature of these wars, houses were targeted individually (Udovicki & 
Ridgeway 2000), executed as it were. The ferocity by which ‘the dwellings of others’ 
were destroyed acknowledges the symbolic properties of housing as discussed in 
the previous chapter. This is different from the Allied bombing of the residential 
areas of German cities in WW II. That was, in part, a ‘combat response’, partly a 
tactical maneuver to ‘incapacitate’ the German labor force, killing German workers, 
by any other name (Glover 2001).  
 
This ‘murder by proxy’, which the individualized destruction of housing represents, 
has been recorded in many of the present wars besides those of the Balkans. I 
have already mentioned the ongoing individualized Israeli destruction of Palestinian 
homes (Halper 2003, Coon 1999) It has been observed in Indonesia and the Philip-
pines,34 Afghanistan (Barakat et.al. 1994), East Timor (Du Plessis & Leckie 2000), 
Rwanda (UNHCR 2000a), Burundi,35 Eastern Congo,36 Tajikistan (Zehnder 1999, 
Anderson 1999). It is as if to erase all traces of ‘the others’’, and by destroying the 
dwelling ensure that they will not return. This warfare of ‘fear and hatred’ perpetu-
ates the conflict as hatred feeds on itself. In analyzing the conflict in Northern Ire-
land, Fintan O’Toole states: “Sectarian prejudice did not cause the violence, it was, 
                                          
33 Holsti has shown that in a majority of ongoing armed conflicts it was state agencies that initiated the 
violence (Nafziger et al. 2000). 
34 As reported by Dr Barakat of the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit, York, UK. 
35 As reported in conversation and E-mail correspondence by the NRC’s previous project manager Rolf 
Moi. 
36 As reported by Charles A. Setchell of USAid in conversation, January 2003. 
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to a great extent, the violence that caused the prejudice” (2000).  Similar conclu-
sions also emerge from the writing of Keen (2000). 
 
This selective killing of housing may be compared to the effects of landmines.  
Rather than kill people, a much larger number of people are affected by having to 
care for the maimed, or in our case, the homeless.  With the gradual closing of in-
ternational borders for victims of armed conflicts, the fleeing civilians are seeking 
refuge ‘with their own kind’ in areas of relative calm within the borders of the war-
affected state.37 This raises totally new housing challenges, tying up already over-
stretched resources. 
 
3.6.3 THE ECONOMY OF THE NEW WARS 
We have already touched upon this third new wars’ characteristic, the way they are 
financially organized through international networks. This is totally different from 
that of, say, WW II. The old wars were by and large financed without external re-
sources. The machinery of war, governed by the national authorities raised, at least 
for a period, employment and the creation of wealth. This is not the case now. The 
networked bands are basically financed by looting, black marketeering, or local re-
source exploitation handled through the aforementioned global networks. The na-
tional economic outcomes are devastating, collapsing economy, endemic unem-
ployment and extreme poverty – with small networked islands of immense ‘clever 
people’ wealth. Into these war-ravaged economies, international agents are sent to 
provide housing.  How may that be done to help upset a trend of economic disinte-
gration?  
Most of these wars are related to the exploitation of raw materials supported by 
identified, most often ethnic groups.  Outputs from mines, logging and poaching are 
all ‘rural goods’ that give prominence to the countryside and the people living there. 
Those expelled flee to the cities, as in Angola38 or as Kurds do in Turkey (Erdem et 
al. 2003, Yilmaz 2003). That is also where the links to the wider world are.  The 
subsequent housing shortage is exasperated by a profound uncertainty pertaining 
to time and place. How long will this ‘temporary situation’ last?  Will this place be 
safe? In the meantime, scarce resources are spent on, i.e. ‘temporary housing’ – 
often assisted by private organizations from ‘the international community’.  
 
3.6.4 THE ATTRACTION OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE  
Since the mid-1990s there has been a conventional opinion that international relief 
to war-torn societies may contribute to prolonging the crisis and hence the suffering 
of civilians through the way the aid is provided, see for instance the Kaldor citation 
below and Prendergast (1996). Terry (2002) takes issue with these claims. Aside 
from the scant evidence there is to support it, there are other international players 
who bear a much more serious responsibility for how these armed conflicts develop 
than do the NGOs. The ‘complexity’ of the new conflicts are just as much a result of 
                                          
37 This is yet another globalization phenomenon, i.e. a very selective policy on transborder movements 
of people, whereas the other component of transfer, goods, money and services, move unobstructed.   
38 Reported in AlertNet (Reuters Foundation website) 7 January 2001. 
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the complex international interventions during the 1990s as it is by the ‘nature’ of 
the wars themselves (ibid.; 13,), a stand much supported by Munslow & Brown 
(1999).  
 
Whatever the case, the mere presence of international aid agencies and NGOs in 
areas of war may affect the conflict. For obvious logistic and security reasons, for-
eign aid personnel group together in the major urban centers. These will therefore 
become centers for relief, not the least the distribution of free food. This sometimes 
carries devastating effects on domestic food production (Munslow and Brown 1999, 
Vaux 2001,).39 The international presence also creates direct and indirect employ-
ment opportunities in an otherwise crumbling economy. All this results in a process 
of war-pulled urbanization, supported by a rural push due to falling food prices. This 
was the case in Somalia in the early 1990s (Cuny 1994).  As in most known cases 
of urbanization in war-ravaged countries, that trend is not followed by one of rurali-
zation when the war is over.40 People whose lifestyles have been urbanized tend to 
stay put in the urban areas even after the security situation allows return to the 
areas they once had to leave (ibid., Barakat et al 1997). The complexity of the new 
wars, whether within the ‘complex political emergencies’ or the ‘emergent political 
complexes’41 concept, are further complicated by the inevitable presence of the 
international respondents (Rieff 2002, Terry 2002).  
This rather extensive run-through of the new wars has been made to show how 
different these wars are compared to the organized wars that used to be.  Houses 
in new wars are becoming ‘identity targets’. They are ‘killed’ rather than ‘de-
stroyed’. This would make housing interventions a challenge way beyond that of 
reconstructing housing. In 1995 Mary Kaldor warned against what she deemed “un-
realistic assumptions” regarding the oncoming international reconstruction efforts in 
Bosnia (Kaldor et al 1995).  Four years later she summed up in the following way: 
“The tendency to interpret these wars in traditional terms, has been the main rea-
son why humanitarian intervention has not only failed to prevent the wars but may 
have actually helped to sustain them in various ways, for example, through the 
provision of humanitarian aid, which is an important source of income for the war-
ring parties, or through the legitimation of war criminals by inviting them to the 
negotiating table, or through the effort to find political compromises based on ex-
clusivist assumptions.” (Kaldor 1999; 10)42 
                                          
39 This local food market distortion is also taking place as a consequence of trade policies favoring the 
North. Powdered milk, for instance, sells so cheap in Africa due to subsidies to European farmers, that 
domestic milk production cannot compete. 21,000 tons of European milk were exported to Africa last 
year (The Observer, June 29, 2003). These are strands of the globalization earlier discussed as the 
backdrop of the new wars.  
40 The possible exception was the establishment of the New Towns in the UK after WW II. This was a 
strategy of primarily moving people and industry out of London as a military precaution: to scatter fu-
ture bombing targets rather than concentrate them in the London area (Bullock 2002).  
41 The latter is a Mark Duffield construction out of the words in the former conventional term for the 
new wars as perceived by those providing assistance.  The conception behind the terms is different, but 
as all writers know, words catch, just as they catch Duffield. 
42 Fiona Terry, supported by John Burton, takes issue with the claim that humanitarian aid plays any 
significant role in prolonging war.  Firstly, there is no hard-knuckle evidence that underpins such a claim. 
Secondly, “political, business, and military actors hold primary responsibility for the pursuit and out-
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The selective demolition of housing in the new wars is therefore not so much about 
their destruction as it is about the challenge of their reconstruction. Housing has 
always been a tactical target of war, the sacking of cities a repeated historical phe-
nomenon.43 The abhorrent destruction of housing during WW II primarily through 
aerial bombing and ‘scorched earth tactics’ ran into millions of units and perhaps 
millions killed. This was destruction on a scale beyond anything done later, al-
though the bombing continued with devastating effects later on in Vietnam 
(Lindquist 2000). But those were state wars where housing was bombed collec-
tively, and the state helped organize their reconstruction. Defeated states were 
rebuilt much the same way.44 It is a different challenge entirely when reconstruc-
tion is about rebuilding what your neighbor has destroyed.   
 
Taking the cue from Turner, the issue of housing destruction in these neighbor-
wars is ‘not what destroyed housing was, it is what destroying housing has done’ – 
to severely erode social capital, ravage the economy, destroy livelihoods, aside 
from the physical damage and demographic shifts. The policy of hatred and selec-
tive destruction of housing has thus created a new platform, a new context for their 
reconstruction. This assigns a significant role to the tactics of reconstruction and 
the process of implementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
comes of conflicts, and their contributions are undoubtedly more significant that those of humanitarian 
actors” (Terry 2002; 16). 
43 It was actually after the sacking of Miletus by the Persians in 479 BC that Hippodamus presented his 
pure grid plan for its reconstruction, a plan which was to have immense impact on urban planning in 
centuries to come. 
44 War has given prominence to planning. It was the experiences from WW I that made public planning 
an academic field – and a practiced activity. The theories guiding the reconstruction after WWII were, 
aside from those of Keynes (Keynes 1964), much indebted to those emerging from organizing public life 
during war, particularly in the US and the UK (Friedmann 1987).  
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4  INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO WAR; 
   The Re/Construction of Housing  
 
4.1 “SOMETHING’S GOT TO BE DONE”: AN INTRODUCTION 
 
Mobilizing ‘your own kind’ is a necessary requirement for entering a prospective war, 
whether it is a Clauzewitzian or a post-national war. A similar mobilization is taking 
place from the effects of war to assist those victimized by the violence. The fact that 
such mobilization takes place among the actors in the theatre of war is to be ex-
pected, but this mobilization also extends to people not directly affected by the vio-
lence; it extends to the fellow human spectators. It is because we get to know about 
the misery of innocent victims that such mobilization takes place. The rise in the 
modern international relief system, starting out with Henri Dunant in 1863 with what 
would later be the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,1 
shows an interesting parallel to the rise of the ‘foreign correspondent’ and the media 
technology which allowed the presentation of images. The harrowing engravings from 
far-away battlefields in publications like the London Illustrated News, and similar 
magazines elsewhere, informed the public in a way that made distant suffering into a 
relevant domestic issue. “something has to be done!”.  Funds were collected by 
charities and volunteers were sent to the field, much the same way as today.  
 
Aroused public empathy2 with portrayed victims of war gives rise both to voluntary 
and state-sponsored emergency relief, whether informed through the London Illus-
trated News3 or present-day news channels. This morally grounded public call “to do 
something” results in private donations, but is also shown to trigger the engagement 
of governments. Research has confirmed significant correlations between the level of 
media coverage of foreign emergencies and subsequent government funding for 
emergency relief (Hybertsen 1997, Rye Olsen et al. 20024). Although reliable statis-
tics are hard to come by, governments, primarily of the 21 OECD countries, provide 
substantially more than do private donations when it comes to emergency relief 
funding (Randel & German 2002). Governments do so in response to domestic public 
opinion, and from anticipated geopolitical benefits.5 This explains why the Balkans 
received more than 18 times as much assistance per ‘persons in need’ than did So-
malia (ibid.; 28). 
 
                                          
1 There existed international bodies tending to those wounded in war prior to the founding of the Red 
Cross, e.g. the Christian Order of the Hospitaller. 
2 The role of the media will not be specifically discussed here, but it is worth noting that the ‘public empa-
thy’ referred to above is totally and fundamentally dependent on the media and the way they portray the 
situation at hand. There seems to be a symbiotic relationship between disaster, human suffering, the me-
dia – and  public empathy underpinning external humanitarian action. To echo Baudrillard: “The Gulf war 
never happened if we were never told”. 
3 By the time of the Crimean War, the London Illustrated News printed 300,000 copies every week, much 
because of its reporting from the war. 
4 Rye Olsen et al. also claim that ‘donor interest’ and ‘stakeholder commitment’ are additional decisive 
issues. 
5 The governments of smaller, rich countries like Norway and the other Scandinavian countries claim to do 
so basically from an ‘alleviation of suffering’ point of view, i.e. as a pure altruistic act. In Norway this stand 
has been contested by Tvedt (2003) and Nustad (2003) and others. 
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This presents the two principally different sources of, and causes for, international 
intervention in areas of conflict: the morally grounded, yet media-dependent public 
urge to help others in need, and the strategically dependent governmental support 
provided to regions or countries of geo-political importance to the donor country.  
The former is basically channeled through private non-governmental organization or 
charities, NGOs (Tvedt 1995, 2003). The latter is political and may take on any form 
from aerial bombardment to large bilateral material and financial aid packages, de-
pending on the war scene’s perceived political importance (Stiefel 1999, Duffield 
2002, Sogge 1996, de Waal 2000). In real life these two converge. From the 1980s 
onward this convergence, made manifest by increased NGO funding from govern-
ments into an increasing number of politicized areas of conflict, has raised fundamen-
tal questions on the morally grounded mission of the NGOs.  Are they still angels of 
mercy or have they merely become development diplomats, as Tvedt rhetorically 
asks (1998). Or worse still, are they reduced to the role of support units in ‘humani-
tarian wars’? (Coker 2001). Nick Cater, in his column in The Guardian, brings it on 
like this “Aid is becoming just another crude tool, to bribe or bully nations into line, 
or to create compliant populations grateful for their handouts and unlikely to threaten 
their new guardians”.6  The alarms have long since gone off in many of the head-
quarters of NGOs (Macrae 2002).7 Aid agencies being violently targeted as in pre-
sent-day Iraq may be seen as the culmination of this gradual convergence between 
this “new humanitarianism” and the “new wars”.  
 
In the following, I first present and discuss the theoretical underpinning of these two 
approaches of assistance and then examine how, why and to what effect they inter-
act. Then I take a closer look at the international actors, the NGOs that actually carry 
out the politically guided work in the field with a particular emphasis on housing 
(re)construction. 
 
In referring to Figure 1.2.1 we are now investigating the external forces, or the ar-
rows, that affect the strategy of joining physical object and meaning into the imple-
mentation of housing within the political context of a war-ravaged society. These are 
convergent forces; one driven by the humanitarian imperative, to assist people in 
need, the other by the assistants’ own interests and the perceived political effects of 
the assistance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
6 The Guardian, February 28, 2003. 
7 http://www.AlertNet.org of the Reuter Foundation is a major arena of discussion among NGOs on these 
issues. 
68
 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
4.2 ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS MECHANISMS OF RESPONSE 
 
There is a moral imperative to help people in desperate need ingrained in all cultures 
and in all civilizations. All the world’s major religions contain this imperative,8 which 
lends itself to political structures and institutions, and is embedded in the very notion 
of habitus of all societies. In times of disaster, be it the aftermath of violence or the 
havoc of nature, these embedded mechanisms spring into force. Evidence abounds, 
from the German soldier who looked the other way, to the wealthy industrialist in 
Gujarat who opened his house to his neighboring house-less and destitute earth-
quake victims, to international initiatives to provide food to people who would other-
wise perish. These are all moral acts.  
 
Albala-Bertrand (2000) has categorized these modes of assistance9 as either en-
dogenous, i.e. response mechanisms embedded in society’s own institutions, be they 
spontaneous action as illustrated above, or institutionally designed as in Civil Defense 
activities, or they may be exogenous – channeled, as he says – via: 
 
“ad hoc, unpatterned, unguaranteed, or irregular processes, which are expressed in 
action, measures and policies that may formally fill gaps left by in-built responses, 
bypass endogenous channels, shift initiatives away from regular actors, or superim-
pose alternative structures brought in from outside” (ibid.; 217)". 
 
This makes for vivid images of external interventions into war-ravaged areas.  
 
4.2.1 THE HUMANITARIAN IMPERATIVE 
The international humanitarian actors ideally see themselves as agents within the 
endogenous tradition; endogenous in the sense of Kant’s categorical imperative: Do 
as if your actions are universal law. A moral ought, as it were. According to Kant, 
“morality must be necessary and universal, that is, it must be absolutely binding, and 
absolutely binding on everyone alike: Whoever you are, whatever your situation, you 
ought to do X” (Miller 1992; 454). Kant thus included all humans, not only the ‘we’ of 
our own kind, skin color, and religion, but the whole ‘human family’. His categorical 
imperative10 is the theoretical foundation for the morally driven ‘humanitarian im-
perative’ of universally assisting people in distress.11  
 
The conventions constituting the ‘International Humanitarian Law’ rests on this moral 
foundation (IFRC 2003, Mackintosh 2000, Gutman & Rieff 1999). In fact, the found-
                                          
8 Whereas Kant’s categorical imperative is deontological in the sense that it stands right, true and univer-
sal; like a law of nature void of any utilitarian aspects, the religions are not so principled. Religions are not 
universal, they primarily cover only their own converts; furthermore, their imperatives are not totally 
without utility: rewards for good deeds will follow in the afterlife. 
9 Davis (1981), Cuny (1983), Jigyasu (2002) and others have also dealt with the nature of these two 
strata of assistance. 
10 Distinctly different from his ‘hypothetical imperative’ conditioned on personal motives or desire. 
11 This is the credo of most NGOs but also of international governmental aid agencies. DFID, for instance, 
has committed itself to “seek to promote a more universal approach to addressing humanitarian needs.  
People in need – wherever they are – should have equal status to right and assistance” (NAO 2003; 31). 
But political commitments/utility take precedence. On November 7, 2003, The Guardian reported that GBP 
100 million would be transferred to Iraq from programs in other poor nations to finance her reconstruction 
caused in part by US and British destruction. 
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ing principles of the United Nations do the same, as do the Human Rights Conven-
tions, (from which the Human Rights to Adequate Housing are drawn). The Code of 
Conduct of the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), 
now ratified by 267 NGOs and agencies,12 is but an operationalization of these rights. 
Under the heading ‘The humanitarian imperative comes first’, the first article reads: 
“The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental hu-
manitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries”. Subse-
quent articles deal with issues of neutrality,13 impartiality14 (which lies at the heart of 
humanitarianism), accountability, etc.15 A similar, even more tangible outcome is The 
Sphere Project, where universal minimum standards of humanitarian provisions are 
set, including shelter space minimums (Sphere 2003). 
 
There are two interacting issues behind the recent upsurge in rights-based codes and 
standards (ODI 1999).  One refers to symptoms: the inequality of aid pro capita in 
emergencies; the other refers to the underlying cause: the weakening of the concept 
of universality.  The former is repeatedly documented, not least in reference to assis-
tance provided for the people of the Balkans. DFID’s per capita support to people in 
need in war-ravaged Tajikistan and in South-Eastern Europe shows a ratio of 1:40 
(NAO 2003; 17).16  The underlying reason relates to the decay of the ‘moral we’, the 
‘universal we’ of the international community, which in effect annuls the very notion 
of ‘the international community’, at least in the sense of being a moral community 
acting on universal imperatives (Rorty 1996).  The way these have been applied 
seems to point towards their relativity rather than their universality. Assistance 
seems to dependent on the recipient countries’ economic potential, religion, system 
of governance and political importance to the donor. “The West”, says Samuel Hunt-
ington, is “unique, not universal” (Huntington 1996; 28), putting Kant aside.  “We” 
are ‘The West’. “They” are ‘The rest’, ‘the others’ we assist in an “ad hoc, unpat-
terned, unguaranteed, or irregular” fashion, as Albala-Bertrand just said.  This is a 
dramatic – and yet plausible – acknowledgement. It introduces the practice of triage 
                                          
12 By November 1, 2003. 
13 Which is crucial to the IFRC, but is not part of any of the international conventions, and not necessarily 
relevant to humanitarian action. 
14 Impartiality comprises three elements: 1) non-discrimination, 2) proportionality, and 3) non-subjective 
distinction (i.e. no distinction between ‘guilty’ or ‘innocent’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’). 
15 The Code reads as follows: “1: The Humanitarian imperative comes first; 2: Aid is given regardless of 
the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities 
are calculated on the basis of need alone; 3: Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious 
standpoint; 4: We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy; 5: We shall 
respect culture and custom; 6: We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities; 7: Ways 
shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid; 8: Relief aid must 
strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs; 9: We hold ourselves 
accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources; 10: In our infor-
mation, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified humans, not 
hopeless objects” http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp 
16 But even South-East Europe is seriously dwarfed when compared to the public donations for the people 
directly affected by the fall of the New York Twin Towers. A staggering US$ 2.3 billion was collected, about 
half of what has been internationally provided for the (post-war) reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(UNDP 2003).  Thus, each family of a public sector worker killed on September 11th received a donation of 
about US$1 million, plus the worker’s salary, tax-free , for the equivalent of his/her remaining years in 
service (The Guardian, September 6. 2002) 
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in humanitarian assistance.17 Both Enzenberger (1994) and Rieff (2002) see this as a 
possible solution – for pragmatic reasons. No realistic scenario exists in the world – 
lofty Millennium Goals notwithstanding – that will mobilize the intellectual or material 
resources required to possibly bridge the gap between the destitute, often war-
affected majority – and the rich ‘we’ minority of the world. Ideally there might be, 
but in reality the ‘the moral ought’ has been replaced by ‘the practical can’; morals 
and money have changed places (Rorty 1996).  
 
 
 
Fig.4.2.1 The relationship between ODA and GDI over time (source ODI) 
 
Fig.4.2.2 The relationship between ODA (as portion of GNI) and humanitarian aid (Source 
Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003). 
 
 
 
 
                                          
17 This is a practice accredited to one of Napoleon’s physicians.  He divided the wounded into three 
groups: those who were likely to survive without medical assistance, those who were likely to die irrespec-
tive of medical assistance, and those for whom medical assistance was likely to contribute towards recov-
ery. 
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The agents of the humanitarian imperative, e.g. most of the NGOs18 have attempted 
to stem the slide by trying to institute universal norms in addition to refocusing their 
activities more towards lobbying19 and capacity building in line with a ‘rights-based 
approach’ (UNDP1998, Macrae 2002, Stoddard 2003).  But with the cost of humani-
tarian action rising, and their scale and scope being extended, the interventions into 
war-affected areas may only be realized through a relative increase in financial con-
tribution from rich, mostly Western governments – and thereby execute assistance 
along the lines set by these donors (Hume & Edwards 1997, Macrae & Harmer 2003).  
 
We are in for a contest across a different fault line, between the ‘ought’ and the ‘can’ 
in international humanitarian action.  
 
4.2.2 THE HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVE  
Kant labeled the second imperative guiding human action ‘hypothetical imperative”. 
This denotes the actions required to accomplish something you desire or want, i.e. a 
specific set of strategic activities. As such, it makes up a central ingredient of daily 
life, and so too with political, and hence international, relations, even of traditional 
wars. This way it guides much of the international action towards countries ravaged 
by war, both in terms of political maneuvering, but also in state-sponsored humani-
tarian aid. This we could label ‘humanitarian utility’, with the quote from Cater re-
ferred to above as its ultimate expression. This humanitarian utility makes up one 
side of the fault line referred to above. The other side is the humanitarian imperative. 
Somewhere in between swivels the real world.  
 
The modern idea of humanitarian action20 as a prospective activity, as something 
that deals with the future, came out of the experience of war. The universalism that 
emerged with the founding or the United Nations21 was a prospect of hope for a bet-
ter world for all people (Rorty 1996). As such, it was a political project soon geo-
politicized, and ‘utilized’ by the major powers of the world.  
 
I will not give a historical run-through here, but in order to understand the emer-
gence of the ‘utility assistance’ to war-ravaged countries, the success of the Marshall 
Plan has to be emphasized. Not only was it a grand success in kick-starting the eco-
nomic recovery of Western Europe, it also proved a decisive weapon in the political 
contest with the USSR (Foreign Affairs 1997). These dual components were extended 
                                          
18 Particularly the European NGOs under their umbrella organization VOICE in Brussels and ICVA in Ge-
neva. The US NGOs act through InterAction, Washington. 
19 There has been a parallel refocusing through conferences, books and ‘publicity actions’ by NGOs on 
“Forgotten Humanitarian Crisis”, re the Copenhagen conference, Oxfam initiatives, special issues of Le 
Monde Diplomatique, etc. 
20 I fully acknowledge that there were worldwide humanitarian organizations long before WWII. These 
were organizations active in post-war assistance and in varying degrees guided by the humanitarian im-
perative. At one end were the Red Cross and Oxfam on the other organizations like the American Relief 
Committee, (later Administration) led by Herbert Hoover, who was later to become president of the US.  
The post-WWII era however, marks a new beginning of sorts also for ‘humanitarian action’ because of the 
institutionalization of ‘development aid’.  
21 Even at this stage the ‘universalism’ was relative. Action on the part of the Allied countries proved that 
the Germans were not included. Their civilian losses - after the war was ended – are only now being rec-
ognized (Bacque 1997).  
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into the ‘development agenda’ introduced by President Truman in 1949. ‘Develop-
ment Aid’ was born out of war, out of political competition, and out of a firm modern-
ist belief in social and technological engineering, if we go by Truman’s inauguration 
address.22 The intention was initially to make the UN the vehicle for (universal) de-
velopment (Hjertholm & White 2000), but what later became the ‘donor community’ 
secured the ‘utility’ dimension of the assistance by strengthening the role of bilateral 
aid and that of the World Bank23. 
  
A similar development has gradually taken place within the ‘humanitarian sector’, 
particularly during the last decade. At the end of the 1980s, UN agencies, primarily 
the WFP and UNHCR, administered 45% of all humanitarian assistance. 10 years later 
their share was down to about 12% (Randel & German; 21). This shift has been 
linked to two utility aspects:  
1) The value of the humanitarian aid sector has risen steadily both in absolute and 
relative terms during the post Cold War era.24 This has taken place against the 
backdrop of a fall in ODA in absolute terms, and very much so in terms of share 
of the donor countries’ wealth and own income.25  In 2001 humanitarian aid 
amounted to 10.5% of ODA, or US$ 5.4 billion. Given the delivery nature of 
emergency aid, and hence its embedded commercial value, the ‘donor utility’ of 
relief is more than obvious.26 
2) Most of the humanitarian assistance is going to areas affected by war (GHA 2003, 
NAO 2003), This makes the assistance a powerful political tool for donor countries   
In such cases the assistance is beyond ‘humanitarian utility’, it is in the realm of 
‘political utility’. 
This growing tendency to join commercial and political interests of donors in post-was 
assistance is brought to head in Iraq.27  
 
 
 
                                          
22 http://www.trumanlibrary.org/calendar/viewpapers.php?pid=1030 
23 The UN and its agencies are run on a ‘one nation = one vote’ system. The World Bank is run by those 
who have contributed the core capital; in effect, the Western countries under the leadership of the US. 
24 This is also because the OECD allowed donor countries to include the costs of one year’s support to 
refugees living in the donor country as ‘humanitarian assistance’. In 2000 this constituted 20% of all 
emergency aid (ODI 2002).  
25 Admittedly, there is a slight rise in the 2002 ODA figures, but the relative decline in the ODA’s portion 
of the wealthy countries’ GDP is stark. It has been reduced by about one-third in the last decade, from 
around 0.35% (half of what has been set as a universal goal) down to 0.22 in 2001. Some of the loss has 
been compensated by a rise in private support or support that bypasses the statistics of the OECD/DAC 
(GHA 2003). However, in volume this is dwarfed by the estimated US$ 80 billion in remittances that are 
transferred to countries mainly in the South each year (Foreign Policy, November–December 2003). The 
picture is not complete without adding the fact that because of the servicing of debt to Northern banks, 
there has been a net flow of capital from the South to the North during a number of years. By the end of 
the 1980s the outflow reached about US$ 15 billion annually (Thorbecke 2000; 38). 
26 “An example is Switzerland’s study, which found that for every franc of Swiss aid, between 90 cents and 
Sfr 1.02 was spent in Switzerland even though 71% of Swiss aid is untied” from a report made by the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) cf. Randel & German 1997; 251. 
27 “The privatisation of war”, The Guardian, December 10, 2003. 
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Fig.4.2.3 Toal ODA per capita of population in selected cirsis affected countries, year of highest 
spending in US$ (Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003). 
 
Interventions within the realm of the hypothetical imperative do not necessarily imply 
humanitarian assistance. It may imply warfare, like the invasion in Somalia, or the 
bombing in Bosnia and later in Kosovo/Serbia (the world’s first ‘humanitarian war’, 
according to NATO (ODI 2002; 2). It definitely includes diplomatic action and various 
kinds of embargoes or boycotts.  Whatever the instruments used unilaterally or in 
tandem with others, the action is aimed at defusing the conflict, to help, directly or 
indirectly, the victims of the war, and finally, to contribute toward international politi-
cal and economic stability. These are the intentions.  
 
It was not always like this. Up until the end of the Cold War, support given to coun-
tries in conflict was determined by their affiliation to the superpowers. The tension of 
the bipolar world did keep the numbers of conflicts down, or rather, the spillover 
from the conflicts was kept low – or left unreported. After the fall of the Wall, the 
former satellite states were left on their own, economically as well as politically. The 
ensuing political confusion and uncertainty first of all affected the principles of sover-
eignty: “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its 
theory was never matched by reality”, said Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the Security 
Council in 1992.28 What emerged came to be a watershed in international political 
relations, which saw universal human rights take precedence over national sover-
eignty.29 This shift came as an inevitable result of the fall of the bi-polar world order 
and the prospects of the UN becoming the one supra-national body that was man-
dated by international law to initiate military intervention,30 which it did in Somalia 
and later in Bosnia – though not in Iraq.  
                                          
28 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Se-
curity Council on 31 January 1992, delivered to the Security Council 17 June 1992. 
29 The sovereignty slide had already started years earlier, by Vietnam invading Cambodia and Tanzania 
invading Uganda to put an end to the dictatorships of Pol Pot and Idi Amin. It had been tacitly accepted by 
the international community – although not formally.  Pol Pot therefore retained Cambodia’s UN seat for 
more than a decade after having been toppled.  
30 The famous ‘Chapter VII’ of the UN Charter (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm). 
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We have been witnessing an extension of the means, or arenas of the ‘hypothetical 
imperative’ on the part of the donor. The “western we” have been given, or taken, 
the extended right to intervene as a ‘universal rights’ accolade. We may intervene 
with the means of our choosing to quell what we consider grave human rights 
abuses.31 This universality of intervention, i.e. military intervention, joining the uni-
versality of humanitarianism is the ultimate manifestation of a globalized world,32 
according to Ulrich Beck (2003). It allows for ‘humanitarian wars’ and make humani-
tarian agencies into partners in what US President Bush and Prime Minister Blair 
called a “military-humanitarian coalition” (Braumann 2001; 29), while the US Secre-
tary of State envisioned the NGOs to act as “force multiplier for the (US) military” 
(Stoddard 2003; 31).  No wonder the NGOs are uneasy. 
 
These issues will not be pursued further here. It has to be added, however, that 
when the war in former Yugoslavia started in 1991 most of this was new. The inter-
vention into Iraq on behalf of the Kurds was what ‘the international community’ had 
to go by, in terms of discourse on sovereignty, on the role of military engagement, 
and in terms of humanitarian assistance.  In fact that was the first time most of the 
present agencies and humanitarian organizations went into war.33 The Bosnia experi-
ence was very much the turning point for the exogenous assistance in areas ravaged 
by the new wars. 
 
In the figure below I link the concepts applied in the text above to explain the rela-
tionship between the modes of assistance in a regular four-field matrix.  It must be 
emphasized that the activities overlap and no single field can function on its own.  
Humanitarian assistance is directed at the suffering individual (1), traditional ‘devel-
opment assistance’ focuses on the institutions (2). Recovery will succeed only by 
strengthening the endogenous fields (1 & 2). Its success will, in turn, (also) depend 
on the activities of the exogenous actors (3 & 4), not least in combining ‘security’ (4) 
with civilian assistance (3).  
 
 
                                          
31 As a soldier was reported saying about the reason for Norway’s military presence in Afghanistan: “We’re 
here to fight the burka” 
32 “Ensuring respect for democracy and human rights came to be seen as the means whereby grievances 
could be addressed and effective systems for regulating violent war economies could legitimately be intro-
duced. Thus, the distinction disappeared between a ‘morality-based’ and ‘interest-based’ foreign policy” 
(ODI 2002; 1). This is the ‘liberal peace’ agenda of aid, according to Duffield, where aid driven by ‘security’ 
considerations in its many forms is but a ‘grand project of social transformation’ - much like the visions of 
missionaries in former days (Duffield 2002). 
33 A number of the big organizations started out as war- or post-war emergency agencies (including Ox-
fam and Care), but had turned to ‘development’ and disaster relief in the meantime. 
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                                                  universal 
 
Helping your neighbor out of social contract 
 
The indigenous individual 
 
Alkala-Bertrand’s ‘Automatic assistance’ 
 
 
endogenous                                            1 
hypothetical    
 
                             Organizing civil defense 
 
                    The State and its institutions 
 
       Alkala-Bertrand’s ‘Designed assistance’ 
 
 
2                                            endogenous  
exogenous                                              3 
 
 
International relief and emergency assis-
tance to relieve human suffering 
 
UN agencies and  
private humanitarian organizations 
 
                                                  universal 
4                                              exogenous 
 
                             International mitigation 
               or interventions to ‘secure peace’ 
                    or preserve ‘national security' 
 
                              The donor states alone  
          or as part of a  collective (UN) action 
 
hypothetical 
 
Fig.4.2.4 The relationship between universal and  hypothetical imperatives, endogenous, and 
  exogenous assistance. 
 
In spite of the evidence supporting the claim that there is a growing overlap between 
the exogenous modes of assistance (Curtis 2001, Macrae 2002, Macrae & Harmer 
2003 with references), there is still a unanimous agreement that recovery depends 
on the strength and dynamics of the endogenous sectors. The challenge for the ex-
ogenous actors, overlapping or not, will therefore be to construct and conduct their 
assistance towards that end. 
 
Of the many multi- and unilateral agencies involved in emergency and post-war as-
sistance, I will concentrate on those implementing housing projects. For all practical 
purposes they are the Northern international non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).  
 
 
4.3  THE INTERNATIONAL NGOs  
       Their Informing Theories And Guiding Experiences  
 
4.3.1 INTRODUCING THE NGOs 
The term “non-governmental organization” is so enigmatic that it is “virtually mean-
ingless”, Lewis and Wallace claim in their book on the new challenges of the NGOs 
(2000; x).  All the same they choose to use the term without further definition on 
account of it being “useful shorthand for a wide variety of different kinds of nongov-
ernmental […] organizations and work” (ibid.; xi). Others have treated the term like-
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wise (Fowler 2000, Edwards & Fowler 2002).34 “The term ‘NGO’ should be used as a 
common denominator, a collective term, for all organizations within the aid channel 
that are institutionally separated from the state apparatus and are non-profit-
distributing”, says Tvedt.  In this context he introduces the term ‘NGO channel’ for 
the system of aid that is handled by the NGOs (1998; 16), much as a “new type of 
international social system” (ibid.; 24), molded out of the prevailing ideology of the 
West.  
 
The new wars have left the aid establishment in disarray.  Out of the many causes 
behind the present uncertainty, two stand out: the nature of the present wars,35 and 
the privatization of aid.  The former has been handled in earlier chapters, the latter 
merits some comments.  During the 1980s and the rise of economic liberalism in the 
West the role of the state was set to shrink. ‘Less state, more liberty’.  The public 
channels of welfare were to be taken over by private providers of one’s own choice. 
So it was to be also with international aid (Tvedt 1996). A ‘new policy agenda’ 
emerged that set out to design an economic order based on “free markets, private 
property, individual incentives, and a minimal ‘enabling’ role for the state” (Gore cf. 
Lewis and Wallace 2000; ix). ‘Partnership’ (state – private sector – civil society) be-
came the operational principle, ‘civil society’ the key channel for international devel-
opment assistance. Civil society, in its most rudimentary definition, is held to be 
‘non-governmental’, not of government; and non-market, not of private sector (Ed-
wards et.al. 2000; 14). This leaves, as a matter of definition, a pivotal role to the 
NGOs, the non-governmental organizations.  
 
The result was a mushrooming of private non-governmental organizations (Tvedt 
1996, 1998, Hjertholm & White 2000). Their number doubled from 1,600 to 2,500 
during the 1980s. Today there are 3–4,000 International NGOs working in develop-
ment, relief and the social sector in the South (Stoddard 2003; 25).36 Their sheer 
number, their disparate ideological background, their history and tradition, and fur-
ther to that, their political and economic relations to their home governments are 
some of the factors that distinguish their modes of action (ibid.). 
                                          
34 Edwards and Fowler use the term NGDO (non-governmental development organizations as an equiva-
lent to the term NGO and claim that “there is no commonly accepted definition of NGOs [NGDOs]. […]They 
can be regarded as third-party, serving non-profit-based, legally constituted non-state organizations, di-
rectly or indirectly reliant on the system of international aid.  In most cases they function as intermediaries 
to promote sustainable development, social justice and enduring improvement in the circumstances of 
poor and excluded groups” (2002; 23) 
35 Whereas Edwards, Hulme & Wallace (1999) separate ‘conflicts linked to globalization’ and ‘intra-state 
conflicts’, I have linked these into one, in line with Duffield (2000, 2002) and others.  
36 There are no statistics showing reliable world-wide figures. The Economist claims there are 30,000 
international NGOs (although not necessarily ‘development’ or ‘emergency’ organizations). NGOs have also 
mushroomed in countries like Bangladesh and Russia where there are presently 65,000 of them (The 
Economist; The World in 2001; 73). 
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   Fig.4.3.1 Humanitarian Aid in percentage of some donor countries’ ODA 
 
 
 
Fig.4.3.2 Voluntary and official income to some large international NGOs, 2001. (Sources to 
tables above Global Humanitarian Assistance 2003, www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org 
 
In 2001 The Norwegian Refugee Council had a total income of US$ 42,6 million, of which 36,7 
million, or 86%, was official aid. Norwegian People’s Aid had a total income of US$ 69,4 mil-
lion, 79% of which was official aid.  
 
Before embarking upon the basic distinctions and general characteristics pertaining to 
the NGOs that work in war-affected areas, the very idea of non-government organi-
zations needs to be elaborated upon.  To distinguish them from state and market 
they are often, especially in the UK, labeled ‘voluntary organizations’, i.e. society’s 
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‘third sector’, or, ‘civil society’ organizations. NGOs emerge where there is a gap in 
services; they are an institutional response to state and/or market failure, according 
to the reigning theoretical perspective of economists (Weisbrod 1988, James 1990, 
Tvedt 1998; 41–43). These theories were developed in the North, but according to 
Brown & Koren (1991) and their work for the World Bank  they are equally appropri-
ate as organizational remedies for failing state and market institutions in the devel-
oping world. This makes for a neat explanation and an easy frame of reference per-
taining to the functions of the international NGOs in the developing world. This is 
perhaps too neat and too easy, as it is not only a matter of providing ‘missing ser-
vices’; it is also about societal development. As we saw in the preceding part of this 
chapter, progress is achieved only when local institutions are empowered to take 
charge of development, meaning that the rationale of the NGOs must also be to sup-
port state and market institutions, not only ‘civil society’ and its members’ consumer 
needs for services. Tvedt furthermore shows that NGOs did not necessarily emerge in 
response to failing state or markets in the developing world, but as organizational 
vehicles of donor countries to provide foreign aid, in fact to organize the aid channel 
in a liberalized world (Tvedt 1998; 43–50, Sogge 1996) 
 
 
4.3.2 THE NGOs AS PEACE MAKERS 
In dealing with post-war housing it is necessary to dwell on the particular role or ac-
tivities of the NGOs regarding  ‘making’ or ‘contributing towards’ peace. It is self evi-
dent that peace in the sense of personal security and mutually recognized social con-
tracts are required elements of recovery. Egeland37 (1999) argues that the NGOs 
hold comparative advantages in ‘making peace’ in societies ravaged by conflict. They 
have access, local expertise and, says Egeland, are generally perceived as being im-
partial by the warring factions. And there are success stories around, which by closer 
scrutiny, may rest on the capacity of a few dedicated long-term committed individu-
als more than the institutional strength of the NGOs (van Tongeren 1999). According 
to Lederach (1999), one of the preconditions of peace or the process of peace is ‘ver-
tical’ and ‘horizontal interaction’ generating trust; i.e. between all strata of society 
(vertical), and between the respective sections across the fighting line (horizontal). 
The NGOs are normally outside the vertical field, but may be at an advantage in fa-
cilitating horizontal interaction.  As for the other two requirements set by Lederach, 
justice and conceptualizing peace as both a result and a (long-term) process, these 
lie beyond the capacity of NGOs in general. The first is outside their mandate, the 
second requires a long-term commitment that NGOs acting in areas of war normally 
do not hold. In addition, “what is clear is that most NGOs lack the capacity to con-
duct the strategic analyses necessary to success (sic) in these areas, especially in the 
complex and contingent environments in which they operate” says Edwards et.al. 
(1999). But it is not merely a matter of capacity, according to Slim. The theoretical 
underpinnings that are to inform the INGOs’ action in current armed crisis are them-
selves in crisis: “Few agencies yet know how to do things ‘peace-fully’” (Slim 2000; 
6).  Schloms (2001) reveals the inherent shortcomings of NGOs simply by pointing to 
the fundamental political nature of peace building, which entails dealing with recogni-
                                          
37 Recently appointed Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs & Emergency Relief Coordinator of the UN. 
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tion and with governments. Such dealings contravenes the neutral and impartial re-
gime most NGOs subscribe to. In reference to practical experience, both Terry (2002) 
referring to her work with MSF, and Judah’s writings from the Balkans (2004) are 
very skeptical about the efficiency of NGOs engaging in reconciliatory activities in war 
zones. Howard (2001) points to the fact that reconciliation was not an issue after the 
world wars fought between the very nations that today fund most of today’s recon-
ciliation programs executed by the NGOs, hinting at the inherent difficulties, and 
touching upon the moral weakness in the ‘do as I say, not as I do’ schism. There 
seems to be both a theoretical and empirical backing for the claim that humanitarian 
NGOs are not particularly well suited to embrace ‘peace making’ – bar facilitating 
community interaction between conflicting parties.38  
 
The theoretical underpinnings of acting in emergencies, i.e. the relief and develop-
ment discourse, will be handled when analyzing the modus operandi of the organiza-
tions themselves, because in addressing the tactical challenges the practitioners 
seem to act according to the stand or status of their organization, not by being in-
formed by theory; again, you stand where you sit.  
 
 
 
4.4 THE MODUS OPERANDI OF NGOS  
 
Tvedt showed that many of the NGOs active in humanitarian work, (and thus in 
housing (re)construction) have grown to their present state and status by having 
been supported by their home governments (1998). The relationship to governments 
is an attribute that classifies the organizations, because it reflects on ‘who gets the 
jobs’. A second attribute refer to the organizations’ understanding of the task at 
hand. As discussed above, this is very much depends on whether it is a ‘relief’ or a 
‘development’ oriented organization.  Hence the question: ‘How is the work in-
formed?’. The third attribute refers to the professionalism of the organization in 
terms of the specialist task at hand. Hence the question: ‘How is the job facilitated or 
executed?’   
 
The answers to these three questions will broadly categorize the NGOs on three lev-
els a) how their work is funded, b) how they approach their work, and c) how they go 
about executing their work. 
 
 
 
                                          
38 This is not, of course, referring the specialist ‘peace brokering’ NGOs, like Transcend and the Carter 
Center. 
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4.4.1 CATEGORIES OF TRADITION  
         The Emergence of the Western International NGOs 
NGOs may be categorized – as Stoddard (2003) does – into three different groups, 
all according to their historical roots: the “Wilsonian”, the Religious and the “Dunan-
tist”.39  
  
The ‘Wilsonian’ organizations,  
whose name refers to President Wilson and his ambition to project US values on the 
world, includes most of the US NGOs and some European NGOs.  What characterizes 
this group is their ‘special relationship’ to their home government. In the US this has 
historically manifested itself by NGOs’ (active or passive) support to government pol-
icy.40 They are “an arm of the US Government” which carries the obligation of doing 
‘public relations’ for the US government, according to Andrew Natsios, head of 
USAid.41 And the NGOs seem to have responded. The CHF International, an US NGO 
that started out as a housing organization after WWII, came forward with this state-
ment: “We support the U.S. troops, coalition forces, and development workers whose 
lives are still at risk as they strive to shore up the foundations for a more stable equi-
table, and prosperous future for everyone” (CHF 2003;2).  
 
The European “Wilsonian” organizations, primarily the Scandinavian and the Dutch, 
Swiss and Austrian, do not have this subservient attitude towards their government.  
Although they might also be executors of their home governments’ foreign policy, 
their ‘special relationship’ is different in two ways: 1) the policies of their home gov-
ernments are not world hegemonic, and 2) the organizations act within a tradition of 
independence.  Yet the organizations are totally dependent on government funding 
for their work (Stoddard 2003, Hume & Edwards 1997).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
39 There are numerous classification systems for NGOs working within international development, re Tvedt 
1998; 32–37. These are extended further by Fowler (2000) (not least by the hilarious ‘Acronyms for NGDO 
Pretenders’, ibid.; 32), and Stoddard who says that “there may in fact be no satisfactory way of categoriz-
ing NGOs according to their philosophy, and there are potentially unlimited ways of carving up the com-
munity according to which of the humanitarian principles and values are emphasized, and in what opera-
tional context” (2003; 28). 
40 In November 2003 Save the Children USA demanded that the UK branch of the same organization with-
draw their public opposition to the US military invasion in Iraq. According to the US branch this could jeop-
ardize their funding prospects from the US government: “Accounts published by Save the Children US 
highlights its vulnerability to political pressure from a Republican White House with ‘government grants 
and contracts’ generating some 60%, nearly £71 m, of its £119 operating support and revenue” (The 
Guardian, November 28, 2003). 
41 Natsios’ statements were presented in a speech to US NGOs in Washington, May 21, 2003, re Naomi 
Klein, The Guardian June 23, 2003. 
81
 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
 
Fig 4.4.1 The flag of the donor is a mandatory part of the mandatory sign erected wherever 
NGOs offer assistance. In due course however – as shown here – the flag and the memory of 
donor and implementing NGO may have all but disappeared. From a project in Bosnia com-
pleted seven years ago.  
  
The religious organizations 
that emerged out of church-based charitable work, are the oldest.  Internationally 
this means missionary work, by any other name. Today some of the biggest NGOs 
are in fact Christian-based organization, although there is little in their practical ac-
tion that differentiates them from other organization as they very seldom proselytize. 
They readily cooperate with and engage local organizations that may belong to other 
faiths, like World Vision and Norwegian Church Aid did in Afghanistan. But faith-
based organizations invariably link up to each other as NGOs internationalize and 
‘divisionalize’, and they seem to show a higher prevalence in areas familiar with their 
faith, as illustrated in the Yugoslavian conflict where Islamic NGOs gathered in the 
Muslim part of Bosnia, Catholic NGOs worked among Croats, and faith-based Ortho-
dox NGOs worked where the Serbs dominated.42 
 
“Dunantist” organizations  
refer to the ‘idealist’ Red Cross type of organizations, deriving their name from the 
founder of the Red Cross movement. This group is made up of secular organizations 
that claim independence from governments. However much MSF was established in 
reaction to the neutrality of ICRC,43 MSF still stands firmly within the Dunantist camp.  
So does Oxfam, and Save the Children UK.  This group also stays more financially 
independent of their home governments, although the government share is rising. 
                                          
42 Even the national branches of ‘Dunantist’ organizations like MSF, has shown preference for fields that 
related to the religious traditions of the home country, like MSF Greece working among the Serbs in the 
Yugoslav war. 
43 ICRC is still ridden by the fact that they knew about the extermination camps during WWII, but in line 
with their Geneva Convention obligations of ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ the organization chose to keep 
quiet about the mass killings (Rieff 2002) 
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Oxfam GB receives about one-third of its revenue from government and about half of 
Save the Children UK’s revenue is government money (Stoddard 2003; 29), substan-
tially less than the large Wilsonian organizations receive. 
 
These traditions may be superimposed by other considerations and affiliations, such 
as that between faith-based (i.e. Christian) and Wilsonian organizations, which the 
present US administration has given preferential treatment. There may be traces of 
similar linkages among the Scandinavian NGOs, although their lobbying and public 
criticism of their own governments are a more noticeable characteristic.  
 
The classification above was presented to highlight how traditions stemming from 
how organizations have evolved within a given society still guides their activities and 
policies in spite of their new role as a “crucial pillar of the international humanitarian 
architecture”, as Stoddard claims (2003; 25). This implicitly also highlights some of 
the difficulties organizations have in ‘reinventing themselves’ in view of the new chal-
lenges, hence this omnipresent call for organizational learning44 (Samset 1998; An-
nex 2).  
 
The question raised, ‘Who gets the job?’ may be decided against the tripartite back-
drop presented above. Housing is like a cuckoo’s egg in the NGO’s nest. Below I will 
show how the above-mentioned properties may have determined which nest received 
the egg.  
 
.1) Housing Interventions in the Shadow of the Wilsonians 
The Wilsonian impact on housing (re)constuction is by far the most important. Hous-
ing (re)construction is to a large extent dependent on donor involvement because of 
the costs involved.45 That makes governments key players in marking up the housing 
strategies the NGOs are to deliver. More often than not this favors one’s own housing 
industry. This was evident in the way the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian govern-
ments opted for provisions of their own pre-fabricated housing units when housing 
was called for during the war in former Yugoslavia.46 In terms of funding, housing is a 
large sector.  This in turn makes housing a lucrative sector for the NGOs. In accor-
dance with the Wilsonian traditions, the US government pressed hard to have a US 
NGO take over the UNHCR-funded housing program in Bosnia in 1996–1997.  In spite 
of their total lack of housing experience, UMCOR47 was awarded the project in prefer-
ence to other NGOs that had worked on housing in Bosnia for years.48 ‘The special 
                                          
44 ALNAP (Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action) has been 
established in the UK for this very purpose. 
45 However, there are exceptions. The Kosovo-appeals launched by independent NGOs in the UK in 1999 
netted more private funds (£ 53.6 million) than could be efficiently invested in Kosovo, according to sub-
sequent independent evaluation (ODI 2000). 
46 This is documented on the part of Sweden in the evaluation by Mossberg et al. (1997), and  Denmark in 
their evaluation of their work in former Yugoslavia (Danida 1999). Norway has not made any evaluation of 
its outcome, in spite of its heavy investments in housing on the Balkans. The policy of providing Norwegian 
pre-fabricated housing stems from the ‘Norwegian Model’ where government, NGOs and the private sector 
(housing manufacturers) co-operate.  This will be further presented in the case study section. 
47 United Methodist Committee on Relief. 
48 IMG’s Director of Housing quit his job in protest of this political decision (personal conversation). Ac-
cording to the subsequent evaluation UMCOR’s work was not that satisfactory (UNHCR 1998).  
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relationship’ is all the more revealing because the US did not spend government 
funds on housing in Bosnia at all.49 
 
There is no inherent quality in the faith-based NGOs that would carry consequences 
into its housing operations, beyond what was already referred to: geographical 
(faith-based) preferences and tendency for similar denominations to group. By far 
the biggest and most active housing NGO, Habitat for Humanity International, is a 
committed Christian organization with strategic links to The Carter Center, another 
Wilsonian NGO with a strong Christian foundation. They have been active in war and 
disaster affected countries in Central America. World Vision, the largest of the faith-
based NGOs has also joined forces with Habitat for Humanity in post-war housing 
projects in Burundi and Rwanda.  
 
The Dunantian tradition holds no embedded guidelines for housing programs. How-
ever, where joint housing programs are taken on, social housing organizations50 or 
housing co-operatives from the home country, are often engaged. This is similar to 
how the faith-based organizations team up.  
 
4.4.2 CATEGORIES OF URGENCY 
The Two Basic Approaches to Intervention 
If the categories above deal with strategies, at least where government monies are 
concerned, the categories in this section deal with tactics: how the organizations ad-
dress the issues they are set to resolve. This is an issue highly contested pertaining 
to housing since housing by nature is a long-lasting investment whereas the reason 
for its being built in areas of war – is one of urgent need. While most NGOs were es-
tablished as relief organizations in the aftermaths of natural and man-made disas-
ters, the ‘development’ agenda of the post-WWII years shifted their focus onto long-
term economic and societal progress. With the upsurge of violent conflicts in the 
1990s the NGO channel again had to refocus. New organizations were established51 
and many old ones set up or extended their emergency divisions.  
 
There is a commonly held view that there is a rift between people and organizations 
working in ‘development’ and ‘relief’ (Rieff 2002).  People from either side competi-
tively defend their own turf (World Disasters Report 1996), and the turf is indeed 
different (Fowler 2000, Edwards & Fowler 2002). Development involves long-term 
capacity-building programs aimed at strengthening local institutions, often informed 
by social research and executed in cooperation with local authorities based upon local 
priorities.  At least this is what is stated, if annual reports are anything to go by. Re-
lief organizations, on the other hand, are oriented towards alleviating sudden – yet 
presumed temporary – human suffering. Thus relief focuses on supporting the indi-
                                          
49 The ‘Lautenberg Amendment’, passed by Congress in July 1996, “bars funding for new housing or repair 
of old housing unless it is directly related to the efforts of US forces to promote peace in Bosnia” according 
to the CRS Issue Brief (http://www.fas.org/man/crs/91-089.htm). 
50 In the UK this could mean The Building and Social Housing Foundation. 
51 One central NGO on the Bosnian scene, Scottish European Aid (SEA), came into being and into promi-
nence in the 1990s, but folded as an independent organization some 10 years later when it merged with 
Mercy Corps. 
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vidual. Within this tradition, institutions are often perceived to represent bureaucratic 
hindrances, or at worst, the very forces that cause the suffering.52   Relief’s focus on 
short-term assistance to the individual stands opposed to the developmental tradition 
of focusing on the long-term strengthening of institutions. This may explain the insti-
tutional discord between the two strands of assistance. 
 
Such was the situation when the NGO channel was opened into former Yugoslavia in 
the early 1990s. The very experience from the Balkans, added to those of the pro-
tracted and violent wars of Africa, spurred a theoretical discourse on the very nature 
of international humanitarian relief operations. What was introduced,53 or rather what 
became common policy, was ‘linking relief and development’ (e.g. Barakat 1993, Bu-
chanan-Smith & Maxwell 1994), which in turn rested on the notion of disasters being 
temporary set-backs on the developmental road to economic progress. All these con-
cepts had strong references to theories on recovery after natural disaster and the 
post-WWII experience (Davis 1978, 1981, Cuny 1983, Barakat 1993) In essence it 
entailed a continuum, a linear understanding of development in the best of modernist 
traditions (Slim 2000, Macrae 2001).  
 
The need for linking the two also came from the practitioners.  It was apparent that 
the many ‘war disasters’ were not temporary, and that relief did not normalize the 
situation.  
It was necessary to focus on livelihood issues. During the latter part of the 1990s the 
two NGO camps were to join forces. The NGO Forum at the Social Summit in Copen-
hagen in 1995 agreed on a set of guidelines for how this was to be carried out (World 
Disasters Report 1996; 47–53). 
 
However, by the end of the decade the NGOs and their informing theories were still 
in disarray, according to Slim (2000). The ‘continuum’ concept had disappeared, and 
the discontinuous ‘contiguum’54 was brought in, meaning that relief, rehabilitation 
and development may take place at the same time (Munslow & Brown 1999, Lewis 
2001). Development requires institutions building, which were often not there (Mac-
rae 2001), making ‘developmental relief’ a term rather than a reality. There came a 
renewed call for going ‘back to basics’, i.e. to lower the ambitions by discharging 
some of the ‘developmental load’ placed on humanitarian relief.55 NGOs instead high-
                                          
52 Wayne Nafziger’s research has shown that “Humanitarian emergencies are caused mostly by the actions 
of the state and only rarely by insurgents” (Financial Times; January 21, 1998, see also Nafziger et al. 
2000). 
53 As a practitioner Fred Cuny had been propagating this for years already (Cuny 1983). 
54 The language of the ‘aid business’ is one of its most striking features. According to Tvedt the mutual 
language or rhetoric (the NGO-speak) is one of the key attributes of the “the NGO thing”. (Tvedt 
1998;18). Accompanying scholars also play out the ‘language thing’.  They juggle between ‘continuum’ 
and ‘contiguum’ the way Duffield flip words in changing ‘complex political emergencies’ into ‘emergent 
political complexes’. Of course here are intentional changes in meaning entailed, but as any good writer 
would know, words sometimes take on lives of their own and by their sound or rhythm tend to change the 
meaning of what was to be said.   
55 The conference Debates, Dilemmas and Dissention: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid held on February 
1st 2001 at the Commonwealth Institute, London, with the support of the Institute for Politics and Interna-
tional Studies (University of Leeds), CAFOD and the ODI, was an important event in highlighting the con-
ceptual, i.e. theoretical, change of heart. The key papers are presented in Disasters (2001) Vol. 25, No. 4. 
85
 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
lighted the (lack of) division of labor between NGOs and donor governments.  Peace 
making and creating institutional conditions for development are for governments. 
Pressing governments for action became an even more urgent issue for NGOs from 
both strands: “From development as delivery to development as leverage”, as the 
current saying goes (Edwards & Fowler 2002). In this, the two strands of NGOs could 
unite. 
 
Organizations are people; people working together within a given or chosen man-
agement structure guided by (more or less) defined goals. The two categories of 
NGOs, even within the same overall organization, are staffed with people who carry 
their respective traditions into their tactical and operational considerations. Rivalry 
itself exasperates the differences.  The urgency – and thus the media coverage – of 
the relief operations makes their operators look more ‘sexy’ than their ‘slower’ devel-
opment agents. Adding this to the fact that funding comes much easier during disas-
ters, and you have another explanation as to why the two stand separate.56  
 
.1) Housing: Long-term Urgent Interventions 
Housing interventions clearly exemplify this conflict. Housing programs are usually 
implemented and managed by humanitarian relief organizations. The NGOs are ur-
gently set to provide ‘shelter’ for people in dire need. Most other considerations are 
set aside. 
 
Literature is scant on post-war housing. The conclusions from evaluations are the 
closest we get to theories being developed. The major review and evaluation from 
UNHCR’s housing program in Rwanda concerning the repair and building of 100,000 
units draw conclusions pertinent to this relief-development dichotomy (UNHCR 
2000).  The developmental failure of the UNHCR housing program in Rwanda, as 
claimed by the evaluation team, was held to rest on the very emergency traditions of 
UNHCR: “UNHCR works as an emergency oriented agency.  This is compatible with 
temporary shelters but incompatible with a sustainable housing construction pro-
gram” (UNHCR 2000; 25–26). The evaluation team made a point of UNHCR’s use of 
ambiguous terminology by not distinguishing between shelter and housing. Making 
housing synonymous with shelter makes housing into a “basic necessities of relief” 
alongside water/sanitation, food, medical care and protection from violence and har-
assment (World Disasters Report 1996; 48).  
 
 
 
                                          
56 The Norwegian government, for instance, until recently funded 100% of emergency assistance costs, 
but only 80% of programs for development assistance.  
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Fig.4.4.2 NGOs are often accused of applying the same shelter conceptions in support of the 
IDPs shown above, and in assisting returning IDPs, as shown below. (The upper picture by 
courtesy of the UNHCR).  
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Relief organizations focus on time (timeliness) and logistics. Making housing into 
shelter executed by a relief-oriented NGO renders housing the function of time and 
logistics. This became apparent when one of the large Norwegian emergency NGOs 
finally employed an architect to handle their large construction portfolio.57 The Head 
of Construction was combined with the post of Head of Logistics.58 However, accord-
ing to the team evaluating returnee housing in Tajikistan as built by SDC59: “the 
emergency approach is questionable for this phase of programme”, adding “Housing 
(reconstruction and/or reconditioning of homes) has to be seen as a complex socio-
economic activity, different from providing shelter (emergency phase)” (SDC/UNHCR 
1999; ii).  “The time factor is a non issue for the [returnee] beneficiaries” 
(SDC/UNHCR 1999; 9). These are findings confirming what previous investigations 
and research have long ago made available, Davis (1978), Cuny (1983) and Roger 
Zetter’s ‘state of the art’ report (1995).  
 
In response to the question heading this section, ‘How do the NGOs address the chal-
lenges embedded in housing (re)construction?’, housing seems still to be ruled by 
relief perceptions rather than development perceptions60 among NGOs.61  Why is 
that?  My third and final categorization of NGOs involved in housing will deal with 
disciplinary professionalism where part of the answer may lie. 
 
4.4.3 CATEGORIES OF NGO STAFF; THE SPECIALIST AND THE GENERALIST 
When the NGOs entered the conflict on the Balkans they did so with no or very little 
organizational experience in post-war (re)construction.  The response to the ques-
tions of how this was to be organized, who were there to do it, and what skills were 
required distinguishes some organizations from others, or more to the point, reveals 
some basic traits of the “NGO thing”, to borrow Tvedt’s term (1998).   
 
There has been a watershed in the NGO world since the war on the Balkans. They 
have now become “a force for transformation in global politics and economics”, dis-
bursing US$ 12–15 billion per year (Edwards & Fowler 2002; 1). The NGOs have be-
come a “giant, global, unregulated industry worth £ 2,500 million a year”, according 
to Lindsey Hilsum62 Yet they are still volatile institutions, volatile in terms of funding 
and political goodwill from governments and the home public,63 but volatile also in 
                                          
57 Constituting about 50% of their operational cost basically made up of permanent constructions. 
58 Cf. also UMCOR being awarded UNHCR’s housing program in Bosnia because of their logistical experi-
ence. 
59 Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. 
60 Professor Ian Davis maintains that ‘nothing much has changed’ since he started working in this field in 
the late 1970s (private conversation May 2001). 
61 The referee team (of which I was a member) and author of the ODI/HPN Network paper entitled “Hous-
ing Reconstruction after Conflict and disaster” (Barakat 2003) held the firm opinion that housing’s main 
challenge was to dislodge it from its prevailing ‘relief orientation’. Yet in publishing the Network Paper, the 
ODI/HPN is said to have edited out the chapter on theory and hence eliminated generating understanding 
of housing “as a complex socio-economic activity”, as UNHCR’s Rwanda evaluation stated (UNHCR 2000).  
62 The Observer, December 31, 1995. 
63 How public appeals are presented so as to induce trust and willingness to donate is a major challenge 
for the NGOs (Fowler 2000, Edwards & Fowler 2002). They sometimes exaggerate the situation in order to 
persuade the public to donate more (Valid International 2004). Maren (1997) spells it all out: “NGOs need 
nothing more than publicity.  Their prime interest is in reaching their customers, the donating public” (cf. 
Rieff 1997; 133). For this, the stories from the field are often distorted (ibid.).  
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terms of the ‘operators’, the NGO people, working in the field. Their security, how-
ever, has been recognized (van Brabant 2000), and so too have the issues linked to 
the management of the volume of funds presently channeled though the NGOs 
(Fowler 2000, Edwards & Fowler 2002, Lewis & Wallace 2000, Minear 2002). But oth-
erwise, the people on the ground are still ‘on the lose’.  Little is known about their 
capacities and competence, about their professional qualifications and about the 
working conditions, contracts and organizational relationships, and how these may 
impact the implementation of projects on the ground.64  
 
There was a saying that the main qualification for working for an NGO overseas was 
“availability”65 rather than specific qualifications. The numerous university courses on 
emergency issues and disaster management during the 1990s have upgraded the 
NGO staff in the field. This has expanding the team of NGO generalists mastering 
basic skills and introductory knowledge on the multiplicity of issues deemed relevant 
in the field.66  
 
Over the years, however, some of the large, cover-all NGOs have emerged as spe-
cialists in particular disciplines, for instance, the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in de-
mining, and Oxfam and Norwegian Church Aid in water and sanitation. In addition, 
there are those who have grown out of their NGO status and become institutions in 
their own right. Grameen Bank is the key example. A trend among NGOs towards 
professionalism is apparent,67 a change that also stems from the calls for a more in-
tegrative approach, division of labor, or co-ordination, by any other name (Fowler 
2000, Minear 2002). 
 
The normal way for cover-all NGOs to become specialists is simply by hiring short-
term staff appropriately trained for the program at hand, i.e. technicians for housing 
programs. This invariably takes place within a ‘relief framework’ which also embodies 
short-term contracts, frequent change in personnel and ensuing organizational dis-
                                          
64 This is all the more remarkable knowing that during the Rwanda crisis one of the main multinational 
NGOs had to change their field-based heads of sections about every three weeks. The impact on all as-
pects to the assistance is obvious. One of the consultants to the Joint Evaluation on Rwanda. Vol III, Hu-
manitarian Aid and Effects provided this information (January 2000) on condition that the organization in 
question was not identified.  High levels of stress have long been the acknowledged reason for this high 
turnover. Carlisle-Pesic writes what rings true in the ears of many aid workers: “The Aid agencies, despite 
their core purpose of being to help those in need, are notoriously bad at looking after their own employ-
ees” (The Guardian March 21, 2001). This might be the direct cause of the rising unionization among NGO 
staff (ibid., June 29, 2001). For further reports from the field, the aid business and the ‘NGO thing’ seen 
from below, see Maren (1997), Terry (2002), Carter (2004). 
65 This was in fact the case in the early 1990s when the NGOs charged into former Yugoslavia, and also 
when the Kosovo crisis struck. 
66 Half of the 242 organizations present in Bosnia in 1999 each covered 12 distinctive sectors, sectors that 
in the home country would be separate disciplines. ‘Shelter reconstruction’, permanent housing, by any 
other name, was carried out by 112 organizations. No architect was reportedly employed.  The sectors 
covered (and the number of NGOs engaged) Education/Training (242), Children/youth (205), Human 
Rights (194), Return (180), Civil Society (178), Humanitarian (169), Women (156), Psycho-Social (154), 
Information/Media (133), Health (129), Micro-Credit/Income Generation (122), Shelter/reconstruction 
(122), and in addition there were Agriculture (89), Elderly (89), Demining/Mine Awareness (31), and Other 
(63) (ICVA 1999). 
67 The publications of the ODI’s Humanitarian Practice Network (http://www.odi.org.uk/hpg/index.html) 
as well as The Guardian’s section on the Voluntary Sector have covered these trends extensively 
(http://society.guardian.co.uk/voluntary/). 
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ruptions, aborted continuity, and lack of institutional memory (Tvedt 1998, Fowler 
2000, Schloms 2001). Headquarters are staffed by all-rounder managers and admin-
istrators, not disciplinary specialists.68 The apparent tension and frustration caused 
by this is not covered at any length in research beyond the issues of ‘institutional 
learning’ and ‘NGO coordination’ (ibid.), although significant contributions towards 
understanding how the field ticks (or rather not), stem from the writing of Maren 
(1997), Vaux (2001), Terry (2002), Carter (2004). 
 
.1) Housing as a specialist sector of intervention.  
In spite of housing’s large share of funding and its many-facetted attributes there are 
very few NGOs specializing in post-war (re)construction housing. UNHCR’s large 
housing program in Bosnia in 1996–1997 was formally run by an Italian economist, 
and the program itself was carried out mainly by a NGO specializing in logistics.69 A 
Kosovo shelter program, undertaken a couple of years later by a group of nine UK 
NGOs, reported severe implementation problems stemming from the lack of specialist 
personnel. The fact that many of their building managers could stay only a few weeks 
had obvious impacts on the efficacy of the shelter/housing projects (Valid Interna-
tional 2000). Some of the NGOs involved encountered so many problems in staffing 
and in negotiating a common standard of delivery that in effect they advocated the 
handing over of shelter programs to regular contractors (ibid.).  
 
Planning, construction and managing housing is a professional discipline, or rather a 
cluster of disciplines. The countries funding post-war housing programs throughout 
the world all recognize this when it comes to their own housing challenges. Annually 
large sums of public funds are spent on higher education and R&D in this particular 
field. When acting on foreign soil, the same governments – in the role of donors – 
pay little attention to that. In the best of cases, engineers, technicians, and in some 
rare cases, architects have been temporarily employed, but just as often teachers 
and social workers have managed extensive shelter/housing programs running into 
many millions of dollars.70 
 
Consequently, it is mostly ‘generally staffed’ NGOs that implement housing projects 
in war-affected areas. Out of the specialist organizations, the most influential are the 
United Nations’ own organization, Habitat, and in addition there are ‘Habitat for Hu-
manity International’ (HHI), a large and American Christian Housing NGO, Building 
                                          
68 The large (US$ 100 million?) shelter/housing programs implemented by Norwegian NGOs in BiH during 
the 1990s were led from HQ by (overworked) administrative officers with a professional background in 
social work. 
69 UNHCR had, however, established a specialist unit, The International Management Group, that acted as 
UNHCR’s technical advisors. 
70 In the spring of 2000 I stayed with the Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit at York Univer-
sity, UK, trying to collecting case studies on post-war and post-disaster housing from major international 
NGOs. 21 organizations responded, not by providing case studies on housing, but by providing information 
as to why no case studies were available. Although they had all implemented housing programs, they were 
‘in no position’ to allocate resources to have the programs documented, although the benefits were ac-
cepted as ‘obvious’.  GTZ which had made exemplary documents on their housing project up until 1998, 
could no longer ‘afford it’.  Inquiring about particular housing projects that I knew the NGOs had imple-
mented, in no case was I informed by people at headquarters; they had scant recollection of project in 
question. Throughout, I was referred to people who were either no longer with the organization in question 
or who were working in another field, most often in another country. 
90
 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
and Social Housing Foundation (BHSF) in the UK, and Cooperative Housing Founda-
tion (CHF International) in the US71. In housing terms, these are large and to some 
extent influential, but remain small compared to the cover-all NGOs. Most of their 
work is, as suits the issue, long-term development work, although some, mainly HHI, 
also work in areas of conflict and disaster (Fuller 2000). 
 
Relief organizations seem by definition to be staffed by generalist organizations, 
staffed with people who are specialists in ‘development’, in ‘ logistics’, or in ‘recon-
struction’ in general terms. When specialist input is required, this is sought covered 
by hiring short-term staff of the appropriate discipline. Specialist organizations like 
those dealing exclusively with housing are mostly employed through outsourcing or, 
in the best of cases, through strategic partnerships with generalist NGOs when it 
comes to work in post-war reconstruction (UNHCR 2000).  
 
From what has been presented above it would not seem unlikely that the way post-
war housing is being realized as a function of the generalist nature of the implement-
ing agencies and their policy of employing short-term specialist field staff.   Is it so? 
 
                                          
71 CHF however has recently diversified to such an extent that housing is but one ‘speciality’ among many. 
It has also through recent practice reiterated its strong Wilsonian traits 
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5 METHODS AND TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 FRAMING POST-WAR RECOVERY 
 
It is self-evident that the sheer volume of housing investments1 accompanied by 
housing’s functional and symbolic properties will in some way or other affect the 
recovery process of BiH, as it would for any war affected society.  It is the outcome 
of these processes that will determine the contribution housing yields to the overall 
recovery. Hence it is necessary first to define the term ‘recovery’, then develop ap-
propriate tools for analyzing the recovery processes embedded in housing projects, 
and finally select cases for investigation that hold the characteristics of recovery 
defined. 
 
5.1.1 DEFINING THE CONCEPT 
Recovery describes a process where people, or societies, after having had their 
normal societal development processes broken, regain their capacities to function 
on their own.  It is a healing process that might be self-ordained or made depend-
ent on support from others.  It is limited in time and deals with the whole of society 
although the ailment, or the cause, may be specific.  The recovery process is not 
merely economic or material, it encompasses the whole body, the whole of society. 
The term is used in medicine and is used here as metaphor because it so readily 
shows how ‘recovery’ differs from ordinary ‘development’. 
 
Recovery is held separate from emergency relief, the immediate shock response to 
abrupt disasters (again the medical reference is illuminating). Recovery deals with 
future perspectives, although different from ‘development’. ‘Development’ as a 
term – even a concept – is more difficult to pin down than recovery. “The eternal 
challenge of development is to do better”, as Robert Chamber says, in lining up 
policy statements from the annually updated Development Reports from the World 
Bank World or UNDP on actions and policies to make the world a better place, es-
pecially for the poor (Chambers 1997:1743). This is a statement that fully satisfies 
Wolfgang Sachs’s much earlier claim that “Development has become a shapeless 
amoeba-like word. It cannot express anything because the outlines are blurred. […] 
Development thus has no content”, (Sachs 1992).2 This does not make defining 
recovery any easier.  In her recent book Joanna Macrae argues, as has Terje Tvedt 
done before, that for intervening agencies applying a long-term developmental ap-
proach to reconstruction of war ravaged societies is well-nigh impossible where the 
societies in question have no functioning state institutions. Such an approach may 
make things worse (Tvedt 1996, Macrae 2001). Ha-Joon Chang does not accept 
that strong institutions as such are a prerequisite to the development of poor na-
tions. He has shown how both the UK and the US were ‘developed’ without first 
                                          
1 By Oct.1 2000  KM 886.588.000 (about US$ 500.000.000) had been officially spent on housing, ac-
cording to OHR Economic Newsletter, Vol. 3, No 6 
2 Chambers, in the 1997 article agrees.  As a way out he sees a requirement for ‘personalizing’ devel-
opment assistance, ‘de-mechanizing’ it on the part of the managing agency. 
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having functioning institutions. Given a similar ‘institutional leeway’3 the poor na-
tions of today could also achieve prosperity. They are effectively barred from this 
by today’s rich nations (Chang 2002).4 
 
Recovery denotes change that comprises ‘development-like’ activities and proc-
esses aiming at creating conditions of predictability, comprising political and institu-
tional growth, economic development, physical reconstruction, and the 
(re)formation of human and social capital. Recovery thus defined would rest within 
the endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, 1994), where the presence of social 
capital is appreciated as decisive in terms of efficiency (Fukuyama 2001), govern-
ance (Putnam 1993), and in issues of location (Krugman 1996, Maskell et. al. 
1998). 
 
Recovery is distinguished from ‘development’ in basically three different ways: re-
flexivity, temporality, and complexity. 
 
.1) Recovery is Reflexive, Guided by the Past 
Whereas ‘ordinary development’ is focusing on improving an unknown future, re-
covery takes place among people who have ‘been there - done that’. As stated in 
the Introduction, this is a fundamental difference between ‘recovery’ and (intended) 
‘development’. Recovery will be directed, guided or influenced by pre-war/pre-
disaster perceptions, either to recreate, or make new. All post-war or post-disaster 
records show this tension (Dancke 1986, Barakat 1994, Mazover 1998, Stiefel 
1999).  Some may want to go back – others will try to reach what is merely a 
dream in the pre-war situation.  Mark Mazower says about the attitudes shaping the 
post WWII recovery: 
 
“The results of wartime and post-war dislocation and upheaval was therefore para-
doxical. […] The outcome was a popular mood which was both radical and conserva-
tive at the same time.  People looked forward to building a new world, but they did 
not wish this process to be disruptive.” (Mazover 1998:228) 
 
International assistance holds no formal political mandate to make choices for fu-
ture change in war-affected nations, therefore their assistance tends to be biased in 
favor of restoring the historical past – as perceived (or intentionally interpreted) by 
the external actors. This is contested territory and along with the weakening of ex-
clusive national sovereignty will possibly be overtaken by direct political interven-
tion to implant ‘democratic ideals’ of the intervening forces.  Bosnia, Kosovo, Af-
ghanistan and Iraq show a pattern.5 This is more than mere political speculation.  
Ulrich Beck maintains that this is an intrinsic property of the dynamics of globaliza-
                                          
3 Which entailed no adherence to copyright laws, laws on intellectual property and the like. 
4 The bootlegging of music, of DVDs, of Rolexes, Levis jeans and the like is the contemporary equivalent 
to the former ‘illegal’ activities of the present world powers,  
5 The US instituted Cabinet of Iraq is composed on the basis of religious affiliation.  Grounded in the 
perceptions of the occupying forces, religion was made a decisive factor, although religion has not been 
a political leadership matter in Iraq since 1927.  The appointed cabinet has a Minister of Human Rights 
(but no Defence Minister). 
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tion, guided as it is by universal rights and liberal economic values (Beck 1998, 
2003). 
 
These internationally imposed– in fact, globalized traits – are new features in post-
war recovery. They stand in tension with the affected population’s urge to restore 
continuity. For recovery to carry meaning, and thus be sustained, the informed ref-
erences people carry to their past endeavors and their potential future capacities 
depend on principal participation in the reconstruction processes. Engaging people’s 
own knowledge, ability and will are uncontested prerequisites for sustainable devel-
opment (Barakat & Chard 2002); it is even more so in the efforts of recovery. 
 
.2) Recovery is Time Limited 
Recovery is a phase of ‘development-like’ change where the activities are borne out 
of war’s societal and material breakdown. When these no longer determine politics 
or policies, the recovery phase is over. In areas of chronic political emergencies, 
this phase may simply not be reached through current relief-development methods 
and very selective international political or donor engagement (Macrae 2001, Duf-
field 2002, Disasters 2000, 2001).  In others, it may come long after the material 
or purely economic setbacks have been surmounted.6 The constituting activities will 
hence change with time.  So, too, will appropriate interventions change, but not in 
a linear fashion as the consequences of conflict are spatially and temporally de-
pendent. Timeliness is crucial.  So, too, will the understanding of the interventions 
themselves change with time, as these will change the context and thus affect what 
is appropriate and timely. 
 
The understanding of time and phasing of post-war/disaster interventions is worth 
deliberating. The way it is conceptualized gives rise to strategies and interventions. 
In his early works on housing after natural disasters, Ian Davis identified four post-
disaster phases: 1) emergency, 2) rehabilitation, 3) reconstruction, and 4) devel-
opment (Davis 1978). Barakat presents three stages for “reconstruction after natu-
ral disasters in general, and war in particular: 1) immediate relief, 2) rehabilitation, 
and 3) long-term reconstruction” (Barakat 1994:63). After research on the recovery 
after earthquakes, Kates & Pijawka identified four phases: 1) the emergency, 2) 
restoration, 3) replacement-reconstruction, and 4) the commemorative period, 
each lasting roughly ten times longer than the preceding period7 (1977). All these 
are ‘continuum models’,8 illustrating the overlapping phases of the recovery proc-
ess.  These processes are not so neatly lined up in the tense atmosphere of vio-
lence and vicious sentiments during and immediately after war as they are after 
natural disasters, although the components are there. Time and again, the war-
post-war scenes juggle the phases in both space and time. 
                                          
6 In Norway the recovery phase following WW II was officially over by 1960 (Danche 1986). By then 
Norway’s economy was way beyond the pre-war level. The 1939 figures were surpassed already in 1948, 
according to Maddison (1982). 
7 Giving credence to the claim that effective emergency management has long-term effects. 
8 The continuum model is no longer helpful in that it does not anticipate the erratic disruptions of this 
perceived continuum experienced in current wars. Within the same ‘theatre of war’ all phases may be 
present at the same time, and the international response does not necessarily pass from one phase to 
the next (Lewis 2001). 
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Recovery covers all the phases presented by the authors referred to above, except 
for the emergency phase.  Again using the medical metaphor, the emergency phase 
is, in most cases, very short – if properly dealt with. However, the nature of current 
wars often leaves the affected societies in a state of extended emergency, where 
recovery is an almost irrelevant idea (Macrae 2001). In others, the emergency 
phase is artificially extended through the mode of aid delivery because much of 
what is implemented as emergency relief is in fact reconstruction work carrying 
long-term consequences (Macrae 2001, World Disasters Report 2001).  Sometimes 
there is relief and long-term investments taking place at the same time, even by 
the same agencies.9 There is no common definitions of these terms. What is ‘emer-
gency relief’ to one organization is ‘development aid’ to another.10 
 
The processes constituting recovery after war – as compared to recovery after 
natural disasters – do not follow a linear pattern, from emergency to develop-
ment.11 Within the same theatre of war12 they progress in a much more politicized 
manner where all phases may take place simultaneously, and change from one to 
another may go either way.13  Hence recovering from war entails political 
(re)construction and the (re)development – or merely change – of political institu-
tions, be they old or new wars (Bjøl 1988, Haughton 1998, Kaldor 1999). 
 
.3) Recovery is Extremely Complex 
Recovery is characterized by embedded political bias and psychological tension fol-
lowing violence, personal loss and humiliation, in addition to the many-faceted 
challenges of the institutional and material reconstruction (Barakat 1994, Zetter 
2001, Macrae 2001). At least in degree, this is different from ‘regular develop-
ment’.  Sultan Barakat says: 
 
                                          
9 In Sri Lanka, NORAD, the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation, funds emergency pro-
grams as well as ‘regular development work’ in the war zones of the country. Currently, Norway provides 
bomber aircraft and emergency aid, as well as long-term support to Afghanistan. 
10 Definitions are pragmatically set. What you call what you do is largely a function of what it is called 
by whoever provides the funds.  
11 I will not digress into the finer print when distinguishing war from natural disaster.  Needless to say, 
there are natural disasters caused by stupid acts of man, but basically, people affected perceive war and 
its destruction as caused by someone in particular whereas natural disasters are perceived as caused by 
God, or Nature in general.  It is how war is perceived that counts when setting recovery strategies. In 
line with the emerging ‘risk society’, the perception of the causes of natural disaster has steadily become 
shifted towards people, i.e. politicians (Beck 1992). 
12 The term ‘theatre of war’ stems from a time when war was very different.  According to Branislav 
Jakovljevic the term “theatrum belli” (war theatre), was first used in the 17th century (1999). The term 
was later used by Clausewitz in his On War, and also in the Hague Convention of 1899, The Law of War. 
13 Even after natural disasters there may be political squabbles in addressing blame. After the Central 
European Floods in 1997, Radio Free Europe stated: “But it has also created an opportunity, despite the 
incalculable damage, of introducing major and lasting improvements in the ways those countries conduct 
the business of government at home and work with each other.”  The matter then entered the subse-
quent election campaigns in the affected countries. 
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“[reconstruction]14 could be distinguished from any other form of normal building or 
development by the level of complexity involved in its process (emotional energy; 
righting wrongs; rebuilding lives, solving differences to achieve national goals, 
etc.), and the magnitude of the task that has to be undertaken in the most pressing 
and demanding economic, political, social and cultural circumstances”. (Barakat 
1994;53) 
 
The complexities are all the more apparent in societies at war with themselves. Ad-
dressing recovery from these wars will have to reflect these complexities as there 
are normally no political bodies, national or international, with sufficient legitimacy, 
political power or will to coordinate or “to sort things out”. Borrowing tactics from 
non-violent conflicts, planning under such circumstances would subscribe to small 
projects addressing practical improvements where few value-based decisions have 
to be made (Sager 1994). Pursuing recovery depends on re-instituting the rule of 
law and vigorously protecting human rights (Glasius & Kaldor 2002, Beck 2003, 
Duffield 2002, World Bank 2003). This is no easy task, if at all achievable. 
 
5.1.2 RECOVERY AS RE-DEVELOPMENT 
Recovery, imbued with the characteristics referred to above, is similar to the term 
‘re-development’.  It has been hammered down to a set of interacting, politically 
sensitive activities spanning time from the true emergency phase onwards to a 
point where society’s dispositions are no longer guided by the effects of war. It is 
about the affected population regaining their capacities – individually and as a soci-
ety – to provide for themselves and interact with others in a mutually dignified way. 
The complexity of the situation is time dependent, but also depends on how the 
processes are perceived in respect to the pre-war conditions and the experience of 
war. These change over time, and they are different at different corners of the 
arena. The choice of cases for investigation will be determined by these uncovered 
attributes of recovery, and so will the tools for analysis. They will be forged by 
these same attributes, chief among them the reflexive quality of recovery, i.e. the 
role of local agency. The time limit and the complexity does not give similar un-
equivocal indicators, and will more generally be made part of my filter of analysis. 
 
 
                                          
14 Barakat refers to reconstruction as: “the totality of mental and manual activities directed toward 
relieving the victims, mending the damages and improving the quantity and quality of the pre-disaster 
structures, operations and relationships”. This describes the recovery process. 
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5.2 DEVELOPING A ‘FILTER OF ANALYSIS’ 
 
By investigating the processes set in motion by internationally funded housing pro-
jects, we need a framework or a filter through which the data are sifted, a filter 
conceptualized and calibrated in accordance with the research challenge. The filter 
as a metaphor is used partly to avoid the word ‘framework’ which in development-
emergency speak is so overspent it has lost its defining meaning. But also because 
it says something about an analytical approach to how data are treated in order to 
bring out valid conclusions. Since I enter into the ongoing recovery processes I am 
to investigate, it is crucial that I find a way of analyzing them that acknowledges 
the dynamics of the processes. A (multi-layered) filter metaphor alludes to a set of 
parameters through which the data are sifted. In the following, I will present ana-
lytical tools, ‘filter’ in my usage, employed in current development practice and re-
late these to the properties of housing as presented in the previous chapters. 
 
5.2.1 THE CAPACITIES-VULNERABILITIES APPROACH 
Anderson and Woodrow, in their seminal Rising from the Ashes; Development 
Strategies in Times of Disaster, presented the Capacities-Vulnerabilities (C-V) ana-
lytical framework, (Anderson & Woodrow 1989). They use a set, or a continuum, of 
three types of capacities when describing or analyzing (a vulnerable1) society: ma-
terial, organizational and motivational. The capacities of a society are mirrored in 
inverse sets of vulnerabilities. In the C-V framework, development is understood as 
processes that strengthen capacities and, or whereby, vulnerabilities are reduced. 
There is a crucial distinction between capacity as ‘capital’ or ‘asset’ and capacity as 
‘flow’ or ‘enablement’.  In reference to education Anderson & Woodrow say: “Edu-
cation is not a process of putting ‘knowledge deposits’ in other peoples’ minds.  
Education is a process of engaging people in discovery and thought” (ibid;86). 
Strengthening the capacities of a society is strengthening their capability to act.  
The capacity itself is not the prime dimension.  It is the interacting flow generated 
by these capacities that constitutes change, and reducing vulnerabilities constitute 
positive societal development.  It is not the fact that Germany in the early post-
WWII years had a well-educated population that caused the ‘Deutche Wunder’, it 
was their ability to put their knowledge and experience into strategic use that made 
the difference. This has been the crucial difference in the post-war reconstruction of 
the former Yugoslav countries.2 The C-V approach is still the fundament for any 
subsequent development logic in that they recognized development-support to be 
                                          
1 Anderson and Woodrow had poor, vulnerable societies in mind when writing their book. Since ‘Septem-
ber 11’ all countries are vulnerable; see Homer-Dixon’s “The rise of complex terrorism” in Foreign Policy, 
Jan/Feb 2002;52-62. 
2 "When the war is over – for example in Bosnia, the country will probably get back on its feet rather 
quickly because the country is fairly well endowed with human capital”, stated Professor in Economics, 
Anders Skonhoft, in an article in Klassekampen in 1996.  He based his assumptions on the post-WWII 
experience of Europe.  His assumptions proved wrong (as did most people’s). The dreary development of 
post-war Bosnia has shown that human capital + financial capital is not in itself sufficient to enhance 
recovery. 
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multi-dimensional. If it were to improve lives and livelihoods of the people assisted, 
it had to respond to all three ‘compartments’ of society, material, organizational 
and motivational. 
 
5.2.2 THE SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOOD APPROACH  
Another approach, another analytical framework, which obviously owes much to 
Anderson and Woodrow, as well as to the work of Robert Chambers, is “The Sus-
tainable Livelihood Approach”.3  The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) was 
commissioned to present a framework for Britain’s renewed commitment to devel-
opment aid as part of New Labour’s political take-over. Extending some of the con-
cepts and relationships presented by Chambers and Conway (Chambers & Conway 
1992, Chambers 1997),IDS/DIFID came up with the “sustainable livelihood ap-
proach” (Scoones 1998, DIFID 2000), in which they conceptualize society as a dy-
namic structure of ‘livelihood capitals’, natural, social, human, environmental and 
financial, through which development and change is taking place.  And again, it is 
the ‘flow’ from these capitals that represents the dynamics, not the capitals them-
selves.  The capitals interact within a “vulnerability context” which is also defined 
by the prevailing power structures of society. On the basis of the overall context 
and the institutional structures of power, people activate the capitals into ‘livelihood 
strategies’ in anticipation of ‘livelihood outcomes’. 
 
The context and institutional power analysis resembles a SWOT4 analysis, with the 
crucial difference of extending the ‘Strength’ dimension into five capitals, one of 
which is financial capital.  The other four capitals are defined as follows;  
 
Human Capital represents the skills, knowledge, ability to work - and crucially, 
health:  “As well as being of intrinsic value, human capital (…) is required in order 
to make use of any of the (…) other types of assets” (ibid. 2.3.1). 
 
Environmental (natural) Capital refers to wide array of the natural assets or re-
sources, from intangible public goods such as environmental beauty and biodiver-
sity, to divisible assets used directly in production. And again, the focus is to be 
shifted towards “the more important issue of how natural capital is used, in combi-
nation with other assets, to sustain livelihood” (ibid. 2.3.3). 
 
Fixed (physical) Capital comprises the infrastructure, buildings, plants and machin-
ery and other producer good required to support livelihoods. DIFID label the follow-
ing essentials for sustainable livelihoods: “affordable transport; secure shelter and 
buildings; adequate water supply and sanitation; clean, affordable energy; and ac-
cess to information (communication)” (ibid. 2.3.4). 
 
                                          
3 According to Robert Chambers, the term “Sustainable Livelihoods” was coined by Conroy and Litvinoff 
for a conference in 1988. 
4 Strengths, Weaknesses (internal), Opportunities, Threats (External). 
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Social Capital, presently often referred to as “the missing link”, or the glue that 
binds the other capital modes together, is defined by the World Bank like this: “So-
cial Capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and the norms that shape the 
quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions” (Word Bank 2002a). DIFID 
points to its manifestations in a development context: “network and connected-
ness; membership of more formalized groups; relationships of trust, reciprocity and 
exchanges” (DIFID 2000 2.3.2).5 
 
5.2.3 THE SUSTAINABLE NEIGHBORHOOD APPROACH 
The Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research & the York Research Part-
nership have, in a recent research project, employed what I have labeled ‘The sus-
tainable neighborhood approach’ in their dealing with housing and regeneration of 
former coalfield communities in Yorkshire. These were communities that experi-
enced the shock of pit closures in the early 1980s (Stafford et al. 2001). It is a 
simplified DIFID model, with ‘financial’ capital left out. Whether it is helpful to in-
clude financial capital into the framework is arguable.6  The Sheffield/York research 
left financial capital out because “Financial capital […] is rather a means of paying 
for (i.e. financing) increases in one or more of the four capitals”.7  This argument is 
strengthened in that projects that are externally funded – like the ones examined in 
my research - convert financial capital into other modes of capital as a matter of 
course. The World Bank also excludes financial capital from the essential socio-
economic assets for sustainable development (cf. Stafford et al. 2001;39). The re-
maining four pillars are those of social capital, human capital, environmental capital 
and fixed capital. I acknowledge that such a ‘capital approach’ is a gross simplifica-
tion of society.  As such it may represent the “the common tendency to reify the 
social world; that is, to turn active, conscious social relationships and processes 
into things which exist independently of us so that we think of them in terms of 
‘having’ rather than ‘being’”, says Sayer (1992;16).8 It is therefore imperative to 
bear in mind that it is the flow from these capitals, the processes and interaction 
they set in motion that validates such an approach.  It is back to the ’agency of 
housing’: what housing does, not what it is. If we rephrase this by referring to so-
                                          
5 Mancur Olson, Jr introduced the framework that shaped the concept of “social capital” in his 1965 book 
The Logic of Collective Action, whereas in 1993 Robert D. Putnam and his Making Democracy Work 
brought added attention to it through his work on the concept of “Civil Society”. Putnam’s own definition 
of social capital: “ By any analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital [...] social capital 
refers to features of social organisation such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination 
and co-operation for mutual benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and 
human capital” (1993;35). Bourdieu also applies the concept of social capital and defines it like this: 
"the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network 
of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition." (Bourdieu 
1986;248) 
6 Other capital forms are sometimes included when investigating particular aspects of societal dynamics., 
this can sometimes be political capital, symbolic, cultural, even aesthetic capital. 
7 From correspondence between Stafford and Skotte on the issue of Financial Capital, November 2001. 
8 Chambers claim that new terms were introduced to make development economists and engineers able 
to handle the new development dogma of ‘people and capabilities’ within their own world of ‘things and 
numbers’ (Chambers 1997). 
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cietal capitals: it is not what they are, it is how we make them interact that brings 
about lasting developmental change. This echoes Forrest and Kearn’s description of 
social capital “Social capital, then, is important not for its own sake, but for what 
one does with it, or can attain by it, as with other forms of capital” (2001;2141). 
 
This approach is chosen as my filter of analysis because it allows for an understand 
of the dynamics of the affected societies by utilizing the notion of interacting capi-
tals. I use the metaphor of the electric motor – which is constructed similar to a 
electric generator: the devise can generate motion or activity when expending en-
ergy, but when in motion it can itself generate energy. From the figure we also see 
that capital replenishment may escape without interaction, without strengthening 
the other capital modes. This was exemplified in the Yorkshire study by the gov-
ernment programs to retrain people, expand their human capital as it were. Instead 
of supporting societal growth, the people simply moved out when sufficiently 
trained, leaving the communities in question even worse off.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5.2.1 An approach to understanding societal interaction as interaction between constitut-
ing capital modes. Development or re-development takes place when replenishing one 
replenishes the others through interaction.  
 
The whole proposition depends on the interaction, the spillover, between the as-
sets. The capital modes feed off each other. Thus depletion in one might lead to 
depletion in another or, investment in one capital form augments capital formation 
of another. These are not market transactions in any way, although the model itself 
owes much to the endogenous growth theory (Romer 1994), particularly to the 
linkage between knowledge (human capital) and investment (fixed capital).  In ad-
dition to conceptualizing this interaction, the illustration above also shows another 
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crucial element of this approach: the ‘complementarity’ between the assets; they 
cannot readily be substituted.9  
 
 
Another metaphor may also help understand the basics of this approach. When lift-
ing a carpet from the floor all four corners have to be raised simultaneously. It 
makes no sense to lift one or two, or lift them in succession. And we may do with-
out metaphors: we experience daily how one action inadvertently leads to another, 
intentionally, or by chance.  
 
This approach acknowledges that there is an inevitable interactions between a capi-
tal intervention, like housing, and that of the other societal capitals. By analyzing 
my findings I will hence be allowed to uncover the extent of interaction, how it 
came about and with what effects.  The bottom line for any intervention is to con-
tribute to the well-being or welfare of the population assisted. “The objective of de-
velopment is well-being for all”, says Chambers, well-being being described as the 
experience of good quality of life: “Unlike wealth, well-being is open to the whole 
range of human experience, social, psychological and spiritual as well as material” 
(Chambers 1997;1748). Well-being may be seen as a matter of subject choice, and 
development as a matter of strategic subject choice. 
 
To operationalize such a ‘filter of analysis’ requires that a territorial aggregate is 
set, and external relations are recognized. Although crucial, this seems to be a 
practical and conceptual difficulty in all sustainability analysis - and corresponding 
planning. It is evident in the realities of slogans like ‘act locally, think globally’, in 
the shifting of scale and linkage between (local) action plans and (larger scale) 
strategic plans (Hamdi & Goethers 1997). The same is evident in theories of ‘Eco-
logical Footprints’ (Rees et.al. 1995) and is also contested in basic social choice 
theories (Buchanan & Tullock 1999, Sen 1990). The ‘neighborhood approach’ de-
fines through its name its territorial demarcation, recognizing at the same time the 
limitations in not being able to investigate the further linkages into the recovery 
processes of the society at large. 
 
This section sets out to develop, or rather to chose among existing modes of analy-
ses, a tool for understanding – and thus analyze, how housing projects might have 
                                          
9 The concept of capital’s modes not being interchangeable apparently stands in stark contrast to 
Bourdieu’s notion of ‘capital’. In his thinking, the capital modes are readily interchanged; it is their very 
nature to be used this way. Symbolic capital, for instance, may be exchanged for other modes of capital 
– in pursuit of and reproduction of power (Bourdieu 1996). This takes place within a given field of soci-
ety, a field into which, as will be examined in this research, external agents are to provide financial capi-
tal in order to strengthen the four basic modes of developmental assets. Resolving the apparent contra-
diction lies in accepting that the capital exchange of Bourdieu constitutes the overall context into which 
the externally financed provisions are made, and that all the models described above are but contempo-
rary tools for the analysis of societal change.9 (‘Change’ is actually too blunt a term. ‘Progress’, ‘evolu-
tion’, ‘ transformation’ or ‘modification’ are terms more in line with the progressive and evolutionary 
nature of sustainable societal change.) 
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affected processes of recovery. I have decided to applying the Sheffield/York 
‘neighborhood approach’, which has already been employed in research on housing 
interventions. By acknowledging that (re)development stems from the strength of 
beneficial interaction between the four modes of societal capitals, the issue will 
therefore be to investigate how this actually has occurred in housing projects in 
Bosnia, and to what effect. This approach gives a way of understanding the dynam-
ics of recovery where one capital mode, housing as fixed capital, is being richly re-
plenished by foreign emergency funds. 
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5.3 RESEARCH APPROACH AND APPLIED METHODS 
5.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
‘Method and Field Work ’ takes on a position in research as ‘Planning and Im-
plementation’ does in building: phases of action that are much more than in-
strumental, executive – almost abstract - activities between the chosen goal or 
end product and the provided resources, be they theoretical/cognitive or mate-
rial. In effect, these ‘phases’ have reflexive qualities. They impact the end result 
in substantial ways depending on the chosen path of research or building. In 
fact, in the post-positivist era of social science, methodology itself is becoming a 
key area of research. Not so for planning and building implementation.  Conse-
quently, for research undertaken by an architect fostered in a technologically, 
and yet discursively inclined tradition, it is pertinent to clarify the path through 
which this research has been implemented since the path passes through a ‘so-
cial landscape’. 
 
In the previous chapter I presented my ‘filter of analysis’ through with my re-
search data will be sifted. Methods relate to such analytical frameworks as tac-
tics do to strategies. And tactics grow out of the ‘situation on the ground’, or 
more correctly, our perception of the situation on the ground. This is what lies 
behind the tactical options selected for the implementation of housing projects in 
war-ravaged societies: appropriate to the given context in view of the overall 
(donor-set) strategies, and (more or less explicit) goals. So it is with research. 
At the end of the day, rigorous research will have to abide by what is practically 
and ethically attainable in the field1 - and be conducted through methods epis-
temologically appropriate, i.e. that acknowledge the impact of methods as such 
on findings, subsequent insight and concluding theories. This is the theme of this 
chapter. First the field is identified, then the methodological approach. 
 
5.3.2 SELECTION OF STUDY AREA: JUSTIFYING BOSNIA 
This research will deal with housing projects financed and implemented by interna-
tional agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are two basic reasons for choosing 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter, ‘Bosnia’ or ‘BiH’) as an arena for research, one sub-
stantial, and one operational.  First and foremost, Bosnia’s war was ‘paradigmatic’, 
as Mary Kaldor states (1999), in that it held so many of the features found in the 
“new wars” (Cairns 1997, Duffield 2002, Woodward 1995, Macrea 2001). 
 
In Chapter 3 four characteristics of the new wars were presented; goals of war, 
methods of warfare, economy of war, international response. The Bosnian war2  
                                          
1 Which makes implementation strategies and choice of method also a matter of values. 
2 True to its ‘new war’ nature, the war in Bosnia held several conflict fronts. First, the Serb aggres-
sion against Muslim and Croats populations, then Croat aggression against the Muslims (in an at-
tempt to divide the country in two then there was the short-lived Bihac rebellion where Muslims led 
by the local business tycoon Fikret Abdic joined the Serbs against the Sarajevo government, and 
then Muslim-Croat rejoined forces in the final campaign against the Serbs. 
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supported them all. The goals in most of the conflict fronts were based on crude 
identity issues, resulting in massive displacements of civilians. These were also out-
comes of internal leadership struggles and horizontal inequalities. The methods of 
war were personalized and extremely brutal, as were the witness statements cur-
rently presented at the War Tribunal in Hague3 and in endless books and reports on 
the issue.4 The way the Bosnian war was financed was partly that of draining the 
national coffers, but more characteristically by the transborder, illegal and Mafioso-
like economy5 (Glenny 2003). This was made all the more obvious since the na-
tional economies in most of the former republics of Yugoslavia were on the verge of 
collaps even before the war started; and may in fact have been a major reason for 
it breaking out in the first place (Woodward 1995, Schierup 1993). The fourth char-
acteristic feature deals with the international involvements. This is one of the main 
issues in this research. 
 
The war in Bosnia heralded a new role for the international agencies, both in scope 
of presence – and mandate. Bosnia’s decade of war and struggling reconstruction 
has been a ‘learning process’ for all. It has been the laboratory in which project 
impact assumptions, timelines and progress, and anticipated effects of the interna-
tional political involvement have been tried out.  This research is entering this labo-
ratory to test the recovery contributions made by internationally financed housing. 
 
The are numerous reasons for the international involvement in the Bosnian war, its 
proximity to Western Europe being the most obvious, triggered as it was by the 
‘national security’ argument, not the least through its historic references (Large 
1998, Glenny 2000). As such, the Bosnian war was a unique kind of new war. But 
all wars are unique in that they are contextual. International interest or response is 
based on how these contextual wars are perceived by the major international ac-
tors. Some wars are important, others are better left forgotten (Conesa 2001, Rye 
Olsen et.al. 2002). The wars in South Eastern Europe were not forgotten, which 
were well documented by the figures on assistance, as shown in Figure 4.2.3.  
 
There are also practical reasons for doing research in Bosnia (as there are practical 
reasons why Bosnia received so much international support).  Bosnia is close, it is 
in Europe.  That is why I had come to know Bosnia well long before this research 
began, partly from working on Bosnian reconstruction issues at NTNU6 and partly 
from having several friends in the Bosnian refugee community in Norway. This has 
practical advantages, e.g. contacts and language, in addition to these Norwegian 
                                          
3 see http://www.iwpr.net/tribunal_index1.html 
4 Noel Malcolm and Quintin Hoare even produced a book on the books written on the Bosnian war. 
By 1997 they included 347 titles (cf. Magas & Zanic 2001). 
5 Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian-Serb leader, was already in 1985 sentenced to three years for 
embezzlement and fraud; three years which he never served. 
6 The Programme for Reconstruction and Development (PGU) was established in 1996 to train Bos-
nian exiles in issues relevant for reconstruction planning. The program ran for two years and was 
funded by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. 
105
 
 
 
METHODS AND TOOLS AF ANALYSIS 
Bosnians providing substantial contributions into the ‘thick’ description of the scene 
of research. 
5.3.3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This research takes on housing in a cross-disciplinary way.  It is part natural sci-
ence (technical solutions and housing construction issues), part social science 
(judgments, decisions, actions – and anticipation of the people involved in its reali-
zation), and then there is architecture. Architecture by its very nature rests, or 
rather moves, in-between these spheres, with scant research basis of its own (Lund 
2001, Leach 1997, Mo 2003).  When challenged, practitioners most often end up in 
instrumental post-rationalizations, honed, as most are, in the modernist7 tradition. 
We get “architectural determinism”, or “the ‘taylorization’ of architecture” as 
Escobar will have it (Escobar 1997), where ‘good’ architecture is presumed to link 
causally to ‘good’ living.8 There exists no such evidence-borne linkage.  In this re-
search the architectural dimension will be left in the in-between realm, between 
technical object and social life. 
 
Investigating housing projects implemented in a post-war setting calls for different 
methodological approaches. On the one hand, it’s a matter of counting and meas-
uring size, cost, numbers, and estimates based on figures provided in cost, remit-
tances, migrations, all in the straight quantitative mode. Then there are investiga-
tions into the motives and understanding underpinning the actions on which these 
quantities rest. My research into the recovery effects of internationally funded 
housing will therefore concentrate on identifying actions impacting these processes 
and uncover the possible motives and underlying tactical and operational consid-
erations made by the people involved or responsible. 
 
The nature of the sub-questions of my research, on housing as physical object, as 
strategy or as symbol, all relate to social action or meaningful individual decisions. 
Even the one on housing as physical object is formulated within an epistemological 
framework of housing as a socio-material phenomenon, because in this research 
housing is conceived as part of the process of recovery.  Again, to reiterate Turner 
- this research is not so much what housing is as what it does, and how and why it 
does just that. I am therefore principally concerned with the qualitative aspects of 
the housing investments, and hence approach this research from a qualitative per-
spective. 
5.3.4 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Qualitative research is an inclusive research approach acknowledging that the re-
searcher will necessarily affect the case s/he is investigating by his/her mere inter-
vention. It is a tradition much indebted to the work of the ‘Chicago School’ of the 
                                          
7 ‘functionalist’ is the term mostly used in the Nordic countries. 
8 The mission of the architect/planner is, according a former president of the Norwegian Architects 
Association, to create urban structures conducive to ‘the good life’ (det gode liv), of which architects  
have a priori knowledge (Adresseavisen’s Urban Environment Meeting, Trondheim, November 2000).  
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1920s and 1930s9 where the ‘students made the streets their classrooms’. Qualita-
tive research is a tradition of science that “fundamentally depends on watching 
people in their own territory and interact with them in their own language, on their 
own terms” (Kirk & Miller 1986:9). Whereas qualitative research is focusing on 
‘qualities’ being absent or present, quantitative research focuses on counting the 
presence of some stated feature (ibid): “Quality refers to […] the essential charac-
ter of something. Quantity refers to […] the amount of something” (Kvale 
1996:67). Identifying, isolating and gauging crucial features pertaining to housing’s 
impact on recovery presupposes an understanding of the prevailing context, which 
is only achievable through identifying the qualities of the situation. Quantities, i.e. 
prevalence and frequencies of constituting features, are still required and will make 
up part of the data collection. From what will be explained later, these figures make 
up the raw material of the context from which qualitative data will emerge. The 
qualitative approach seeks to uncover people’s own perceptions which, at the end 
of the day, are what drive or sustain change, development, - or recovery following 
war (Barakat & Chard 2002). 
 
Without understanding the perceptions, opinions, and experiences of the people 
directly and indirectly assisted, it is not possible to grasp what long-term effects, or 
potential, these foreign housing interventions have had, or will have on a broader 
societal recovery. It is not a matter of what is ‘true’ in my sense, it’s what per-
ceived ‘true’ in theirs. And what is true in theirs is what will have true - real – con-
sequences.10  This is all the more evident in the omnipresent call for reconciliation 
as a required element of post-war recovery (Galtung n.d.).  Both recovery and rec-
onciliation (and reconstruction) is about creating hope, which is both an individual 
and a social endeavor, not an abstract societal feature. The “quality dimension” in 
research is made manifest here.  Doing research on the recovery processes of a 
community makes the research and the researcher part of that emerging hope. I 
certainly was.11 
 
This raises questions on the very nature of knowledge, objectivity and truth – and 
how it is obtained.  All these are ‘slippery’ terms and concepts and require some 
clarification: in the natural sciences, truth is what is confirmed through experience, 
be it through inductive experience (“every morning the sun rises in the East”) or 
through deductive logic opening up for explication and causation of natural phe-
nomena (“The sun rises in the East – because the earth turns counterclockwise 
around its own axis”). In the world of the natural sciences, ‘truth’ exists on its own 
terms, separate from all human life.  It relies on the ‘correspondence criterion’ of 
truth; it is true if the statement corresponds with the realities of the external world.  
This is the criterion applied in the positivist tradition. The ‘coherence criterion’ re-
fers to the inner consistency and logic of the statement, as in mathematics (and 
                                          
9 Its conceptual roots are much older that that. 
10 This is all in line with the Thomas Theorem: “if men (sic) define the situation as real they are real 
in their consequences” (Merton 1995). 
11 I have subsequently submitted my ‘local knowledge’ gained through my research to NGOs apply-
ing for funds for reconstruction projects in some of these settlements. 
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hermeneutics), whereas the third, ‘the pragmatic criterion’, relates the truth of a 
knowledge statement to its practical consequences. Knowledge is action rather than 
observation. These are not fully exclusive of each other as they are all used in our 
every-day life. The first one cannot, however, run parallel to the last, but they can 
both interact with the second one. 
 
In the social sciences – as in everyday life - truth is in some way negotiated.12 
Therefore there is no such concept as ‘absolute truth’. A negotiated truth is both 
temporal and may stand as one among several, sometimes competing truths. This 
may stem from different ontological perspectives, and or from different perceptions 
and interpretations of one’s own experiences. Truth in social science, being negoti-
ated, is a fairly recent concept. Historically, it replaced the positivist tradition where 
truth existed on its own, the way it does in the natural sciences. This tradition fed 
the development of Modernism, “the grand project” as Niels Ole Lund said,13 to 
which ‘post-modernism’ or ‘late modernism’ emerged as a reaction. “The concep-
tion of knowledge as a mirror of reality is replaced by a conception of “the social 
construction of reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1966 cf. Kvale 1996:41). 
 
Where do all of these ‘negotiated truths’ leave objectivity? And how will research 
findings stand to be recognized as true? In science there is a long tradition for hold-
ing true what has been subjected to testing by scientific methods. Today this 
means that an assumption stands true if it has been subject to rigorous testing by 
evaluated evidence from the ‘real world’ and has thus withstood efforts of falsifica-
tion, at least until some later test topples it. This means that our understanding of 
the world changes over time: “’Truth’ (or what provisionally passes for truth at a 
particular time) is thus bounded both by the tolerance of empirical reality and by 
the consensus of the scholarly community” (Kirk and Miller 1986:12).  Kvale vali-
dates true scientific findings by the “craftsmanship of the research” (Kvale 1996). 
In the world of science this is striving for objectivity. 
 
Truth, knowledge and understanding being negotiated in discourse, were brought 
into mainstream planning in the 1970s with the decline of the post-WWII synoptic 
planning tradition (Friedmann 1987).  To replace the synoptic model ‘communica-
tive planning’ was one of the alternatives introduced.14  Habermas’ concept of ‘un-
distorted discourse’ was an important theoretical underpinning. 
 
The Habermasian claim (within a hermeneutic perspective) that true knowledge 
stems from undistorted communication between informed people was to be the 
basis for enlightened political action – and hence, planning (Sager 1994).  But 
where are the common fora for this undistorted communication?  Bourdieu claims 
through his writings on Habitus that there are none for ‘general use’.  Those avail-
able are only for groups playing on the same field, as it were, groups that ‘under-
                                          
12 When it comes to it – such negotiations also take place in natural sciences (Feuerabend 1988, 
Kvale 1996). 
13 During a lecture at NTNU in 2002. 
14 Having just as hard a time in being accepted any post-positivist stand has. Synoptic planning is 
based on a positivist epistemology. 
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stand each other’, i.e. share a common system of relations that rests on a common 
habitus (Bourdieu 1995). Qualifying ‘undistorted communication’ in this way does 
not make qualitative research any easier. It merely focuses on the need for reflex-
ivity on the part of the researcher, which is what ‘undistorted communication’ is all 
about. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.3.1 Observations are reference or theory laden. The drawing above shows the Brooklyn 
Bridge as depicted by a Chinese artist in 1885 (Source: Amnesty-Nytt 1996, No 1), below is 
what it looks like on a contemporary photograph.  
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Qualitative research is epistemology bounded15 and may logically be linked to the 
philosophy of pragmatism (Smith 2001:32). But Smith also presents a political 
agenda in justifying the qualitative approach: “These choices are not so much 
about philosophical and methodological abstractions as about political and ethical 
practicalities [in] recognizing the relevance and importance of ‘lay’ or ‘folk’ perspec-
tives on the practicalities of everyday life”, she says, and continues by claiming that 
qualitative research is a “strategy that aims to place non-dominant, neglected 
knowledges at the heart of the research agenda” (ibid:25).  If there were ever a 
disenfranchised group of people, people that almost by definition are objectified 
(Harrell-Bond & Voutira 1995), it must be refugees and displaced people in war, the 
primary group of interviewees in this research. Although it may be seen as a politi-
cal act, interviewing the disenfranchised can also carry methodological benefits.  
People otherwise never listened to, open up to any trusted interviewer, simply be-
cause there is someone there who is genuinely interested in their lives and views.  
This happened to me. 
 
5.3.5 THE CASE STUDIES 
This research is designed as a case study research.16 It is part evaluative, trying to 
find out ‘how’ housing projects do or do not render support to the overall recovery 
processes, with a ‘why’ extension that seeks to explain the reason for people acting 
in ways that support or impede these central processes. These are the type of re-
search challenges that lie at the heart of the case study approach, being “an em-
pirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life con-
text, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin 1994;13). The case study is a project of understanding and 
communication rather than prediction.  It was chosen because this approach is de-
tailed, explanatory, and descriptive, and the most appropriate when studying im-
plementation processes (Vedung 2000). 
 
The present research, dealing with a complex issue in a different country without 
the researcher speaking the local language, not only sets limits to the available 
sources of information, but also shapes the perspectives of the research. In effect, 
it restricts the research question within the investigated research theme in line with 
the tactical research options available. To comprehend the workings of a situation 
different from your own is always difficult, especially since you initially only have 
your own references to guide you. It is made more difficult still when people them-
selves are often unable to comprehend and hence explain what is going on, what 
has happened, and are even worse off in predicting anything about their futures. 
Yet they act in attempts to reduce uncertainty and to regain some existential 
meaning in life (Marris 1986). Add to this the fact that meaningful action is tempo-
ral: what makes sense today may have seemed senseless only years back.  It is a 
social complexity, "mess" would perhaps been a more appropriate term, full of con-
                                          
15 Kvale (1996) refers to post-modernist interpretations, hermeneutical interpretation, phenomenol-
ogical description and dialectical situating, Sayer (1992) to realism. 
16 There are five major research strategies in social science, says Yin (1994).  Aside from experiments, 
the major research strategy within the natural sciences, these are: surveys, archival analysis, histories, 
and case studies. 
110
 
 
 
METHODS AND TOOLS AF ANALYSIS 
fusion, contradictions and rumor. This is how life is. This is the material and cogni-
tive context in which action is taken. This is the field of research where the central 
methodological challenge will be to uncover the hidden patterns of action under-
girding the everyday observations. 
 
I started out this chapter by saying that the research approach is ‘field depend-
ent’.  The following section will deal with the choice of cases for investigation, 
but these choices interact with the methodological choices I have made.  Al-
though there is no principle reason why surveys uncovering issues of frequency 
or prevalence cannot be embedded in case studies, they must be conducted in 
ways that provide reliable results. The general post-war social mistrust also af-
fects the foreigners. Their high profile role as ‘foreign donor’,17 and ‘parallel gov-
ernment’ also make them targets of local manipulation. Under these circum-
stances I found it highly unlikely that a survey conducted by an outsider18 would 
provide unbiased information. As a Norwegian I was automatically made a ‘Nor-
wegian representative’ and prospective donor. Under these circumstances I pre-
sumed that a survey would draw too many opportunistic answers.19 
 
5.3.6 THE CHOICE OF CASES 
The choice of individual cases has to respond to the research questions and 
hence to the central characteristics of the new wars as presented in Part Two of 
this thesis. The cases also have to reflect the central constituents of context, i.e. 
time, place and agency. Time because what is done will depend on when it is 
done. We act differently during war than we do after war, and different still if 
five years have passed or merely five months. Place is similarly important in 
war, and in particular in the new wars since they affect different areas so differ-
ently, creating different platforms for recovery. Finally whoever decides what 
and how things are to be done, may make projects significantly different in 
terms of recovery contribution. This deals not only with the international agen-
cies, but on how they interact with the people they are set to assist, i.e. how 
they engage local agency.   
 
Separating time, space and agency is done for analytical reasons, the way we 
split society into capital modes.  In turn, joining them - time/space/agency - 
emphasizes their interdependence. ‘Time’ and ‘space’ are ultimate abstractions 
of the human context. ’Time’ is embodied through ‘action’ and ’space’ through 
‘place’, place being space perceived. ‘Action’ and ‘place’ are meaningless con-
cepts unless linked to each other. Time takes place. Place is space perceived 
                                          
17 ‘Donations’ was one of the English words most Bosnian people seemed to know. 
18 The researcher carrying all the paraphernalia of the well-off: his own car, big camera, local assis-
tant, etc. 
19 Clive Connough, head of the Swiss Red Cross Committee, and now managing the Mihatovici refu-
gee settlement, was himself a man with a background in social science.  He gave clear warnings 
against trying to do a survey in the settlement: “It would give you figures, but not figures I would 
trust” (personal communication, January 2002). 
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through action.  Action is rooted in human agency, i.e. in everyday activities or 
strategic action spurred on by or made in response to perceptions of self in con-
text. The nature of this relationship between agency and time/space is what 
Giddens has defined as the duality of structure and agency (Giddens 1981, 
1984). These structures may materialize in constraining or enabling institutions, 
i.e. ‘accepted ways of doing things’. It is presumed that through the set of selec-
tion criteria my cases will present such time/space bounded structures that will 
help explain action.  
As there are many projects that fulfill these criteria, and since the choices must 
be made provisionally, more mundane reasons also played a role in the final 
decision on cases to examine. 
 
The unit of analysis will be the housing project or a set of internally linked projects 
located on the same place or within the same area.  A housing project is normally 
handled by individual agencies or NGOs, whereas shelter or housing programs are 
instituted or set in motion by funding donors. 
.1) Cases In Time 
Housing interventions will relate to the continuously changing political situation, 
first of all to the scale of displacement and ‘houselessness’ and the prevailing 
security situation. This in turn has an impact on the availability of materials, on 
logistics and transport, all of which affect the possible physical solutions to the 
housing challenge. These constraints will swing with the times.  Because of 
these contextual changes, the set of presumptions and the determining consid-
erations brought to bear on the housing projects will vary significantly over 
time.  For the projects to yield relevant data it must be old enough to have 
worked itself into the context, into the capital interaction of the community, as 
it were. 
 
Just as important are the objectives sought through the intervention. ‘Post-War 
Reconstruction’ is an activity, the substance of which will change throughout the 
‘post-war years’. Projects will aim at different target groups and housing will 
support different political objectives. The most obvious are those of doing hous-
ing for the displaced at their temporary place of residence versus 
re/constructing housing when they return to their permanent place of resi-
dence: 
 
Case I – (The NRC shelter scheme) covers the mean and extreme period from 
the fall of 1993 and onwards, i.e. during the war. 
Case II – (The NPA Settlement at Mihatovici) covers a large settlement built for 
what was presumed to be temporarily displaced people. The settlement was re-
alized in stages, the first opened March 1995, the last, one year later, i.e. at the 
end of and immediately after the war. 
Case III – (the rebuilding of Grapska) is a ‘return case’: a destroyed village be-
ing partially rebuilt by the people who were violently displaced in 1992.  The 
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project was implemented when political and practical circumstances (and 
neighbors) ‘allowed’ return, in 1999, i.e. well after the war was formally over. 
.2) Cases In Place 
Housing will necessarily relate to the social and physical environment and the 
supporting infrastructure, be they the institutions, landscapes or man-
made/man-destroyed environments. 
 
Different places have different ‘war-stories’. Memories and experiences are dif-
ferent for people chased away from their homes as compared to people who 
lived in areas where the displaced chose to, or were forced to go. Initiating and 
managing housing interventions will be executed differently in such environ-
ments. 
 
Different places have different resource bases and thus different potential for 
recovery (and reconstruction funding).  This is most obvious when comparing 
isolated farms in remote villages or housing quarters in dense urban settings.  
The ‘recovery impact’ of housing projects will be different in such different set-
tings: 
 
Case I – (The NRC shelter scheme) is built for incoming IDPs within the existing 
urban fabric of Tuzla or directly linked to existing infrastructure and peri-urban 
neighborhoods. 
Case II – (The NPA Settlement at Mihatovici) also built for IDPs, was a separate 
settlement built on a brownfield recovered from an open pit mine, about 12 km 
from the city center of Tuzla. 
Case III – (the rebuilding of Grapska) covers the partial reconstruction of the 
village of Grapska in what is now Republica Srpska, 12 km from the regional 
sub-centre of Doboj. Bosniaks are returning to a totally destroyed village and an 
environment of social antagonism and municipal disregard. 
 
 
.3) Cases Of Agency 
This investigation is focusing how the international housing interventions have 
fared when set against the local contexts outlined above.  The way this is 
addressed depends on strategic guidelines set by donors, on tactical 
considerations made by the implementing agency, but also the operational 
dicisions made by the staff in the field.  It is therefore necessary to investigate 
different implementing agencies to catch different approaches pertaining to the 
housing challenge. 
 
The projects must therefore be implemented by different agencies – and thus 
relate to different ‘organizational traditions’, stated guiding principles or 
adhering to different donor induced strategies. 
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They must employ different tactical approaches, i.e. ‘self-help’ versus ‘contractor 
built’ housing; support directly to private owners versus support to existing 
public authorities.  These tactical approaches must reflect different modes and 
levels of interaction with primary and secondary beneficiaries. Most of all they 
must show different approaches to activating local agency. 
 
Case I – (The NRC shelter scheme) was executed by Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC), and covered different implementation strategies and modes of interaction 
during the examined period. The NRC approach was novel and was widely 
replicated in the region. 
Case II – (The NPA Settlement at Mihatovici) was implemented by Norwegian 
Peoples Aid (NPA), as one of many similar projects done in BiH during the war 
and in the first post-war year. It focused on expanding the municipal housing 
stock to be temporarily used by displaced people.  The project was implemented 
according to ordinary local construction practice. 
Case III – (the rebuilding of Grapska) was managed by the Swedish Rescue and 
Services Agency (SRSA) and was executed as a strictly self-help project with 
only materials and technical advice provided by SRSA. The project relied on 
responsibilities being shifted from the agency to the the village inhabitants 
regarding, e.g. the selection of ‘beneficiaries’, obtaining legal permissions and 
determining end design of the rebuilt houses. 
 
5.3.7 COLLECTING DATA 
 It is well worth quoting Wedel’s simple equation data = observation + concept 
(Wadel 1991:77).  This means that all data are theory laden, as Sayer would 
have said (Sayer 1992).  We record what we experience, but our senses are 
calibrated according to our own ‘cultural categories’ (Aase 1997:43), or to our 
own ‘habitus’ in Bourdieu’s lingua. This makes collecting qualitative data into 
constructing data. An approach that certainly does not mean the same as ‘mak-
ing them up’.  According to Callewaert, Bourdieu holds that “we are in a way 
studying our own knowledge of reality, or the reality as it is known” (Callewaert 
1992:149). The required reflexivity constitutes the road signals or rear-view mir-
ror which conduct and control the collecting of data when the researcher passes 
through the social landscape. 
 
According to Yin, there are basically six sources of evidence available in case 
study research: documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, par-
ticipant-observation, and physical artifacts (Yin 1994, p:78-90).  Sometime 
these come as hybrid sources, like exploratory and explanatory drawings. These 
may well be physical artifacts for the researcher, but they are the manifest re-
sults of ‘participant observation’ on the part of the people involved, where they 
express, through the drawings, their own emotions and perceptions of their own 
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situation.20 Such drawings may also illustrate how the community is seen to 
function,21 and are particularly significant in that they reflect spatial relations. 
 
In ordering the data below, I distinguish between physical data, however much 
the latter may be the outcome of negotiated encounters, and interactively 
gained data, primarily interviews. 
 
The collection of data has been going on for more than two years, with the first 
exploratory interviews held in Mihatovici in February 2000.  Subsequent inter-
views with HQ staff of the Norwegian NGOs were held throughout 2000 and 
2001.  The interviews took place in earnest during a three-month stay in BiH, 
from late October 2001 until February 2002.  Some were held earlier, and some 
in the Spring of 2002.  Primary and secondary physical material has been col-
lected continuously since the mid-1990s. 
 
.1)  Physical Data 
a) Maps, site plans and construction drawings 
Since this is a housing investigation, maps, site plans and construction drawings 
are important types of documentation. Maps will unmask the physical relations 
between site and neighborhood and reveal future development potential, par-
ticularly relating to infrastructure, communication, and public utilities.  Site plans 
provide a basis of understanding the structure of the site and buildings and 
thereby provide information on the capacity for future change, upgrading and 
required maintenance. Drawings show the technical solutions and the materials 
used, and thereby disclose performance quality regarding sound, heating, light-
ing, etc., and they will disclose solutions likely to cause future problems, such as 
water leakages, subsiding, and erosion. They also show what improvements are 
required to enhance the performance of the building – and the living conditions 
of its inhabitants. 
 
These types of documents also indicate, by way of their execution, the intention 
underlying the shown solution. The Mihatovici case had a totally different set of 
drawings from those guiding the construction of Case I and Case III.  This also 
discloses the level of ‘planning control’ exerted by the authorities.  Mihatovici 
was a formal construction case, where a full set of drawings was required by the 
law. The others were, at best, registered by name only.  When rebuilding Grap-
ska, there was no village reconstruction map, only one made by hand, highlight-
ing the lack of authority held by the planning office of Doboj Municipality. Cf. 
Figure 5.3.1 below. 
 
                                          
20 The UN has established a ‘drawing school’ in Freetown, Sierra Leone, where traumatised people 
draw their pain (see Dagbladet July 8, 2003 p 4-5. and Cathrine Skonhoft (1998). Skonhoft used 
children’s drawings as a means of gaining insight into the lives of displaced people in Tanzania. 
21 This is well established and has rendered important new understanding in ‘development research’ 
(see the work of Robert Chambers and the PRA-method (Participatory Rural Appraisal), later ex-
tended into PLA, Participatory Learning and Action (Chambers 1983). 
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Obtaining official maps proved difficult.  A lot of formal paperwork was required 
because maps are still deemed politically sensitive, especially in the areas where 
whole villages are destroyed. For these areas, I was able to obtain maps through 
‘private connections’, much the same way it was done in the Yugoslavia days.  
Sometimes, I made my own rough maps and site layout sketches to document 
the extended building activities made by the inhabitants of Mihatovici since 
1995. 
 
 
 
Fig.5.3.1 Part of the Reconstruction drawing of Grapska, above, and the site plan for Mi-
hatovici, below.  
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b) Photographs 
So much was lost during the mayhem that took place during the war, that old 
photographs have become precious documentation. Pictures are not mere docu-
mentations of what was once there. For the people concerned, they are literally 
‘pieces of history’, both as tangible objects and in what they show. They are as 
visual, sometimes emotionally powerful observations, a means of gaining insight 
through supportive conversation and interviews.  Superimposing old photo-
graphs with recent ones visualizes time. Cf. Pictures from Grapska in Chapter 
6.5. 
 
c) Filed Project Data and Reports from the Implementing Agencies 
Pertaining to the wartime projects, most files and records were in jumbles. This 
made identifying - and accessing the early NRC-houses difficult. Some were 
identified by street name only, which we still could not find because many street 
names and numbers have been changed since the war. Asking for directions was 
difficult because most of the people in that area were themselves displaced, 
while others, in a puzzling way tried to shield the people we attempted to find. 
Two days were spent in vain trying to identify a particular group of NRC houses. 
 
The field offices of the agencies submit regular reports to HQ on the prevailing 
conditions and on progress. In addition, there was also – conditions allowing – 
considerable correspondence between HQ and the field offices. This gave infor-
mation on operational matters, which at times proved to be of significant impor-
tance for the final outputs.  These reports and letters reveal uninhibited ‘vibra-
tions’ of the situation in a way present day recollections never can. 
 
d) Statistics, quantitative information 
Statistics, quantitative information are from both primary and secondary 
sources.  Some are compiled for this research; some are made by others, but as 
yet unpublished.  Others are extracted from statistical works produced by the 
international agencies, primarily by the OHR, UNHCR, UNDP, but also developed 
elsewhere and already published. 
 
 
.2) Interactively Gained Data 
a) Direct Observation 
Observing the goings-on in any settlement renders important information, but is 
highly unreliable.  Observation refers to more than the mere visual. Our visual 
sense being the strongest often dwarf the other senses. Architects who are pro-
fessionally biased in favor of the visual, may if not careful, construct a somewhat 
distorted understanding of the investigated field. Observation is about using all 
the senses to make sense of what is observed. But what is observed is inter-
preted from the observer’s own referential history or preconceived notions.22 It 
                                          
22 This is at its most obvious when choosing motifs for photographs when travelling.  Pictures – pure 
visual observations – are just as much confirmation of home grown notions, prejudices by any other 
name, as they are documentations of the realities of the people in question. Change in motifs over 
time may signify a change in understanding. 
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is the Wedel equation again (data = observation + concept), which also implies 
a central validity challenge in research. Observations remain as hypothesis, if 
not accompanied by the raising of relevant questions or discussions on the 
meaning, the narrative, of what is observed. Therefore, to be used in evidence, 
observation normally needs to be confirmed or falsified by other means of infor-
mation. For social phenomena, this implies (triangulated) interviews, questions 
or plain talk; for building works, construction drawings and interviews with peo-
ple functionally involved in the building process. 
 
Architecture is perceived as a multi-disciplinary practice comprising elements 
from the social sciences, technology and art. As such it relies heavily on the 
rhetoric of art, and hence its visual qualities for its legitimacy (Kasa 2000). Add 
to this the legacy of ‘architectural determinism’ referred to earlier, and we have 
a plethora of tripwires for architects doing direct observations. This is mentioned 
merely to emphasize the reflexivity required to withstand professional biases 
when entering unknown territory, but also the many legitimate perspectives that 
may stem from the same set of observations – by different observers. I felt this 
to be a general challenge throughout my work,23 one most apparent in Case II, 
Mihatovici, a formally designed settlement where the initially designed houses 
have been overtaken by incrementally built ramshackle sheds, which now make 
up the character of the place. The issues raised are further explained in the case 
study itself. 
 
b) Participatory observation 
According to Aase, “The primary purpose of participatory research is to be al-
lowed behind the official front and into the arenas of internal interaction that are 
valid for the research question at hand”24 (Aase 1997:51). As direct observations 
are means of raising relevant questions, participatory observation is where, for 
instance, these questions are raised, and discussions on the meaning of the ob-
servations take place. This is entering Goffman’s backstage, where the inter-
viewer, translator and the interviewee act on a stage, communicating through 
worlds and gestures, giving and “giving off” information pertinent to the expec-
tations of the other (Goffman 1969).  To fully enter into such a participatory dia-
logue depends on trust, which in turn depends on some sort of symmetry, which 
Aase, in citing Wadel (1991), attributes to mutually acknowledging the status of 
the participants and the roles that come with it (Aase 1997:50). 
 
Working with an interpreter makes the interpreter your alter-ego in this dia-
logue, not merely a translator. But others had been experienced this long before 
I had. Take, for instance, Berreman’s experience in the Himalayas: 
 
“Since to villagers my assistant was more conventional and hence comprehensi-
ble as a person than I, it was largely from him that impressions were derived 
                                          
23 When conducting my first (trial) interview in February 2000, a trader was chosen, admittedly 
because he had such a well-designed and professionally built little shop. 
24 My translation from the Norwegian. 
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which determined our status.  It is for this reason that the characteristics of the 
assistant-interpreter were of crucial significance to the research effort”25 (Ber-
reman 1962:13 cf. Aase 1997:54). 
 
The role of my assistant and interpreter was therefore crucial in achieving the 
required symmetry. He was himself unemployed, had served in the Bosnian 
army during war and had had his education cut short.  It was possible for the 
displaced to relate to his position. My role as Norwegian on the other hand, gave 
me a certain status26 and the embedded role of ‘provider’ or ambassador of hope 
– roles I persistently disclaimed, sometimes to no avail: “We know you don’t 
have money, but at least you could talk to somebody who has”.  Consistently 
trying not to create false expectations, I never promised to do any service if I 
was not certain I could carry it through. On several occasions I was able to.27 At 
other times the symmetry was established through my very mission.  When I 
excused myself for prying into a young family’s dismal history, the husband 
said: “I like to tell you about it. It’s nice that somebody – even one from Norway 
– is interested in our story”. 
 
The required symmetry was thus established first of all by my interviewees relat-
ing to one of their own.28 My entering their story was exchanged for an, albeit 
limited, indirect access to agents otherwise closed to them.  I felt accepted in 
my role as an oddly interested grown man, well acquainted with the Bosnian 
scene, who wanted to know and discuss community issues. In turn, they had a 
channel for relieving their grievances, expressing their gratitude or simply acting 
as kind hosts for a foreign visitor.  The fact that I am, by age, not a typical 
young researcher also affected the perceived balance in status which made 
these participatory observations more rewarding,29 aside from being personally 
enjoyable.  There is an inherent tension in these close interactions; between 
being ‘on the same team’, which, in a way, qualitative research requires, and 
                                          
25 I remain forever grateful to my main assistant and translator Adnan Ahmedbegovic, who at times 
was supported by Nevres Kesetovic and Vedran Krajinovic. 
26 The Serb population also seemed to have given the Norwegians preferential treatment, for in-
stance at military checkpoints during the early phases of the war, due to Norway’s WW II legacy. 
Karadzic even gave an account of the kind treatment he was given when he was prisoner of war in 
Norway when interviewed by Bjørn Egil Eide of the Norwegian State TV in the mid-1990s. Karadzic 
was born 15 June 1945. 
27 Besides being a normal go-between between inhabitants/interviewees and international agencies, 
embassies, and Norwegian business, on one occasion I promised – and carried through – an attempt 
to link a younger sister of an interviewee to the World Health Organization.  The sister was rapidly 
going blind and had no means of otherwise saving her eyesight.  There are numerous stories in BiH 
where such individual link-ups have been successful, mostly because they were linked to mass media 
coverage. 
28 “One of your own” calls for much more than language skills or nationality. Comparable personal 
war narratives proved important. So when interviewing the Serbs I used a non-Muslim interpreter.  
Temple & Edwards (2002) had earlier shown how the difference in perceived social class affects the 
work of translators, and hence becomes a methodological challenge affecting the research results. 
Again, it is a matter of symmetry. 
29 I once interviewed people displaced by the Germans from Northern Norway in late 1944. On sev-
eral occasions they expressed misgivings about the reconstruction planning, not the least how young 
the planners were.  “More mature planners would be able to understand our situation better”, one 
said during an interview.  I take this to heart. 
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succumbing to the ‘team spirit’, when the researcher ‘goes native’.  Evert 
Vedung refers to the regulatory capture theory to explain how actors are co-
opted by the very people they set out to oversee (Vedung 2000:236). This the-
ory, developed initially by George Stigler (1971) was not targeting research, but 
covered the tension of acting on the inside and the outside – simultaneously.  
 
 
5.3.8 CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEWS 
Beyond my own capacity to think and act, the obvious constraints were time and 
access.  It takes time to reach a working level of reciprocity, the first level of 
trust. Only after talking for about an hour or so was the valuable information 
revealed – the nibs of the interviewee’s guiding perceptions – as, for instance, 
the Head of Development and Reconstruction in Tuzla whispered to me as I left: 
“I’ve only told this to the mayor – and to you”30  Am I to believe what he said, or 
is it only the “Spezial-price-for-you syndrome”? In some of the other encounters 
the answer to such a question would emerge only after subsequent meetings. 
 
In most cases access was not a problem, although I stubbornly had to send sev-
eral letters and press the assistant to make numerous calls to some of the offi-
cials I would like to meet. Throughout the years such officials have been overrun 
with foreigners like me with no relevant local mission. Interviews were eventu-
ally granted. It was much easier with the primary and secondary actors. Most of 
them were idle anyway. Most international agencies were also open as long as 
the issue at hand dealt with non-controversial projects or issues.31 The primary 
organizations, the NRC, NPA & SRSA, opened all their files and cooperated to-
tally.32 
 
The interviews took place both as formal interviews with set and guiding ques-
tions and as flowing (sometimes overflowing) conversations with primary actors.  
They took place individually and in groups.  The latter arrangements took place 
when supporting information was needed, when alternative views of events were 
called for, as a means of simple triangulation – or to try to reveal the power 
structure within leadership groups, as in Grapska and Mihatovici. All field inter-
views were conducted through interpreters - which allowed intermittent breath-
ing spaces for making notes.  Tape recorders were never used, for tactical as 
well as ethical reasons.  It was hard enough to be a resourceful foreigner prying 
into unknown peoples’ often miserable lives without using a fancy machine to 
depersonalize the encounter further.  Consequently, no signed interview agree-
ments or any other formalized arrangement was ever made, except for promis-
                                          
30 He complained about the quality of the assistance they had received from ‘the international com-
munity’.  It was not that good, and not at all that efficient: “The low quality of the assistance is a 
greater threat to our future than is the local corruption”. 
31 I was ousted from one large international NGO when inquiring about an incident where about 100 
IDPs were forcefully evicted from Tuzla to be moved back to their reconstructed houses in a remote 
village in Eastern Bosnia. The fact that these evictions had become a media event, closed off my 
access, but I made my way back, and was actually able to –off the record – spend an hour talking to 
the local project manager. 
32 I will forever stand grateful for that. 
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ing never to reveal information that would identify the informant or link the in-
formation to the source.33 In the beginning there were some hapless incidents 
that required the interpreters to be given a second crash course on this issue. 
 
.1) Primary Actors 
The primary actors signify the people whose dismal life and living conditions re-
leased international funding for housing re/construction . ‘Prime beneficiary’ is 
the difficult term used. Aside from its ‘victim’ connotations, it is contentious as to 
who the real prime beneficiaries actually are. In Case I, the NRC shelter scheme 
provided funding for private house owners to complete their houses if only they 
allowed  IDPs to live there for 30 months for free. Here, the house owners are 
arguably the prime beneficiaries, although the international housing investment 
was released by concern for the  IDPs that were to be temporary sheltered 
there. 
 
In housing there are therefore two sets of primary actors. The first set are the 
displaced in their role as ‘prime beneficiaries’; the second set are the home own-
ers, be they recipients of the NRC ‘completion funds’ in Tuzla, or formerly dis-
placed, now returnees to Grapska. Because of the way the reconstruction of 
Grapska was carried through, I have chosen to include all returnees in the pri-
mary group, irrespective of whether or not they were funded by SRSA. 
 
Selecting whom to interview was part chance, part intentional.  For the NRC 
case, there was only a relatively small group of house owners identified.  They 
seemed to be concentrated in selected areas of town. We chose those clusters 
where we were able to identify a sufficient number of houses so that we had a 
chance of investigating any social impact the importation of displaced people 
might have had. Such a cluster also had urban development impacts, which we 
were also able to examine. The clustering also clarified how house owners came 
to be involved in the program. We went out of our way to interview owners of 
different type of houses, the big, multi-flat houses where more than DEM 
100,000 was invested and the DEM 1,500 alterations in old houses with space to 
spare.  And although the house owner was normally a man, when he was not 
present we mildly insisted on interviewing the wife.  This proved particularly 
fruitful at times. 
 
The Mihatovici interviewees (Case II) first chosen were those we were able to 
identify as former Case I participants, tenants of the NRC scheme. This would 
provide additional data on the life of the tenants of Case I. We gained further 
insight into the changes that have taken place over time, aside from the fact 
that in explaining their actions or everyday lives they were also able to place 
these into other housing experiences. Others were identified because of their 
participation in livelihood programs or apparent tenacity in securing an inde-
pendent livelihood. One grandfather was interviewed because he had moved out 
of his overcrowded flat where he lived with 10 others and into a tiny clapboard 
                                          
33 All the people whose names appear in the case studies, have given their permission.  
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shack next to the house, while others were interviewed because during earlier 
visits had taken their photographs which I had since brought back. One ex-
tended family was selected because they stood to be evicted from the settle-
ment.  We took some of the young members up into the remote mountain vil-
lage close to Zwornik where the parents/grandparents/in-laws already had re-
turned - and the young were set to follow. And then, of course, the teacher, the 
administrator, the staff of the clinic and some of the shop owners were duly in-
terviewed, as well as several members of the elected Settlement Board. 
 
The Grapska interviews were initially set up by the Village Board.  Their mem-
bers, all recently (re-)elected proved very knowledgeable. Some became key 
informants. As a matter of triangulation, people with no connection to the board 
were interviewed, the local tinsmith and medical doctor, among others. In 1999 
I passed through Grapska by chance and the only person I met during that visit 
was duly interviewed with his family, so were those with family members in 
Norway.  There are many weekend Grapskanians who have not yet returned for 
good because of the lack of employment. We interviewed some of them as well 
as some of the teenagers who had recently returned with their families. We set 
up interviews with returnees who were not part of the SRSA program, people 
who still lived in small temporary structures, or, through remittances or foreign 
earnings, had been able to build their own houses. 
 
.2) Secondary Actors 
These comprise two categories: 1) the people who made up the ‘social context’ 
of the primary actors, 2) the present and former staff of the implementing agen-
cies. 
 
In Grapska, the social context group comprised the Serb neighbors who proved 
to hold strong nationalist views, the displaced Serbs who in 1995 sought refuge 
in the destroyed Bosniak houses, and local government officials formally respon-
sible the return process, one of whom was a Bosniak returnee. I made several 
interviews with the displaced Serbs, and even took a small group back to their 
destroyed homes in the village of Panjik in the Federation, which proved a dis-
turbing experience in participatory observation. 
 
In the Mihatovici case, I interviewed two immediate neighbors from the village of 
Mihatovici proper. This secondary group also comprised personnel from the NGO 
presently running the settlement, Head of the Municipal Office of Displaced and 
Refugees (ODPR) and the Chief City Planner and her staff. The latter two were 
also interviewed as secondary actors in reference to Case I, the NRC shelter 
scheme.  Similarly, the neighbors of the Case I houses were also interviewed, 
chosen by proximity only. 
 
The other set of secondary actors was the former and present field staff and HQ 
personnel of the implementing agencies.  It is because the workings of organiza-
tions are so idiosyncratic, so dependent on individuals in the field, that the NGO 
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staff belongs to the secondary actor group rather than the ‘functional others’. In 
total, I interviewed formally and made notes from informal meetings with 27 
people; present and former staff, both Norwegian and Bosnian. 
 
.3) Others Functionally Involved 
This group comprised donor representatives, i.e. ambassadors and high-ranking 
diplomatic personnel, and senior staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo. 
Then I held several meetings with contractors involved in the projects as well as 
with building material producers and with traders who provided building material 
and components to the projects. 
 
.4) Others 
This was a disparate group, including academics, economists and planners who 
shed light on the forces that shaped the pre-war conditions in the country – and 
the linkages from then to now. In addition, this ‘others’ group was also staff of 
the diplomatic corps, representative of other international organizations and UN 
agencies involved in housing.  The group included other displaced and returned 
people who, through their life experience, shed light on prevailing policies and 
practices, all part of the current recovery. 
 
5.3.9 ASKING THE QUESTIONS 
Asking questions in case study interviews is all about uncovering the prevailing 
perceptions people hold on issues that guide their actions and underpin their 
preferences, not the least in their relationships to others, and (in my case) to 
their housing situation. This is not sociological or anthropological research as 
such, but in dealing with housing I would have to borrow some of their methodo-
logical approaches. My questions focused on issues within the domain of archi-
tecture and planning and how these issued related to their choices and actions, 
to their life stories as it were. But again, it is not only what issues and questions 
you raise, it is just as much how you go about asking them. 
 
Basically all questions, all observations – and all the information otherwise gath-
ered – were focused on how and why the housing projects, their housing situa-
tion, had made any difference on the processes of ‘re-normalization’ – beyond 
the obvious, that of sheltering a certain number of people. A long list of ques-
tions was initially made up, which (of course) proved impossible to handle. 
 
There are different ways of approaching – and thus posing questions – to mem-
bers of the primary and secondary group as compared to the ‘functional others’ 
group.  Getting towards – not to - the bottom of things with the former, semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions were posed, slightly different in 
each of the three cases.  The others were asked more precise questions since 
the prime objective was to get supportive data.  But here as well, it is not possi-
ble to ‘simply ask questions’. Other issues were brought into the conversation 
which by the end of the day proved useful also for understanding underlying 
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concepts and ‘triggers of action’ of the primary actors as well as presumptions 
underpinning decisions made by the ‘secondary actors’. 
 
The issues for which the questions were formulated centered around how the 
housing project had changed, directly and indirectly, the ‘capital modes’ - and to 
what effect and with what benefits. These, however, are not the type of ques-
tions to ask. They were reformulated to safeguard an uninhibited conversation. 
The capital concept would have made the conversation all too abstract.  For the 
sake of analysis and reliability, I initially set up a quite extensive ‘interview 
guide’ that covered the main issues embedded in the research questions (cf. 
Appendix 10.1).  However during the course of the interviews, this list was heav-
ily ‘edited’, made do contain only a few headlines and was constantly reviewed 
(cf. 5.3.11).  
 
For the people working in the implementing organizations, the questions were 
posed in such a way as to uncover the background for the decisions and actions 
– formal, rational and emotional – and to reveal any stated or anticipated long-
term ‘recovery dimension’ in their projects. 
 
All these formal and informal interviews, all the checking, all the querying, all 
the open conversations, the shrugs, the sighs, the looks, all of these interper-
sonal exchanges all contributed towards better understanding the rationale be-
hind peoples’ choices.  The ‘chained visits’, following people from Case I, then 
Case II, and on to their prospective future home, and the return visits with the 
Serbs displaced in Grapska proved very valuable insights into the reconstruc-
tion/return/recovery challenges posed by the international interventions. 
 
5.3.10 VALIDITY 
Validity is about accuracy, about using relevant information and asking questions 
that are relevant to the research topic. Are we conducting the study consis-
tently? This is not only dependent upon the researcher, it also deals with those 
engaged by the researcher, in that it also entails conveying the questions to the 
respondent in a way that s/he understands. It is about the respondent telling the 
truth, not necessarily what is factually correct, but what s/he holds as the truth. 
The same goes for remembering correctly. Memory plays with our perceptions – 
and vice versa. And it is about interpreting and analyzing the information in a 
way consistent with what the respondent gave and ‘gave-off’ as his/her true an-
swer. Kirk and Miller said it rather bluntly: “validity is the degree to which the 
finding is interpreted in a correct way” (Kirk and Miller 1986: 20). Validity as 
quoted here raises the issue of “correct interpretation” which, Kvale holds, de-
pends on the “context of interpretation”. The context appropriate depends on 
whether it deals with the interpretation of statements by interviewees, or 
whether it is a critical common sense interpretation aimed at the general public, 
or whether the statements are theoretically interpreted, in which case only theo-
retically qualified people may validate the interpretation (Kvale 1996:217). All 
my case studies have been submitted to central agents of each case, and sent to 
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the interpreter-assistant.  Minor factual corrections were made along with sug-
gestions for highlighting certain issues more clearly. 
 
.1) Yin’s Four Tests 
Yin has devised a set of four tests to ensure that case studies withstand the vi-
ability/reliability test of being trustworthy, credible, confirmable and data de-
pendable (Yin 1994 :32). It is worth noting that Yin does not proscribe ‘correct’ 
or a quantifiable answer. The tests are to bring about negotiated, persuasive 
results.  
 
Trustworthiness is secured by testing the ‘construct validity’ of the research.  In 
my case, this test is passed when it is confirmed that there exists a critical rela-
tionship – not merely a spurious one, between housing re/construction  and 
long-term recovery. This is tested when sifting the evidence from the case stud-
ies through the developed ‘filter of analysis’ in such a way as to show that there 
is, and under what circumstances there is, a critical linkage between housing as 
a specific sector of international intervention and critical elements of the recov-
ery process. 
 
Credibility is ensured passing the ‘internal validity’ test, “whereby certain condi-
tions are shown to lead to other conditions as distinguished from spurious rela-
tionships” (Yin 1994: 33). This is what traditionally is referred to as ‘validity’ in 
research. Yin highlights the problem of making inferences because, he says, “a 
case study involves an inference every time an event cannot be directly ob-
served”34 (ibid: 35). This problem stems from researchers bringing to the field – 
and hanging on to – pre-conceived notions of causation. Alternative explanations 
may be excluded. Sayer refers to the same when claiming: “Successful commu-
nication, including the establishment and negotiation of concepts, depends to 
some degree on particular temporal sequences of actions, both linguistic and 
non-linguistic, and spatial, material settings: in other words meaning is context-
dependent” (Sayer 1992: 60). He warns against overlooking the dangers: “Con-
textualizing events involves finding familiar patterns of association but the proc-
ess of making inferences from the latter is fraught with difficulties. The dangers 
are clear in cases where associations which are accidental or ‘contingent’ (nei-
ther necessary nor impossible) are treated as if they were necessary properties 
of objects” (ibid: 61).  Fielding and Fielding (1986) warned against exploring 
merely the conspicuous phenomena and to leave the more silent alone. 
 
The aforementioned is an appropriate warning to an architect trained in reading, 
examining and interpreting the man-made environment, not least its visual 
properties. The safety valve lies in the ‘what housing does’ notion, that is, how 
peoples’ everyday life and strategic decisions relate to the building as object, 
symbol, and ‘vehicle for change’. On the other hand, bringing an architect’s per-
spective into the interview-conversation might change the perceptions of the 
                                          
34 And even when observed we make inferences (see above, on the hypothetical nature of observa-
tions). 
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interviewee. This might have been the outcome of one of my interviews. This 
made for some uneasy questions as to the participatory role of the researcher.  
But the answer is simple. When uncovering the perceptions underpinning the 
choices and actions of the interviewee, we are given the perceptions guiding 
past action.  Future action, however, now resting on new understanding, will be 
part of somebody else’s future research challenge. 
 
However successful this research has been in terms of passing the ‘internal va-
lidity test’ will become evident through the case study analysis and in the com-
parison of cases. The findings from the different cases, chosen as they are on 
merit of theoretical propositions, will necessarily be different, and hold plausible 
explanations as to why they are, or are not.. The internal validity test is passed, 
i.e. the conclusions are deemed credible when the different cases are shown to 
bear different impacts on to the processes of recovery, and are given credible 
explanations as to why they do, or do not.  All this is done when comparing the 
cases. 
 
Yin’s third test is on confirmability through testing the ‘external validity’ of the 
case study. Whether or not the finding from this one case study can be used in 
trying to understand another similar case concerns generalization.  Generaliza-
tions from case studies are a contentious issue, since they are studies of one-off 
situations. Whereas surveys underpin statistical generalization, case studies 
generate analytical generalizations, or ‘theoretical generalizations’ in Sayer’s 
terms (Sayer 1992).”In analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to 
generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory”, says Yin (1994: 
36). As far as the present research is concerned, not much theory has been de-
veloped through case studies within this field (which, of course, is the rationale 
for this endeavor in the first place).  This means that whatever has come out of 
the present research will be a theoretical input into further research on perma-
nent housing in a war or post-war setting. When these theoretical generaliza-
tions are, in Yin’s term, ‘replicated’ we have a confirmed ‘analytical generaliza-
tion’. And again there is the issue of who determines when and if there exists 
such an analytical generalization. Is it the researcher through his/her conclu-
sions or is it the next researcher using these conclusions into any subsequent 
research? The question is relevant regarding qualitative research, which at the 
end of the day is validated by its conclusions being trusted by other researchers, 
and applied by practitioners in the field.   
 
To ensure that the external validity test is passed, the design of the research 
has to provide a clear linkage between the theoretical input, the case study evi-
dence, and the theoretical output to safeguard the logical consistency through-
out the research. 
 
Yin’s fourth test, the data-dependability test, deals with reliability and will be 
dealt with under that heading at the end of this chapter. 
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.2) Kvale’s Contextualization 
Yin’s rather elaborate validity testing has an engineering quality about it in that 
the validity testing is somewhat estranged from the data collection and the ana-
lytical processes.  Kvale, on the other hand, emphasizes that validity testing is 
an integral part of the research practice itself, not a separate activity.  By ex-
tending the validity concept from ‘observational’ to ‘communicative’ and ‘prag-
matic’, he maintains that, ideally, the practical excellence of the research proce-
dures will create knowledge outputs that by themselves are so convincing and 
strong that they actually carry their own validity – “like a strong piece of art” 
(Kvale 1996:252). He argues for the ‘shifting the focus of validity’ towards 1) 
‘the craftsmanship of research, i.e. checking, questioning and theorizing within 
the framework of the Popperian falsification process; 2) the ‘communicative va-
lidity’ as deliberated in discourse among the interviewees, the general public and 
the scientific community, bearing in mind possible underlying power structure. 
Thirdly, Kvale introduces ‘pragmatic validity’.  A pragmatic validation of a knowl-
edge claim replaces justification by application. A claim is ultimately validated 
through concrete action, either as part of the research itself, or instigated by it. 
And it is the ‘desired result’ that validates the claim. This immediately makes the 
validation an issue of value and ethics – and of politics. 
 
Qualitative research validation is difficult.  Many of the validity tests are in fact 
rooted in the positivist epistemology according to Kvale (ibid:238): “The com-
plexities of validating qualitative research need not be due to an inherent weak-
ness in qualitative methods, but may on the contrary rest on their extraordinary 
power to picture and to question the complexity of the social reality investi-
gated” (ibid:244).  Whatever the case, it will be on the bases of the internal logic 
of the claims and the craftsmanship of the executed research that this research 
will be judged.  Its ultimate validity will eventually be decided by the people and 
organizations who will execute housing projects in future theatres of war. 
 
 
5.3.11 REFLEXIVITY 
Contextualizing validity is another term for reflexivity. Data and the meaning will 
reflect the presence of the researcher. This is embedded in qualitative research, 
hence the notion of data being constructed and truth negotiated. Reflexivity is a 
way of exploring how the researcher impacts the ongoing research. Personal 
reflexivity refers to the personal qualities of the researcher, his/her beliefs and 
prejudices; epistemological reflexivity refers to the incessant inquiry into how 
the research design, the question, methodological approach and the like affect 
what is ‘found’ or constructed. 
 
Research into fields of intense emotions, loss, grief, and destroyed social bonds 
is methodologically and logistically difficult and emotionally exhausting (Barakat 
& Ellis 1996). It is hard on reflexivity, much easier on advocacy.35 My position 
                                          
35 One of the most influential theoretical approaches to planning in the late, turbulent 1960s, was 
actually coined ‘advocacy planning’ (Davidoff 1965), in a way similar to ‘action research’.  Advocacy 
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was that war in of Bosnia was basically the result of external and internal Serb 
and Croat aggression,36 which at the end resulted in unimaginable injustices to-
wards all civilians.  In numbers, the Bosniaks suffered by far the most. Working 
with displaced Bosniaks made it very easy to ‘go native’ and thereby lose the 
independent perspective on which research depends. 
 
There were basically two means of acknowledging my presence, yet securing my 
independence. Firstly, in addition to my field records I kept a personal diary, 
filed as “My Spontaneous Reflections”, where important issues raised during the 
day’s field visits or interviews were pondered upon. These were reflections of the 
bygone and preparations for the oncoming work.  The second strategy was of 
talking to the antagonists.  The privilege of the researcher – or the outsider – is 
not being fully reigned in by the customs where you work.  I could have meet-
ings with the Serb nationalists with the full understanding of my much closer 
Bosniak acquaintances. Much to the surprise of my assistants – who had their 
legitimate prejudices – I could spend hours interviewing, discussing and trying to 
get to grips with the moral codes, the perceptions, and perspectives of those 
who made the lives of the Bosniaks so miserable – all in the most amicable way. 
 
5.3.12 RELIABILITY 
Yin linked reliability to validity although they both address different aspects of 
the research. They are in no way ‘symmetrical’.  According to Kirk and Miller, “It 
is easy to obtain perfect reliability with no validity at all.  Perfect validity, on the 
other hand, would assure perfect reliability, for every observation would yield 
the complete and exact truth” (Kirk and Miller 1986: 20), which is, of course, 
impossible “in part because ‘perfect validity’ is not even theoretically attainable” 
(ibid.21). Validity deals with consistency, reliability addresses replicability, en-
suring that others doing the same case study and following the same procedures 
will come up with the same findings.  But is replicating the procedures at all at-
tainable (and who would spend time doing it – and who would pay for it)?  How-
ever, as a matter of documentation, I have made a protocol of all interviews in 
Bosnia and in Norway, time, place, with what interpreter, and dealing with what 
issues. 
 
The idea of reliability in qualitative research being ensured through replicability 
is contentious, to say the least. I am a central character in this reality play, and 
my approach in gaining access, addressing questions, providing information, 
etc., is customized to me (and my interpreter). Any other researcher will fail in 
being me. Whoever will attempt to repeat my study will have to customize my 
procedures to those of their own. This way, the study could be repeated (not 
strictly replicated) and its analytical generalizations re-confirmed. 
                                                                                                                     
planning rested on the quest for “the dreams of the past for an enlightened and just democracy” 
(ibid:277). 
36 with numerous mediating causes. 
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6.1 THE WAR IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA  
An Overview 
 
The war in Bosnia held the whole world’s attention for the better part of the 1990s. 
Not primarily because of its political or territorial issues, they could be difficult to 
follow, but because of its human misery, so vividly presented by the world’s media. 
More than half of Bosnia’s population was forced to flee their homes. Of those, 
800,000 sought refuge outside Bosnia proper, affecting almost every country in 
Europe directly. All the more so when large contingents of international UN and 
later NATO forces were deployed there.  The key issue throughout the war, and the 
main cause for this extraordinary flux of people, was the policy of ‘ethnic clean-
sing’1. ‘The Others’ were expelled, the area ‘cleaned’, through intimidation and vio-
lence, or by outright massacres. In material terms, the ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia 
came to be linked to systematic destruction of housing. 
 
The map on the next page shows the post-war division of the country into a totally 
Serb dominated part, The Republika Srpska, and the Muslim/Croat Federation, 
which, in spite of its name is divided into Croat dominated areas, especially in Her-
zegovina, and areas in Central and Western part of the country dominated by Bos-
niaks, or Muslims. The historic outcome of the Dayton Agreement was the partition 
of the country into ethno-religious para-states. Much of the internationally funded 
housing re/construction may be seen as an attempt to nullify this particular effect 
of the Dayton peace agreement.  
 
It is not the mission of this research to bring new possible interpretations to the 
causes or the conduct of the war.  The war as context is presented in each of the 
following case studies, to link it directly to the lives of the people in the communi-
ties I examined. This is done rather extensively, particularly in the case of Grapska, 
and it is done to give a deeper sense of what the war experience meant for the 
people affected, how they reacted and how it changed their perceptions of the fu-
ture, which lies at the very heart of recovery. 
 
It is still necessary to first present the economic and political dynamics of the years 
preceding the war in order to understand what happened locally. I will then briefly 
consider the theatre of the 1992-1995 Bosnian war, and close by presenting how 
the war has been interpreted politically and what guidance this gave to the interna-
tional intervention. 
 
 
                                          
1 The term was new, translated from Serbo-Croat "etnicko ciscenje", but the phenomenon was ancient. 
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Fig 6.1.2 Annual Inflation Rates in Yugoslavia 1979 -1991 
 
   
Fig 6.1.3 Growth if GDP in Yugoslavia, 1979 – 1991 
 
 
Fig 6.1.4 Yugoslav Rate of Unemployment 1979 – 1988 (Please note that this is based on 
national averages. Slovenia did not have unemployment to speak of, Croatia was below 10% 
throughout the period, whereas Kosovo passed 50% in the mid 1980s, and Bosnia ran in the 
20s)  
(All tables are from Woodward 1995) 
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The effect of the economic retraction was not equally dispersed. Slovenia had no 
unemployment at all, neither did the coastal parts of Croatia. They had ready ac-
cess to foreign earnings. The constitutional rules governing the federal share of 
these earnings became a critical, decisive, issue during the 1980s. 
 
The constitution of 1974 called for extensive economic decentralization.  The bal-
ancing powers of the central government were correspondingly reduced. This was 
brought to a head when first Slovenia and then Croatia refused to share tax monies 
with the federation and later refused to abide by central government decisions re-
garding economic reforms. This stand was supported by neo-liberal economic advi-
sors, and not least by the international creditors, but not by the IMF who promoted 
a strong central government as a means of resolving the economic crisis. 
 
 “By 1985-86 the preconditions of a revolutionary situation were apparent”, accord-
ing to Woodward (1995;73),  With no democratic outlets, no fora for unbiased dia-
logue, the opinions and the forging of perceptions were left to academia3, the 
bounded media – and public rumor.  The constitutional stalemate and the rapidly 
deteriorating economy (inflation was to rise to more than 1200% for a period in 
1988) made people – and politicians – look for scapegoats. The duality of ‘narod’ 
was discarded; now the nation and people became one. When the Croats and later 
the Slovenians in principle refused to contribute to the funding of the JNA (Yugoslav 
National Army), but instead started shoring up their own defense units, the situa-
tion became dangerous. By then they had reached the Hobbsian stage of “interest, 
fear and honor”. 
 
Within Serbia, and not least within Kosovo, manipulations, deliberations, and vio-
lent demonstrations took place, well nurtured by the official press. Throughout 
Yugoslavia the language, the arguments, and the simmering ethnic ‘sleeze’ in the 
official press, legitimized the perceptions that ‘the others’ were to blame for the 
hardship most people were experiencing. As one of my interviewees said, it was: 
“Just like it was during WW II”, inadvertently confirming Oberschall’s claim (2000). 
This etno-religious narrative was given democratic legitimacy in 1990 when the 
nationalist parties won the elections throughout the country. 
 
What took place in Yugoslavia was inextricably linked to the political developments 
elsewhere in Europe. With the Cold War over a number of independent Central 
European nation states4 re-emerged. The dismembering of Yugoslavia was seen by 
many outsiders as a similar process of liberation, not least because many of the 
Nationalist movements were headed by former political prisoners. 
 
                                          
3 The most notorious document was the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Art and Sciences 
which gave credence to the notion of Greater Serbia. 
http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:yZf7CpjTH1UJ:members.aol.com/SIPANY/MEMORANDUM.html+
sanu+memorandum+of+the+serb+academy&hl=no&ie=UTF-8 
4 Before being taken over by the Communists in 1947-1948, both Poland and Czechoslovakia had 
cleansed their territories of Germans, 1,950,000 and 2,900,000 respectively, so by 1989 they were ideal 
nation states. 
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Only days after their declaration of independence on June 25 the JNA invaded Slo-
venia and armed bands of Serb paramilitary units started killing and expelling 
Croats from Eastern Slavonia. A couple of months later the JNA rolled in. The war in 
Croatia drew to a close after Germany issued their national recognition during 
Christmas 1992.  By then a violent societal climate had percolated the country. 
 
It is possible to interpret the JNA invasion of Slovenia and Croatia as the ultimate 
attempt to rescue the federation, in effect similar to Lincoln’s military defense of 
the US union. This is a stand more difficult to defend in the case of the Bosnian 
war.  By then Yugoslavia was history and the Bosnian war is best interpreted as a 
war in pursuance of a Greater Serbia (and Greater Croatia).5 
 
6.1.2 THE WAR IN BOSNIA 
Bosnia was a country where the nature of being Bosnian was to live ‘with others’ 
(Bringa 1993, 1995). She was, and still is, the most heterogeneous republic of for-
mer Yugoslavia, although the only republic where Muslims made up a significant 
part of the population, in fact its largest nation.6 As the Ottomans withdrew the 
Muslims had early on been expelled from other regions, and many had settled in 
Bosnia. Croats had lived in the mountainous areas bordering the coast with numer-
ous settlements scattered throughout the country. Serbs were living all over Bos-
nia, but made up a proportionally larger group in the areas bordering Serbia and 
Croatia.7 
 
This description belies the realities of life in BiH. People belonging to these tradi-
tional ethno-religious groups lived all over the country, according to a social con-
tract tacitly accepted by all. The rural settlements were by and large segregated 
territorially (cf. my Grapska case) but socially integrated with full social equity 
(ibid.). This spatial segregation could sometimes be a mere matter of 100 meters, a 
bend of the river, or across a hill. Cities also held territorially distinctive areas, but 
the structuring impact had waned over the years. It is claimed that the Muslims 
made up the majority8 of the urban population with the Serbs and Croats owning 
more of the rural land.9  But again, there were many other lines of distinction, 
which made more sense in people’s lives than of ethno-religious affiliation. Being 
urban or rural, educated or not educated were very important distinctions in Bosnia 
(Djilas 1958, Woodward 1995, Mazover 1998, Glenny 2000). 
 
                                          
5 Tudjman and Milosevic had agreed in principle to a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina at a meeting in 
June 1993 (Magas & Zanic 2001;368). 
6National Composition of BiH in 1991: Muslims 43.7 %, Serbs 31.4%, Croats 17.3% , Yugoslavs 5.5% 
(the highest portion in the federation), Other 2.5%. 
7 Ethnic mapping is a highly contested endeavor.  Raising the scale literarily erases the minorities. The 
territorial image so important in identity politics is easily manipulated by scale and unit size. 
8 Radovan Karadzic among them. He said to the Serbian Weekly (11.12.1992): "So far, the Turks used 
to be in the cities and we were in the woods, and now it is the other way around; we are in the cities 
and it is the Turks who are in the woods”  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/karadzic/bosnia/bosnia.html 
9 This is why the Serbs demanded 51% (and got 49%) of the land area in the negotiations in Dayton. 
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With the collapse of the federal order the split within Bosnia was inevitable. Ethno-
religious parties emerged and were supported by their respective ‘narods’. With the 
Slovenia and Croatia out of the federation, the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, 
himself an ardent Muslim and former prisoner because of it, led a similar process 
towards independence for BiH. Given the fact that Serbs made up a minority, the 
SDS (Serb Democratic Party) professed fear of Serbs becoming secondary citizens 
the way SANU’s memorandum10 had described the Serbs position in Yugoslavia. 
The SDS boycotted the referendum and established their own Serb national state 
within Bosnia instead.11  Their aspirations were in due course to join Serbia proper, 
and were financially and militarily assisted by Serbia/Montenegro to accomplish this 
reciprocal goal. 
 
There is no real date for the beginning of the war in Bosnia.12 The open aggression 
began in earnest after the referendum on Bosnia’s independence held Feb 29/March 
1 1992,13 After that Serb bombardments and random shooting started. Vicious 
raids by Serb paramilitary bands were taking place in the East. During the spring of 
1992 regular units of the JNA entered the war in Bosnia, formally led by Bosnian 
Serb commanders, yet dependent on support and manpower from Ser-
bia/Montenegro. Facing them were Muslim and Croat units, for the most part made 
up of the TDF (Territorial Defense Force), established within each republic as local 
guerilla units, plus militias from the various political parties. Within a short time the 
Serb forces occupied the major part of the country, with devastating consequences 
for the non-Serb population. It was to be worse. 
 
About the time President Tudjman and President Milosevic reportedly agreed on a 
partition plan for Bosnia in March of 1993 the Croats also turned on the Muslims. A 
merciless tit-for-tat cleansing took place that ravaged large parts of the built envi-
ronment in Herzegovina, and thousands of lives with it. In November 1993 Croat 
forces blew up the bridge in Mostar, an act just as spectacular as any Twin Towers 
destruction,  and just as spiritually devastating.  By now, the HVO (Croat National 
Defense)14 effectively controlled the transport routes into central Bosnia from the 
sea, which proved to seriously affect my two first cases. The Serbs on their part 
controlled airlifts and practically all transport routes into Sarajevo proper15.  Sara-
jevo had been held under siege since the summer of 1992 and was to remain cor-
                                          
10 The Serbian Academy of Art and Sciences which issued its famous Memorandum in 1993. 
11 The way the Serbs within Croatia had already done. These border territories (Krajina) were occupied 
by Croat forces in the spring of 1995, resulting in the departure of 250,000 Serb Croats.  Many came to 
Bosnia. 
12 The commemorations take place at different dates throughout the country, because war started in 
different parts of the country at different times. 
13 92.68% voted for independence. The turnout was at 63.4% with the Serbian Democratic Party boy-
cotting the referendum. They instead proclaimed an independent ‘Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina’ 
on 27 March 1992, later renamed Republika Srpska (12August 1992). 
14 When it was first established as a defense measure against the Serb aggression many Muslims joined 
the HVO. 
15 Serbs claimed 23% all goods airlifted or convoyed to the sieged city of Sarajevo for distribution to 
Serb areas elsewhere (Prior to the war the Serbs made up 23% of the population of Sarajevo. In general 
30 % of the food distributed by UNHCR went to the Serb population as per the pre-war ‘population ratio’, 
- irrespective of needs) (Cutts 1999). 
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The Appendix 7 of the Dayton Agreement17 dealt with the right of return for the 
about two million who were victims of these ethno-religious expulsions.  By and 
large, these took place during the campaigns at the beginning and at the end of the 
war. During 1993-1994 the fronts were fairly stable, which meant there were stable 
areas on either side of the front lines. This was when UN protection forces were 
sent in and ‘safe havens’ were established.  During the final Muslim/Croat campaign 
Srebenica was purged and renewed housing destruction took place. With (Bosnian) 
Serb atrocities first in Tuzla and later in Sarajevo, the latter well covered in the 
media, the long awaited NATO air strikes in effect brought the parties to Dayton. 
When the war ended and housing destruction assessments were done, it was evi-
dent that about 35% of Bosnia’s housing stock had been damaged or destroyed 
(IMG 1999).  Part of the post-war obligations taken on by foreign donors was to 
support housing reconstruction so that the right to return could be realized. 
 
 
6.1.3 The Bosnian War As A Conceptual Backdrop 
The war in Yugoslavia and in Bosnia in particular allowed for two basic interpreta-
tions. It was either a war of Serbian aggression, a war towards realizing the histori-
cal vision of Greater Serbia – or it was a war driven by ‘ancient hatred’ between the 
various tribes of the Balkans. The latter explanation made the war contagious and 
could, in the worst of cases, spread to other parts of Europe.  With the exception of 
Serbia, and to a certain extent Russia and Greece, the first explanation was taken 
by most of the countries plus USA. The explanation on ancient hatred, easily dis-
seminated in the press, was primarily held by the British and the French, and oth-
ers who had experienced the senseless violence applied in the fighting. It was a 
combination of these that guided the many international peace missions (Simms 
2002, Eide & Stoltenberg 1996). During the negotiations in Dayton the aggression 
argument secured the right of return and ensured funding for the uncompromising 
goal of helping the displaced return, which would in effect nullify the aggression.  
The ancient hatred explanation brought on the division of Bosnia as an irreversible 
‘fact on the ground’. 
 
The international funding for the reconstruction of Bosnia was linked to these two 
sets of causal explanations. They were to guide the policies, the priorities and the 
operational regulations employed by the foreign donor governments and the im-
plementing agencies. My cases were conceived within this twin, or rather double, 
frame of mind. 
 
Susan Woodward and Mary Kaldor presented separate explanations as early as 
1995 (Kaldor et al.1995, Woodward 1995).  Both claimed that this was a different 
war. It was neither like the European ‘world’ wars, nor was it a ‘tribal war’. Its un-
derlying causes were embedded in the international dynamics of political and eco-
nomic change. These changes were scrambled through at a time when Yugoslavia’s 
markets were dwindling and their economic capacity and living standards were rap-
idly declining. This corroded societal trust, and state institutions were rendered im-
                                          
17 The formally correct name is ” General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 
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potent in managing the political crisis. It was a European case of state failure, simi-
lar to what has been seen in the former Soviet Union and in countries in Africa 
(Woodward 1995;15). 
 
These perspectives might have led to a different reconstruction regime, and differ-
ent priorities, but by 1995 the prevailing explanations had become conventional 
wisdom. 
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6.2.3 INTERNAL LINKAGES 
.1) Social and Political Characteristics 
 
The industrial expansion after WW II made Tuzla part of an industrial cluster, also 
comprising the neighboring Banovici, Lukavac and Zivenice municipalities. These 
were later to be major host communities for the displaced people from Eastern 
Bosnia. By 1991 about 260,000 people were permanently living in these four mu-
nicipalities.  In addition, maybe more than 25,0006 people commuted daily into this 
cluster from villages around. This industrial experience had forged a new social and 
political identity in Tuzla.7  Statistical data on ethno-religious affiliation, religious 
affiliation, and political voting patterns makes this quite clear.8 
 
The main outcome of Bosnia’s first elections in 1990 was a legitimization of the na-
tionalist rhetoric of ethnic supremacy and territorial division, – not of democratic 
governance. Such sentiments were not so prominent in Tuzla. That made it possible 
for the ‘opposition’, the non-nationalistic Social Democratic Party (SDP)9 to win the 
Tuzla elections. Choosing the SDP to govern the city in times of high uncertainty 
revealed the strength of the non-nationalist convictions among the people of Tuzla.  
It also characterized attitudes totally different from those held by the thousands of 
displaced Bosniaks from villages and towns in Eastern Bosnia who were later to 
seek refuge in Tuzla. This would in due course create tensions and underpin several 
important IDP policy dispositions on the part of the political leadership of Tuzla. It 
would also directly, although in different ways, affect the two Tuzla cases to be ex-
amined. 
 
.2) Physical and Urban Development  
Tuzla is situated along the banks of the Jala river trapped between hills on either 
side. It expanded into its present state from a central mound where the footprints 
of the old Ottoman town plan still shape some of the finest urban spaces any-
where10. Industrialization also entailed industrialization of construction, creating a 
skyline of large housing estates similar to what we see in all cities in former Yugo-
slavia.11 
                                      
6 I have no exact figure for Tuzla. However, I have information that Doboj had about 15,000 and Zenica 
had 20,000 daily commuters. Those towns are significantly smaller than the ‘Tuzla cluster’. 
7 I am indebted to Professor Reshad Baktic of the Faculty of Economics, Tuzla, for much of this informa-
tion. 
8 According to the 1991 census, the ethno-religious composition shows that more than one-fifth (21.3%) 
of Tuzla’s population ascribe themselves as “Others” (“Ostali”), i.e. ‘Yugoslavs’ as compared to Muslims 
(Bosniaks) (47.6), Serbs (15.5) or Croats (15,6). More revealing still are the religious affiliations people 
ascribe to. Almost half the population (46%), claims no religious affiliation at all (Samary 1995:89). As 
this refers to a national average, the figure is definitely higher in urban areas, and most definitely in 
Tuzla. Being a Yugoslav (with no religious affiliation) was a claim to being a ‘modern citizen’, free from 
the confines of the enthno-religious traditions (Bringa 1993). This was also reflected politically. 
9 The SDP was established on the basis of the communist party in BiH ahead of the 1990 elections and 
still holds government in the municipality – as part of a coalition.  In the 2000 elections the SDA became 
the largest party. 
10 This needs to be emphasized and repeated: “some of the finest urban spaces anywhere” – but alas – 
decaying and most probably disappearing. 
11 In fact, Tuzla came to be a center for Yugoslavia’s international construction industry, with Tuzla 
companies active in most parts of Africa, the Middle East and in USSR.  
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But Tuzla is still different – and again because of the salt.  The underground salt 
extraction has caused the ground to subside under large parts of central Tuzla. Dur-
ing the last 80 years almost 3,000 dwellings have collapsed, affecting about 15,000 
people, and around 200,000m3 of commercial and public floor space, as well as 
important historical buildings. A total area of 500 ha has thus been rendered unfit 
for development for purposes other than parks and playgrounds (Õzerdem 1998: 
269). When adding these limitations to the fact that the city’s large industrial sites 
were located on the river plains west of the city effectively barring further urban 
expansion in that direction, most of Tuzla’s future growth will have to take place 
within the confines of the existing city.  
 
 
Fig 6.2.4 Central Old Tuzla with the Orthodox Church. The area in the front of the picture 
was previously built-up land, but abandoned due to subsidence. Since the picture was taken 
(2000) the World Bank has funded a leisure park with a lake for swimming.  
 
Housing is a major element of urban growth. In Yugoslavia housing provision was 
the responsibility of the employer, and as most employers in Tuzla had thousands 
of employees – the biggest had over 12,000 – the scale of the housing projects 
tended to reflect that. Appropriate sites for large-scale housing thus became a me-
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diating element in the pattern of urban expansion. These high-rise blocks with 14–
17 floors housed about 60% of the population of Tuzla proper.12 
 
These large-scale projects, however, fed a parallel process.  Unregulated, often 
formally illegal, small-scale private housing was constructed throughout fringe ar-
eas on plots of private land.  This was a Yugoslavia-wide phenomenon (Vucinic & 
Todorovic 1995) In Tuzla, these new ‘informal settlements’ gradually filled hillsides 
and smaller side valleys, as these areas were unsuitable for the large-scale housing 
projects.  Lacking formal approval, a large portion were not connected to the city’s 
sewerage system, although they were formally connected to other utility systems.  
They were normally of the same construction quality as any formal housing pro-
ject.13 It must be added that such was the structure of Muslim towns that the hill-
sides were traditionally where housing, or the  ‘mahallas’14 were located, although 
most of the Tuzla mahallas had been destroyed by the subsiding land.  The new 
ones were built outside the areas of subsidence, on virgin slopes, on farmland and 
pastures.  Generally, the new housing was ‘self-help’ housing, constructed in 
stages.  As these will be the scene of one of the following cases, an extended ex-
ploration of this housing type, or rather, housing strategy, is merited. 
 
 
Fig 6.2.5 Picture of the central part of Tuzla taken from a US helicopter showing the high rise 
housing on the valley floor and the individual private housing at the urban edges. The large 
building across the river is the city sports hall, the Mejdan, which was packed with IDPs 
throughout the war. In the narrow valley behind Mejdan NRC compleded a number of 
houses. I made several of my interviews there.  
                                      
12 According to the Dutch organization, “Assistance to Bosnian Communities Foundation” (ABC), active 
in Tuzla, 18.03.02. 
13 For all practical purposes they have been accepted, even formally so in Sarajevo in a recent formal 
‘up-date’. 
14 A mahalla is an ordering unit in Arabic and Muslim societies; it is a neighborhood unit initially defined 
in area by how far a mullah’s voice could be heard, and contained a school, a bakery, a market and a 
water fountain.  Housing was organized in such a way that each house had a view often on to the ‘char-
shiya’, the urban center.  All this made the traditional villages and towns in the Balkans favor a valley 
floor or river bed location with the mahallas situated in the adjacent slopes (Grabrijan 1984). 
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.3) The Half-Finished House 
It is obvious for anyone to see. Houses left half finished. The owner living on one 
completed floor and the rest left open. Sometimes there is not even a roof, and 
often one can observe building materials stored for the next building phase. 
 
This is a ‘generic’ type of private housing in areas where industrialized building ma-
terials are readily available. This is what in Chapter 2.2.2.2 was labeled ‘contempo-
rary vernacular’, a housing type found throughout the Balkans, the Middle East and 
Asia. It replaced the truly traditionally constructed house in Yugoslavia during the 
WWII reconstruction era (Grabrijan 1984). This ‘modern house’ is incremental in 
the sense that its construction is often phased, depending upon personal savings 
and self-help capacities. Building materials may be bought when economic condi-
tions allow, and stored as if they were a bank deposit. Not only the half-finished 
houses, but also these deposits of building materials proved crucial when the war-
time housing construction took place. 
 
Houses in this half-finished category were either built, to a large extent illegally, on 
family land, or legally, on purchased plots in accordance with some formal urban 
plan. For building permits to be issued, formal drawings had to be presented, 
though not necessarily adhered to for construction. 
 
Fig. 6.2.6 Half-Finished Houses of today. They are somewhat similar to some of those com-
pleted by NRC during the latter part of the war, although those shown are larger than most 
of those included in the NRC scheme.  
 
This ‘privatized urban encroachment’ represented yet another curtailment on the 
future development of Tuzla, enclosed as it was by surrounding hills, the subsiding 
grounds of the central city, and large industrial sites in the west. At least, that is 
the way urban development was perceived and urban development planning prac-
ticed in Tuzla. 
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.4) Plans and Planning 
Choosing a path for spatial development and coordinating, sometimes even ce-
menting social and material linkages in space, is what centralized physical planning 
is about.15 The core feature was the Master Plan. Tuzla had one made in the expan-
sive 1970s.16 As the overall economic climate in Yugoslavia deteriorated during the 
1980s, this mode of planning became almost irrelevant. It became evident that 
targets set would never be reached as there were no public funds available. Conse-
quently, planning was reduced to regulating immediate projects or anticipated in-
terventions. 
 
The war and its impacts on Tuzla were anything but anticipated or small. The ab-
sence of a structural plan for urban development embracing the whole of Tuzla ef-
fectively eliminated any thorough guidance concerning the physical interventions 
made to meet the acute needs of the people chased into Tuzla during the war.  At 
least, that is the way the planners saw it.  The concepts of development and the 
development planning practice were neither sufficiently flexible nor open enough to 
deal with the prevailing scale of uncertainty.  But then, can any planning approach 
cover ‘force majeure’ (forces beyond one’s control)? 
 
6.2.4 LINKAGES RIPPED 
.1) The War comes to Tuzla 
The people of Tuzla knew it was coming. After the initial raids by the Serb paramili-
tary groups into north-eastern Bosnia, and the subsequent invasion of regular JNA 
forces, it was a matter of time before they would take on Tuzla.  The Serb forces 
had already ‘cleansed’ Bijeljina, Brcko, Modrica, and Doboj, and the Muslims ex-
pelled had already knocked on their doors. 
 
After the UN brokered cease-fire in Croatia in January 1992 large contingents of 
JNA forces had been relocated to bases in BiH, and also to Tuzla.  The City Council 
immediately established a local defense force comprising the local police, the Terri-
torial Defense Force17, various militia bands and regular volunteers. Among those 
presenting themselves was my research assistant’s former professor, Dr Muhamed 
Borogovac. He later recollected: “We were all waiting in line to become soldiers in 
defence of our homeland. I was so touched that for the first time during the war, I 
cried” (Borogovac 1995). True to the legacy of Tuzla, in that line there were Bosni-
aks, Croats and some Serbs. And true to the situation was also the breakdown of 
social mores, and the parallel collapse of social trust. Worst off were the Serbs. 
                                      
15 This centralized planning model based on the concept of rational choice and coordination was devel-
oped in the aftermath of WW II.  It was much indebted to military planning and the experience of WW II 
campaigns. It required control of the means to meet the chosen ends.  This model of ‘synoptic planning’ 
was in principle maintained in Eastern Europe right up to the tome of “liberation” (Åman 1987). 
16 Sarajevo had one made prior to the 1984 Olympics.  This was – and still is – the plan of reference for 
the development of Sarajevo, in spite of new political and territorial realities, and in spite of the chang-
ing role of planning itself, as Bosnia is moving from a centralized economy to marked-led economy. 
17 The national defense of Yugoslavia was organized in three levels: The National Army (JNA), the (de-
centralized) Territorial Defense (TD) force, and the public militia. As part of a ‘reorganization’ of the 
national defense, all TD and militia weapons were handed in to the JNA well ahead of the war.  The Tuzla 
TD was, in effect, without weapons. 
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They had a hard time in making a choice as what to do, and a hard time when the 
choice to stay had been made. It is estimated that about half of the 20.000 Serbs 
left Tuzla18. Many fled out of fear. Others did so because they were forewarned, and 
some even armed by the JNA in anticipation of what was to come19. Also true to the 
situation in Tuzla in the spring of 1992, my assistant, then a young university stu-
dent, was not accepted as a volunteer, “because there were no more guns”. Later, 
he was accepted. Later there were guns. 
 
On May 15 the Tuzla volunteer corps made a pre-emptive strike on a Serb military 
column, killing about 200 soldiers. That day Tuzla entered the war. The JNA re-
treated into the nearby Ozren mountains for later to occasionally shell Tuzla. This 
irregular bombardment kept tensions high. People were scared, they feared for 
their own lives and the lives of their family and friends: “A recurrent feeling of fear, 
isolation - and anger.  Life was on ‘stand-by’ all the time”, as one of my interview-
ees described the atmosphere of Tuzla during the war. The intermittent shelling did 
relatively little material damage.  Only 715 flats and houses were affected, most of 
them slightly (IMG, cf. TALDI 2001).  Beside the fear, the most dramatic impact on 
life in Tuzla was caused by the influx of displaced people from eastern and northern 
Bosnia. 
 
.2) The Displaced come to Tuzla: Local Response. 
By the summer of 1992 more than 50,000 people had already sought refuge in 
Tuzla proper.  In the region there were 250,000 and in Bosnia as a whole there 
were 752,000 IDPs, according to UNHCR’s May 1992 estimates. By the time the 
fighting stopped in 1995, the Mayor claimed the Tuzla region held one-third of the 
total population of the country, according to information disseminated to the inter-
national organizations. The huge population movements into Tuzla took place in 
waves, reflecting the advent of the war. The first started in April 1992 and lasted 
into the summer. In one night alone, 12,000 people entered Tuzla20  As most able-
bodied men were called into military service, about 85–90% of the incoming IDPs 
were women and children21.  The last wave of women and children came from Sre-
brenica in July 1995.  Their menfolk were never called into military service. 
 
                                      
18 Figures vary, and data from the Federal Bureau of Statistics do not always add up as post-war figures 
are often estimates. Taldi (2001) sets pre-war figures of Serbs at 20,424 and the 1997 figure at 10,156. 
19 This is one of the war’s most chilling phenomena. Serbs were told by word of mouth about JNA plans 
and data on future military attacks. At the same time, Serb volunteers were being armed. Stories like 
these were floated among displaced and refugees but were only recently corroborated through Serb 
documents.  In the 2nd Military Sector encompassing Sarajevo, 75,198 handguns had been distributed to 
Serb voluntary groups and members of the SDA by the JNA (Divjak 2001). 
20 This is a figure given to me by the then Head of the Office of Refugees and IDPs in Tuzla, Zehera 
Dropic (later Zehera Morankic).  This was an estimate, like all other figures in the first year of the war 
that are seldom based on actual registrations.  Even  UNHCR figures, in the early phases, were mere 
aggregate estimates from various sources. 
21 The information on Tuzla in the early days of the war is (where no other reference is given) assem-
bled from documents, reports and briefing papers, sometimes undated and unsigned, held in the files of 
the Norwegian Refugee Council or the Norwegian People’s Aid, and from transcribed interviews with 
expatriate staff stationed in Tuzla during 1993-1994. 
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In November 1991 the Secretary General of the UN had requested  UNHCR to be 
the lead agency for humanitarian assistance to ‘people of concern’ in the war on the 
Balkans.  UNHCR established their head office in Sarajevo, but when the war also 
hit Bosnia they retreated to Zagreb with most of the INGOs. International agencies 
were still active within BiH though, operating convoys from Belgrade and the Adri-
atic coast, and airlifts into Sarajevo.  UNHCR did not re-enter Tuzla operationally 
until early 1993. 
 
The administrative and material challenges of managing the IDP influx during 1992 
and early 1993 were exclusively handled by the local agencies, first among whom 
were the Civil Defense units of the region.  They were organized according to the 
Yugoslav laws regulating civil defense, and acted within their corresponding man-
date: it was an absolute emergency regime. The housing strategies were crude and 
short-term: people were either ‘self sheltered’ in some private accommodation, in 
some cases formally requisitioned, or they were placed in ‘collective centers’. 
UNHCR figures from mid-March 1993 show that of the 51,120 registered IDPs in 
Tuzla, 82% were accommodated privately. The remaining 11,000 (18%) were 
shoehorned into public buildings, schools, hotels, sport halls; even the city’s old 
peoples home was converted into a ‘collective center’, as these temporary accom-
modation stations were labeled.  
 
 
Fig 6.2.7 The main sports hall, the Mejdan, in Tuzla was the most important reception center 
for incoming IDPs.  From here people were either transferred to other facilitie,s or private 
people with some extra space came to pick up families temporarily sheltered like this picture 
shows, although this one shows how Serbs driven out of Croatia were sheltered in Belgrade. 
Printed by the courtesy of UNHCR. 
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There were 22 such centers in Tuzla alone. These figures are strikingly parallel to 
figures obtained for Croatia, albeit taken at a later stage of the war: 79% were ‘pri-
vately accommodated’,22 21% resided in organized accommodation (Kurent 1999).  
It is important to recognize that these figures are not precise, rather they indicate 
an ‘about’ figure’, which in this case implies that the recipient communities in ques-
tion were able - in some way or another - to take on about four-fifths of the people 
coming. One-fifth had to rely on some sort of collective solution. These figures 
stand alongside similar findings from natural disasters, where “in no case have 
these organizations (i.e. external shelter programs) provided more than 20% of the 
local shelter response” (UNDRO 1982:5). 
 
The ‘self sheltered’ were occupying flats and houses left by fleeing Serbs, or houses 
not yet fully completed, although most of the IDPs went to live in private homes, 
either with friends or relatives, or with ordinary citizens with rooms to spare.  This 
extraordinary phenomenon of Tuzla residents, on a grand scale offering space in 
their homes to total strangers, often also to rural and hence almost ‘alien’ strang-
ers, signifies two things: the extreme destitution of the displaced, and the role of 
ethno-religious communality. Because the help people offered was, as a rule, help 
for ‘their own people’. It is difficult to assess how Islam’s command to assist the 
needy23 may have impacted the assistance to the displaced during the war in Bos-
nia.  None of my interviewees volunteered any information on the issue, true to the 
nature of the notion: it is part of ‘the practice of life’, not a function attached to it.  
Whether the support given to the incoming IDPs was primarily a humanitarian re-
sponse on the part of the urban population of Tuzla, or an ‘obligation’ embedded in 
the ethno-religious tradition of Zakat and Sadaqa, is nowhere uncovered.24  All this 
corroborates the claims of a generic human urge to help innocent victims (Albala-
Bertrand 2000). 
 
If we apply the concept of habitus of people growing up as Muslims in Bosnia, however 
secular in practice, it would follow that the ‘legacy of Zakat and Sadaqa’ would still pre-
vail in their ‘practice of life’. During the course of the war the religious convictions – or 
rather the Bosniak habitus - were to become all the more manifest. Most conspicuously 
                                      
22 ‘Privately accommodated’ did not mean ‘living with host families’. The latter accounted for about 20% 
of the IDP/refugee total in Croatia, about the same number as were taken care of collectively.  The rest 
had to fend for themselves (Mossberg et al. 1997:45). 
23 An important principle of Islam is that everything belongs to God, and that wealth is therefore held by 
humans in trust. Giving alms is thus one of Islam’s ‘five pillars’, the concepts and practices which consti-
tute Islam.  The first pillar is ‘Shahada’ or the declaration of faith; the second ‘Salat’, or prayer; the third 
is ‘Zakat’, then there is ‘Syam’ or the fast of Ramadan; and the last is ‘Hajj’, the pilgrimage to Mecca. 
The giving of alms is either done through ‘Zakat’, the obligatory one-fortieth of your assets or annual 
income, or Sadaqa, which is a voluntary donation given as a symbol of faith and assistance to a cause.  
In the Qu’ran (9:60) the following are listed as worthy beneficiaries: “Alms are for the poor and the 
needy, and those employed to administer the (funds); for those whose hearts have been (recently) 
reconciled (to Truth); for those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of Allah and for the wayfarer: (thus 
is it) ordained by Allah, and Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom”. IDPs qualify on several of these 
accounts. 
24 In a similar investigation into a IDP-receiving Muslim community in Sri Lanka, the host community 
claimed not to be bound by the obligations of Zakat or Sadaqa in their relationships to the displaced 
(Brun 2003). 
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this took the form of new religious buildings, but also in everyday practices and rituals.  
Non-practicing Muslims now refrained from eating pork, for instance, which may have 
been part of their regular menu before the war.  This also changed the role of the reli-
gious leadership. The Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks have become – as a matter of 
patriotism – more Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim because of the war.25 
 
.3) Sheltering the Displaced: the response of ‘the international community’26 
It was all about housing.  The undignified housing conditions offered to the incoming 
IDPs were at times so appalling that aside from bringing in food and non-food essentials, 
housing came to be the key sector of external intervention. Upon returning to Tuzla in 
early 1993, UNHCR set out to organize the implementation of internationally funded 
housing programs in and around Tuzla.  This coincided with the Municipality of Tuzla 
establishing The Office of Refugees and Displaced Persons (ORDP).27 They took over the 
management from the Civil Defense and were also to act as the local counterpart to  
UNHCR and the international organizations being established in Tuzla. In a top-down, or 
‘savior – victim’ perspective, shelter had become an international priority, basically 
through the media coverage of the plight of the homeless. Already in 1992 donor coun-
tries had pledged about USD 30 million for shelter purposes in Bosnia.28  From the per-
spective of the IDPs, those at the very bottom, the Collective Centers proved to be ex-
tremely dysfunctional human habitats.  The buildings used had neither space nor service 
capacities to cater for the number of people forced to reside there.  In one instance in 
Kiseljak, close to Tuzla, according to documents found in the NRC archives, 930 people 
shared 3 working showers and 5 toilets.  In another reported case, 65 people were ac-
commodated in one classroom (and later refused to leave).  To use schools for accom-
modating IDPs automatically closed the schools for their primary purpose.  Schooling 
took place in improvised localities, cellars, in private homes, and at alternate times.  In 
some areas, children’s education simply stopped: “Children have been almost without 
schooling for two years”, said a NRC report to headquarters in July 1994. As the conflict 
dragged on reopening schools became a high priority issue. These two local needs 
matched the international shelter agenda. During the winter-spring of 1993 UNCHR 
called upon organizations that were already working in Bosnia, and only months later 
the first internationally funded shelter programs were implemented in the Tuzla 
region29. 
 
                                      
25 The current composition of the Tuzla population shows a dramatic fall in the number of self-ascribed 
‘Ostali’, primarily ‘Yugoslavs’, from 21.3% as per the 1991 census to 3.1% in 2000.  In 1991, 47.6 % of 
Tuzla’s inhabitants labeled themselves Muslims – currently, 74.9% do so.  The 2000 figures originate 
from the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Sarajevo, quoted from TALDI 2001. 
26 The term is well-nigh meaningless as an analytical tool.  The definition of ‘community’ cannot apply to 
societies with so divergent political and economic agendas as those active in BiH (cf. Foreign Policy Sep-
tember/October 2002). The usage has strong moral, self-righteous overtones and is basically referring to 
the countries that hold western liberal values, and  act in areas or on issues of political conflict or con-
troversy. 
27 Headed by arch. Zehra Dropic  who was later to become the Chief Town Planner in Tuzla (Zehra 
Morankic). 
28 Information from  UNHCR’s first ‘shelter coordinator’ in Tuzla, Per Iwansson. 
29 In the spring of 1993 the following organizations were present but still only provisionally connected to 
the shelter sector: ICRC, SDR, NRC, NPA, OXFAM, SEA, UNHCR; and at least two more NGOs were doing 
surveys. 
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Fig.6.2.8 Tuzla became a ‘hot spot’ for international organizations. Many grouped together 
and gave meaning to the term ‘international community’ when establishing offices in a voca-
tional training school in central Tuzla. This picture is taken in 1996.  
 
These first internationally funded (emergency) shelter projects were implemented 
close to one year after the shelter crisis had become a critical reality.  As a matter 
of course, these new funds were to be administered by ‘international’, i.e. external, 
agencies. The local political and administrative bodies, which had managed the IDP 
influx and implemented the emergency shelter provisions, were not awarded funds, 
for institutional and political reasons. The fact that they were remnants of former 
communist structures did not enhance their standing, and ‘representing’ only one 
side of the conflict, disqualified them. Many observers had strong misgivings about 
the role of the local leadership. “They were perceived as part of the problem” as 
one centrally placed field agent later told me. Another international agent left his 
position, albeit in another part of the country, because of undue local interference 
into the internationally funded projects. Their interference was indeed contributing 
towards sharpened the forces of conflict. A complex call for ‘doing no harm’. 
 
The reason for the international agencies not intervening earlier was also due to 
basic logistics.  The international organizations had limited access, the security and 
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supply situation was unpredictable and thus deemed unsafe, and besides, to build a 
sufficient professional and organizational capacity takes time. Few of the agencies 
had any experience in construction work, and none had specifically worked on 
housing. 
 
Just as international shelter agencies established themselves in Tuzla, a new war 
broke out, now between Croats and Bosniaks. New front lines were established, 
new roadblocks set up. From April 1993 until the US brokered the ‘Federation 
Peace’ in March 1994, the Croats effectively closed the only ‘international link’ to 
Tuzla, leaving Tuzla besieged from the summer of 1993 onwards. The trapped 
population was in for hard and difficult times.  So too were the agencies present. 
Aside from small quantities of smuggled goods, what little was brought in came by 
way of international convoys, but only at the mercy of roadblock commanders of 
various creeds, and often only after they had their share of the load.30 All in all, 
65% of all aid into Bosnia was brought in by convoy trucks.31 
 
Many of the organizations involved in these initial supply convoys were among the 
first to take on the shelter challenge.32 The field staff’s personal experience of the 
appalling housing shortage and overcrowding was instrumental in shifting organiza-
tional focus towards shelter, a sector where none had substantive experience, and 
none had HQ staff that professionally covered building construction. 
 
Because Tuzla was late in getting outside help, the organizations which were to 
participate were familiar with, directly or indirectly, what had been done in BiH dur-
ing the first period of the war. The housing interventions thus far were basically 
providing prefabricated houses and camp units delivered from the donor country.  
This had proved to be both prohibitively expensive and a transport liability, given 
the distance and the conditions of the local road network.  By the time international 
housing interventions were set for Tuzla, the prefab trial period was practically 
over.33 In those very first Tuzla-attempts the NGOs were supported by private 
building management consultants from the home country. The Swedish funded ‘Hi-
fab Houses’ were even to carry the name of the consultancy firm.  These were the 
first regular, in-situ built housing in the Tuzla area, built in the neighboring munici-
pality of Zivenice. Sites within Tuzla proper were deemed ‘too expensive’ (Mossberg 
et al. 1997).  That argument will be examined when presenting my second case, 
NPA’s Mihatovici project, the only new IDP settlement built in the municipality of 
                                      
30 There are claims and anecdotal evidence of 5% to 30% cuts at these roadblocks (Mossberg et al. 
1997). 
31 New York Times 20 May 1995. 
32 The Danish Refugee Council, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency and the Norwegian Refugee Council 
were all initially engaged in transport, but experiencing the plight of the displaced, they took up a long 
engagement in providing shelter. 
33 The experience based advice against providing donor-produced prefabs was not picked up by other 
agencies that entered the ‘shelter scene’ later on.  Consequently, the NRC sent prefab housing to Serbia 
four years after NPA had concluded that Norwegian prefabs were not for the Balkans. It would also be 
NRC’s last prefab venture: “Never again!” was also their subsequent conclusion. The UNDRO handbook 
from 1982 cautioned agencies against using donor-produced prefabs. Organizations not previously in-
volved in housing construction did not normally subscribe to that type of information. 
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Tuzla.  UNHCR’s reigning policy regarding all shelter programs was for the munici-
palities to provide free and fully serviced plots.  This was rarely the case.  One large 
NGO even chose to pay a reluctant and cash strapped neighboring municipality for 
providing an unserviced and remote plot in order to have housing built for some of 
the displaced.34 Another NGO, Scottish European Aid, went straight into recon-
structing damaged houses along the former frontlines, and thus enabling the very 
first IDP ‘majority returns’. 
 
What amounted to a Croat blockade in effect made it impossible to bring in building 
materials except as emergency supplies on  UNHCR convoys. meanwhile, the IDPs 
kept coming, kept coming. When, in the spring of 1993,  UNHCR appealed for shel-
ter assistance to the Tuzla region, Norway responded immediately. 
 
6.2.5 Norwegian Shelter Programs in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Norway provided help to Bosnia from the very beginning of the war. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (NMFA), in the wake of the displacement of the Kurds in 1991, had 
established a comprehensive emergency program. This comprised a swift three-
pronged response to international emergencies: the NMFA provided politically ap-
proved funding to Norwegian non-governmental organizations for implementing 
relief operations, in partnership with the Norwegian private sector, through the 
NOREPS consortium.35  Specialized personnel was also part of this supply program, 
as were prefabricated housing and tents. This system was set in motion when the 
call for emergency aid for Bosnia reached NMFA. The Ministry prescribed a division 
of labor between the NGOs involved.  The Norwegian Refugee Council was given 
responsibilities for logistics, i.e. transportation and warehouse management.  In 
Bosnia they soon assembled a fleet of more than 50 trucks36 that was to become 
the lifeline to large parts of the county in the years to come. In addition they were 
made responsible for providing temporary shelter and water. The latter was later 
taken over by the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). The Norwegian People’s Aid was 
designated the medium and long-term shelter agency, and the Norwegian Red 
Cross was to deal with health. 
 
All Norwegian organizations were in action in Bosnia from 1992 onwards (with 
NOREPS supplying goods and services). By the time NPA was called to Tuzla, Nor-
wegian prefabs settlements had already been built in and around Zenica. During 
the early 1990s the construction market was slack in Scandinavia. This led to a do-
nor preference for the type of aid that also aided the donor’s domestic markets. 
Shelter assistance is capital intensive and thus easily tied. Not only products, Swe-
den even sent carpenters to the war zone to assemble Swedish prefabricated 
                                      
34 The professional and administrative ‘impotence’ felt by the local authorities – and sometimes by the 
local citizens – made for such reactions, like the one reported by Guy Hovey when, after literarily risking 
his life bringing a truck load of foodstuff into Sarajevo during the siege, he was refused help by the local 
warehouse staff to unload the truck: “you brought it - you unload it” (Hovey 2000). 
35 The Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) was obliged to provide food and non-food 
supplies, personnel and ‘service packages’ (tent camps, mobile hospitals, etc.) at 72 hours notice. 
36 These were the white truck convoys for UNHCR, initially supporting the work of 15 organizations 
working in BiH.  All total there were 438 white trucks involved in UNHCR convoy system supplying BiH 
via Serbia and Croatia (Mossberg et al. 1997). 
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houses. This proved grossly inefficient37, impractical and led to unacceptable costs 
per beneficiary. 
 
Norway was to provide shelter support for the Tuzla region through the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). They responded differ-
ently, partly by mandate, partly through different contextual interpretations on the 
part of their field officers, and partly by intention, i.e. as a result of ideological dif-
ferences.  In the following, these two approaches will be presented and discussed 
through two project cases. They acted within the same time/space context but their 
different approaches resulted in two distinctly different housing outputs. By the fate 
of time, however, some of the prime beneficiaries from one were later to benefit 
from the other. This will also be discussed in the following. 
 
 
                                      
37 “A cost comparison between Swedish and local staff shows that one expatriate costs as much as at 
least 150 locally employed people.  The per diem alone could pay the salaries of 60 local people” (Moss-
berg et .al 1997:74). 
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6.3 CASE I  
A SHELTER SCHEME FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA 
Implemented By The Norwegian Refugee Council 1993-1995 
 
The following presentation of the NRC case reflects the way I learnt from asking the 
set of research questions that guided my work.  The physical properties of NRC 
projects were never seen as a particular issue of investigation since most decisions 
on the ‘layering’, as discussed in 2.1.2, had already been made by the house owner 
long ago.  The central issues were how the project was instigated, carried through, 
interacted with the context, and what benefits and re-development dynamics it left 
behind. This process is perceived differently for the different categories of primary 
and secondary actors. Resting on the donor decision to ‘do housing’ the challenge is 
to uncover how the tactical considerations were forged, and how these interacted 
with the ‘contextual flow’ of  figure 1.2.1. 
 
6.3.1 FAILING TENTS 
When NRC entered Tuzla it was still an umbrella organization acting on behalf of a 
number of other Norwegian NGOs specifically focusing on assistance to refugees 
and internally displaced people (IDPs). In spite of slight shifts in ascribed mandate 
and formal status, NRC’s singular focus on the protection of refugees and IDPs in 
cases of emergency has basically remained the same.1  They revised their statues 
in 1981, but went through the kind of ‘slide in mandate’2 that so many NGOs went 
through during the 1980s (Tvedt 1998, Smillie 1995). The organization would 
probably claim a place within the Dunantian tradition, but being totally dependent 
on project funding from the Norwegian government it firmly remains an 
(independent) Wilsonian organization (see chapter 4.4.4). Professionally NRC had 
no prior housing experience to speak of.  It was their emergency experience and 
their expertise in logistics that underpinned their shelter mandate in Tuzla. 
 
Part of the overall agreement on the Norwegian assistance to the Tuzla region was 
for NRC to provide transport and warehouse management, water provisions, and 
provide short-term shelter, i.e. tents. Tents were seen by UNHCR in Geneva and by 
externally placed donor agencies to be the most appropriate shelter contribution to 
the Tuzla region at the time. UNHCR anticipated more waves of IDPs fleeing into 
Tuzla. NRC was initially set to build a tent camp with a capacity of 12-15,000 beds.3 
However, only 9 ‘rub-hall’ tents with a combined capacity for 2000 were built. They 
                                          
1 Reconstruction has never been formally addressed by NRC, in spite of housing rehabilitation being 
their main field of intervention in the former Yugoslavia. It has, at all times, been addressed as 
emergency operations. 
2 In Tuzla this led NRC to act within the same field of action as some of their ‘owners’. This proved 
difficult and caused some antagonism, particularly at HQ level between NRC and the NPA as both were 
to act, not only in the very same sector, i.e. housing, but also in the very same country, and in the very 
same area of emergency – at the same time. In 1997 NRC went on to become a foundation that was 
independent of its former ‘owners’. 
3 All in line with the comprehensive Norwegian emergency regime in which private industry provided the 
tents (10 x 54 m, at a reported price of NOK 350,000/85,000 DM a piece), NMFA provided the funds, 
and NRC carried out the work.  By opting for these (unused) tents the Norwegian government lost 
several million NOK. 
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were hardly used by the displaced4 because new IDPs never arrived in sufficient 
numbers, and those who did never wanted to stay there, claiming the site, by the 
Tuzla airport to be unsafe, the spaces too cold, open, with no windows, etc.  The 
local political authorities had also advised against building the tent camp.  
Eventually it was taken over by a Swedish NORBAT company. It was not the cold of 
winter, but the extreme heat inside the tents in summer that caused the Swedish 
company to move out. They were 30 to a tent, a mere one-seventh of the planned 
number of IDPs. No one knows where these rub-halls are today. 
 
The first Norwegian shelter initiative in Tuzla had thus failed, initiated as it was 
based on a supply side understanding of the local situation, not on the local 
demand, and an apparent disregard or ignorance for the laws of building physics. 
This was to characterize much of the international housing support in BiH. 
 
6.3.2 OPTING FOR HOUSING 
From the Spring of 1993 onwards Tuzla was isolated, under siege.  It would 
sometimes take days to wind one’s way from Sarajevo to Tuzla within Bosniak held 
territory.  Once there, one stayed.  The city was short on water, on electricity, on 
all sorts of goods.  Tuzla had, according to UNHCR, only received a quarter of the 
aid volume they needed.5 Petrol prices were steadily rising. The communications 
were bad, and prior to the satellite telephones it could be well-nigh impossible to 
communicate with the outside world.  And still hundreds of displaced people were 
walking into Tuzla every day – with no place to stay.  The conditions offered to 
them were appalling. The situation was extreme. 
 
Under such circumstances the Head of Field Office of any NGO takes on strategic 
responsibilities in addition to those of tactics and operations. Mandate or no 
mandate, the one overwhelming need in Tuzla, apparent to all, was housing for the 
incoming IDPs.  Joining NRC’s overall objective, “to enhance international protection 
of refugees and internally displaced people, and to offer humanitarian assistance” 
(Solberg 2002), and NMFA’s clearly expressed mandate: “To reach as many people 
as possible in the shortest possible time”,6 the head of NRC’s Tuzla office, Mr Lars 
Silseth, proposed a program of completing the many half-finished private houses in 
the area so they could be used for temporarily sheltering IDPs. This was not the 
result of any NRC initiated capacity assessment, and was one far removed from the 
type of procedures proscribed and illustrated in intricate flow diagrams in learned 
literature (Babister & Kelman 2002) or even UNHCR’s Blue Book (UNHCR 2000b). It 
was a combination of Silseth’s professional background and a field-based perspective 
that revealed these resources, these opportunities, in a situation of extreme 
logistical constraints.7 In no way could new housing be constructed in time for the 
                                          
4 In NRC’s own statistics, 1500 IDPs are said to have been assisted, but only for a very short period: 
“days, not even weeks”, according to former field officers. 
5 Dagbladet 8 March 1994  
6 This overall goal was re-emphasized by the Ministry as late as June 24, 1996 according to minutes 
from meeting between NMFA and the NGOs involved in BiH housing FS/AKA 4.7.96. 
7 This ‘method’ was once again applied by Charles Setchell of USAid in Goma after the volcanic eruption 
in 2001: no flow chart assessments, merely being ‘inside’ the situation and from there using one’s 
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1993-94 winter to shelter the steady flow of displaced people.  Ownership issues and 
local political opposition prevented the many flats in the half-finished housing 
estates from being completed.  But private houses could be completed if the right 
deal could be struck with the owners. Indeed, deals were struck. This was to become 
NRC’s ‘Tuzla Model’, copied by other NGOs and NRC elsewhere in the region.  In the 
Tuzla and the adjacent municipalities,8 five consecutive NRC-SHELTER phases were 
implemented: I and II jointly financed by UNHCR and NMFA,9 phases III and IV were 
funded by NMFA alone, and phase V was a GTZ project.10 In total, 647 houses were 
completed and c. 13,000 IDPs were temporarily sheltered.11 
 
I investigated houses completed as part of NRC-SHELTER I, II, III in the 
municipality of Tuzla.  Initially, I was to exclusively concentrate on Phase I, but it 
proved impossible to locate all the houses. Records were incomplete and street 
names and numbers had been changed.  We also learnt that some of the houses 
had been sold.  By including houses from the other phases I was able to observe 
effects apparent in later phases but not in the first, because of changes in NRC 
tactics. For logistical reasons and for recording possible aggregated social effects, 
five areas were chosen: three streets within urban Tuzla, one on the urban fringe, 
and one separate Croat settlement outside Tuzla proper.  See markings on the map 
Fig. 6.3.3. 
 
6.3.3 THE NRC TUZLA MODEL; Contextual Determinants 
The rationale behind the ‘half-way’ house approach was underpinned by perceived 
urgency and practical constraints, i.e. lack of time, thousands of houseless IDPs 
facing winter; scarcity of building materials, closed production plants, no regular 
markets; severe transport constraints with Tuzla cut–off from the rest of the coun-
try, bad roads, and soaring petrol prices. Tuzla was overcrowded – yet all quiet. 
 
Time was crucial. The urgency left most other considerations aside. Examined 
reports, letters and communications all dealt exclusively with the prevailing 
situation, and said practically nothing at all about the future.  In spite of large 
investments, there is almost no reference to long-term, or post-war development. 
An attitude of “when the war is over, everything will be OK” prevails in most of the 
NGO’s archival material that I consulted. It is evident that the context was 
overpowering, all efforts were set to finding solutions to very acute problems. 
Whenever the future was touched upon, it was superficially without obligations and 
in general terms.  And nobody from HQ or the donor community called for any 
                                                                                                                         
professional capacity to try to make sense of the true contextual potentials.   Setchell came up with 
surprisingly similar proposals (personal communication, January 2003). 
8 Banovici, Lukavac, Zivinice, Srebrenik. 
9 This may have been for ‘safety’s sake’, in that the institution of UNHCR was held to be more 
experienced and professionally accountable, which of course it was not. This co-funding merely caused 
added bureaucracy and personal antagonism. 
10 NRC also undertook regular housing reconstruction; they repaired schools, hospitals, and upgraded 
several CCs. 
11 The IDP figures vary because NRC statistics in general refer to project proposal figures whereas there 
were houses completed where no IDP ever stayed, and others where IDPs stayed sometimes more and 
sometimes less than initially proposed. 
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serious reflection on the long-term effects of the efforts undertaken, much less as 
to how these housing interventions would possibly strengthen the post-war Bosnian 
society in regaining its former self.12 As one of the early Norwegian field agents 
said: “Seeing displaced people actually freezing to death, makes a hell of an impact 
on how you see your own role”. And that role called for ‘Action now!’.  NRC’s Tuzla 
Model made ‘action now’ possible. New housing was made available within weeks. 
 
Building materials and building components had been produced in the region prior 
to the war. All production had been closed down when war started:  “There was no 
market”, said the deputy director of the Siporex factory, “and remember, the 
workers also had families. They had to take care of their own lives”. The NRC model 
circumvented the non-existing formal building material market by drawing on the 
deposits of building materials stocked by private house owners.  When establishing 
a cash-on-delivery demand, first supply and then a market of sorts are bound to 
emerge. It did. What proved impossible to obtain within the region was brought to 
Tuzla by NRC convoys, on “the Friday trucks”. 
 
Transport became an urgent issue. The longer the isolation of Tuzla lasted, the 
more expensive the fuel. The prices fluctuated immensely, almost by the hour.  The 
price of diesel was said to reach DM 30 at times.  This, of course, made transport 
prohibitively expensive.  One of the house owners, later to be assisted by NRC, told 
of spending DM 500 in fuel to go to Srebrenik, 34 km away.  Thus, any attempt to 
go outside the region to access building material was impossible. And the added 
burden this would have on the worn down road network would in fact put other 
types of more urgent transport at risk.13  The Tuzla Model called for much less 
transport, 100 mT of transport per house, according to Mr Silseth.14 
 
6.3.4 THE MODEL COMPONENTS 
The idea was simple. The owner of a ‘half-way’ house was given funds and technical 
advice by NRC to complete the building against the owner allowing IDPs to move 
into the premises for a set period.  This way, a triple set of benefits were to be 
achieved: 
• Within a very short time the housing stock of Tuzla increased, enabling more 
people to be decently sheltered (or ‘protected’ in the refugee lingo of NRC). 
• Schools used for sheltering IDPs could be emptied and regular educational 
activities could resume. 
• House owners could enhance their investment by having their house 
completed. This was presented as a gesture towards the host community. 
 
The scheme aimed at some subsidiary benefits as well: 
                                          
12 During the early phases of the Kosovo crisis, I urged the ‘desk staff’ of NMFA to give due 
consideration to the long-term consequences when forging their strategy for shelter and return support. 
This was to no avail: “First things first”, was their express response! 
13 There are recurrent stories by former convoy drivers about old buses and trucks full of ‘Christmas 
presents’ breaking down and stalling the regular convoy transport. The roads in Bosnia at the time were 
“not for amateur drivers and worn-down vehicles”. 
14 From notes prepared by NRC for a Norwegian delegation, Spring 1994. 
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• The investments would bring real salaries, cash, into the community and 
thus contribute towards overcoming some of the current hardships.  These 
were the days when sugar was to reach 35 DM/kg. 
• Commissioning private contractors would contribute towards the formation 
of a construction industry formerly ruled by very large state-run building 
contracting firms. In pre-war Tuzla the biggest of these, Technograd, had 
12,000 employees. 
 
These objectives show that there are in fact many sets of ‘beneficiaries’.  In the 
following, I will use the term in reference to the displaced people, those being given 
temporary shelter through the program - as well as to the house owners. They 
were given investment resources allowing for long-term benefits15. 
 
NRC was to act in concert with the Tuzla Office of IDPs and Refugees (ORDP), which 
was to be the overall responsible agent.  The latter identified the IDPs. NRC 
primarily saw its role as building manager and funding body. These two parties plus 
the house owner signed a tripartite agreement regulating the intervention. True to 
the prevailing emergency concept, the tenants were mere ‘victims’, never 
considered as a due signatory party16. 
 
Selecting houses, or rather, choosing house owners was, in principle, a matter of 
economics.  Those houses were selected where minimum investment would shelter 
a maximum number of IDPs, as long as ownership and other formalities were in 
order. 
 
Each house would be fully completed, including plastering and rendering of external 
walls.17  Even certain external works were included.  All rooms were to access a 
chimney, as stoves were provided, a large number of which were even imported 
from Norway. Each floor was to have a toilet, and the house owner had to certify 
the capacity and a formal municipal link-up of the sewerage system. Electrical 
installations were down to a minimum: one light and one socket per room. Thermo 
insulation in external walls was required and so too was double glazing, but these 
requirements proved difficult to fulfill. There was to be vinyl flooring, with ceramic 
tiles on the bathroom floors.  The house owner could – when paying for it himself – 
have better quality materials and a more comprehensive electrical installation.  
Many owners did just that, cf. Technical Specifications in the Appendices, page 359. 
 
                                          
15 Contract documents issued for the Tuzla Model are found as an appendix at the end of the thesis. 
16 In the contract between house owner and ‘tenant’, it is the Municipality that signs ‘on behalf of’ the 
tenant. See appendices where a set of contracts are enclosed. 
17 As the same technical solutions and same detailing were used throughout the program, we were soon 
able to identify a ‘NRC house’ from the way the balconies were executed. 
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Fig.6.3.1 A central quality in the 
NRC Model was the location of the 
houses. Most of them were 
centrally located which meant that 
services and infra-structure was 
already in place and no major 
such investments were required. 
The children went to the local 
schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of IDPs per house was determined by what came to be UNHCR norm: 5 
m2/person net18, or rather, 5 m2 per bed.  Many houses were not accepted because 
the layout made it impossible to place a sufficient number of beds in the flat, and 
thus to reach the required cost efficiency, or ‘DP density’, by any other word. 
Furthermore, houses were chosen in clusters.  This was done to ease the logistics 
and reduce transport. These were the days of exorbitant fuel prices, and when 
electricity was available one hour a day.  Electricity meant radio and television – 
information.  It was during these short bursts of communication that NRC 
introduced their Tuzla Model. We are in the fall of 1993. 
 
6.3.5 SHEARING THE NRC HALF-FINISHED HOUSES 
I investigated 20 houses.  In terms of their shearing properties, these were different for each 
one of them, although since most of them were initiated in the 1980s they were constructed 
and spatially structured according to the traditional Bosnian ‘contemporary vernacular’, 
presented earlier and evident in the plans for the first floor shown below.  Where the owner 
was around, or did the work himself, there was a minute quality control. Where the owner 
was absent, this was not the case. In general there was nothing NRC did that constrained 
the future peace-time use of the building. It was normally the other way around. The 
strategic decisions regarding adaptability and capacity for change were made by the 
individual owners long before the war. The very fact that the houses were able to take on 
the shelter functions of NRC scheme would normally confirm their open-endedness. Some 
                                          
18 General living space 3.5 – 4 m2/per person + sanitation 0.5 m2  + cooking/dining 0,5m2  = 4.5–5 
m2/per person. This norm, which were to become a national norm, was initially set by UNHCR’s shelter 
coordinator in Tuzla in early 1993. 
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houses chosen for completion were not of the ‘open ended’ type, see figure 6.3.3 below 
right, and Figure 6.3.4. The fact that such structures were chosen again emphasized the 
level of discretion involved in the selection of houses, or rather, the selection of house 
owners. Regarding ‘layers’, it will become apparent that it is the ‘site’ layer, the location, that 
stands out as the most critical dimension in the building’s strategic importance in serving the 
recovery process. This will be discussed in due course. 
 
Fig 6.3.2 One of the first houses in 
a cluster to be completed in Phase 
I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6.3.3  Floor plans; 1. floor to the left, basement/ground floor to the right. 
The house has a traditional four quadrant structure which normally allows for one quadrant 
(the kitchen/living room) to occupy a quadrant and a half. In this case the plan for the 1. 
floor  was made to allow for the maximum number of occupants: 13.  In the 
basement/ground floor, half of which was initially planned as a garage, 17 people were living 
in conditions made worse by sloppy spatial organization. 30 IDPs lived in this house. When 
the picture was taken in 2001 the two completed flats were occupied by rent paying tenants. 
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Fig 6.3.4  
A large NRC-house in a 
narrowalley close to the 
town enter. The initial plan 
was to have a shop in front. 
The structure, floor plans 
and the finishing are all of  
mediocre quality. The rent 
from the present tenants is 
the sole income of the 
owner family. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.6 IMPLEMENTATION IN TIMES OF WAR 
The Tuzla Model was forged in the field. For it to succeed would depend on the assumptions 
being correct, on goals being shared and on local agencies being able to carry it through. The 
Tuzla Model was realized through its approach to implementation, i.e. tactical considerations 
informed by operational assumptions.  Hence, how a project is ‘implemented’ will affect not 
only its output,– but more so its outcome. In high uncertainty cases - and Tuzla during the 
1993-1994 period certainly was one such case - any successful implementation approach 
emerges from the constraints and opportunities present. In funding the second phase, NMFA 
went so far as to state: “it is for NRC to decide as to what would be the most appropriate 
way of spending the funds both pertaining to the security situation and to the quickest way 
houses may be completed”.19 In the following, I will examine the implementation phase and 
show how change in agency and context affected the outcome. 
 
.1) Spreading the Word, Selecting the Beneficiaries 
In the fall of 1993 the head of NRC’s Tuzla office, Mr. Lars Silseth went on the air. With 
the support of the Tuzla Mayor and with funding from NMFA and UNHCR, he was 
interviewed on TV and presented his ’Tuzla Model’ to radio audiences.  Within a short 
time the ODPR received about 200 applications from house owners. Most of my 
interviewees heard about the scheme on the radio directly themselves or were contacted 
by others that had heard about it. None of ‘my’ first phase participants entered the 
scheme without others they knew also doing so.  Not all applicants were eventually 
enrolled, but the reference to other house owners, and later to their experience with the 
IDPs, was to play an important role throughout the whole program. 
 
                                          
19From NMFA’s covering letter approving funding for the 2nd phase of the Tuzla Shelter Scheme, 8 
November 1993. 
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After several rounds of selections and site visits the first 37 houses were selected on the 
basis of the criteria set, among which investment per IDP was the most important. The 
fact that investment per IDP varied from 600 DM to 1,583 DM makes it evident that the 
selection still was a matter of discretion. In this selection process the local staff both 
within NRC and ODPR came to play an important role, not least by way of their bi-lingual 
powers. A former Head of Office of one of the large NGOs told me, “They [the local staff] 
knew whom I was to employ - even before I did myself!”  It is a fact – but one not 
presented here as statistical evidence – that 10 per cent of the 20 house owners I 
interviewed, had in some way been employed by NRC. And as most of the applicants 
were engaged by word of mouth, it is not at all known how the links of friendship, of 
reciprocity and ‘making up outstanding dues’ and the like actually affected the selection. 
The local staff, however, did appreciate their vulnerability towards rumors and therefore 
made it a prerequisite that the final decision always lay in the hands of a foreigner who 
could act independently of local pressure.  But then again, “they probably did not 
understand the situation”, as one former local staff said. He referred to the selection of 
houses in the Croat settlement of Kiseljak-Breze in the outskirts of Tuzla. The 
circumstances surrounding that particular selection procedure are still cloudy, not only 
for the then head of office, but also I myself “did not understand the situation”.  NRC 
invested 207,000 DM in completing 5 houses to ultimately shelter 246 IDPs.20 The 5 
houses were completed, but not one single displaced person ever stayed there.21 
 
 
Fig.6.3.5  The largest of the empty houses in Kiseljak Breze. 144 people were to live here. 
The owner stayed in Croatia throughout the war and never returned. The house is all but 
empty and due to lack of maintenance is showing signs of advanced dilapidation. 
                                          
20 At 110,000 DM, the contract for one house was NRC’s largest. It was to be completed in 40 days, 
and was to host 130 IDPs. That caused political upheaval, involving the political leadership in Tuzla. NRC 
was accused, in writing, of supporting ethnic cleansing by ‘shifting the ethnic balance’ of the village. The 
owner of the house in question lived in Croatia, and still does. 
21 The fact that ODPR, according to a minute from a meeting in April 1994, proposed Kiseljak as a future 
location for Phase II, does not make the selection process easier to grasp.  More complicated still, ODPR 
and NRC there agreed on a maximum of 40 IDPs per house. Why NRC then went on to fund a project 
that was to shelter 130 IDPs remains a mystery, - although the neighbors claim to know. 
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If nothing else, investigating these selection procedures clearly disclosed the power 
of language.  Command of English was extraordinarily empowering.  During the 
first years of international relief operations in Bosnia relatively few Bosnians spoke 
English.  Local staff was then often employed simply on the basis of their mastery 
of English22, in much the same way as many of the expatriate NGO staff were 
recruited on merits of ‘being available’. Many of NRC’s local project managers 
started out as interpreters. In the prevailing situation, where real money was 
literarily given away, the people involved in the selection procedure yielded 
considerable power. “They were trusted with tasks they were not prepared to deal 
with, or dealt with according to their own preferences”, as one former staff said. A 
large number of people – in Tuzla several hundred – perhaps more than a 
thousand23 were working for the international agencies and organizations at salaries 
well over what they could expect if locally employed.24  Rumors of their ‘financial 
prowess’ were circulating freely,25 not dissimilar to what returning refugees 
experienced. I have heard many such rumors. 
 
I found no clear support for claims that certain people, say, friends and family of 
politicians or agency staff were able to buy themselves into the list, in spite of such 
claims having even been presented internationally (Kaldor et.al. 1995). I do know 
of cases where such offers were made, but reportedly not accepted.  However, in 
Phase V in Srebrenik, one of the new flats completed was taken over by the local 
branch of the SDA. The IDPs were said to have been given alternative lodging.26 
 
As the housing scheme progressed into the next phases, NRC went on to manage 
most of the program components with only minor participation from ORDP, 
although the latter remained the sole selector of IDP beneficiaries. And again, 
rumors were affecting the program. As the first two phases got under way and 
                                          
22 Sometimes not even that. Female staff were often given language courses to be able to master 
English, according to my assistant, himself an NGO employee from 1994 onwards. ‘Drivers’ who spoke 
English but could not drive were given driving lessons. They even went to Dubrovnik to do driving 
lessons, according to my source. But there were also professionals employed who spoke no English, but 
who learnt during the course of their employment.  In this way, one architect learnt “English with a 
Norwegian accent”. 
23 There are no reliable records of the number of people employed by NGOs and international agencies. 
However, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, ICVA, issues data on the number of 
organizations active within BiH. By August 1997, their updated directory showed that 116 such 
organizations had offices in Tuzla. Figures on those locally employed by the NPA in BiH range between 
266 and 252 in the years 1997 and 1999, with expatriate-local ratios between 1:11 and 1:16, which 
were high because of their demining and psycho-social programs. Their buildings department employed 
17 and 18 local staff respectively, with a respective ratio of 1:4 and 1:6.  Bojicic-Dzelilovic claims that in 
1999 about 15.000 foreigners were engaged in non-military activities in Bosnia, and as many as 50.000 
locals were employed by ‘various international organizations’ (2000; 110). 
24 In sectors with scarce human resources, like in the health service, the local employers lose out – with 
dire consequences for the local population. During the refugee turmoil in the Great Lakes region in Africa 
in the mid-1990s, so many of the locally employed nurses and doctors were taken over by the 
international organizations that it brought the local health service in the affected areas into serious 
crisis. According to Dagens Nyheter (12, 15, 16, 17 May 1999) the consequences were so grave that 
they affected the local mortality rates.  
25 “Their signature could be clandestinely quoted” as one interviewee claimed, albeit not referring to 
NRC. 
26 This case has been passed on to me by a former expatriate NRC staff. 
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houses were being filled up with IDPs, the bad, brawling cases seemed to have 
been circulated among prospective house owners. It was much more difficult to fill 
up the list at the end of the program than it was in the beginning. 
 
Rumors, so prevalent when transparency is veiled and regular information channels 
are clogged, erode confidence.  It makes no difference if they are totally false. 
Distributing ‘free cash’ to selected house owners fuelled suspicions on whether or 
not the selections were fair. True to their emergency nature these selections 
certainly were not ‘transparent’. Even NRC reports to HQ and onwards to NMFA 
could be ‘selective’ in their presentation of facts.27  From working with the NGO 
staff of my three cases and interviewing staff from other NGOs, it is evident that as 
they were going back into the local job market, they do not see their former NGO 
employment as an asset. They feared it to be more of a liability, either ‘rumor 
infected’ or, as is perceived to be the case in Republika Srpska, also ‘politically 
infected’. This is contrary to commonly held NGO claims, which see the hiring of 
local staff and the emergence of local NGOs as a ‘civil society contribution’. I find no 
support for such a general claim, neither does Dough Rutzen in Kosovo.28  Such 
rumor infected perceptions are themselves eroding the social capital base which in 
turn will reduce the benefits from the human capital formation that people in 
productive and meaningful employment actually accrue. These first line findings 
merit more thorough investigations. 
 
Selecting the other category of beneficiaries, the IDPs, was a mere administrative 
affair.  ORDP selected the worst off among those sheltered in schools. All the 
houses were initially filled almost to the last bed.  Compared to where the IDPs had 
been sheltered so far, this was a great improvement: “Now at least we as a family 
have a room of our own”, as one former IDP tenant explained.29  For two years 
they had lived in a classroom with several other families in a run-down Tuzla 
school. Others, however, felt humiliated at being sheltered in other people’s 
houses, tucked into rooms with other people they did not know. As one of the IDPs 
told me, thereby bringing to light yet another reconstruction dilemma: “NRC was 
giving to those who had everything in order to help those who had lost everything”! 
For two and a half years they were allowed to live in their new room.  By then, 
surely, the war must be over – and they all could go home. 
 
.2) Setting the time 
The perception of time is just as much a victim of war as is truth. The inherent 
uncertainty combined with peace-time references dupes actors into overreaching 
                                          
27 Although the difficulties pertaining to the Kiseljak case was known at HQ, all records, all reports and 
all formal feedback to donors carried the figures from the project proposal, not from the completed 
project. 
28 “In Kosovo, there were more than 2,000 registered NGOs.  Most of them folded once international 
emergency aid dried up.  The experience left a lasting negative image of the non-governmental sector, 
and a lack of public trust”, according to Dough Rutzen, Senior Vice President at the International Center 
for Not-for Profit Law in Washington DC, in IWPR’S Balkan Crisis Report No. 427, 2 May 2003. 
29 Dagbladet 5 March 1994. 
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their capacities, and thus invariably leads to short-term planning.30 Immediately 
after the Dayton Agreement both UNHCR and IMG set the emergency period to last 
only another 6–12 months. UNHCR made plans to scale down its activity 
accordingly and advised their implementing partners to plan for the same. NMFA 
followed suit and suggested the Norwegian NGOs “start preparing their exit 
strategies” as the expected funds would be “substantially lower in 1997” than they 
were in 1996. From 1997 onwards it was expected that normal development 
mechanisms would pick up the action through private investments along with 
strategic support from the World Bank and others.31 But this of course never 
happened.32 The Bosnian experience has taught us about time33. 
 
When NRC set the contract period for IDP tenancy to 30 months it was under the 
presumption that “surely by then the war would be over”.  Primarily, however, it 
was to ensure that the IDPs would be sheltered during the coming ‘two winters and 
then some’, This 30-month term became the norm throughout all the Shelter 
phases, irrespective of when they were signed, i.e. irrespective of when the term 
ended. For many it literarily ended in the snow, or by the police evicting them.  
Others were allowed to “stay until spring”. Some few remained as tenants, paying 
their 100–300 DM a month, and in one observed case, a mother and her two 
children were invited to stay for free for a whole year after their contract period 
was over. NRC’s housing scheme emerged out of the opportunities their head of 
office grasped in the fall of 1993.  He was worried about the IDPs and the winter 
cold. The fact that the contracts were not modified to secure full winter protection 
for the IDPs of the later phases, while modifying the construction strategy, indicate 
that the subsequent heads of office were focusing more on construction issues than 
on protection issues. Raising yet again the question as to who were the true 
beneficiaries.   
 
By the time the Phase I contracts expired, the war was indeed over. But for most 
there was still no place to go. Return to the new Republika Srpska was as yet 
impossible for Muslims. Many were therefore transferred to the newly built 
settlements, among them my other Tuzla case, the NPA settlement of Mihatovici, 
where no limitations were set on the duration of their stay. Others left the country, 
went to occupy empty Serb houses in the region, and in some few cases had to 
                                          
30 One of the war’s most memorable ‘time slides’ are those of the US administration. When finally 
committing ground troops to Bosnia, Clinton said on US television in November 1995: “our Joint Chiefs 
of Staff have concluded that this mission should – and will – take about one year”( New York Times 28 
November 1995). One year later, a further postponement was announced (ibid. 9 November 1996) 
whereupon the US Secretary of Defense concluded in March 1997: “it’s very clear that by June 1998, 
we’ll be on our way out” (ibid. 5 March 1997).  At the current time of writing (2003), there are still large 
contingents of US troops in BiH.  
31 NRC Board meeting papers 3/96, 24 April 1996. 
32 The emergency-based donation policy prevailed. When I first asked NRC’s head of mission in Sarajevo 
in 1997 if they were considering changing their housing approach from donation to some sort of credit 
scheme, he said: “Yes, we do – for five seconds”. Running credit schemes was held to be way beyond 
the capacity of NRC. 
33 Re Carl Bildt’s analysis for BBC where his final lesson learnt from Bosnia reads as follows :  “Lesson 7: 
Nation-building takes a longer time, and requires more resources, than most initially believe” 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3407613.stm). 
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return to still existing Collective Centers.  As far as the house owners could report, 
very few were able to, or indeed chose to go ‘back home’ after the contract period. 
 
 
 
Fig.6.3.6 A completed NRC house in one of the side valleys of Tuzla where the Muric family 
were tenants for 30 months. They later moved to Mihatovici, to my Case II, from where I 
followed them back to their initial home in the hills outside Zwornik, see under chapter 
6.4.5.5  
 
Implementing the Tuzla Shelter Scheme largely kept to its initial schedule, primarily 
because of the short completion time required, from 10 to 60 days, depending on 
the amount of work required. This was fast, efficient emergency work, never made 
complicated by long-term considerations in spite of their long-term contributions. 
Being able to deliver within these tight schedules was the program’s very ‘raison 
d’être’. 
 
.3) Completing the half-finished house; Phase I 
Contractors known to the local staff were invited to tender for the first 37 houses. 
This was done on the basis of simple floor plans sufficiently detailed to have all the 
beds positioned, the number of IDPs fixed and floor space per IDP determined, cf. 
Figure 6.3.3 and Appendices page 354. In addition, Bills of Quantities (BoQ) and 
technical specifications were issued, cf. Appendices.  About 10 contractors 
submitted tenders, 5 of them small private firms.  Although tendering was well 
institutionalized in Bosnia, the prevailing conditions called for radical improvisation. 
How were prices to be set when no building merchants were operating? And how 
was transport to be secured when petrol prices fluctuated +/- 2–300%? And what 
would the security situation be in three months?  When NRC’s intention of 
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specifically supporting the establishment of small & medium-sized private 
contractors was added,34 the embedded challenges for all parties involved become 
apparent. 
 
Three small private contractors working on the basis of unit prices of the lowest 
bidder executed the first phase. Their role will be discussed below.  To have regular 
building contractors do all the work was something new to most of the house 
owners as they had done most of the present construction themselves.  This made 
for a certain discord on site reflecting a wider issue prevalent throughout Bosnia.  
The type of private housing reconstructed by international organizations were 
originally built, or at least administered, by the owners. This made them 
knowledgeable on building matters, and often ‘a pestering nuisance’ for the 
contractor.  The owner complained about the quality of the work done and cases of 
ducking contract requirements, like “only one coat of varnish instead of three …”, 
etc. Some of the house owners alleged that the contractors siphoned off excess 
profits through low quality workmanship, and by employing unskilled workers.35 All 
the while, the owners sat around watching, knowing well that participating only 
made the contractor make more profit.  Such complaints are well known to NGOs 
engaged in contractor-built housing.  The contractors rebuff these allegations.  In 
substance, so too do the technical staff of the NGOs, but for practical reasons, more 
than  for economic or developmental reasons, most of the NGOs have over the 
years shifted towards self-help.  So too did NRC after their first Tuzla phase.36 
 
The winter of 1993-1994 was extreme in Tuzla. The population was hedged in, left 
hungry and made the object of random Serb shelling. The house owners entering 
NRC scheme saw their houses being used by contractors to make, what they felt to 
be short-cuts to profits.  At the same time, the IDPs who came to stay were 
provided with food parcels and other emergency assistance.  The house owners saw 
nothing in this for them – not in the short run. And all were short-term oriented: 
“Patili kao nikad”, said one, it was “suffering like never before”. 
 
.4) Completing the half-finished house: Phase II and onwards 
From Phase II onwards, NRC made the house owners responsible for completing 
their houses. This was in direct contravention of the advice from the ODPR. They 
wanted – true to their pre-war tradition – one big contractor to take care of all 
projects.37 Instead, NRC provided cash grants, normally in three installments, to 
                                          
34 Again this was a ‘generic development approach’ informed, for example, by Silseth’s experience from 
working in Africa, rather than by reference to the discourse following Habitat’s Istanbul Declaration and 
the ensuing partnership-approach to housing, which in essence is quite similar to the Tuzla approach 
(see World Bank 1993). 
35 The labor market was made difficult by the fact that much of the labor force made up Bosnia’s 
military force during the war years: “Two weeks at the front, one week at home”.  For all laborers this 
was their week of possible work. Under certain circumstances, there were exemptions for skilled labor 
from serving on the front. 
36 NRC’s own in-house evaluation report questions why the organization kept up the use of contractors 
when the participatory self-help model had proved so successful.  Almost two-thirds of their housing 
since 1993 has been executed as contractor-built (Solberg 2002:25). NRC applied two self-help 
approaches: building material grants and cash grants. 
37 Minutes from NRC-ODPR meeting, April 19, 1994. 
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the house owner for the owner to complete the house on the same contractual 
terms as in Phase I, The difference was that the grants were based on pre-
construction cost estimates rather than competitive tendering. The estimates were 
based on the initial quotations from Phase I and then adjusted to the reigning ‘cost 
of the day’. Sometimes these were unit prices from NRC’s warehouse38 as certain 
materials had to be brought in by the convoys.  About 20% of the house owners of 
Phase II still commissioned a contractor to do the work. 
 
Most of what was needed for completing the houses was locally available, at least in 
the beginning.  Although building merchants were closed, they still stocked 
materials and so did many private people.  Transport was in effect unavailable, due 
to fuel shortage and exorbitant prices.  This forced the contractors to walk when 
locating sources of supplies: “In one day I did 40 km on foot”, said one of ‘the 
selected 3”.  NRC provided 40 liters of fuel per house, which was often not 
sufficient.  Much of the materials were transported on horse carts. As the news of 
NRC program spread, a building materials market of sorts emerged with prices 
reflecting local availability. These fluctuating prices made cost estimates difficult.  
All contracts therefore had a 20% contingency entry to absorb such changes.  
Already during the winter of 1993-1994 this ‘market’ had expanded to include 
several second-hand building material outlets. It is a simple fact of the BiH war that 
the destruction of houses to a large extent – although no estimate has been 
published – was caused by theft and looting. It would not be surprising if this would 
prove to surpass the destruction from shelling. These goods were brought onto the 
market.  Reliable sources tell about cash-strapped army units that let soldiers bring 
(stolen) windows and doors from the front to sell on the ‘reconstruction market’ – 
in lieu of being paid salaries. 
Much of these items were to re-emerge in internationally funded housing 
reconstruction, certainly in the later phases of the Tuzla model they did.  
 
 
                                          
38 Throughout the war NRC brought in, by convoy every Friday, building materials that were otherwise 
unobtainable.  In this way NRC warehouse became a formal building merchant. 
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Fig.6.3.7 House with the kind of windows that were ‘available’ at the time of rehabilitation. 
This is not a Tuzla Model house. 
This shift from contractor-built to house owner-built reflected a shift in perceptions 
by the field staff. It was a true case of what Donald Schön would call “reflection in 
action” (Schön 1983). It was never a matter of policy change, merely a shift of 
tactics based on operational experience. It could never have come from HQ.  There 
was no difference in the quality of work executed during the contractor-built phase 
as compared to the house owner-built period.39 These were all minor works, where 
specialist skills were never really called for except for plumbing and electrical 
wiring. 
 
This new approach also meant the owner was awarded payment for his labors. To 
repeat the lament of those sheltered: ”NRC was giving to those who had everything 
in order to help those who had lost everything”!  This shift to cash grants bred 
rumors also by the fact that the perceptions and explanations of the owners were 
so inconsistent as to what these grants actually were to cover. Some were adamant 
in that the money they received was “1/3 rent, 1/3 building works, 1/3 labor”.  
Others took it to be a compensation of “850 DM per head – and then some”, while 
others had understood the funds to cover “the cost of completing the house + 30 
months rent”.  Almost all my interviewees from the cash grant phases took part of 
the money to be rent, or ‘profit’. NRC never saw it this way: the grant was to cover 
the cost of material and labor only. 
 
A Short Story of Ham to an Orthodox Wife 
One house owner reluctant to entered the scheme, but strongly encouraged 
by his wife and by the NRC staff, finally gave in and agreed to allow 27 IDPs 
to take over their then half-finished house. At the time they lived in a flat in 
town. The very morning he signed the 30.000 DM contract, he received the 
first installment, an envelope with 10,000 DM in cash. As he came back to his 
wife, still in bed, he slowly spread the 10,000 DM notes over her, “… and then 
we ran out to buy ham … My wife is orthodox, you see”. These were the days 
when ham would cost a fortune, which was what they paid. The house was 
completed in time, and in full compliance of the standards set by NRC. 27 
IDPs moved in, stayed 30 months and left the house owners with a clean-up 
bill of 4,500 DM, which he claimed he was able to pay from the NRC grant. 
 
.5) Living in the full-finished House 
The ultimate goal of NRC’s emergency activities was to secure peoples lives. The 
Tuzla model also aimed at restoring some dignity to survival. In that sense, it had a 
long-term perspective. My interviews with house owners and the handful of former 
tenants I was able to trace, revealed that dignity was not the first thing that sprang 
to mind, although there were cases where conditions and expectations successfully 
overlapped. The NRC Tuzla Model was a minimum survival package – except for 
one embedded quality: location. The IDPs were living in the city where they could 
easily blend in with the rest of the population. Although their total number, 
including the IDPs otherwise sheltered in Tuzla, was so large that “the image of the 
                                          
39 These are my own assessments, made on the basis of 20 years of building practice. 
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city changed. The rural influx changed the domicile population also. The latter have 
retreated into themselves”, said the Chief City Planner.  The Model made for no 
territorial segregation.  The IDP children went to the neighborhood school. The IDPs 
shared the city’s amenities as if they were permanent citizens. Several of the 
former tenants saw this very access to services and places outside the house as a 
social and psychological safety valve from the overcrowded premises. 
 
The density of 5 m2 per person was extreme. Although this figure was initially used 
by all NGOs when applying for funds and when submitting reports, they were never 
strictly adhered to in the field.  My next case on a settlements completed a year or 
so later, followed the same standard, but these later settlements were seldom filled 
up, thereby raising the area per IDP.40  The Tuzla Model, however, kept to the 
standard. 
 
The density had social consequences.  There were many reports of disagreements 
with the owners, and of tense and spiteful relationships among tenants, particularly 
when it came to intimate relations and “woman things”. Different families having to 
share the same room did not make living easy, neither did the sharing of one 
bathroom among 10-20 people. The singular focus on numbers (as many, as 
cheaply, as quickly – as possible) and not on rooms and families was deemed the 
major reason for these impoverished social conditions. ‘Dignity’ was not a term 
easily associated with the conditions by my interviewees. 
 
The number of people bore down hard on the buildings, for two reasons. Firstly, 
there was the level of use, the wear, and the chance for breakage due to large 
number of people using the installations. Secondly, there was the psychological 
urge to get even: “Why should the house owner get it all?” Stories abound about 
clogged toilets, broken windows and smashed doors.41  One absent house owner, 
and the worst cases stemmed from houses where the owner was absent, reported 
on the tenants breaking up floorboards to use for firewood. In another house I 
personally observed paneling that apparently had left the wall for the stove. The 
ironmongery on a balcony had been dismantled and reportedly sold on the market 
as secondhand reconstruction material.42 Chimneys cracked due to overheating. 
 
It was not like that everywhere. In some houses there seemed to have been 
respectful relationships prevailing. The level of damage or the exact number of 
satisfied or dissatisfied tenants and owners is not the issue. The fact remains that 
the density prescribed in the Tuzla model was so high that it led to exceptional 
damage. And it seems to have been anticipated by NRC. In their initial contracts 
                                          
40 By early 1996 four of the settlements managed by NPA in the region ran at 84.9%, 77.8%, 88.9%, 
and 82% capacity, according to a report sent to NMFA, July 1996. This raised the effective area per 
person by about 20%. It must be noted, however, that under extreme circumstances, especially after 
the expulsion from Srebrenica, the settlements were packed way beyond capacity. 
41 In one case, an owner family would not reveal how bad it had been because I was Norwegian and 
they felt grateful for Norway’s contributions. The full story was later told to my assistant. Much was in 
fact destroyed. 
42 In the best of cases the ironmongery was reused on another NRC house.  As I have already 
mentioned, NRC houses had the same type of balcony railing. 
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with the contractors, the guarantee period against workmanship faults was set at 6 
months, whereas the still existing Yugoslav building norms prescribed a minimum 2 
years.  This was yet another case where the laws of physics and professional 
predictions are subjugated to the ‘perceptions of urgency’:“But it was war”!. 
 
.6) Managing the full-finished House 
There is a tendency among local authorities to blame the international agencies when things 
turn difficult, much different from how they were greeted in the beginning.  “Initially we 
wanted to be like them – European”, one actually burst out saying. This helps explain why 
the international agencies and their staff were trusted with making the sort of wide-ranging 
and strategic decisions that reside within the realm of local politics. The perceptions have 
changed somewhat over the years.  Now many of the people who initially praised the Tuzla 
Model have become very critical. Among the first are the former and present director of 
Tuzla’s Office of Displaced People & Refugees (ODPR). The Tuzla Model proved to be “an 
enormous administrative burden”, said the present director.  During the desperate days of 
the 1993-1994 winter, much was overlooked. The level of social problems and internal 
disputes was never anticipated, nor that the wear and tear, and outright destruction would 
be so prevalent. Nor too was it anticipated that the IDPs would normally not be allowed to 
stay on.43 Instead, they were evicted, adding yet another burden on the ODPR. They were 
left – yet again – to handle the extensive logistical and social challenge this represented. And 
then it appeared that the departing IDPs as a rule left large water and electricity bills behind. 
Although the water bills were wavered, and the house owner in the end had to pay most of 
the electricity bills, the ODPR spent hundreds of man-hours defending themselves against 
claims presented by the large numbers of affected house owners. The director has been 
brought to court four times by house owners claiming compensation for ‘the IDPs having 
destroyed their house’. 
 
ODRP tried to quantify the administrative burden loaded onto them through the NRC 
program. All told, the director estimated that about 100,000 man-hours have been spent on 
managing the NRC program. That is about 50 man-years.44 This work did not qualify for 
international project support. 
 
.7) Reclaiming the House 
In most cases the post-contract repair work was quite extensive.  One of my interviewees 
claimed to have spent 7,200 DM on repairs, about 25% of the grant, but such figures are 
hard to confirm. However, most house owners who initially were on the cash grant phases 
claimed to have received sufficient funds to also cover most of the restoration works. The 
Phase I house owners did not. They had to cover the repairs out of their own pockets.  The 
little support they received from the financially strapped ODPR was not sufficient by far. It is 
no wonder that most house owners would not extend their contracts. They did not have to, 
because by the time the contracts expired, refugees who had fled abroad started to return in 
earnest.  They had money, as did the many foreign agency personnel coming to Tuzla. 
                                          
43 In this arrangement the ODPR would pay regular rent to the house owner; 100 DM for a family of up 
to 4 members, 120 DM for 5 members, 150 DM for more than 5 members.  In total, only 170 families 
were allowed to remain on these terms. 
44 Letter to me from ODPR Director, Tuzla, Professor Esma Ibrisimovic, December 13, 2001. 
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Fig.6.3.8 This house in the 
suburbs of Tuzla sheltered 
75 IDPs from December 
1993 onwards. Since the 
owners did not live there (it 
was an investment for their 
two sons), displaced people 
had already broken into the 
half-finished house and also 
sold off their stored building 
materials. Joining the NRC 
program was therefore 
perceived to be a win-win 
option.  By the closing of 
the contract period, and by 
agreement with ORDP they 
let the IDPs stay for another 
year for free. When they 
left, the house was 
extremely worn-down. “All 
we got from the municipality 
was three door handles and three cans of paint.  We needed ten times as much”. After some 
repainting they let the house to Bausanierung und Kampfmittelbeseitigung SMSA, a German 
de-mining company which kept their local (IDP) staff in the house. The destruction was even 
worse. They have spent all together 45.000 KM in repairs and upgrading now that the sons 
have moved in. 
 
The NRC Model allowed the house owners to enter the housing market at a period 
of peak demand. Focusing solely on the short-term objective of temporary 
protection45 brought some unexpected outcomes because of ignoring the long-term 
nature of the intervention. These may even have been “perverse”46 in the 
terminology of evaluation theory, i.e. houses completed to shelter displaced people 
were (instead) taken over by foreign aid workers sent to care for the displaced and 
returning refugees. These groups could pay a much higher rent than the 
municipality was able to offer on behalf of the IDPs, for whom the program was 
initiated.47 The IDPs were again left houseless. 
 
Today (2003) there is a glut in the rent market.  The foreigners who paid 2-3 times 
the rent of local tenants are moving on and substantial numbers of IDPs are 
returning to their pre-war place of residence.  Still, most of the flats completed 
                                          
45 The conception of the Tuzla Model as a “temporary” intervention is maintained within NRC.  In their 
recent in-house evaluation report a “durability scale” has been introduced to categorize their housing 
programs in BiH.  In spite of more than 20 million DM invested in permanently completing about 650 
houses, the Tuzla Model houses are still labeled “temporary” (as compared to reconstructed houses for 
returnees, which are labeled “permanent”).  The report reveals a crucial conceptual shortcoming in not 
acknowledging more than the “shelter as protection” attribute of permanent housing. 
46 “Perverse effects run exactly counter to the very intentions of the program instigators” (Vedung 
2000:50). 
47 By 2001 the maximum rent support given to an IDP family in Tuzla was 150 KM. A foreigner was 
expected to pay 4-500 KM for a one-bedroom flat in Tuzla. Five years earlier the price would have been 
1,000 KM. 
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within Tuzla proper are let.  For a number of house owners interviewed, rent was 
their only ‘formal’ income. For the houses located outside Tuzla, like the ones in 
Kiseljak-Breze, there is no housing demand. Those not re-occupied by the owners 
are left empty. True to the program’s immediate protection focus the urban 
development potential in these investments and hence their location, were never 
considered an issue, neither by NRC, nor by the planning authorities of Tuzla. The 
empty, neglected NRC houses outside the Tuzla proper are rapidly decaying. 
“Because it was war”, makeshift detailing and bad workmanship was more readily 
accepted.48  Now the results appear.  Without maintenance timber rots because of 
leakages, walls crack due to frost and subsidence. 
 
.8) Supporting the Contractor 
The direct contractor support, which was one of NRC’s objectives, never really took 
off beyond Phase I. But this period, the winter of 1993-1994, was also the hardest. 
“These were the time of famine”, as one of the three contractors said. Nothing was 
available.  Getting hold of materials “was a game without rules”, he continued. It 
must be emphasized that NRC was one of the very few sources of virgin cash in 
Tuzla.49 The contractors did act as ‘distribution nodes’ for the funds NRC spent: to 
their laborers, to their suppliers, and to their own families. “I never had such a big 
family as I did during that winter”, another one said. None of their earnings were 
thus reinvested into their company, not only because of family requirements, but 
simply because there was nothing to invest into. Besides, credit was not available.50 
In that sense there were no possibilities for the Tuzla Model to contribute towards 
the establishment of a private construction sector – aside from keeping them afloat, 
allowing them to maintain their skills. There was no long-term capital formation or 
capacity building taking place. One of the three went bankrupt after the war. The 
two others keep the business running with a handful of people in full employment.51 
The business situation is more difficult now (2003) because there are so many 
‘non-professional’ firms52 competing for the decreasing volume of international 
funds, according to one of the ‘selected 3’, Enver Mehmedovic.  He maintained that 
these difficulties were “extended by the lack of professionalism among the NGOs.  
They don’t know the difference between an amateur and a professional, because 
                                          
48 This explanation, “because there was a war going on”, was the main reason given by technicians and 
program managers alike when queried on issues of bad detailing and fallible technical solutions. 
49 Two issues are important in this respect. There was no universally accepted currency in Bosnia at the 
outset of the war.  The Dinar was destroyed even before the war because of the collapse of the 
Yugoslavian economy.  The absence of a financial system in BiH made all internationally funded activities 
reliant on hand-carried cash.  For various reasons, the German Mark (DM) was chosen as the main 
currency of the reconstruction.  Literarily hundreds of millions of DM had been carried in cash by agency 
personnel across the border to pay for the reconstruction works during the years up until 1997. This 
‘international cash culture’ was by its very nature non-transparent and made financial dealings easy to 
hide or camouflage. Corruption was not prevalent only because of ‘dishonest people’, but also because of 
a financial system that invited corrupt practices. 
50 When the banking system came back on track in 1998–99, the interest rates were so high and the 
payback period so short that loans were still beyond the reach for most of the smaller contractors. Their 
investments came from savings. 
51 One had about 50 people working with a core staff of 10, during the 1993-94 NRC period.  This is also 
his present staff level.  The other also runs at the same level as during the 1993–1994 winter: 6 people 
permanently employed. 
52 One is run by a medical doctor.  Being a buildings contractor may be more profitable than working as 
a physician.  Physicians employed in the public health services are paid 5–600 KM/month (2002). 
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they are all amateurs”. “Your unprofessionalism is worse than our corruption”, 
maintained the Head of Office for Reconstruction and International Relations in the 
Municipality of Tuzla. The perceptions of the international agencies have changed 
considerably over the years. 
 
6.3.7 CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS LOCAL CAPITAL FORMATION  
This NRC project was conceived as a ‘protection project’, implemented through 
completion of half-finished houses. These tangible, material objects constitute the 
fixed capital contribution. Along with other man-made environmental objects, these 
also constitute part of the environmental assets, particularly in urban areas.  
Environmental assets as such, of course, refer to the area’s total natural 
environment. Human capital has been affected both through the implementation 
processes, and will be if the new flats contribute towards societal stability and thus 
enable local capacity to be extended.  Social capital, what Grootaert (and the World 
Bank) label the ‘glue of society’ (Grootaert 1998) refers to societal coherence and 
trust. These will be affected by the way the implementation processes were 
conducted and the way the houses and the completed flats will allow for reliable 
social relations to develop. 
 
.1) Environmental and Fixed Capital 
The physical and environmental contributions were the most significant. They were 
the feeding capitals from which the spillovers originated. The Tuzla Model houses 
were in effect an extension of fixed and environmental capital already in place. This 
refers both to the houses, the infrastructure and the urban fabric.  Each house as 
physical object was brought to a level of completion beyond what is normal for 
post-war houses in BiH today, signifying independence, relative prosperity and 
“community settledness”.  As such, it represents an environmental contribution to 
the whole community.  These effects are strengthened by the clustering of NRC 
houses in certain areas. Pertaining to the decaying houses in Kilseljak-Brese, the 
opposite happens. Eroding the fixed and environmental capital base has negative 
spillovers. At least, those interviewed felt let down by the people who ‘got the 
money and ran’ and let the buildings just crumble. 
 
The implementation processes did not produce noteworthy spillover effects into the 
social capital bases.  Most of those found were actually negative. This casts doubts 
on emergency housing as such being able to contribute towards social capital 
formation at all.  It seems evident that the Tuzla Model was the most successful 
emergency intervention at the time. Yet, the fact that they were permanent ‘give-
away houses’ to people who already had houses, caused resentment among many 
IDPs and, through lack of transparency, mistrust among the general population, at 
least initially. The fact that the Model was a much-preferred emergency approach 
by local leaders does not negate these findings. 
 
This leaves the developmental spillover effects for the post-emergency period, 
indicating that if permanent housing is to play a role in societal recovery, the focus 
must shift from the emergency settings to its post-conflict use. This does not make 
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a difference in coping with emergency housing needs. Moving into ‘peace time’ 
housing is what most of the displaced people do during emergency anyway.  
 
In that respect the completed flats of the Tuzla Model are suitable contributions to 
the housing stock of Tuzla, and do already play a part in the strengthening the 
other capital bases. Some owners have arranged for relatives to move into the 
completed and refurbished flats for mutual social and economic benefits, others 
have entered the local housing market for economic, and hence material and social 
benefits.  Engaging the housing market is primarily a function of locality, which 
means that some of the housing gifts are in effect much more valuable than others 
in enhancing the capital base required for recovery. 
 
.2) Human Capital 
The Model relied on the human capital of contractors and house owners. However, in neither 
case did the construction works contribute to extend these capacities. The contractors were 
held economically afloat, and thus able to maintain their skills, but the conditions did not 
allow for investments and growth. Instead, the growing construction market in post-war 
Tuzla was met with an increased number of small, less experienced contractors rather than 
those who were kept afloat during the war growing bigger.  In the meantime, the large 
construction companies of pre-war Bosnia have been privatized and remain the large ones 
even today. 
 
By working for NRC the local and expatriate staff have gained valuable experience and 
important new skills. However, these gains in human capital may not automatically be 
utilized. It will depend on how they interact with the other capital modes. Expatriate staff 
have left NRC53 with mixed feelings and often under the impression that their gained 
experience was never really appreciated.54  Bosnian staff have been met with local prejudice 
when approaching the local labor market simply for having worked with international NGOs.  
Therefore most staff try to stay within the NGO circuit.55 
 
Again, we see the difficulties in reestablishing the linkages required in recovery. And again 
we see how the flows, the drawing of benefits from one capital mode depends on how it 
interacts with the other societal assets. In this case we see how updated skills are useless if 
there is no social trust allowing these skills to be utilized. 
 
There are two basic sectors, however, where NRC’s housing scheme, did make a 
unconditional contribution towards increasing the human capital stock of the region. Firstly, 
by emptying the school buildings, and thereby allowing children back into school, a 
significant contribution was made towards raising the long-term human capital of the area. 
Secondly, granting that the NRC housing was better than what was otherwise available, life 
for many was made healthier, which in turn increased people’s ability to act, and thereby 
increasing their capacity to contribute towards the future BiH. 
                                          
53 There are other organizations that have a much longer trail of disappointed former staff than NRC. 
54 This seems to be an almost ‘generic’ reaction and relates to the uniqueness of the experience 
confronting the organizational ‘business as usual’. 
55 There were almost 400 applicants for a vacancy as Return Monitor for World Vision recently (2003). 
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Fig.6.3.9 Children being taught in a bathroom during the early stages of the war when the 
classrooms of schools were used for sheltering the incoming IDPs. Photo by Linda Graham. 
 
.3) Social Capital 
The war has depleted Tuzla’s social capital. Replenishing is difficult. The way the 
Tuzla Model has made, or will make, a difference to the stock of social capital 
hinges upon two conditions, the implementation processes, and how the completed 
flats will allow social capital to develop. There is a methodological challenge in 
gauging ‘levels of’ or ‘change in’ social capital. Surveys and opinion polls are often 
used (see for instance, World Values Survey56).  I found it impossible – and 
superfluous – to conduct a survey since I had limited access particularly to the 
former IDP residents.  Besides, why should anyone trust me, yet another foreigner 
breezing by, to lay bare his or her opinions on societal trust and social cohesion? 
Through my interviews, archival data and documents I have received information 
and explanations which enable me to determine how the housing project has 
affected people’s opinion about the other actors involved. This allows me to 
conclude that NRC’s Tuzla Model has had complex and divergent impacts on social 
capital formation. I will highlight three areas where the project bears impacts on 
increasing or decreasing social cohesion and trust. 
 
a) Exasperating the differences in society – between those who received help and 
those who did not.  It is quite evident that the IDPs found it disenchanting to see 
money given to those who already had houses, and not to those who had lost 
                                          
56 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
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theirs, in spite of their being given a ‘respite’ through the project.57 The lack of 
respect and trust between house owner and tenant was presented as part of the 
reason for the physical breakdown of the premises. The rumor so prevalent during 
the Tuzla Model period would indicate that those not eligible for the program envied 
those who were given money. In that way the program may actually have seriously 
contributed toward lowering society’s capacity to collectively mobilize for 
recovery.58 However, this program was but one of many international support 
initiatives where the beneficiaries were individually chosen in ways that many felt 
were random choices made by foreigners. This individualization of reconstruction 
assistance might in fact have contributed to the erosion of trust and thereby 
deflated the social capital on which recovery rests. This conclusion is all the more 
plausible when considering Tuzla’s legacy of solidarity as presented earlier.  My 
third case, the reconstruction of the village of Grapska will present another 
approach – executed several years later – which shows the opposite: discernable 
social capital gains through collective incentives. 
 
b) Social strain through overcrowding. There is an apparent link between the 
attitude of the house owners and the tangible effects on the physical environment 
caused by the sheer number of displaced people in the houses. This has led most of 
my interviewed house owners – with some marked exceptions – to be more 
distrustful of the IDP population: “They behaved like animals!”.  The exceptional 
wear and breakage due to overcrowding has been interpreted by the house owners 
as intentional action on the part of the tenants. Although that seems to bear some 
credence, the fact remains that overcrowding in itself has destructive consequences 
on the physical environment.59 
 
However, there were lasting personal relationships established between some host 
families and IDP families in ways comparable to the experience from the 
evacuations in the UK during WW II. The UK experience is referred to because it 
confirms the importance of social capital formation on post-war reconstruction. 
According to Brown (2000), the relationships that emerged and the mutual 
understanding and insight into the lives of the inner city population and life in the 
country side ultimately “led to […] today’s welfare state” (ibid:v). 
 
c) Change in lifestyle and values. Life in the city as experienced by the IDPs has 
had effects on their lifestyle, particularly among the young.  The NRC Model houses 
being located throughout the city, enabled the IDPs to learn about, and to a certain 
extent be part of urban life (in spite of the Chief City Planner’s comment quoted 
above). During their stay many had become ‘urbanized youth’ indistinguishable 
from those born in Tuzla. In this way, it is possible to link the program through its 
                                          
57 There are numerous incidents, a pattern almost, of people refusing to leave their Collective Centers. 
Security of food rations was one, the physical connectedness was another. When the latter was ripped, 
‘secondary trauma of displacement’ ensued according to Sutovic (2001). 
58 Several interviewees made comparisons between the enthusiasm of the collective WW II 
reconstruction and the individualized and fragmented processes taking place today (see also Loyd 1999). 
59 Phase II had an average of 15.82 IDPs per floor.  There was normally one toilet per floor.  Similar 
physical consequences will also be presented in the following case from Mihatovici. 
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location as having contributed towards erasing some of the traditional Bosnian 
prejudice between the rural and urban population. This represents a contribution to 
the overall social capital of the region, although it in effect meant that many IDPs, 
particularly the young, chose to stay on in the city, rather than return to their place 
of origin.60 
 
6.3.8 REESTABLISHING THE LINKS 
The linkages that made up Tuzla’s societal web have been transformed forever.  
The war, and the inevitable ‘conquest’ of the internationalised liberal, free-trading 
world, whose key local agents were the thousands of international military and 
humanitarian personnel and their organization, together made an irreversible 
impact on Tuzla’s ‘legacy of solidarity’. History has been forever altered.   
 
NRC’s shelter program in Tuzla was part of this change, however much it protected 
IDPs in times of crises, and however efficiently it was in offering shelter.  However, 
furnishing free investment funds to a selected group of families exposed 
contradictions between the objective, providing short-term shelter to victims of 
war, and means, providing long-term assets to private homeowners. The program 
thus effectively widened the gap between “the haves” and “have nots”.  During the 
war and the years that followed, this program therefore made no significant 
contribution towards the sort of ‘unity’, trust or mutual respect that would seem 
beneficial for the ‘recovery of Tuzla’. This was further exasperated by the 
exceedingly heavy, yet unsupported, administrative burden the local public 
institutions had to carry. This again bred support for the general resentment 
towards the ‘refugees’. All this seems to be in line – intentional or not - with 
guiding principles of the ‘new political agenda’, that of weakening state institutions, 
and supporting private institutions61 (Tvedt 1998; 4).  
 
This transformation of the economy makes up Bosnia’s ‘frame of recovery’.  Within 
this frame of redevelopment the investment funds that the NRC provided to 
selected private house owners already play a supportive role – where there is a 
rental market. This remains – as always – a matter of strategic location62 combined 
with timeliness. The fact was that most of the houses that were completed by NRC 
within Tuzla proper had been vacated by IDPs already by 1996–1997. These houses 
could then enter the rental market at a time of peak demand, and at international 
price levels. Many house owners made a living out of that, and many still do. In 
that way, the NRC program contributed towards re-establishing new societal 
linkages, but now of a new order. In this emerging societal web the violently 
displaced, for whom the housing scheme was initiated are in effect superfluous.  
 
                                          
60 What we witness are processes at the heart of Giddens ‘reflective modernity’: “Lifestyles are 
routinised practices, the routines are incorporated into habits of dress, eating, modes of action and 
favoured milieus for encountering others; but the routines followed are reflexively open to change in the 
light of the mobile nature of self-identity” (Giddens 1991; 2). 
61 In this context, the institutions of private (house) ownership. 
62 The houses built in Kiseljak Breze therefore remain empty. Not only were they left empty for political 
reasons during the war, they remain empty even today as they were built where there was no 
(prospects of a) housing demand – a double loss.  
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6.4  CASE II, MIHATOVICI,  
A SETTLEMENT FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA 
Implemented by the Norwegian People’s Aid  1994 - 1996 
 
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) is an organization founded by the Norwegian Labor 
movement in 1939. The organization is today one of Norway’s “Big 5”1, working 
within numerous professional fields both as a ‘development organization’ and as an 
‘emergency organization’  aside from their domestic services.2  Its ideological 
profile is drawn from the principles of the international labor movement: “solidarity, 
unity, human dignity, peace and freedom”.  This has made NPA an organization 
that often signals a stand in conflicts where they work, and in choosing areas where 
to work. Its independence signify a genuine Dunantian strain, but being totally 
dependent on the governments3 in funding its projects duly places NPA in the 
Wilsonian family of NGOs. Mine action activities has become NPA’s main sector of 
expertise. In Bosnia the organization additionally focused on shelter programs, 
organizational and psycho-social support within settlements built, and 
psychotherapeutic support to traumatized women and children. 
 
6.4.1 SETTLING THE DISPLACED 
In the division of labor among the Norwegian NGOs in Bosnia, NMFA gave NPA the 
mandate of providing “medium and long-term shelter”. “Medium-term” housing was 
initially understood to be temporary housing for the displaced, i.e. Norwegian 
prefabricated housing (pre-fabs) in line with the NOREPS deal presented earlier. 
The reason NPA was given this particular task was not on the basis of their 
experience in development assistance, which sometimes also comprised housing.  
It was because of their management experience in running asylum and refugee 
reception centers in Norway. In general there was little interaction between the 
development and the emergency sections of the organization. 
 
The initiative taken by NMFA and the inclusion of Norwegian prefabricated houses 
inherently contained the ‘settlement concept’.  This was also in line with the 
ideological basis of NPA as the houses were to be built on behalf of the 
municipalities, whereby they marked an ideological distance to NRC and their Tuzla 
model.  “NRC supported the house owner, not the IDPs”, said Marianne Øen, head 
of NPA’s Bosnia program.4 The settlement model was furthermore a well-tried 
Norwegian housing model. It was not in Bosnia as we shall see when examining the 
Mihatovici case. 
                                          
1 The others are: Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Church Aid & Save the 
Children 
2 Their international activities cover long-term development assistance within agriculture, environment, 
production, health care, psycho-social assistance, self-organizing, human rights, media, etc. in 
emergency aid NPA cover shelter, rehabilitation, medical aid, mobile clinics, etc.  They deal with conflict 
prevention and resolution, but their foremost international expertise is on mine-clearance and mine-
awareness programs. 
3 NPA takes on mine clearance projects on behalf of many donor governments, the US among them. 
4 In due course, and out of local pressure, NPA gave in and did the 40 ‘Tuzla model’ completions in 
municipalities around Tuzla, funded by UNHCR. However, their contracts lasted 36 months and they 
finished a number of the flats in half-finished municipal (office) buildings. 
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In 1992 NPA set out to build four IDP settlements around Zenica, three of which 
consisted of Norwegian prefabs.5 Architect-planners and building management 
consultants were initially brought in from Norway. By the time NPA was summoned 
to Tuzla by UNHCR in 1993, NPA was probably the most experienced NGO working 
in the housing field in Bosnia. This capacity was due as much to their short-term 
field personnel as to their HQ staff. 
 
 
Fig.6.4.1 Norwegian prefabs erected by the industrial sites of Zenica.  One of NPA’s first 
building projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
In Tuzla, NPA continued their ‘settlement approach’ to secure “decent housing for 
the displaced”, as stated in their own documents.  This also meant improving the 
collective centers and, after the war, doing regular housing repairs and large-scale 
housing re/construction.  The settlement phase, which is the area of my interest, 
roughly lasted from 1993 to 1996 and made up a minor part of the NPA’s housing 
work in BiH. 
 
6.4.2 THE POLITICS OF LOCATION 
During the 1993–1994 blockade of Tuzla the international housing projects were 
the only investment projects in the region, aside from those triggered by the 
presence of UNPROFOR. The settlement projects were the biggest of all. For that 
reason they were welcomed by the authorities.  However, the fact that they were to 
provide large, serviced plots for permanent housing schemes made the same 
authorities skeptical. Permanent settlements did not signify temporary residence, 
and the authorities did not welcome the idea of ‘refugees’ coming to stay for good. 
“Municipalities seldom welcomed refugees”, said Bjørn Mossberg rather indiscreetly 
(Mossberg et al. 1997:64). In addition, the settlements would be filled up with 
destitute people that would easily turn them into ghettos or “potential slums”, 
according to local politicians.  This was the part of the reason why Lukavac 
                                          
5 These were from three different producers: Ringsakerhus, Konsmohus and Anebyhus. Prices were 
negotiated, not tendered. 
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municipality, one of Tuzla’s neighbors, never allowed settlements to be built within 
their area. Zivenice municipality had two Sida/HIFAB6 settlements built in 
1993/1994, at reasonably good locations, but only after some heavy persuasions.  
“Cooperation was […] less good”, Mossberg et al. said (ibid:60). When NPA later 
approached the municipality proposing an extension of the Sida/Hifab settlement, 
they were told in no uncertain terms: “New settlements would shift the ethnic 
composition”. Tuzla municipality was also very reluctant to allow permanent 
settlements. The official reason was that the “cost would have been too high” 
(ibid:60). Similar difficulties had previously been experienced by NPA in Zenica and 
by others elsewhere. Sometimes ‘IDP settlements’ were indeed physically and 
infrastructurally integrated.  In Gorazde this was achieved – not without spite – by 
building on municipal land within the abandoned Serb part of the town. But most of 
the time the settlements were built on remote sites, requiring additional 
infrastructure investments. In several cases these sites had no access to the public 
transport network. NPA settlements in Zenica “depended on NPA transport” (NPA 
1994), as they did in the Tuzla region. 
 
 
Fig 6.4.2. The IDP settlement of Doborovici. These houses located on the hillside next to the 
village proper was designed in Norway, but built from materials produces in the region. By 
1994/95 when these houses were built, NPA no longer imported prefabricated houses. 
 
The first NPA settlement in the region was in Doborovci, in a neighboring 
municipality, where NPA initially was allotted a remote site outside the village. It 
was not least by demonstrative action on the part of the Norwegian consultant 
architect that NPA was given a plot adjacent to the village proper.  
 
Regarding their last settlement, at Prutace near Brcko, the Final Report submitted 
to HQ states: “There is a rather long way to the nearest center, Gornji Rahic, and 
                                          
6 A Swedish building consultant firm handling the building works on behalf of Sida. 
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so long as there are no bus routes it is difficult for the inhabitants to use the 
services of the community”. Six years later there was still no bus routes. In 
Banovici the municipality was very, very reluctant. In the end, NPA actually had to 
purchase land from the municipality for the settlements – 5.5 km into the forest.7  
During this first emergency period, lasting into spring 1996, NPA built all together 6 
different settlements for about 6000 people, besides doing housing reconstruction 
and other construction work.  They also managed the settlements as part of their 
program and managed the settlements built by Sida/Hifab.8 Except for UNHCR 
funding for the Doborovci and part of the Jecevaz settlement, all were constructed 
from NMFA funds. 
 
None of the permanent settlement projects, irrespective of agency or donor, made 
any serious planning provisions for their post-war use, in spite of the fact that these 
were large, expensive, long-term investments – and that peace was, if not 
imminent, at least anticipated.9 The archival material, i.e. policy papers, project 
proposals, final reports and general correspondence, show an almost total absence 
of reference to future use.  In their funding application of 17 February 1996 for the 
extension of the Mihatovici settlement, NPA states that in due course the 
settlement “can easily be converted to family housing”. There are sometimes 
passing remarks on “housing for the elderly”, a possibility also envisioned for the 
Sida/Hifab settlement in Zivenice (ibid:75). Another possibility discussed, but not 
found in the planning proposals I have had access to, was using the settlement flats 
as ‘transit housing’ for returning refugees. A possibility of converting the isolated 
settlements in the Banovici forest into a hotel and tourist resort was also 
mentioned, albeit superficially.  These settlements were built to overcome acute 
housing needs, and basically nothing else. Their potential benefits in the years to 
follow, was not a prioritized planning proviso. This is most evident in their highly 
inappropriate location, which in effect resulted in their being highly inappropriate 
investments. When considering these remote settlements as long-term social or 
financial investment, they appear today as highly misallocated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                          
7 This settlement, Grad Potok, is a severely depressing place in terms of physical conditions and social 
possibilities. However, recently LWF (The Lutheran World Federation) has initiated a strawberry 
production program which is now able to produce two harvests a year. This had never been achieved in 
this part of Bosnia before. 
8 In Zivenice, these settlements, because of NPA having managed them, are now formally named ‘NPA 
settlements’, with no reference to Sida or Hifab who actually funded and built them. 
9 The NRC model, as we have seen, was based on the presumption that war would soon be over. There 
is no indication that other agencies involved in settlement construction assessed the situation differently. 
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Fig.6.4.3 The settlement in the forest in Banovici. What was once thought of as a possible 
future post-war hotel is today a dilapidated structure, made almost uninhabitable by extreme 
neglect on the part of the tenants, lack of maintenance and unsound construction. 
 
There were some that were able to focus differently, a few people and organizations 
able to look beyond the immediate needs so endemic in situations of high 
uncertainty.  Funds were made available to restart one of the shoe factories in 
Tuzla. It was better to produce locally what otherwise had to be brought in by 
convoys. Tons of dry milk powder was brought in before someone finally looked 
beyond the immediate and discovered what the local people knew all along: the 
largest dry milk factory in the country was located in Tuzla, but was closed because 
of lack of spares and some of the key production ingredients. The same eventually 
happened with local food production and food processing. Not only did this ease 
logistics and the fulfilling of current needs, it carried sustainable post-war 
perspectives.10 What was needed, and was provided, was seed funding, donor-led 
demand (e.g. 50,000 pair of shoes for distribution to displaced children), 
willingness to work with the existing structures of power11 – and the strategic 
capacity of outsiders to look beyond the immediate needs (World Disasters Report 
1996; 49). These cases are highlighted to show that it is possible not to be totally 
overpowered or blinded by the short-term needs.  These issues were thoroughly 
discussed among the field personnel.12 
                                          
10 All of these projects were initiated by Norwegian Church Aid. The agriculture and food processing 
projects were later taken over and expanded by the Lutheran World Federation. 
11 These were most often seen as part of the problem rather than of the solution.  By joining forces with 
the authorities, some agencies held the opinion that they were aiding one faction of the conflict, the 
same way as supporting local production could be seen as contributing to “extending the war”. So, many 
‘kept on trucking’. 
12 This merits a footnote.  A surprisingly high number of former NGO field staff has complaints about how 
HQ has acted upon their field-based professional or strategic proposals.  Many I have interviewed claim 
their contracts were not renewed due to these disagreements.  The NGO environment abounds with such 
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6.4.3 BUILDING MIHATOVICI 
.1) Introduction 
Mihatovici, as a case, represents a totally different housing strategy to that of NRC 
Model. In due course this will become apparent. As such it will also be presented 
somewhat differently as there are issues present in this case not present in the 
former and vice versa. The major difference, of course, is that the people for whom 
the Mihatovici settlement was built are still here.  This gives another dimension to 
the investigation. 
 
Because of this the constituent processes of Figure 1.2.1 bring about different 
outcomes in this case as compared to NRC case. This is basically because the NRC 
case related differently to the contextual flow than did this one.  Although it was 
planned and built using indigenous materials and manpower, it still transferred a 
concept that was not interacting to any significant degree with the contextual flow. 
This is reflected by the division of meaning and symbolic content between the 
donor/provider side and the user/recipient side. This will be uncovered as we go 
along. 
 
 
Fig 6.4.4 Mihatovici settlement as seen from the North, from where up until the war there 
was the biggest commercial orchard in the region with 12.000 fruit trees. This picture was 
taken just after Phase I was completed, summer 1995. Beyond the hill in the very 
background lies Tuzla, and the single houses on the hill to the left are the upper houses of 
the old village of Mihatovici 
 
The Mihatovici settlement, as a project,  is of a different category compared to the 
other two cases examined. Whereas the latter were implemented as support to 
private house owners, Mihatovici is a public housing project in the traditional 
‘provision mode’.  It is a project made “to” and “on behalf of” the displaced. For 
logistical, but also for political reasons, strategic and tactical decisions are taken 
outside the realm and influence of the primary beneficiaries; except for the choice 
of site, even outside the direct influence of the local public authorities, the 
secondary beneficiaries as it were. The ‘settlement concept’, as I have pointed to, 
was the inherent result of the ‘partnership-in-emergency’ approach developed in 
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a true consequence in the Wilsonian 
                                                                                                                         
stories.  In the field this fosters conformity. More dangerous still, it causes the field staff to refrain from 
taking on the opportunities available, because opportunities are inextricably linked to risks. 
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community’. The settlement was given a site of no status, as were most other NPA 
settlements in the region. 
 
The two formal planning arguments behind the siting were: 
1) The master plan, albeit outdated, had not made provisions for such a large, yet 
low density, housing project. Locating it next to Mihatovici village in some fashion 
made it into an extension of the village, and, by stretching it a little, ‘not in 
contravention’ of a minor plan made for that area some years earlier. Besides, 
Mihatovici could fulfill the requirement set in the brief for access to plots for 
growing food. 
2) NPA’s plans for a settlement this big left few or no alternatives. Smaller schemes 
could much more easily have been located within the city proper. Later, such 
internationally funded 5-7 house schemes were indeed implemented within Tuzla 
proper. But when the decision on Mihatovici was made the housing stress was 
desperate.  In terms of efficiency and time one big settlement would be cheaper, 
faster and logistically easier to execute that many small ones. “It was take it or 
leave it”, as Tuzla’s Chief Urban Planner told me. 
 
 
Fig.6.4.6 The only official planning map showing the new settlement of Mihatovici to the left, 
albeit only the first half of it. The thick demarcation to the east (right)  of the settlement 
shows the old village of Mihatovici through which the access road to the settlement is show 
as a dark winding line. Where it joins the main road (shown as the ‘Arizona road’ on the 
previous map) lies the water source shown in Fig.6.4.12. 
 
At times like these political power is concentrated at the top. The Mayor and his 
close support staff15 in effect ran the municipality - that is, as long as the military 
leadership concurred.  Hence, “locating the settlement was not a planning issue. It 
                                          
15 The Chief Urban Planner, Zehere Morankic, was appointed to her post by the Mayor in 1994 after 
having headed the Office of Displaced People and Refugees from its initiation the year before. 
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was a political issue”, a senior UNHCR official stated, referring to discussions with 
the Mayor on the matter. 
 
.3) Designing Mihatovici 
In March 1994 NPA appointed Sefic Vejzagic project manager for Mihatovici. He was 
the former Technical Director of Technograd.16 Providing shelter was for most 
agencies, and in particular for NPA’s settlement projects, a matter of time, quantity 
and cost.  Shelter interventions became ‘buildings projects’.  In this perspective the 
extraordinary capacity of Sefic Vejzagic could be fully utilized. He prepared a brief 
in line with UNHCR standard and prescribed design solutions and materials to 
ensure that the project would “shelter as many as possible as quickly as possible 
and as cheaply as possible”, as he told it. He immediately had five architects 
compete on the design17, one of which withdrew upon receiving the design brief, 
because he could not accept the ‘humiliating living standards embedded in the 
project’.  The winning entry was designed by the Municipal Urban Planning Office, 
for which they were paid DM 1500. The design merits some comments. 
 
Although the housing model of low-density row houses was new in the region, the 
proposed floor plans of the flats were not.  They were, albeit smaller in area, of the 
typical quadrant type found in typically Bosnian ‘contemporary vernacular’.   In that 
sense the floor plans were a most appropriate response seen in a long-term 
perspective, - bar on one crucial account: the total lack of support space. Given the 
high density of people, where were they to store the “stuff” they brought or 
acquired? This one feature was to shape the visual and spatial environment of 
Mihatovici, and will be discussed later. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next page: 
Fig.6.4.7 The site plan of Mihatovici designed by the Municipal Urban Planning Office (with 
more than a tip of the hat to the architects of the Sida funded NPA/Hifab settlements built in 
neighboring Zivenice municipality the year before) 
 
                                          
16 Before the war Tecnograd was the largest of Bosnia’s international construction companies, with 
12,000 employees. 
17 Prior to this Alan Cameron, the NPA’s Head of Office, had asked an architect working for the UN to do 
the design. With the Vejzagic initiative that deal was annulled and the architect paid off. Cameron had 
no previous experience in building. He was a de-mining expert. 
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Fig.6.4.8 Floor plans, ground floor. These were two storey building and the drawing shows a 
construction unit of four flats joined by a semi-private stairway. In reality all of the spaces 
shown became semi-public. The closeness, the density of people – and the mode of 
construction - made privacy an impossible quality. 
 
Fig.6.4.9 Section through two flats. The floor between the two flats was built from (raw, and 
eventually warped) timber, which made vertical sound insulation impossible. The reduced 
roof height on the 1. floor made it necessary to construct cross gables inn order to reach full 
ceiling heights in places. This was designed or constructed in ways that caused  endemic 
leakages. 
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Some months before Mihatovici was designed, a local architect had made the 
design for the Sida/Hifab settlement in Zivenice. His one-and-a-half story18, 4-flat 
walk-up became the cue for the design of Mihatovici.19 Although the design was 
slightly modified, there still remained unresolved construction detailing that would 
later cause problems.  This is partly because there were design ambitions 
overruling practical insight.  “The architects wanted to prove themselves as 
altogether European designers’, as a Norwegian colleague mused, and partly 
because the ‘quality guard’ was lowered on the part of the client.  These were times 
of emergency – although conspicuously absent in the over-all design.  
 
I cite from my diary of December 9, 2001: 
Re Mihatovici:  The site plan:  It was built on an illusion of normalcy (long 
term housing) in a highly abnormal situation (homeless IDPs in huge 
numbers).  Its site plan looks like any suburban housing plan from almost 
anywhere in the world. Even had organized ‘kiosk areas’ and trees lining the 
street. 
 
This the architect knew very well would not materialize.  S/he was not looking 
into the challenge as a ‘real world’ case.  As a wishful illustration only.  Not 
taking on the design challenge of creating space (5m2 pr person) for bereaved 
people within the material and temporal conditions prevailing.  Hence an 
extreme illusion of a suburban settlement was created.  Everybody knew it 
was wrong, - but not knowing any alternative approach, the process detached 
itself from the situation at hand and became an estranged, yet ‘normal’ 
process of design and build.[20] 
 
The point is that the detached and illusive assumptions on which the designer 
made his/her site plan and housing design, reproduced – through the plan 
drawings - these illusionary concepts of housing for IDPs into the donor 
community and among NGO staff unaccustomed to dealing with physical 
planning and housing.  Re Alan Cameron’s contact with an architect he had 
happened to come across in UNHCR whom he simply asked to do the 
Mihatovici plan.  And it was not out of reaction to this architect’s approach it 
never came to be, it was because it did not conform to Sefic’s design and 
building management aspirations which almost in total rested on efficiency, - 
in planning, implementation and site management. 
 
Seven years after its construction Mihatovici was as far from being a Tuzla suburb 
as it was on the architect’s drawings.  In fact it had become one of Tuzla’s official 
Collective Centers, the very institution it set out to replace. 
 
                                          
18 Already in 1946 the Norwegian Housing Directorate found that the one-and-a-half story house was the 
most resource efficient housing type.  It was therefore used as a model for the reconstruction of housing 
in Northern Norway after WW II (Dancke 1986). 
19 Which was later to be copied in the NPA’s last settlement in Prutace near Brcko. 
20 This sounds like Hannah Arendt’s comments on the Pentagon Papers, see Chapter 3.1, but was written 
months before I came across her writing. It shows the crucial importance of structuring theories for our 
actions, for our practices. 
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.4) Constructing Mihatovici 
NPA applied standard FINIC21 contracts on all works initially tendered. Whereas 
NRC favored the small, independent contractor (for their numerous small works), it 
was the former state construction companies that competed for Mihatovici. The 
company chosen was Technograd I, an engineering company which in turn 
contracted Technograd II, a construction company (and fellow competitor). Some of 
the works were further outsourced by Technograd II to smaller, private contractors.  
These international projects were the sole means of survival for the construction 
industry during the war years.  Inasmuch as NRC kept some of the small 
contractors afloat, the Mihatovici contract might have had a larger impact in 
maintaining Tuzla’s human and institutional construction capacity by keeping the 
largest and most experienced building company in business during the war. 
Between 150 and 200 workers were employed at any one time. According to 
Vejzagic, it was the largest work place in Tuzla where they regularly paid salaries, 
even though they were low: “Labor was cheap then”, DM 10–15 a day.  In total 
only about 20% of the building cost was spent on salaries22, most of it on day-
labor. By default rather than strategy, “most of the able-bodied men” from the old 
village of Mihatovici were engaged in this work.  This definitely cushioned the social 
impact of suddenly having a large settlement of displaced people established in 
their backyard. Even some of the men from the settlement’s first phase were 
engaged. In the beginning all was synchronized to the front-line duties of soldiers, 
as most laborers were also soldiers.  The 80% spent on materials was by and large 
spent on materials produced in Bosnia, most of which was made before the war.  
Siporex, the main construction material, was bought off private individuals or 
companies having planned to build when the war came, much the same as was 
done by NRC. Prices were about 50% of pre-war levels. People had to have money. 
 
Besides it being an housing investment, the Mihatovici construction was also a way 
of disseminating purchasing power. It is hard to find evidence of its construction 
contributing to any significant increase in local capacities, the standard claim often 
held by international organizations.23  More than half of the funds spent went into 
purchasing locally produced materials. By mostly drawing on stocks that were not 
being replenished, the secondary employment effect was also rather meager. As far 
as capacity building is concerned, the Mihatovici experience supports the findings 
from NRC case: the emergency context itself hampers any significant industrial or 
institutional capacity building.24 The tale of local roof tile production is a case in 
point. 
 
                                          
21 International Federation of Consulting Engineers. 
22 In Norway it fluctuates around 50%. 
23  See any brochure or newsletter from any of the big NGOs or from those dealing with construction 
work, CHF in particular 
24 There are always exceptions.  During the war a joinery workshop turned factory was established in 
Lucavac. Private sawmills and workshops for concrete blocks were also being established, most of them 
‘highly informal’. 
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A Short Story of Bosnian Roof Tiles 
In Bosnia most pitched roofs are covered with clay tiles originally produced in 
what is now Croatia or Serbia. The Bosnian clay is not good enough for tile 
production. When the international housing re/construction started in 1993, 
roofing material was not available since Tuzla in effect was sealed off.  This 
represented an opportunity for taking up production of concrete roof tiles, 
which in many European countries have a larger market share than do clay 
tiles.  Scottish European Aid supported by UNHCR and the Soros Foundation 
purchased two machines for producing concrete tiles. These, plus one made 
locally, were placed at the Siporex factory. They were to produce roof tiles to 
most of the internationally funded housing projects during the war.  In 1995 
NMFA reportedly funded, via IMG and NPA25, two more machines that were 
installed in a Technograd production shed. They provided roof tiles to 
Mihatovici and to other international housing projects. 
 
With the Dayton Agreement and the opening of borders,, suddenly no one 
needed concrete tiles any more. Clay tiles were again available. They were 
imported tax free26 from Croatia at lower prices per tile than were the locally 
produced concrete tiles.  The fact that concrete tiles were cheaper by the 
square meter, as there were 10 concrete tiles pr m2 compared to 16 clay tiles, 
apparently made no difference. And besides, clay tiles “looked like real roof 
tiles”, whereas the gray concrete tiles made the house look inferior. The 
Deputy Director of Technograd, the one responsible for concrete tile 
production, told me he “would never use concrete tiles” on his own house! 
 
By 1997 there was no production of concrete tiles at any of the production 
machines in Tuzla. Skills and know-how meticulously developed during the 
hard days of war, were lost. 
 
This story has a post scriptum. Skeptics are at a liberty to read it as an 
allegory of Bosnia’s post-war reconstruction and recovery challenges: 
 
After the war a Norwegian engineer and contractor, Bjørn Bøe, having 
formerly worked for NPA, established a large, modern concrete tile factory in 
Zenica with investment support from Sida: “If there ever were a market for 
roof tiles, Bosnia must be it”. His factory, symbolically named “Most” (‘Bridge’) 
set out to serve the local marked through slogans like “Made in Bosnia, by 
Bosnians, for the Bosnians”. “It was a  total flop”, he concedes.  “Anything 
Bosnian is deemed second class”.  Even after having changed the slogan, 
solved the color problem by making them look like clay tiles, and offering tiles 
at very competitive prices, he still has a hard time on the local market, “the 
cultural market”, as it were. “Roof tiles are synonymous with clay tiles” in the 
minds of people. “Besides, the local market is marred with all sorts of 
‘commissions’, kick-backs and political back-scratching”. So far the 
international organizations have been ‘Most’s major customers. As they are 
pulling out, where does that leave ‘Most’? “If there ever were a market for 
roof tiles, Bosnia wasn’t it;- or may it still be”? The 2002 sales figures from 
Most may indicate hope. 
 
                                          
25 Information confirming the funding has been impossible to obtain.  This is how Technograd 
‘remembers’ it. 
26 All goods to be used by international agencies or NGOs are exempted from duties and tax. This is 
seriously diminishing the multiplier effect and hence the (re)developmental effect of the international 
housing support, as explained in the Housing as Strategy chapter. 
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Fig.6.4.10 Detailing where two units of construction meet. The roof constructions were  not 
correctly designed (or constructed) and caused endemic leakages. Note the flashing on the 
roof. 
 
.5) Construction in war 
In chasing “the cheapest and quickest” solution, some serious technical 
misjudgments were made.  I have already touched upon bad architect’s detailing. 
Similar technical slips passed on the waterproofing of bathroom floors, and on 
metal flashing between houses.  All of these caused endemic leakages: in the first 
floor when it rained, on the ground floor whenever somebody used the bathroom 
upstairs. Whenever these issues were raised with local NPA staff, they were 
acknowledged – conditionally: “but it was war”! 
 
I have earlier shown how uncertainty shifts the focus towards the immediate. So it 
does regarding technical solutions.  It is as if we refuse to acknowledge the 
physically inevitable – like a prosaic leakage, as long as we can provide an 
immediate solution to the primary problem we set out to solve: providing shelter 
for the houseless - now. 
 
This will have to explain the choice of timber floors, a highly unusual solution in 
contemporary mass housing,27 all the more so since no dry, stable timber was 
available.  By using timber though, both money and time was saved.. Money was 
saved by the fact that the price of timber was down to less than half its pre-war 
price, while cement was much more expensive since cement had to be brought in 
on convoys because the local cement factory at Lukavac was down. Time was saved 
in that one did not have to wait for concrete to cure.  But even with these two 
parameters fully satisfied, the end result was highly unsatisfactory, bordering on 
the undignified. The absence of horizontal sound insulation between the flats and 
                                          
27 Even the previously built Sida/Hifab buildings had concrete floor slabs dividing ground and first floor. 
198
 
 
MIHATOVICI, A SETTELEMENT FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA 
warped floor and ceiling boarding made two flats into one ‘soundscape’ inhabited by 
several families, sometimes more than 20 people. 
 
These were all results of local tactical decisions borne out of the overriding strategic 
goal, set by the donor and HQ, to provide shelter for as many, as quickly and as 
cheaply as possible. But the funding procedure itself also plays a role in explaining 
the results. By funding these housing investments as emergency assistance the 
funds are released annually and normally in the spring. Consequently, the 
construction of the main structures will then be carried out during winter. In the 
case of Mihatovici this had an adverse effect on the quality of the timber slabs, and 
thus on the subsequent living conditions of the flats. 
 
In addition to the challenges of the field, of snow, material shortages and high fuel 
prices, what seems to have caused delays were in fact difficulties in transferring 
funds from HQ, from Oslo to the Tuzla offices.  The archives are full of fax copies 
from Tuzla on the same issue, over and over again: “money is necessary for further 
progress”, “work stopped due to lack of money”.  The last phase was about 4 
months late, fully completed on September 16, 1996. 
 
 
Fig.6.4.11 Constructing the ‘Mihatovici houses’ in Prutace in February 1996 revealing the 
seasonal difficulties in constructing floor slabs in timber. In Bosnia, even today, there is 
normally no ’exposed’ construction going on in winter. 
                                               
 
.6) The settlement built 
In terms of physical output Mihatovici will have to be assessed differently to my 
other two cases.  They were permanent, individual, small-scale houses where each 
owner owned and managed the premises. Besides, in the NRC case, it was the very 
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adaptability and structural rigor of the houses that made them part of the project. 
In Grapska, all choices were – as a matter of development policy – left to the 
individual owners and the community organization to decide. At Mihatovici it was 
different: a publicly owned and managed settlement, “built on behalf of” displaced 
people staying there for free awaiting possible return to their former homes. The 
settlement was built during war, but will serve in the years that follow.  Whether it 
constitutes a sustained fixed capital injection will depend on the benefit flows, and 
how it possibly helps replenish the other capital modes on which recovery depends. 
So far Mihatovici has remained a one-dimensional shelter project. But it is not a 
matter of what it is, but what it might become. “Time is the essence of the real 
design problem” says Frank Duffy (cf. Brand 1994; 13). 
 
In order to examine its potential, to see its true capital contribution, I will briefly 
analyze the settlement by shearing it in the Duffy-Brand manner presented in 
Chapter 2.2.2. This will disclose how Mihatovici is prepared for the inevitable 
change that follows war. 
 
Site:  
Mihatovici is fixed, its location deemed a liability by all.28 Its only salvation lies in 
the possibility of urban expansion and new housing built on the adjacent brown 
fields.  “There is absolutely no chance of that happening in the foreseeable future”, 
according to Tuzla’s planning authorities. As it was located ‘out of sight’ it also 
relies on its own water and sewerage treatment plants. Both are in bad condition, 
overburdened.  The water, containing three times the permissible iron content, is 
not for drinking as it may cause hepatitis.29  Drinking water is collected at a public 
tap down by the main road, but there the water is so infected from sewerage 
infiltration that it has to be boiled. The sewerage treatment plant of the settlement 
is overburdened and undermaintained. The manholes of the septic tank have been 
removed, some say stolen, others say to allow for overflowing. Overflow they do: a 
child fell in and drowned last year (2002). 
 
                                          
28 Except for IDPs living in the more remote settlements. They repeatedly report on wanting to move to 
Mihatovici, because it is closer to Tuzla. 
29 According to the project manager it is still within “war standards”, which allow for an iron content 3 
times higher than the normal standards.  This implies that the contextual, the immediate, considerations 
during the implementation stage take precedence over issues of long-term health. Certainly the 
buildings and the water system was planned to outlast the “war standard” period. 
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Fig.6.4.12 a)  When the water pump in the settlement is out of order – which they often are 
– water, still with hazardous levels of iron, is collected from the source in the upper 
Mihatovici village. 
Fig.6.4.12 b)This is the only water source that holds a permissible level of iron.  It still needs 
to be boiled, however, as it is contaminated from sewerage spills. The source is located by 
the main road, approximately 1 km down the access road, cf. Figure 6.4.6. 
 
The structure of the site plan is fixed although its garden city ideals are currently 
impossible to recognize. There are two planning reasons and one situational, or 
dynamic reason for this. Firstly, because of the total lack of storage space people 
built sheds and garages adjacent to their house to store everything from foodstuff 
to firewood. Secondly, the extraordinary number of people causes an extraordinary 
wear on the physical structures and on the environment, leaving the settlement 
with hardly any lawns, trees or flowers. Thirdly, this very high number of people 
constitutes a market, triggering the building of shops. There are at least 30 shops 
in operation.30 All these constructions are incrementally built, basically on the front 
of one’s house and from bark-covered slabs and off-cuts bought cheaply at the local 
sawmills. The inhabitants have invested  something like DM 50,00031 in these 
sheds, garages and shops. Today, these structures cover a ground area of at least 
6800 m2, more than do the formal buildings. For outsiders the visual impact of 
these ramshackle sheds creates the ‘character of the place’ i.e. destitution and 
hopelessness. This is a superficial observation and definitely one that has nothing to 
do with the settlement’s environmental potential. Its garden city atmosphere could 
yet materialize if its inhabitants had other future perspectives and terms of tenure 
than those they have today.  Because they all see the inadequacy of the situation, 
none of the Mihatovitcians has ever lived this primitively before.  But why bother?32 
                                          
30 On December 4, 2002 there were 31 shops and hairdressers operating. The number depends on the 
season, and the ongoing process of ‘take overs’ within the settlement. 
31 Calculated from material cost data provided by the interviewees, approximately DM 6–8 /m2.. 
32 These are strikingly similar observations to what Rapoport has referred to pertaining to migrants in 
developing countries. The environmental quality of their initial dwelling was totally unacceptable after 
201
 
 
MIHATOVICI, A SETTELEMENT FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA 
 
Fig.6.4.13 Mihatovici. The initial situation. Picture taken in the summer of 1996. 
 
 
Fig.6.4.14 What it turned out to be. Picture showing the street depicted above; December 
2001. 
 
                                                                                                                         
some years. Rapoport refers to research done in India by Sastrosasmita and Nurul Amin (Rapoport 
2002). 
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Fig.6.4.15 Main Street, Mihatovici with the shops (initially) established by the tenants of the 
houses right behind.  These shops also serve people in the old Mihatovici village.  
 
Fig.6.4.16 The house where the tenants divided the 50m2  ground floor flat in two, and one 
made a separate entrance at the back. At another house it was also done for 1.floor flats 
with a new entrance door out to a somewhat rickety stairway in the back. 
 
Structure:  
The one-and-a-half story houses are set in rows, leaving most of the houses with 
expansion possibilities only at the front and back.  They are built within a concrete 
frame from Siporex blocks, but with only 20 cm external walls.33  Siporex, being 
easy to work with, has already showed its capacity to accommodate change: people 
sharing the same flats, but unable to live together, have been able to divide the 
premises and make separate entrance doors – simply by cutting through the 
external Siporex walls.   
                                          
33 Tilting the 20x25x50 cm blocks so that the thickness is reduced increases the wall area by 20%. This 
is a cheaper solution when building, but one which draws substantially more energy resources to heat. 
This was a trick the self-help builders used both in NRC project and in the following Grapska case. 
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There is, similarly, the potential for joining flats horizontally or even shifting the 
entrance to adjacent rooms from one flat to the other.  No provisions have been 
made for this, however, nor for the merging of flats within the same 
“soundscape”34, although the structure allows for this. Sound leakage through the 
timber slabs (discussed earlier), may be mediated somewhat by introducing 
insulation and gypsum ceiling boards. Water and trapped vapor may have severely 
damaged the timber floors and joists, which may require serious repair. The roof 
construction is part of structure, and part of the roof construction has some weak 
points. Repairs are required not only to waterproof the roof, but also to prevent 
part of the construction from rotting. The structure, its materials and the applied 
technology is adaptable to change, but some serious repairs and improvements, 
primarily of the timber construction, are required. 
 
Skin: 
Skin is part of the structure in the Mihatovici houses. The plaster is easily damaged, 
which is evident from this settlement and others where plastered Siporex has been 
used.  In due course the walls could be re-dressed or re-clad, allowing insulation to 
be added. Winters are cold in Tuzla.  I know. The roof is covered for life by concrete 
tiles. 
 
 
Fig.6.4.17 a,b The three colored facade, front and back 
 
                                          
34 In terms of flexibility and adaptability there is much to learn from the “Swedish Houses” of Finnish and 
Norwegian reconstruction, or from the results of the architectural competition for flexible housing for 
refugees held in Norway in 2000 (Rikskommittén 1942). 
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Services: 
Services are strategically well suited to change and extensions, the fittings and 
equipment used are of standard good quality. 
 
The Space/floor plan: 
The plan has a structure which allows for flexible use of  the flat. Its small size and 
the load bearing wall cutting through it reduce the options, however. The lack of 
storage space calls for solutions outside the flat, or two flats sharing the space of 
three, an option fully possible. See Fig. 6.4.8. 
 
Stuff: 
Stuff is not an issue beyond the repeated fact that there is no place to put it. The 
same could be said about the people living there. There are too many people and 
too little sleeping space. Therefore, all furniture is convertible into beds, or else 
there are very few pieces of furniture so as to make floor space for all the 
mattresses required at night. In no home did I observe an eating table or regular 
chairs, only coffee tables and low stools, folding camping chairs at best; otherwise 
there was no room for the people.35 
 
 
 
Fig.6.4.18 An industrious’ cow farmer’ and sheep herder shown in his family’s one room flat 
with his ‘stuff’ conspicuously exhibited. The crucial lack of storage space in the flats is the 
main reason for the wild growth of ramshackle sheds throughout the settlement.  
 
The above run-through shows that the weaknesses of Mihatovici lie at its most 
permanent layers. The situation may be salvaged, to put it bluntly, if, within a few 
                                          
35 If comparisons are made to, say, the furnishing of flats in Hong Kong, which have a similar living 
space per capita, we find there a much more sophisticated and efficient space utilization. But then again, 
they have a much longer history of dense living – and they have money. 
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years some of the structural weaknesses are tended to. If they are not, Mihatovici 
will inevitably descend into an arena for the truly marginalized and thus represent a 
social liability to the municipality and perhaps an uneasy embarrassment to NPA.36 
The oncoming decay is partly due to ‘unfortunate’ planning, however much “it was 
done in war”, and is further exasperated by extreme wear and lack of maintenance. 
 
But Mihatovici was indeed cheap when built. It cost DM 428 /m2, excluding 
infrastructure investments.  This is 30% less than NPA’s settlement in Jezevac in 
close-by Banovici municipality.  Since there is no common standard for calculating 
construction costs among the implementing agencies, comparing Mihatovici with 
others is difficult.  Some agencies include items that others exclude, some make 
concessions for administrative costs, other agencies do not. Whenever such 
comparisons are used, they are often used strategically – and often misleading.  
The mandatory “cost per beneficiary” figure may be very inaccurate as both the 
figures above and below the fraction line are highly contentious. In reference to 
Mihatovici this figure was always calculated on the basis of 2,200 IDPs. Reportedly, 
never more than 1650 people lived there, which immediately raises the cost per 
beneficiary figure by more than 30%. NRC did similar calculations, even on houses 
that had zero beneficiaries. Such inaccurate calculations in effect pushed the 
reconstruction focus onto the houses with the least damage, houses that often 
could have been taken care of by the owners themselves.  All this made the cost 
per beneficiary figures ‘impressively’ low, which again made the NGOs aim at 
assisting the least needy. Those families whose houses were totally destroyed, were 
initially not assisted at all: the ‘cost per beneficiary’ was too high. 
 
6.4.4 Managing Mihatovici 
Housing management is more than administration.  It is about strengthening the 
inhabitants’ human and social capital, helping in making the settlement into a 
place. Managing the settlement is the guiding activity that allows for the crucial 
interaction between the built environment and the lived lives. This link was fully 
appreciated by NPA. Managing the settlement became a project in itself, and sought 
carried through during the short period that NPA ran altogether 13 settlements 
throughout Bosnia. Mihatovici was under the official management of NPA until 
December 31 1996, when NMFA closed further funding.  NPA prepared a 
comprehensive outline for the running of the settlements (NPA 1994), conceptually 
founded on the interaction between: 
1) material conditions: housing, food, transport, common facilities, international 
presence providing security, etc. 
2) organizational conditions: citizens’ participation through democratic processes37 
3) psychosocial conditions: meaningful activities for work and leisure, social rights 
advocacy, the handling of loss and mourning. 
 
                                          
36 The NPA settlement at Grab Potok has already reached that stage. 
37 In this work NPA used a canon of the Norwegian labor movement, the book Tillitsmannen (The Shop 
Steward) by the post-WW II Norwegian Prime Minister, Einar Gerhardsen. 
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While funding lasted NPA did organize a People’s Committee, but 5 years later few 
people have any recollection of its doings or impact.  What is remembered is the 
availability of funds for dealing with daily life, like occasional maintenance, 
transport and organizing funerals, etc.38 The legacy of the People’s Committee is 
retained in the story of the minibus. This is just as much an allegory on the state of 
social capital in Mihatovici and the difficulties outsiders encounter in trying to 
‘organize’. 
 
A Short Story of the Minibus in Mihatovici 
As told by nurse Edina, Clive Cavanaugh and Mihela Dzindo of SRC 
 
A couple of years back a French woman doctor donated a minibus to the 
settlement to ensure that emergency cases would be attended to, either by 
taking the sick to hospital or by enabling the doctor to come to the settlement 
during off-duty hours. 
 
But the van had to be registered. As the donation was given to the 
Settlement, and not to the health center, which was run by the Swiss and 
owned by the Municipality, the chairman of the former “People’s Committee”, 
the old NPA-induced settlement board, signed the registration papers. 
Although the committee had ceased to exist long ago, it was still important to 
have somebody from the settlement remain as the formal owner, and not the 
ODPR, as they were claimed to have ‘hi-jacked’ a bus previously donated to 
the settlement by the Norwegian AUF.39 
 
This time the signee, the former head of the People’s Committee, claimed the 
van. He is the formal owner, because the committee no longer exists. And 
that was it.  So he has taken the car for his own use. He sells vegetables on 
the market. It is reported, however, that he occasionally helps people with 
transport. 
 
The same minibus owner was the one receiving the most personal votes in the 
elections for the new Settlement Board in 2001. 
 
The ‘People’s Committee’ never survived the handing over of the management 
responsibilities to the Municipality in 1997. From the very opening, due to its size 
and proximity to Tuzla, Mihatovici has attracted several curious and benevolent 
individuals and agency representatives (and researchers) bringing project 
proposals, projects and gifts to be distributed to the needy. The manager, Ekrem 
Mirascic, has long since lost the names of all the agencies involved in the various 
support services. They have taken on – independently of each other – the building 
of a gym hall (French), a kindergarten (Dutch), playground equipment (Danish), 
and a youth club (‘some Swiss lady’).  NORBAT (The Norwegian Battalion in BiH) 
has left two containers which are used for youth activities, and at the time of my 
last visit a French organization was involved in the upgrading of the water system.  
                                          
38 Staffing (6 persons), transport, repairs, cantina cost (food distribution – not provision – cost), and 
miscellaneous items ran at DM 2 250 /month. 
39 The Youth Chapter of the Norwegian Labor Party had donated a bus to the settlement because of its 
isolated location. It was also a way of disposing of the vehicle used to transport gifts from Norway to 
BiH. 
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This was after a Dutch organization had extended the pipe network to 18 houses of 
old Mihatovici, houses that were situated above the pressure level of the 
municipality water system. No wonder Mr Mirascic is ‘relieved’ now that several 
NGOs are leaving Bosnia. But even his salary is paid by ‘some organization’. Since 
1988 Mihatovici has been run by The Swiss Red Cross, (SRC). 
 
SRC was called in to take care of the psycho-social program that was left in 
disarray after NPA left.  From there on they have tried to revitalize social activities, 
enabling the inhabitants to take care of the community.  Today they spend more 
than DM 150,000 a year on running Mihatovici.  The psycho-social program has 
been altered from its ‘palliative’ focus toward dealing with the challenges ahead. 
This has changed the activities within the settlement. Besides carrying the cost for 
the health services and the administration of the settlement, SRC also initiates all 
sorts of communal activities, such as basic reading and writing courses for illiterate 
grown-ups, computer courses, and establishing work units that can take on 
cleaning jobs outside the settlement.  There are also sewing groups, an old men’s 
club and boy scouts groups. They have even run a course on make-up for teenage 
girls. All this takes place within SRC’s “Healthy Community Approach”. “The aim is 
to make people wake up”40, as the social worker said. A key institution is the 
recently elected Community Board. 
 
The Board was meant to be the focus of activities in the settlement. Although they 
have no funds of their own, whenever a donation is presented, like the one from 
“the Swiss lady”, they make the priorities. The Board also disseminates a 
newsletter once a month to counter the swarming of rumors within the settlement. 
Their most conspicuous initiative was launching the big Spring Cleaning Day, when 
more than half of the inhabitants got together to clean and bury the solid waste 
that had been piling up. The settlement owed DM 35,000 in waste collection fees, 
so the municipality just stopped collecting solid waste from the settlement. 
 
The Board encountered problems, however, when trying to deal with payment for 
electricity.  Each family was allowed DM 20 of free electricity a month.  Beyond that 
they had to pay.  But they did not.41  Even after the distribution company wavered 
all claims up to January 1, 2002, the Settlement Board was still split over whether 
or not to pay. The Board dissolved itself shortly thereafter because of this. 
 
                                          
40 Thereby disclosing her ’parental’ attitude towards the population – all in line with the provision 
concept 
41 In total the settlement has a monthly allowance of 90.00 KWH, but consumes up to 150.000 kWh.  
Organizing a fair payment system has proved difficult because of the way the metering has been set up. 
Several families share one meter, and these may fluctuate within the settlement, and others leave. 
Some have previously paid, others not, and all the while the distributing company wants it all in one 
sum. In addition, the municipality provides free coal to the settlement, worth DM 80,000 year.  Much of 
this has been privately sold to outsiders because ‘free’ electricity has been available, or additional ‘free’ 
coal have been (illegally) collected from an open pit mine close by – and sold. 
208
 
 
MIHATOVICI, A SETTELEMENT FOR DISPLACED PEOPLE IN TUZLA 
 
 
 
Fig.6.4.19 a, b  Spring Cleaning Day 2001;  
women, children – and men participate. 
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When it had taken so long to settle the electricity issue, it was also because the 
municipality expected a political uproar: “They’ll take to the streets of Tuzla”, 
ODPR’s director said. If that were ever done, it would be one of the very few times 
the population of Mihatovici ever did anything in unison. It would advance the social 
capacity of the settlement.  But then, what for? ‘We’re only here for the time being, 
waiting to be evicted’, as the co-chairman of the defunct Board told me. 
 
6.4.5 LIVING IN MIHATOVICI 
“They hate the place”, Dr Sutovic told me. This was in early 1999, and Dr Sutovic, 
a clinical psychologist, had just seen to some of his “several hundred” patients in 
the settlement.42 The lives of the inhabitants are in limbo. They do not know what 
the future will bring, and they are burdened by an uncertainty, unease, trauma 
even, about the past; the grown-ups share that past, but the children raised in 
Mihatovici do not. Fault lines run every which way in Mihatovici. 
 
The people of Mihatovici do have certain things in common. There is the territorial 
proximity; it is the shared experience of expulsion from their home somewhere in 
Eastern Bosnia; it is the temporary tenure; and the fact that all inhabitants are 
Muslims. They carry all sort of different capacities and professional skills and 
aspirations.  These are all but irrelevant elements of life in the settlement. Here 
they are all categorized by most others as ‘refugees’, and most of the people are all 
here against their will. For all practical purposes the refugees do not need each 
other. This is hardly a pregnant starting point for creating a sense of community. 
 
.1) Selecting Beneficiaries & Close Co-Habitants 
The first people came here in early 1995. NPA had made a provision in the contract 
with the municipality and UNHCR to select the beneficiaries themselves, but found 
that their selection criteria were adhered to through ODPR’s own selection 
process43, which was basically to empty some of the most undignified collective 
centers . It was the extraordinary random allocation of space within Mihatovici itself 
which caused the most problems.  People were set to share their lives in the same 
flat or the same ‘soundscape’ without previously knowing each other. Although 
families and ‘special cases’ were allowed to stay together, the process entailed 
shoehorning people so close together that there was little space and no privacy left. 
In most cases people were taken from the CCs against their will and put onto yet 
another unknown stage, this time somewhere out on the countryside. “They were 
pushed into a secondary trauma”, according to Dr Sutovic (Sutovic 2001). Some 
refused to leave the collective center, whereupon they had their food rations 
reduced.  Many of those who eventually did go did so almost at gunpoint. “The only 
time during the war I was so afraid that I carried a gun, was when I was 
transporting the first group of refugees to Mihatovici”, said a former NPA employee. 
                                          
42 “An evaluation team estimated that 300 persons living in this settlement suffer clinically standard 
PTSD [post traumatic stress disorder] symptoms, (and) at least 1000 persons suffer of secondary 
trauma”. (Sutovic 2001) 
43 The NPA initially set out to prioritize the most vulnerable: single mothers, single minors, the old and 
chronically ill, former POWs and their families, soldiers and civilian made invalids during war, and 
displaced people presently living under extremely bad conditions (NPA 1994). 
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However, by the time the last phase was completed, people reportedly broke into 
the completed flats to secure residential rights.  This was in 1996, after the first 
batch of IDPs were evicted from NRC houses presented in my first case. There are 
dozens of former ‘NRC families’ living in Mihatovici. Residents of the other 
settlements built in the region also aspire to a flat in Mihatovici: “so much closer to 
Tuzla”.  And besides, people stay for free, and so far have had free electricity, and 
coal. This makes living a day at a time all the more easier, but it hardly signifies a 
road to recovery. 
 
.2) The old population – and the new 
Mihatovici never had a regular population of more than 1650 inhabitants44, a total 
which is significantly less than the nominal capacity of 2,200.  However, it is 
reported that for a short period after the Srebrenica exodus as many as 1800 
people stayed here. Many left voluntarily; the size and the density was too much to 
take. The number of people has declined as a matter of policy ever since.  It stood 
at about 1250 when I last visited the place in early 2002.45 Almost no new people 
have moved in since it opened. About 450 family units, sometimes consisting of 
only one person, share the 220 flats, which makes an average of two families a flat. 
Lately, a growing number have become one-family flats. Using the official figures 
from 2001, when 1291 people officially lived there, 43.5% of these were male, and 
56.5% female. The breakdown in age shows that 309, or almost a quarter of the 
population, were below 14 years of age. These are the people with no or little 
recollection of the places they were forced to leave in 1992. 128 children have 
actually been born in the settlement as per December 2001. Over recent years the 
birth rate has been declining46, partly because of offensive campaigns for the use of 
contraceptives, partly because of the age profile of the population. Two-thirds of 
the population is between 14 and 60 years of age, and 10% is more than 60. 50 
have died here over the years, which for many relatives may be a strong reason for 
remaining in Tuzla. 
 
The children and youths are the true Mihatovicians. Since their world is created here, 
their mental references are significantly different from those of their parents. It is this 
split between generations that is presented to me as the most important conflict in the 
settlement.47 “Going back” would not make sense for most of the young.  They hardly 
remember ‘their’ place.  Besides, many have established their own families while in 
displacement: more than 20 new families in Mihatovici alone, four of them between 
settlement residents and people from Mihatovice proper, the rest are among displaced 
people. And it is for these ‘children’, the true Mihatovicians, that the physical assets could 
spill over into enriching the social capital of the settlement and thus create a platform for 
                                          
44 About the same number that Charles Fournier proposed in his utopian phalanstère housing in the early 
19th century and Le Corbusier anticipated living in each of his Unités d’Habitation housing blocks, from 
the middle of the 20th century. 
45 It was set to increase as it is one of the few remaining settlements where people evicted from 
occupied flats and houses in and around Tuzla may be re-housed. 
46 Number of births per year from and including 1995 and onwards: 29, 17, 27, 20, 19, 9, 7, as per 
December of 2001. 
47 A parallel observation was made by Roger Zetter in the settlements for Greek-Cypriot refugees 
(Zetter 1999). 
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development for making Mihatovici into a community. But that is not what is happening. By 
January 2002, 12 such ‘young families’ cum ‘DP children’ were served preliminary eviction 
orders from Mihatovici because their parents have had their house reconstructed.  Hence the 
tenure of the children is also terminated however much they are gown-ups or have families 
of their own. For those without local employment or housing prospects, ‘going back’ seems 
the only option. Mihatovici is a place for temporary residence only, not a community. 
 
.3) Social Cohesion 
”The collective spirit does not exist here”, said one of the former residents to me.  He later 
left for Australia. When he tried to mobilize the residents to have the wreck of a truck moved 
out of the settlement48, their refusal was underpinned by the presumption that there was 
something in it for him personally. His statement is supported by all my interviewees: there 
is no trust. That is why the co-chairman of the Settlement Board initially withdrew. He was 
later convinced to stay on. He himself felt the suspicion by the others that his initiatives and 
actions were to his own personal benefit, and not in support of an emerging community. My 
last interviewee claimed stubbornly that whatever money the Settlement Board handled, the 
members made sure they got their share of it – personally.  These findings are in line with 
what UNDP has come up with based on large national surveys. There is a general low 
societal trust, lower still with regard to the politicians – in both entities of the country (UNDP 
2002). The prevalence of distrust was not gauged by me for reasons discussed in my 
chapter on methodology.  Let there be no doubt that the level of distrust in Mihatovici is 
sufficiently high to guide the actions of the people living there, either by those not caring, or 
by those who see a mission in trying to overcome it. The turnout for the elections to the 
Settlement Board was an impressive 60%. The results – so far kept from the electorate – 
was that the man who ‘hi-jacked’ the minibus from the health center got the most votes. 
One can but speculate. Admiration for the ability to seize the moment, ‘to outsmart the 
system’, stands as a plausible explanation – hardly a contribution towards community 
building. 
 
The war experience where your former neighbor turned out to be your mortal enemy, was 
held by Dr Sutovic as one main reason for the breakdown in trust (Sutovic 2001). Another 
reason may be still closer. The home provided do not hold the attributes required to nurture 
the building of trust between people. In Mihatovici people are deprived of their privacy, and 
thereby a necessary base for personal recovery. This explanation was fully endorsed by Dr 
Sutovic (2001).  The overcrowding cause and perpetuate conflicts that effectively inhibit any 
sense of community in Mihatovici. In one observed case the father/grandfather in his 70s 
was ‘moved out’ of the flat and made to stay in a small shack made of DM 80 worth of scrap 
boards. There was initially 22 people in the flat. Something had to give. “But I sneak in 
during day-time to watch television”, said the old man, staring at the snowy 14” screen. 
 
                                          
48 That old truck originated in Norway and was initially donated to “some organization” that filled it with 
gifts, presents and donations, drove to Bosnia, distributed the gifts and subsequently gave the truck to 
the settlement of Mihatovici. Having no money for registration fees, the truck was left to crumble and 
rust.  It did. It was finally taken away by SRC.  Add this to the story about the bus ‘donated’ to the 
settlement (but later ‘hijacked’ by ODPR).  In both cases it seemed more like a matter of ‘getting rid of 
the vehicle’ than providing sustainable assistance. 
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Fig.6.4.20 The Grandfather’s sleeping  
quarters next to the family’s flat 
 
The LWF gave the concluding argument on the low status of social capital of the 
settlement: “The reason”, they said, “for the success of the agriculture programs is 
that in this program the people do not have to rely on others”.  Success depends 
solely on the commitment of each participating family. Margaret Thatcher springs to 
mind. Mihatovici fulfills her concept of non-society: “There’s no such thing as 
society, there are individual men and women, and there are families”.49 
 
.4) Health 
It is not only the focused will to work, but also the ability to work, which determine 
success. People’s health is the chief constituent in human capital and a pillar in 
development. I have briefly touched upon the prevalence of diagnosed PTSD in 
Mihatovici in 1999, see 6.4.5. That figure has decreased, primarily due to the fact 
that a re-assessment of the cases as PTSD carries a set of contestable symptoms 
which in themselves are the basis for extended debates.50 This decline in PTSD 
prevalence coincides with a more forgiving attitude among the inhabitants towards 
their former perpetrators, according to the health center personnel.  This echoes 
findings from similar cases elsewhere.51 
                                          
49 Woman’s Own Magazine October 31, 1987. 
50 See, for instance, the British Medical Journal Vol. 321:232–235(2000), Vol. 322:95–98 (2001), Vol. 
325:1105–1107 (2002). 
51 “PSTD were significantly more common in those who were unforgiving towards the perpetrators than 
in those with high “forgiveness” scores”, according to findings from South Africa and referred to in the 
British Medical Journal 2002; Vol. 325:1105. 
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The medical statistics52 on the population in Mihatovici show what the doctor 
described as “a general condition of bad health” for which she saw two main 
causes: “The psychosomatic impacts of the experience of war – and the high 
population density”.  Both affect the immune system. There is a high war-related 
prevalence of hypertension, with a significant increase parallel to the exhumation 
processes from the mass graves of Srebrenica in 2000. See figure below. 
 
The population density, the highly unsatisfactory solid-waste treatment, the 
overflowing sewerage system and the iron-laden and unhealthy water make fertile 
grounds for contagious diseases.  Early treatment and preventative measures have 
so far held these at bay, although the prevalence of the seasonal flue and hepatitis 
is much higher than normal, according to the health center nurse.  The health 
center, now also catering for the old village of Mihatovici, covers a population of 
approximately 2000 people all together. 
 
 
 
Fig.6.4.21 The graph shows the prevalence of diabetes and  hypertension among the 
population of Mihatovici. Note the rise in diagnosed cases of hypertension following the 
exhumation processes than unrolled during the summer of 2000.  
 
.5) Livelihoods 
People’s skills and capacity to work is contextual. That is made all the more 
apparent when people are forced into another environment, into another context, 
                                          
52 During the one year (1.12.1999–1.12.2000) there were, for example, 6592 examinations and 365 
home visits, 4890 rump injections, 890 vein injections and 329 bandages provided. 100 patients were 
being treated for diabetes, 160 for hypertension and 141 carried a psychosomatic diagnosis. 
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which is the case with refugees and displaced people.  In Mihatovici there were 
teachers, engineers, shop attendants, farmers, mine workers, technicians, 
plumbers, i.e. all sorts of skills that only a handful could use in their new 
environment. Some of the teachers were able to; as teachers at the new school in 
Mihatovici. Most breadwinners had to opt for other vocations. A mechanical 
engineer set up the only shop made out of proper building materials in the 
settlement, for which he had to take a loan for the first time in his life.  The reason 
for his design attention was his presumption that people would see the difference – 
see the ‘normalcy’ in his shop, and choose him. His next step was to extend his 
credit and start an auto repair shop. He never did.  Instead he emigrated with his 
family to the US. 
 
”The best ones leave”, said the nurse53.  Since they started recording in 1996, by 1 
December 2001, 75% of those who have officially left the settlement have 
emigrated, 25% have gone back to their homes or left for some other destination 
within BiH.54 In addition, more than 50 families have been formally accepted as 
immigrants in other countries. They are reportedly only awaiting formal admission, 
made more complicated after Sept 11 event.  The chairman of the Settlement 
Board claims that more than half of the population have made their first 
applications to leave for another country.  He himself has also applied, although he 
does not want to leave Bosnia. He holds a job as a night watchman in Tuzla but will 
soon be evicted from Mihatovici. He owns a flat in Srebrenica, but “How will I make 
a living? he asked, “you think those people will give me a job?” So he will try to 
make it abroad55. 
 
But some do their best to sustain a living even within the settlement. The 
settlement represents a market and holds large pieces of land that the residents 
have come to use. Many have therefore gone into cultivation or raising livestock; 
either on their own, or through the agriculture program of LWF, by far the most 
successful development project I have come across in BiH. The local director 
“should have been the Agriculture Minister of Bosnia”, a senior diplomat stated.  
New skills on intensive farming and on greenhouse cultivation have been acquired 
by hundreds of people in all the IDP settlements around Tuzla. For those returning 
to villages this will be a possible way of sustaining a living if, or rather when, they 
return. LWF has not only trained people in these new skills, but also introduced 
these ‘new’ farmers to the food processing industry towards which the farmers will 
be able to plan and organize their production. This is changing the heart of Bosnian 
village farming which, to a large extent, has been for the production of household 
food, which was all what the small private plots allowed. 
 
                                          
53 Echoing finding from the Yorkshire study.  As soon as people had completed some of the many 
training courses, having ‘increased their human capital’ as it were, they leave for well paid jobs 
elsewhere (Stafford et al 2001). 
54 As per December 1, 2001, 160 persons have emigrated, and 58 have left for an address somewhere in 
BiH. 
55 Most of those leaving do so through a company in Zagreb that has specialized in arranging all the 
formalities regarding immigration to various countries. They also furnish tickets.  Their expenses – plus a 
substantial service fee – is to be paid back to the company within 3 years. 
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The settlement as a ‘market entity’ shows signs of crude capital aggregation, 
primarily a result of investments in human and environmental rather than financial 
capital. One man’s day work cutting trees brought earnings sufficient for him to 
place his first initial investment, two sheep. The last three years, assisted by credit 
from a brother in Australia, has resulted in 8 sheep and a cow. The milk is sold in 
the neighborhood at 1 DM a liter.  This agent may purchase another cow because of 
the market potential for milk. 
 
 
Fig.6.4.22 One of the barns of Mihatovici. Inside there is a cow and 8 sheep, all winter fed 
from the hey stacks shown, and from corn grown in the adjacent fields. 
 
 
Fig.6.4.23 The sheep and the shop belonging to the “Manager of the year”  
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“The manager of the year” was how the second agent was introduced to me.  He is 
also an IDP but used to live in Tuzla before moving to the strategically located flat 
of his parents when the second family moved out. With some ‘savings’ he set up a 
corner shop, and also bought some sheep.  He now has more than 50 head of 
sheep and has already bought - and closed - several competing shops in the vicinity 
of his own.  The settlement’s location – with adjacent pastures – has at least 
enabled some to draw benefits from it. 
 
But those who buy their food at the corner shop, the residents in general, how do 
they make a living?  All sorts of lofty answers abound. This is definitely not the sort 
of data the residents will reveal – in full – to a foreigner. According to reliable 
sources, about 250 people still receive food support which otherwise was stopped in 
1998. Out of the 1250 people living in the settlement, 12 people (1 per cent of the 
total population) are reported to have formal employment. Many try to work as day 
laborers.  SRC has helped establish ‘cleaning units’, groups of women who take on 
cleaning jobs in the city, although this appears to be an initiative of good intentions 
rather than an important employment reality.  In the late 1990s, a van and tools 
for carpentry, plumbing mason work, etc. were donated “by some organization” and 
a ‘repair unit’ of skilled tradesmen living in the settlement was established.  But it 
soon folded. Skills are realized in context, i.e. in local social networks, particularly 
when employment opportunities are scarce.56 
 
The Word Food Program (WFP) made a study on food security among IDPs in BiH 
(WFP 1999).  Their findings echo the pieces of information I was able to glue 
together for Mihatovici. For one thing, they do not pay rent, and (at least prior to 
when I was there) had paid nothing for electricity or coal. Secondly, they pool 
resources. This is done as a matter of course in Mihatovici in that people have to 
share flats, although not much within the flat is shared.57 WFP cites findings by the 
World Bank that about one-third of IDP income stems from remittances sent by 
relatives living abroad58, and a quarter from the ‘informal sector’ (ibid). These are 
recognizable figures for Mihatovici too, although people now complain that the 
remittances are drying up. Agriculture does play a more significant livelihood role in 
Mihatovici than among the general IDP population, according to the WFP report, 
justifying the choice of location pertaining to this particular feature. A key source of 
real money comes from the ever diminishing pensions paid to the old, the infirm, 
the ‘war widows’ and others. In 2002 the monthly pension stood at about KM 120, 
down from KM190 two years previously. Only those who worked for Bosnian 
                                          
56 Similar efforts by Norwegian ex-NGO staff have proved similarly unsuccessful. 
57 Where flats are sheared between families, the kitchen is furnished with their own stoves, with 
separate cupboards, kitchen utensils etc, making the kitchen extremely cluttered and easily crowded. 
58 According to figures I obtained from the Central Bank of BiH, the annual volume of private 
remittances stood at KM 1,257,000,000 in 1998, declining slightly to 1,150,000,000 in 2001.  This is 
much more than the annual ODA to BiH. Remittances are sent into the Bosnian economy in full – albeit 
much of it is spent on traded imports from the neighboring countries, but again, much less than does the 
ODA (Official Development Aid). 
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enterprises are eligible for a workers’ pension. Those who worked in the other ex-
Yugoslavian republics, have no pension whatsoever.59 
 
One of those who lost his pension has already left Mihatovici.  His story is the story 
of village return.  There are thousands of stories like this.  Three of his children, all 
grown into adults during the 9 years of displacement, stand to be evicted from 
Mihatovici now that the family house in Samari is sufficiently complete to allow 
them back. 
 
The story of the Murić family’s return to Samari 
The houses of the village of Samari ride along the ridge of a hill some 10 km 
west of Zwornik, or rather, what is left of the 111 houses that once made up 
the settlement. There were many such hill ridge or hillside villages in the area.  
From one you could look across the valley onto the next one.  One may be 
Bosniak, the next Serb.60  The Murić family owned the farm furthest up. The 
forest was just beyond their house. It was an old family farm of 4 steeply 
sloping ha of land. The Murić household consisted of the husband, Behram, 
now in his mid-50s, his wife, Zejta, four girls and one boy. Behram was a 
migrant worker in Belgrade for 23 years. About 80% of the menfolk of Samari 
were migrant workers. “The village was full of children, wives and cattle”, he 
said. 3.5 kilometers down on the steep, curved road there used to be the 
school, the youth club, the shops, and the bus to Zwornik and Tuzla. All are 
gone now, but for an occasional bus. 
 
 
Fig.6.4.24 The village of Samari with the houses riding the ridge in front. On the left in 
the background there is a similar village inhabited by ‘the others’ 
                                          
59 Throughout Yugoslavia’s extensive industrialization the prospects of regular pensions was a key 
welfare issue.  This became a dominant driving force behind the region’s urbanization and de-ruralization 
processes. 
60 The situation is very similar to what is found in Lebanon, also a country of many religions, and also a 
country ruled by the Ottomans for centuries. 
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They were forced to flee together with all the other villagers, through the 
forest west to Tuzla in April 1992. After a harsh period living in collective 
centers they eventually ended up in one of NRC-finished flats in Tuzla. They 
found that “a good period”, and when their 30 months had passed, “on the 
3rd of June 1995” they were taken to Mihatovici. When they came they had 
absolutely nothing. Their ‘NRC-hosts’ gave them some old furniture and an old 
refrigerator.  Their flat, mostly furnished with second-hand items, now stands 
impeccably neat and inviting.  But as their parents have already left 
Mihatovici, the children have received notice.  They are to go back to Samari. 
 
After four and a half years Behram could not suffer Mihatovici any more. 
There were too many people, and too noisy: “The nerves played on me”. So, 
after ‘some organization’61 had agreed to provide materials for the burnt-down 
roof, give him three doors, three windows and 15 m2 of floorboards, Behram 
left for Samari. In the beginning, he stayed alone working on the house that 
he initially built 20 years earlier. The cash required to pay for electrical 
installations and other sundry costs, totaling DM 370, was collected from the 
rest of the family, not least from the relatives they have in Germany.62 
 
The fact that he was not harassed by the Serbs opened up for further return. 
During the ensuing months, materials for the reconstruction of yet another 33 
houses were provided.  What pull-factors proved decisive? “I had no other 
place to go to”, he shrugged.  He certainly acknowledged the hardships he 
faced, but what was there for him elsewhere?  “To recreate life here takes 
much longer now than before. And yet, earlier we did have support, now after 
the house is completed, we have none”. Besides, part of the year they are 
completely cut off because the road up to the settlement is no longer kept 
open during winter, and erosion will make the upkeep difficult without 
municipal input – which they will not get. One organization has given them 7 
chickens, and a cow, whose milk they have to share with the others.  They 
were also promised 40 fruit trees by ‘some other organization’, but since they 
were unable to come up with the required self-contribution of a certain 
number of “tractor hours” – because they have no tractor – they expected the 
offer for the trees would be withdrawn. It was during the discussion on these 
international organizations that  Behram Murić said: 
 
“It is not a matter of making houses, it’s a matter of making a living”. 
 
While in displacement three of the Murić children have married.  Two 
daughters are staying with their in-laws, one within Mihatovici settlement.  
The only son, Abdullah, has also married and now has a small child. His new 
family and his two sisters now share the Murić flat in Mihatovici. When evicted 
– and with no other viable option open to them, they will most probably go 
back to their parents (and in-laws) in Samari. 
 
                                          
61 There turned out to be several NGOs working in the area, InterSOS and Islamic Development Trust 
being two of them. 
62 A letter we brought when visiting Muric in Samari was from their relatives living in Germany. Also this 
time there were DM 10 notes appearing when the envelope was slit open. 
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Fig.6.4.25 the Muric house recently rebuilt, bottom right. 
 
 
 
Fig.6.4.26 The Muric family (from left: daughter, mother, daughter in law, son, father). 
Picture taken in their provincial basement living room. 
 
The young Murić family would like to stay on in Mihatovici. Along with other 
young Mihatovicians, they have the human and social capacity to make the 
settlement a community, make it an “ordinary housing settlement” in line with 
the initial vision of NPA.  But this proves a pipe dream for the Muric ‘children’ 
now, as it was a pipe dream for NPA then. 
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6.4.6 Contribution Towards Local Capital Formation 
NPA settlement scheme is in many ways an archetype emergency intervention, in 
the later phases modified by being planned and constructed by local personnel from 
locally produced materials. Conceptually, it relates to the ‘provision models’ from 
the early ‘trickle-down’ days of development aid to housing (Rodwin 1987).63 The 
case of Mihatovici shows how NPA’s planning considerations and construction 
approach have affected the lives and livelihoods of the inhabitants.  At the same 
time there are wider contextual attributes that shape the way the inhabitants use, 
or are allowed to benefit from the settlement’s physical and environmental assets. 
By sifting evidence through the four-tiered environmental, fixed, human and social 
capital filter, I will be able to uncover the contribution towards recovery already 
made and the contributions expected, from this settlement project. 
 
.1) Environmental Capital Contribution 
Locating the settlement to the orchard on the brownfields of Sicki Brod set in 
motion the chopping down of altogether 12,000 fruit trees. With the outbreak of the 
war, the orchard was abandoned as a commercial enterprise and there was a free-
for-all attitude on the part of the settlement as well as the domicile population –“it 
was war”64 – the orchard was doomed.65 This represents a major environmental 
loss. It cannot be compensated for by the fields being used for grazing or for 
cultivation. Orchards are traditionally being used for grazing in BiH anyway, and the 
part used for cultivation is but a small part of the former orchard. 
 
On the other hand, the access to land has proved crucial for many of the IDPs. For 
those participating in the LWF program, annual incomes may reach more than DM 
4,000 for a family. Most people in the settlement have at least a patch where they 
can cultivate potatoes and vegetables.  Some land would have been made available 
even if NPA had succeeded in locating the settlement within Tuzla proper, but 
obviously the former orchard at Mihatovici opened up possibilities that were not 
available in the city.  In this respect, the formal planning arguments for locating the 
settlement where arable land was available have proven valid. 
 
The settlement is not part of the overall urban environment of Tuzla, neither 
geographically, nor morphologically, nor infrastructurally. Its contribution towards 
the wider environmental asset base of Tuzla is doubtful in as much as the spillovers 
                                          
63 The World Bank funded Palestinian housing projects implemented in the wake of the Oslo accord is 
also characterized by this ‘provision approach’. In his PhD work, Ghassan Elkahlout found that this 
approach may have come about by default rather than informed choice because of the inexperience of 
the Palestinian authorities (Elkahlout 2001). The NPA and NMFA shared a similar inexperience in 
housing. 
64 It is impossible to hold back on a personal story. During the very first days of the German occupation 
of Norway a stranger was discovered chasing our neighbor’s cattle up the Romsdal valley, away from our 
neighbor’s farm. When our neighbor finally got on to the cattle chasing stranger, asking him what the 
hell he was doing, stealing his cattle, the cattle chaser responded: “Nobody owns nothing when it’s 
war!”. An explanation our neigbor did not accept.  
65 The domicile population added another crucial argument for chopping the trees: this was the land of 
their forefathers, confiscated during the Tito era.  Now they were merely reclaiming it for cultivation. In 
effect, the land is still free-for-all although a new pattern is emerging based on the work actually carried 
out on each carved-out plot. 
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bring both depletion and capital gains to the other modes of societal capital. The 
man-made environment of the settlement itself holds potential for improvement, 
but as it stands today it carries all the visual connotations of a place for the 
marginalized. Its low status is fully acknowledged, albeit not accepted by the 
inhabitants. That is why they ‘almost physically attacked’ the ODPR director during 
the funeral ceremony for the boy drowned in the malfunctioning septic tank (see 
story at the end of this chapter). And that is why Elektrodistributia refrain from 
action against Mihatovici in spite of not paying their bills. Any other electricity 
customer not paying would have had their electricity cut off. 
 
The flow from the environmental capital embedded in the Mihatovici settlement 
thus shows an increase both in benefits and in liabilities.  Benefits are drawn from 
using the available arable land, which in turn further increases its capital value. 
There is an obvious spillover into human capital formation as new skills are 
acquired in growing vegetables and in green house cultivation. The loss of 
environmental capital due to the chopping down of the orchard was basically a 
result of negative spillovers from the depleted social capital base.  As such it amply 
illustrates how change in one capital mode spills over into a similar change in other 
modes. Similarly, the site – seen as environmental capital – at the very edge of 
Tuzla, behind a hill barely accessible, has no status.  After two weeks, one of my 
interviewees finally gave in: “It is really the bottom of the world”, he conceded. The 
joint ‘flow’ from the environmental and social capital does not make for appreciated 
benefits66. For sustainable benefits to flow, assets have to be replenished and the 
nature of the interaction must change. 
 
.2) Fixed Capital 
This is the origin of the intervention: constructing houses for the temporary 
houseless. The process of construction whereby a large number of future neighbors 
were engaged as day laborers proved very effective in contributing towards an 
amicable social relationship between the domicile and the settlement population. 
The buildings have already been analyzed and show that it is on the most 
permanent levels that the weaknesses are most apparent. The spiraling reciprocity 
between leaking roofs and the reluctance on the part of the inhabitants to do 
anything about it, starkly highlights how the physical structures, i.e. the fixed 
capital, interact with the social capital of the settlement, and in sum inhibit a 
platform for sustainable development from being properly created. 
 
The sheds, the ramshackle constructions made by the inhabitants, barely qualify as 
fixed capital. But they hold a reciprocal importance towards the initial housing, 
enriching both. These structures also stand as a genuine expression of life in the 
settlement, both in terms of sustaining a minimum level of independence and 
                                          
66 In a recent competition on first aid between youth groups in the region, the Mihatovici participants 
were reported to have hid their origin.  They were ashamed, much the same way, incidentally, that 
displaced Norwegians felt while living in temporary barracks awaiting their return home in the early 
years after WW II. 
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security67, and in terms of livelihood opportunities. It is fully acknowledged that 
they ‘look terrible’, but this is the best possible under the prevailing circumstances.  
In that sense they actually signify progress, the ability to cope, and stand as a 
genuine result of interaction between all the four modes of capital.  But they are 
but temporary structures, easily torn down. And in due course they will disappear, 
either intentionally as a consequence of economic progress, or simply through 
negligence. 
 
NPA built a community building and a school. Later, others built a kindergarten, a 
youth club and a gym hall.68  All these buildings strengthen the developmental 
potential of the settlement by countering its isolation. Along with the health clinic, 
these facilities are open to the people from outside the settlement.  Initially, very 
few parents from Mihatovici proper let their children attend the settlement school. 
The number of outside pupils has increased over the years, confirming the growing 
acceptance of the settlement population on the part of the people of Mihatovici 
proper.  It also shows that the practical benefits of having a school and a health 
clinic next door outshines any possible social division between the two groups.  
These elements of fixed capital69 produce obvious social and human benefits, 
making them the most important structures in the settlement.70 
 
.3) Human Capital 
The Mihatovici settlement may have replenished the human capital base of the area 
if its implementation and physical properties have enhanced the development of 
new capabilities or allowed old ones to be maintained, and by securing or improving 
peoples’ health and thereby their livelihood potential. 
 
Through the Mihatovici contract the contractors involved were allowed to retain and 
renew their basic organization and thus regain their strength as a major contractor 
in the Tuzla in the post-war era. Thus, the impact of engaging the ‘old’ Technograd 
was more significant for the re-development of Tuzla’s construction capacity than 
was keeping the small ones afloat (cf. NRC policy of engaging small private 
contractors), although both are required.  We have seen how the employment of 
local labor helped defuse tension between the settlement and the domicile 
population.  More significant in scope was employment itself, skilled and unskilled. 
Mihatovici was “the biggest ‘salary site’ in Tuzla”, according to the project manager. 
The material gains were obvious.  The psychological gains were highlighted by Dr 
Sutovic.71 “There’s no better therapy than being permanently employed”. 
 
                                          
67 One of the main reasons for building the sheds was to store, but also to secure a family’s property, 
their ”stuff”. Sheds could be securely locked; nothing in the houses could. 
68 Even before it was opened the building showed signs of subsiding and cracking, adding further 
liabilities onto the settlement. 
69 A similar, yet reciprocal relationship stems from the fact that the Settlement Board voted in favor of 
extending their water pipe system to include 18 houses in Mihatovici proper. 
70 This is further explored in the third case from Grapska.  It is not housing that creates social 
interaction and communal development, but the overarching structures, the collective activities that do.  
In BiH this has been a crucial element in developing and maintaining a multicultural society. 
71 Interview in Mihatovici February 2, 2000. 
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Only a small number of settlement laborers were engaged. The most significant 
spillover from the intervention and onto the inhabitants, i.e. from the fixed onto the 
human capital, has therefore taken place after the houses were completed. Being 
located in a fairly inaccessible cul-de-sac at the outer fringe of Tuzla has so far 
made the few employment opportunities available in urban Tuzla difficult to exploit 
for the people of Mihatovici. And besides, when employment is scarce, local social 
networks where IDPs are normally excluded, take on a decisive role.  However, as 
was presented in the introductory chapter on Tuzla, the industrial plants and 
factories are located west of the town center and in nearby Lukavac municipality.  
This is a favorable location for the Mihatovitcians. Although the days of high 
industrial employment died with the war and the ensuing privatization, the 
industrial plants and installations are still nearby and hold the potential of offering 
future industrial employment. This was yet another possible score for the planners’ 
formal arguments. 
 
The ‘secondary construction’, i.e. the school, the community building and the health 
center allow for a significant interaction with the human and social capital modes. 
The school definitely adds to the lives of the inhabitants, both instrumentally by 
providing education, but also socially by contributing to the children’s and thus 
society’s future (re)development. The children, the true Mihatovicians, provide 
tangible hope for their families and for the country.72  
 
The health condition of the population is chronically ‘bad’, as previously explained. 
The health center staff acts as a buffer against further erosion, i.e. erosion of the 
settlement’s human capital. They can do little, however, when it comes to the 
density of people in Mihatovici, which is held to be partly responsible for the ill 
health thus linked directly to the fixed capital provided. Again, a convincing 
illustration of the generic linkages or interaction between physical assets and those 
of human and social capital.  
 
There is no lived-in house that exists on its own. How it is used, i.e. the 
management of a house, is one of the operational constituents of this interaction. 
After 1997 the management of Mihatovici was made a municipal responsibility.  It 
was severely disabled by lack of funds and administrative capacity – in addition to 
the traditional prejudice against ‘intruding refugees’ whom are perceived to stay on 
indefinitely. And it is quite evident from what has happened thus far that the longer 
people stay under the current terms of tenancy, the more their bundle of human 
capital is depleted. This will make it all the more difficult to ‘re-enter’ post-war 
society and contribute towards its recovery. “Those who do leave, mostly leave the 
country”, the nurse said. 
 
.4) Social Capital 
I have already discussed the low level of trust prevalent in the settlement. There is 
a relationship to the other modes of capital, and the effects are negative.  But the 
                                          
72 And finally, after all these years, there are now (2003) firm commitments on the part of central 
government to fully integrate education, with the same curriculum for all ethno-religious groups. 
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distrust, the individualization, is embedded in the general condition of the post-war 
‘fend-for-yourself’ climate.  Having no data on the level of societal trust in 
Mihatovici as compared to, say, one of the permanent neighborhoods where NRC 
completed their houses, makes it difficult to state in any certain terms how the 
housing settlement and the approach that guided its planning and implementation 
have affected the level of social capital. Trust is low within the settlement itself, and 
from the data collected it is fairly easy to argue for it being in part the result of 
people having to live so close together.  The inhabitants are thus deprived of decent 
privacy and live so physically close that they are bound to run into personal 
conflicts aside from not being able – or willing - to take care of the physical 
environment. Above these private skirmishes lies a general distaste for being there 
in the first place. Staying in Mihatovici makes no sense to a large part of the 
population.  And staying in a place with no meaning, gives little guidance to action. 
 
A vicious – not a virtuous – circle has been created between the constituting capital 
modes of Mihatovici. To make this interaction re-developmental, assets have to be 
replenished in a way that changes the capital interaction.  
 
Two short stories on the identity of Mihatovici: 
To gauge the feeling of community here comes two Mihatovici stories. One 
was on the extremely gifted but mortally ill teenager who was flown to Italy 
for treatment, but later died. The other was on the child who drowned in the 
septic tank.  Both were tragedies well-publicized both in the national and 
international press. 
 
The first boy was born in a village near Srebrenica. He was so gifted that he 
was enrolled as a medical student at the university before he was 18.  He did 
his first year studies – passed with laurels – from his bed in Mihatovici. He 
was already seriously ill by then. Initiated by the settlement nurse money was 
collected after he and his case had been presented on Bosnian and 
international television and in other media. About DM 100,000 was collected, 
primarily from international sources, to pay for an operation abroad.  He was 
picked up by helicopter from the settlement and eventually flown to Italy. The 
treatment was successful. Upon return to Mihatovici he died from a common 
cold a couple of weeks later. His case drew attention to the settlement, and 
although Mihatovici was known among international agency personnel, this 
was the first time it had been repeatedly presented to the Bosnian public. In 
far as I saw it, this display of extraordinary talent, tenacity, commitment – 
and tragedy would represent a classic case of civic pride and mutual loss on 
the part of a community. But in Mihatovici it did not seem so. This happened 
one year before I was there. People still remembered the helicopter, but 
nothing much about the boy or the fact that their settlement was hot news for 
a while. “But people from his home village were very proud of him”, said the 
nurse, inadvertently giving away much about the (lack of) communal spirit in 
Mihatovici. 
 
The other story relates to a tragedy that took place after I left. I have already 
described the overloaded and overflowing septic tanks. A 6-year-old boy lost a 
ball down the open manhole and drowned trying to retrieve it. This also 
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became a national media event.73 This time, however, the people of Mihatovici 
acted like a community.  From what I have been told by participants, there 
was a burial ceremony which started out at the settlement with dignitaries 
from the municipality and the canton, and international agency 
representatives in addition to the inhabitants of the settlement. The incident – 
the tragedy - was directly related to the physical conditions under which the 
residents lived, and the perceived policy conducted towards them by the 
municipality. The ceremony doubled as a demonstration. The director of ODPR 
was present and was reportedly, “just about physically attacked” by some of 
the most aggressive residents. 
 
This elementary ‘joining of forces against a common enemy’ would have the 
potential of enhancing the creation of a community spirit, the formation of 
social capital in and of this very physical setting. But it was bound to fizzle. 
For who would be a constructive enemy to fight in post-war Bosnia? 
 
 
I recently learnt that the World Bank has conducted a BiH study on Local Level 
Institutions and Social Capital (World Bank 2002) where they also have examined 
(old and the new) Mihatovici. Their findings differ from mine in that they consider 
the divide between the domicile population and the IDPs as socially significant, 
whereas I saw the devide as weakening.74 There is a rising number of domicile 
pupils attending the settlement school, the health center is widely used by people 
from Old Mihatovici, traders and customers attend the settlement market, and 
intermarriages have taken place between people in Old and New Mihatovici. These 
are all a type of interaction that depends on certain levels of trust, although the 
settlement and Old Mihatovici are definitely perceived, at least by the older 
generation, as two distinctly different fields. 
 
The World Bank Study also portrays the Mihatovici population as a unified group 
acting against the domicile population and other bodies of authority.  I never saw 
that. In fact the internal situation got more and more grim the longer I conducted 
my investigations.  What people revealed after three weeks was a different 
community than was presented to me in the beginning. The World Bank team might 
have caught first stage information only. 
 
The World Bank’s general findings stemming from a representative survey of 675 
people all over BiH reveal the general state of deepening social distrust, or 
crumbling social capital. This has already been documented by UNDP (2002), and 
comes out in line with my specific findings from Mihatovici. 
 
 
                                          
73 I have been informed that these news reports also were presented in the Norwegian press without the 
added information that the settlement was actually the result of a Norwegian housing intervention. 
74 I cannot say ’statistically significant’, but neither could the World Bank. 
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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE VILLAGE OF GRAPSKA 
6.5.2. EXTERNAL LINKAGES; Regional Structure and Village Development 
As was done for the two Tuzla cases, I will provide a thick description on the vil-
lage’s external and internal linkages, how the village has been shaped by national 
and regional policies, and by internal social and physical processes.  These two per-
spectives give crucial guidance towards understanding the present activities and 
the rationale behind reconstruction priorities. 
 
.1) Industrialization, urbanization and the de-ruralization of Bosnia 
The post-WWII industrialization concentrated national investment in regional centers 
throughout Yugoslavia. Doboj became such an investment node due to its strategic impor-
tance in the country’s emerging communication network. It was made the ‘railway capitol’ of 
Yugoslavia alongside Vincovici in present-day Croatia.  For Grapska, located 12 km away 
from Doboj2, this meant access to a whole array of new employment opportunities. By 1990, 
Doboj was one of Bosnia’s 6 regional urban centers. Its population was a mere 28,000. 
However, an additional 15,000 people commuted daily. This was partly due to the city’s 
housing deficiency, but also because people preferred ‘the independence’ of living in private 
houses in their home villages. During this rapid post–WW II industrialization the number of 
people involved in agriculture fell dramatically in Yugoslavia, from 78% to 29% (Mazover 
1998;44). This also affected the demographic structure in Bosnia, but here, leaving agricul-
ture did not necessarily entail a parallel permanent migration to the cities. Instead, the coun-
try went through a process of ‘de-ruralization’ where the rural population took up employ-
ment in the newly established industries while remaining residents of their villages. Grapska 
was such a “de-ruralized” village. 
 
This phenomenon merits a broader presentation. It not only helps understand the context of 
the war in Bosnia3, it is crucial in understanding the reconstruction challenges of the country, 
and to assess the internationally funded housing reconstruction that has taken place during 
the last 8–10 years. 
 
By the early 1980s Bosnia had about 5500 villages, i.e. settlements with less than 2000 
people.  Of these, about 3300 had less than 400 inhabitants (Bogunovic & Pericsic 1983). In 
general, the villages were mono-ethnic, partly because of conversion during the Ottoman 
years often took place collectively (Mazover 1998).  In addition, people belonging to the 
same ‘millet’4 joined forces in settling and cultivating Bosnia as well as migrating within the 
region, thus creating the present ‘quilt of nations’ that is Bosnia.5  Thus, Grapska is located 
between Orthodox villages on either side, with Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim villages across 
the Bosna river. 
 
                                          
2 The same as the distance between Mihatovici and Tuzla in Case II. 
3 Throughout Mazover’s book on Balkan history (1998), he repeatedly return to the tension, even hatred, be-
tween the peasants in the mountains and the villagers on the plains. Milovan Djilas do likewise: “If the towns-
people, erstwhile peasants, had contempt for the peasants, the peasants, in turn, hated them, as animals hate 
traps whose location and purpose they know and yet cannot escape" (Djilas 1958:142). 
4 Millets‘ were ‘faith based nations’ in the Ottoman world. Grapska was part of the Muslim millet, their Serb 
neighbors belonged to the Orthodox millet.  This religious definition was in other words how ‘nations’ were 
conceived in the Ottoman period.  It deteriorated in the latter part of the 19th century as the modern, secular 
and ‘ethnic’ notion of nation took hold. 
5 A similar phenomenon appears in Lebanon, another ‘Ottoman country’: neighboring villages hold different 
faiths. 
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After 1945 the large agricultural estates were taken over by the state, whereas the 
smaller farms remained private.6 A large portion of Bosnia is hilly and steep, and so 
most farms here are small, smaller still through generations of intra-family parti-
tions – and therefore private.  In fact they were so small they could no longer sus-
tain the lives of their owners. Hence, mostly the men left for industrial work in the 
cities, either close by as was the case with Grapska, or further afield in other Yugo-
slav cities or abroad.7 Formal employment brought cash earnings and merited old-
age pensions. These earnings were brought back to support the (extended) family 
and finance new village investments, mostly new housing.  The industrialization of 
Bosnia in fact enhanced the reproduction of traditional values and village life-styles.  
This took place irrespective of the villages being mono-ethnic, as many were, or 
were spatially shared. Village life was life conducted and reproduced according to 
the habitus of each of the ethno-religious groups in an almost pre-modern ‘multina-
tionality’ (Andrić 1995, Bringa 1993). 
 
According to the 1991 Census these ‘de-ruralized’ villages held 37.2% of the Bos-
nian population, down from 46.5% in 1981. During this period a significant urbani-
zation took place, villages were deserted, while others grew into the ‘urban’ cate-
gory.  By 1991, 49.5% of Bosnia’s population lived in urban areas. Grapska was 
part of that figure, although it did not grow significantly during the 1980s, many 
left for ‘the modern life’ in the city. 
 
There is a strong prejudice towards the rural population in Bosnia, a pecking order 
affecting almost all communities; there is always a village smaller and more remote 
than one’s own.8 The de-ruralization process of re-enforcing ‘traditional values’ may 
thus explain the persistent bias between the urban population and the people from 
the villages that is so common in BiH.9 
 
In spite of this local patriotism or inter-village bias, extensive documentation and 
research have shown fundamental similarities between villages in BiH. Irrespective 
of its ethnicity, the physical and spatial imprints were similar, excluding religious 
buildings.  What made villages different in structure and concrete features were 
only their size and geographical location (Bogunovic & Pericsic 1983, Hamidovic 
                                          
6 According to the 1991 census, 53.26% of the land was state owned, the remaining 46.74 was owned pri-
vately, 45% of which was owned by Muslims, 42% by Serbs, and 13% by Croats 
(<http://ftp.yurope.com/ftp/pub/news/various/o2.txt>).  Pertaining to arable land, 94% of it was privately 
owned according to the World Food Programme’s Displacement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Final Draft, Rome 1999. 
7 By 1990, 8% of the Bosnian work force was employed as ‘Gastarbeiters’ abroad (Mønnesland 1995).  For a 
period the late 1960s–early 1970s Yugoslavia was the single largest exporter of labor in Europe.  In the 1980s, 
611,000 Yugoslav Gastarbeiters with their families were living in Germany (Williams 1996). 
8 The Serbs remaining in ‘their’ part of Grapska village throughout the war, saw Serb IDPs coming to occupy 
some of the abandoned Bosniak houses as nothing but ‘peasants’.  The same goes for the fleeing Bosniak vil-
lagers that came to Tuzla in 1992–1993: “Seljaki!” (“You peasants!”).  
9 In fact, the first explanation I was ever given on the causes of the war in BiH, was that it primarily was a war 
between the rural and urban population (presentation by Dr Amir Pacic, Røros, April 1994).  That claim still 
stands today (see Papic 2001). We have to bear in mind that the Bosniaks have always outnumbered the Serbs 
in the urban areas.  At the beginning of the 20 century half of the Bosniak population was living in the cities, 
while only 20% Serbs did.  By 1991, with a much higher level of urbanization, the Bosniaks were still the major 
urban ‘nation’ in BiH, according to data provided by the Geography Department of the University of Belgrade.  
This made Bogdan Bogdanovic, the famous architect and former mayor of Belgrade label the Serb aggression 
as an attempted murder of urban life.  He branded it “Urbicide”, giving name to a subsequent international 
exhibition on war destruction in BiH (Bogdanovic 1993). 
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2000).10,11 El-Masri & Kellett (2001) give a similar description of the villages in 
Lebanon.12 
 
Although the physical structures carry seemingly identical features, they carry dif-
ferent meaning within the different communities. So, if imprints are seemingly 
identical but interpretations different, what is the role of ‘culturally specific’ physical 
planning? How do planners interpret what they observe? And what is – or what 
should be – their response? The experience from the reconstruction of Grapska 
suggests a planning approach that deals with the ‘meaning of things’, developed 
through the ‘process of planning’ rather than aiming at the ‘product of planning’. 
 
Summing up the external linkage overview there are two sets of reconstruction and 
recovery-relevant issues to be highlighted. 
 
Firstly, rebuilding houses in de-ruralized villages of Bosnia will not support the re-
covery process, i.e. not as long as the destruction of its economic linkages and the 
required communication means are not replaced or substituted by other means of 
livelihood.  Without such substitution (intensified farming methods may be one pos-
sible strategy13), there is no economic logic – i.e. no livelihood basis – behind the 
international housing reconstruction. Without sustainable external linkages (or local 
innovation) the re-ruralization programs cannot be anything but programs for tem-
porary residence steered by international political goals and morally underpinned by 
convention based ‘rights of return’. A phrase often flagged by the present High Offi-
cer to BiH, Mr. Paddy Ashdown.14 
 
Secondly, the traditionally antagonistic relationship between rural and urban popu-
lations, exasperated by social tension between displaced ‘intruders’ and the ‘domi-
ciles’, especially that pertaining to housing,15 seems to give rise to an urban ‘send-
them-back’ sentiment.16 Although this lends support to the ‘politics of return’, what 
we see on the part of many IDPs is a struggling urban adaptation – or the shred-
ding of traditional lifestyles.  All rural migrants go through this as part of ‘moderni-
zation’. “When she arrived she could not tell time, by the time she left she was 
wearing mini-skirts”, one of the house owners in Tuzla said about an IDP teen-
                                          
10 This is also the case in Lebanon between Christian and Druze villages, and in Xian, China, between Chinese 
Muslim and Han Chinese communities.  By interpreting this as the objective structures, or imprints, of the 
habitus of these different societies, violent conflicts would require an outside source rather than internal one. 
11 Anecdotal observations and the writings of anthropologist Tone Bringa contest this claim (Bringa 1995). 
12 “Looking at the distribution of house types in Lebanon one is surprised that the composition of the country  
of a predominantly Christian northern part and the predominantly Druze and Muslim southern part is not ex-
pressed in the architecture. The religious affiliation of a family cannot easily be deduced from its habitation” (El-
Masri & Kellet 2001;539) 
13  LWF have initiated some greenhouse and vegetable production programs that have proved extremely suc-
cessful, firstly for IDPs in displacement and then for maintaining an initial support upon return. 
14 "We've invented a new human right here, the right to return after a war," (Guardian, 11 October 2002). 
15 A similar attitude was directed towards the IDPs from Northern Norway in the early post–WWII years. 
16 From numerous conversations with diplomatic and NGO staff, both local and expat, 1996–2002, and re-
corded at meetings with the Urban Planning Institute and the Faculty of Architecture, Sarajevo, and the Direc-
tor of Planning, Tuzla, and underpinned by the first strategic plan for the reconstruction of Sarajevo. 
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ager.17  The years in displacement have changed the existential preferences, the 
lifestyles of the people now called upon to ‘go back’. 
 
6.5.3. INTERNAL LINKAGES; Pre-War Grapska 
Before the war (Gornja og Donja) Grapska18 had a total population of about 280019, 
a figure fairly stable over the last 20 years.  The village had good public services, 
better than most other villages of its size, according to their own claims.  These 
services were shared among the population irrespective of where within the Grap-
ska basin they lived, i.e. what ethnic affiliation they claimed.  
 
.1) Origin and Composition 
According to Bosniak legends, Grapska was first settled by a Turkish officer named 
Huria during early Ottoman times.  Hence the name Hurtic, one of the main family 
names in the village.  Huria was married to a Bosnian girl, Murat, from which stems 
the other prevalent family name, Muratovic. Names play a significant role in Bosnia. 
For all practical purposes, that is how ‘ethnicity’ is determined.20  The founding of 
Grapska, being a tale of names, is a case in point. 
 
The topography of the village is a like a large amphitheater divided by a low ridge.  
To the South live the Bosniaks, to the North live the Serbs, cf. Figure 6.5.1. The 
division is not absolute. Land has been exchanged throughout time. In the Bosniak 
part there were some 25 houses belonging to Serbs ‘married into’ the Bosniak part. 
There were likewise Bosniak living next to Serbs in the northern part of the village.  
However, the overall division between the ethnic groups was echoed in space and 
in the topography of the land. Between the village and the river Bosna are large 
areas of agricultural river bed land which in pre-WWII was the main resource of the 
village, and the rationale behind the first settlements. 
                                          
17 Although this certainly is an exaggeration it indicates a general tendency of an inevitable shift in lifestyle. 
18 In the following, ‘Grapska’ will – when nothing else is noted – refer to the Bosniak part of the village, the 
part that was destroyed, and whose reconstruction has been the focus of my studies.  Gornja Grapska is the 
new ‘formal’ name of that part, whereas Donja Grapska refers to the predominantly Serb part.  
19 Which was – as were all population figures in BiH – split into Bosniaks (81%), Serbs (18%), Croats (0%), 
and ‘Others’, i.e. ‘Yugoslavs’ etc. (1%). 
20 However, in the early partisan days after WW II a campaign was launched to ‘exchange’ names.  Many today 
hold a Serb first name and a Bosniak family name and vice versa.  They had especially hard times during the 
recent conflict when passing checkpoints and ‘entity’ borders.  
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Fig.6.5.2 The Reconstruction Map of Grapska showing all pre-war houses (open squares) and 
those reconstructed (filled squares) + provisional buildings built by those who still wait for 
donations from ‘some organization’. January 2002. The picture below is taken from the 
southernmost part of the village looking North-north East. (For editorial reasons the map is 
slightly cropped) 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6.5.3 Grapska 2001 showing part of the rebuilt village with the agricultural fields in front 
towards the Bosna river 
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.2) Built Environment and Housing 
The built-up environment showed no ethnic distinction, except that in the Serb part 
there were more farm buildings within the village fabric. The Bosniak part, holding 
five times the number of people, was larger, denser, and therefore had a more ‘ur-
ban’ flair, although this was initially more due to subdivisions of land than urban 
intentions.  With the post–WW II growth followed more formalized planning re-
quirements.  The ‘urbanist plans’ from the 1950s and 1960s set out regular plots 
along the main road and side streets, irrespective of territorial perceptions.  This 
way, several Bosniaks also purchased plots within the Serb-dominated part of the 
village.   
 
Within Gornja (“upstream”) Grapska, the Bosniak part – which is the focus of this 
study – there were 584 inhabited houses at the outbreak of the war, according to 
the local reconstruction map. Although the village is old, the pre-war building stock 
was not.  The built environment was basically composed of typical Bosnian ‘con-
temporary vernacular’, i.e. two-story concrete structures with clay block infill walls, 
sometimes plastered, sometimes not. 
 
 
Fig.6.5.4 A pre-war picture of Grapska taken along the main road; the road which during the 
build-up towards war had been the Serbs’ ‘Boulevard of provocation’.  
 
.3) Village life, village organization 
It is impossible to present a ‘correct’ picture of what social life was like in pre-war 
Grapska. There are many pictures; each inhabitant would probably paint his own.  
People interacted irrespective of ethnic origin as they did throughout Bosnia up until 
the late 1980s. A small qualification is required:  The interaction was conditioned by 
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a traditional codex of behavior. An ascribed identity “we – them” was prevalent 
even in Grapska particularly among the old, whereas the young were not particu-
larly conscious about it.  By the outbreak of the war there were about 80 ‘mixed-
marriages’ in Grapska, which signified a ‘open and modern’ village. Today people 
see it otherwise. “There will be no mixed marriages any more, not for a long time”, 
said a Bosniak. “Now it’s all different. After all we did shoot at each other”, said his 
Serb neighbor a couple of days later. 
 
On average, 4 people inhabited each house.  The relatively large housing area per 
capita was due to two overlapping tendencies: rising affluence, and the demise of 
the extended family.  Traditionally, houses were built big enough to accommodate 
the families of sons. However, by the time of the war many of ‘next generation’ had 
built their own houses21, or had moved to flats in the city. In addition, one could 
discern a tendency in which the urbanized young no longer automatically moved 
back to the village to take care of their parents.  Now that the war has scattered 
young Grapska families all over the world, this is no longer a tendency.  It is a ma-
jor fact of life.  Its ill social effects will probably affect other more remote villages 
much more than it will affect Grapska.22 
 
During the Communist years each urban municipality, hamlet or village had its own 
Savjet Mjesne Zajedice , its own ‘Village Board’. Within the Doboj region, with its 
106,000 inhabitants, there were 60 such Village Boards. One of them covered 
Grapska.  It had 9 elected members, all men, it proved. These boards were nor-
mally not fora for ‘apparatchics’. “Ambitious politicians would never be satisfied by 
sitting in a local Board”.  Instead, it was “a local board of ‘elders’ supported by the 
young who wanted things to happen”, as one of the members recalled. This board 
had the responsibility of organizing and administering the public services.  These 
were provided if and when the local population did their share of work or carried 
their share of the cost. Ultimately, the level of public services in the village would 
be the resultant of three sets of actions: 1) Initiatives and activities organized by 
the Board; 2) Voluntary action, or “samo doprinos”23, and individual contributions 
carried by the population. This in turn reflected the legitimacy the Board’s prioriti-
zation; and 3) The direct or indirect resource support from the regional or central 
authorities, often in the way of tax exemptions. This accounts for some of the dif-
ference in service level among similar villages. 
                                          
21 Still “built big enough to possibly accommodate the next generation’s family”. 
22 Particularly, many of the reconstructed villages funded by international donors will be badly affected because 
of their very high mean average age (in a return and reconstruction program comprising about 2900 returnees, 
SRSA recorded an mean age of 54.25 years), and the lack of institutional resources – and often political will – 
to provide services to the needy. Conditioning housing support on ‘return’, irrespective of future prospect of 
development the international community, has willfully contributed to these oncoming difficulties. 
23 “self-involvement”, or ‘voluntary action’, equivalent to the Norwegian “dugnad”. 
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Fig.6.5.5 Members of the Savjet Mjesne Zajedice, or Village Board of Grapska, plus one out-
sider.  January 2002. 
 
As for Grapska, the inhabitants funded and built river embankments, had the main 
streets tarred, had street lights erected, administered the Community Hall – and 
successfully lobbied the municipality into building a health centre, a community hall 
and a post office.  The inhabitants joined forces and built the village water tank, 
and pump station, and laid out the sewerage system and the water distribution 
network. This water distribution network was laid out in the 1980s when the na-
tional economy showed clear signs of contraction, and the nationalistic movements 
were becoming equally expansive throughout Yugoslavia.  Locally, this resulted in a 
Serb call for the division of Grapska, into a ‘Gornja’ (upstream), Bosniak and a 
‘Donja’ (downstream) Serb part.   Donja Grapska was thus never linked up to the 
water system:  “When it came to paying their share, the Serbs would not stick to 
the agreement, so we never provided pipes onto their part of the village”.  To which 
the Serbs retorted: “the Muslims would never give us access to the water”.  During 
the years of displacement the water pipes and sewerage system was systematically 
ripped up and destroyed (or sold). 
 
It is worth emphasizing the ‘multi-ethnic’ role of the collective action in implement-
ing public services or infrastructural improvements. This was a neutral arena for 
mutual improvement of life, for institutional development, for the sort of (secular-
ized) modernization that in urban centers has led to an increase in ‘mixed mar-
riages.  It was in such arenas rather than in the realm of the home that the ‘multi-
ethnic’ dimension of society was played out.  The ethno-religious identity was mu-
tually respected. What one group ‘had to do’ as part of their religious practice was 
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respected by the other. Yet, in working together on the village infrastructure, no 
religious identity had to be observed at all. This changed in Bosnia in the late 
1980s. 
 
.4) Livelihoods 
Out of the 2.800 people residing in the whole of Grapska, less than 20% of the 
population made their living from farming, with less than 10% of the work force 
employed in agriculture.  Given the small individual land holdings, land was leased 
and farm produce bartered to make farming viable.24 
 
True to her ‘de-ruralized’ status most of Grapska’s population was employed in Do-
boj, the municipal center 12 km further upstream. The 2002 Board secretary esti-
mated that about 80% of those employed worked in Doboj, Modrica and other local 
towns, about 10% worked abroad or in the major cities of Yugoslavia, and the rest 
were self-employed or worked in public service or in agriculture. Due to its prox-
imity to Doboj, Grapska’s population was well-educated. 80 of its pre-war inhabi-
tants held a university degree, according to the Board secretary. 
 
.5) Politics and the emerging Crisis 
As expected, the 1990 elections ended with landslide victories for the nationalist parties. By 
now Grapska was divided. SDA (the Muslim nationalist party) won Gornja Grapska and SDS 
(the Serb nationalist party) won Donja Grapska.  These first democratic elections legitimized 
and elevated national extremists, certainly no democrats, into power.  In a way, it 
represents a democratic short circuit, disabling the very system of governance the elections 
were set out to guide. 
 
“It was the elections, not the violence, that started the destruction of Bosnia”, says Ekrem 
Buljabasić, a member of the Village Board and former mechanical worksmith in the National 
Railways, working in Doboj. 
 
 
4.5.4. LINKAGES RIPPED; The War and its Aftermath 
.1) The Serb Anschluss, and the Bosniak Expulsion May 199225 
On May 10, at 12.00 noon, heavy Serb artillery initiated a systematic destruction of 
Grapska. From all around the village, and most seriously from artillery positions on 
the fields right in front, high caliber shelling of the Bosniak part of the village con-
tinued for the rest of that day. At least 50 houses were burning when darkness fell. 
There was total confusion. People were being killed or wounded, with no one to 
help. Families were left to fend for themselves, hiding in cellars – or trying to flee.  
Some stayed below ground until the next day. When they emerged they were taken 
                                          
24 The wealthiest man in Grapska, Ahmet Besic, initially only owned 100 da (10 ha).  By the time of the 
war he ran a large beef cattle farm with well over 100 heads of cattle, had three tractors, two combine 
harvesters and the largest house on the most conspicuous site in Grapska. Now everything is gone; 
stolen and destroyed. Besic died during the war, so did one of his two sons, the other son will not return.  
25 The attack on Grapska and the subsequent killings are included in the war crime indictments both against 
Yugoslavia’s President Milosevic and Republika Srpska’s President Plavsic. 
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prisoner by the Bosnian Serb forces.  The stay-behinds were later shot; their graves 
have still not been found.26 
 
The story of the expulsion from Grapska is the embodiment of ‘ethnic cleansing’.27  
The people assisted in my two previous cases could have given similar stories of 
threats, fear and eventual expulsion. These experiences make fundamental referen-
tial nodes in any subsequent ‘network of meaning’ for all present-day displaced 
people (Porteous & Smith 2001).  For many people these experiences also made 
dramatic impacts on their health and their subsequent ability to cope with the on-
coming difficulties. Subsequently, for any action to make sense, it will in some way 
have to refer back these incomprehensible acts of expulsion.28 
 
 
EKREM BULJABASIĆ’s STORY ON THE EXPULSION FROM GRAPSKA 
 
Fig.6.5.6 One of the most 
moving experiences I encountered 
in Bosnia was sitting in Ekrem Bul-
jabasic’s living room watching an 
old photograph of Ekrem with his 
arms around two smiling Grapska 
girls.  It vibrates with beauty, 
smiles, and optimism. The snapshot 
was taken around 1980. Today one 
of the girls is a soldier’s widow living 
in Germany, the other lives with her 
family in Denmark – and Ekrem, still 
an optimist of sorts, is restarting life 
in Grapska. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“He’s either stupid or brave - probably both”, his neighbors say when we go 
through what Ekrem did in the early years after the war.  The first one to re-
visit Grapska in early 1996, he brought food stuff and flour to the group of 
                                          
26 There is a deep and persistent resentment against the neighboring Serbs because the returning Grapskani-
ans feel that their neighbors know where the missing Bosniaks are buried, but will not tell.   
27 It also holds biblical references.  War stories often do.  In war myths and realities seem to interact. 
28 A Grapska refugee now living in Germany told how her father saw no meaning in leaving his house in Grap-
ska that day in May.  He has never been heard of  since. (http://www.grothe.org/bosnien/mb.html). 
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displaced Serbs who were then occupying some of the Bosniak houses in the 
village.  More than anything he wanted “to see what was Grapska now, just to 
sit, to have a cigarette, just to feel what it was like”.  He was also the first one 
to rebuild his house after the war.  Years before that, on the very day of the 
Bosniak expulsion his very ‘stupid or brave’ ways secured his exit from 
Grapska. Dressed up as a Muslim woman he was allowed to board one of the 
buses that were taking the women and children out of the village.  Most of the 
other men were taken to concentration camps.  Many were shot. 
 
Ekrem Buljabasić is 45 years old, married with no children, and carries one of 
the original Grapska family names.  With his wife, also a Grapska girl, they 
live on a family plot where the families of Ekrem’s two brothers also have their 
houses. During the war his brother, Tarik, settled in the US, in Atlanta, 
Georgia, where he lives in the vicinity of about 20 other Grapska families. 
Still, he has had his house in Grapska rebuilt, primarily by Ekrem. The other 
brother who spent two years in a Serb concentration camp is still displaced 
within BiH, but he will return permanently when his house is completed in the 
spring of 2002.  
 
Grapska entered the emerging disaster in early 1991.  A local mobilization 
order was issued to all young males to join the reserve army or the local 
police.  All the 120 Grapska draftees deserted – while all the Serb youth 
joined. They were given uniforms and guns: “That was the point of no return.  
Now the Serbs were armed”. 
 
Ekrem was called to join a new police unit established in Grapska. The 
following year was tense. Serb intimidation caused fear among the Bosniak 
population. When the JNA (Yugoslav National Army – in Bosnia renamed 
‘Bosnian Serb Army’) entered Doboj on May 1 1992, the writing was on the 
wall. All telephone lines were cut, Serb roadblocks were built and new identity 
cards were issued to all non-Serbs. In trickles, Bosniaks started to flee.  Some 
even had the foresight to take their tractors and other valuables along small 
back roads to place them in safety further South.29  Ekrem, as most others, 
never came around to doing that. 
 
“On May 8 it got serious”.  On that day the JNA arrested a Grapska family who 
were fleeing South. At the same time Bosniaks from another village, 
threatened by hooded Serb paramilitary units, were fleeing into Grapska 
giving evidence of things to come. The next day, on May 9, Grapska was given 
an ultimatum: “Hand over 400 guns within 12 hours – or face the 
consequences”.  They knew well that there were no “400 guns” in Grapska. 
 
“No-one knew what do to.  We were not prepared for this, had no experience 
with this sort of thing. We responded – by building barricades and close the 
only road between Modrica and Doboj!!!”. This way they were actually able to 
arrest 20 JNA soldiers. This act immediately reopened the telephone lines. The 
deadline was extended. 
 
By now Grapska was totally surrendered.  The Village Board and the local 
police station pleaded with the Serbs to let the women and children out; there 
were about 1000 still in the village. “Only if the 400 guns are handed over”.  
The next day the 20 soldiers were exchanged with the arrested Grapskanian 
                                          
29 The same story my own family went through in Norway in 1940. 
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family.  By now the Serbs opened the telephone every 15 minutes to reiterate 
their demand for the “400 guns”. 
 
“The ultimatum was extended until 12.00 noon. Then they would attack.  The 
last contact was at 11.00. At 11.20 the first grenade – a dead one – was sent 
from Kladanj, a deserted Bosniak village on the other side of the river – as a 
warning.  It hit a house”. 
 
At 12.00 full artillery attack. Total confusion.  Shelling continuously.  From all 
directions. People tried to hide in cellars, others stood in the river under the 
bridge.  Many killed. Children even. “Your own people - killed”. Impossible to 
exercise any leadership.  No communication.  Heavy bombardment went on 
for two hours. New ultimatum for “400 guns”. “We couldn’t accept.  We had 
no guns!  – so they started again”.  By now heavy artillery was positioned in 
front of the village and wrought further havoc.  
 
 
Fig.6.5.7 This picture is taken a little to the north of where the artillery was positioned. 
From their standpoint the Serbs had the semicircular sloping village of Grapska right in 
front. It was slaughter. 
 
A new revised ultimatum was issued: “Present all guns – and all people!”  
“Many tried to escape through the woods, others swam the river.  Some made 
it – some did not.  It was total panic! No one had any idea!  Total confusion”!  
They were then ordered to line up on the main road with Serb soldiers 
guarding on either side.  All the men and boys were taken out of the queue 
and eventually sent to prisons and concentration camps.  They were beaten 
badly.  Many died. 8 were shot while in prison in Doboj. The women, children, 
old men – and Ekrem - were sent through on buses organized by the Serbs.  
 
“I was sidelined by a Serb officer I knew and asked to go back to the village 
and collect the sick people.  I never did.  I wrapped a shawl around my head 
and made it into a bus nearby.  I could see my brother in the queue.  He 
ended up in Manjaca.  A women outside the bus saw me and started to 
scream “Ekrem, Ekrem!!”, but no one took notice of her”. 
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“In situations like these you only think of yourself”. 
 
The people were sent off without any belongings, no papers, no money, no 
extra clothes.  Later, all what was left was either stolen or destroyed. 
 
The buses took them to another Bosniak village closer to Doboj. Some went 
on the next day. Others stayed. Nobody knew anything about what was 
happening or what would happen - to themselves or to their men, to their 
homes in Grapska – or to the war. Eventually all were forced to go further 
South. Some kept on moving within Bosnia, others went abroad.  Ekrem 
eventually ended up in the nearby town of Gračanica. 
 
The Serb (paramilitary) forces in Grapska were under the command of Nikola 
Jorgić, a notorious gangster who had lived in Germany for 23 years. He was 
later tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity for his deeds in 
Grapska.  He was given five consecutive life sentences.30 
 
 
.2) The Interregnum:  Displacement, Exile and Post-War Destruction 
Immediately after the expulsion no one knew what to make of what had happened, 
or what the future would bring.  They stayed with Bosniak friends and relatives in 
the vicinity.  During these weeks many Serbs put their own lives at stake to help 
Bosniak friends escape from the Serb confines. The current chairman of the Grap-
ska Village Board was saved from execution that way. As the contours of a Serb 
entity emerged, many people from Grapska left the country altogether.  There are 
no reliable figures, but various sources from the village indicate that at least 20% 
of the Grapska families have left the country for good, to Germany, USA, Sweden, 
Denmark, and Norway where two Grapska families now live.  In addition, there 
were single family members, particularly the young, who during the uncertain times 
of 1992–1993 left and have since settled permanently abroad.31 When also consid-
ering that about 50 Grapskanians worked abroad before the war and never re-
turned, we see Grapska gradually becoming part of a globalized network. This net-
work has proved to be crucial to Grapska’s reconstruction and return process. 
 
Most of those who remained in the country eventually settled in those municipalities 
on the Federation side closest to Grapska. Although many of the men served in the 
Bosnian Army32, and some were employed by international organizations, most 
families were dependent on external support to survive.  In addition to the food 
parcels from international organizations, the internally dispalced Grapska popula-
tion was soon to be supported by the Grapska diaspora.  As early as June 1992 the 
Grapska Gastarbeiters started sending food and clothing to displaced Grapskanians 
                                          
30 After the verdict the presiding judge, Günther Krentz said to Associated Press, “Whoever hoped something 
like the genocide of the Nazis against the Jews could never be repeated sees himself cruelly disappointed after 
the events in the former Yugoslavia'' (http://www.applicom.com/twibih/twib1104.html). 
31 There could well be about 1000 Grapskanians living abroad by now. 
32 The army normally paid salaries in kind, often in smuggled cigarettes, or the soldiers were allowed to loot 
Serb property, and later also Croat property. In Doboj Istok it is openly reported that the soldiers grew marihu-
ana for sale.  
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in Doboj Istok.33 The volume of this support grew with the increasing number of 
Grapska refugees.  This constituted a ‘pull effect’ towards the villages in the region 
close to Grapska.34  To take care of the distribution of the goods from the diaspora 
in a transparent way, the Village Board was reassembled, but only ‘temporarily’ 
since many of its members were dead or living elsewhere. “Everything was signed 
for”, ensured the Board secretary. This growing influx of support was organized 
through Zagreb, where a Grapska family purchased and packed parcels that were 
forwarded to Doboj Istok and Gracanica through one of the informal distribution 
systems that operated throughout the war.35  Initially they rented a garage36 as 
their ‘dôm cultura’37, their community hall and distribution centre, but by 1996 they 
actually received a prefab house as a prize for being the best organized return 
community in the region.38 They could not function without a place for meetings, 
nor for transit storage of goods. In 1996, about the same time they moved into the 
prefab in Brijesnica, they formally elected a new Village Board. 
 
The interregnum of Grapska in exile uncovered how dependent the village proved 
to be on foreign contacts, a sort of ‘bottom-up globalization’. Not only did the Grap-
ska diaspora eventually help finance much of Grapska’s reconstruction, it instigated 
the reorganization of the village board which was later to prove crucial in setting up 
the reconstruction process.  The importance of this self-organization was recog-
nized locally by the provision of a residential building for the Board to use, not to 
shelter homeless individual Grapskanians, but to support the collective process of 
return.  In internationally funded return interventions, we do not often see that sort 
of priorities. 
 
.3) The Post-War Destruction of Grapska 
The Dayton Accord held the promise of return for the displaced Grapskanians, and 
caused fear of their return on the part of their Serb neighbors.  “That’s when”, one 
of the Serb neighbors said to me, “ I understood that, after all, there would be a 
Turk’s cow eating grass on my grave”.  An organized resistance against the Bosni-
aks returning instigated a renewed destruction of their property. This was carried 
out as a ‘networked destruction’. It involved the SDS party, i.e. the local authori-
ties, the neighboring Serbs – plus the Serb IDPs that had settled in some of the 
empty, but still partly habitable houses in Grapska.  The Serb IDPs had themselves 
been chased from the villages of Panjik in the Ozren Mountains North-West of Tuzla 
                                          
33 Doboj Istok is a new municipality established as part of the Dayton Agreement, It is comprising that part of 
the former Doboj municipality which was located within the Federation, whereas Doboj Municipality remained 
within RS. 
34 Klokotnica and Brijesnica in the Doboj Istok municipality and Gracanica, Pribave, Lohinja, Stjepan Polje and 
Lukavica in Gracanica municipality.  These villages held most of the displaced Grapskanians during the war. 
35 During the war The Open Society Network was to set up a distribution system through which the Bosnian 
refugees could send parcels and post to family and friends within Bosnia.  The feasibility study, however, 
showed that a satisfactory distribution system, albeit informal, was already in place and so no new system was 
needed. 
36 Paying an exorbitant DM 100/month. 
37 “House of Culture”, Community Hall 
38 It has been impossible to identify the donor.  Sometimes the Tuzla Municipality is named, sometimes the 
SDA party, sometimes “some organization”.  This is not primarily to hide the facts, but exemplifies the “some-
organization syndrome”.  All organizations were perceived as part of a large organizational maze.  It was like a 
lottery, it was your luck, not your needs that made the difference. 
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during the 1995 Bosniak-Croat offensive. The story of their expulsion is unasham-
edly similar to the story of the expulsion from Grapska. 
 
 
 
Fig.6.5.8 The upper picture shows Hamid Spreco’s House in Grapska in the Summer of 1999 
as they were clearing the site for reconstruction and return. The house had been torched and 
sought destroyed by smashing the walls. The roof timber was most probably dismantled and 
re-used on some other house or sold. The lower picture shows the house after it was dyna-
mited in August 1999 a mere week before the first UNHCR organized return visit. Having 
stayed abroad during the war Hamid Spreco did not qualify for SRSA support. Doing a full 
reconstruction from private funds alone was beyond his means. He was still in displacement 
looking for donors during my last visit in the Spring of 2001. 
 
By the end of the war more than half of the houses in Grapska were still partly hab-
itable, although damaged and looted, according to pieced-together information. The 
52 IDP families from Panjik had settled in the houses closest to the domicile Serbs.  
This renewed post-war destruction had a triple set of objectives: 1) Make the 
houses where the Serb IDPs lived fully functional by stripping usable items and in-
stallations from the other houses in the village, and 2) Sell and trade whatever sur-
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plus material the stripping allowed. This was at a time of early reconstruction; with 
an expressed demand for water pipes, taps, electrical switches, cables, joinery, etc. 
– not to mention movables which were looted much earlier, such as furniture, farm 
equipment, machinery, cars, tractors, and livestock.39 All were stolen and sold. The 
ultimate goal was, however, to 3) Ensure that the Bosniak population would not (be 
able to) return. Why is it so important for them to live here?!  Why could they not 
go somewhere else?!”, one of their Serb neighbors said to me – echoing the rheto-
ric of similar conflicts elsewhere. 
 
This post-war ’networked destruction’ rolled on for 4 years. The last house to be 
blown up was destroyed in August 1999, a mere week before the first UNHCR bus 
brought Bosniaks back to start preparing for the reconstruction. By the time the 
reconstruction started almost all houses not inhabited by the Serb IDPs were de-
stroyed ‘beyond repair’, i.e. >70%.40 
 
In Grapska most of the houses were destroyed beyond repair – after the war was 
over.  Similar stories abound.41  Not only people’s houses, but significant historical 
buildings were obliterated as well.42 
 
This was also the case in the villages where Grapska’s Serb IDPs came from. The 
Ozren area was 100% Serb before the war. At the very, very end of the war, in 
mid-September 1995, they were all forced to flee their homes.  By that time there 
lived several thousand displaced survivors from Srebrenica in the region.  With the 
Serbs out, one of the villages, Donja Brijesnice, was taken over by some 140 fami-
lies from Srebrenica. In May 2002 they were still living there. In the meantime, all 
the other Serb settlements which were left standing in 1995 were totally destroyed, 
not by artillery, but by dynamite in a concerted ‘networked action’ in which the local 
Bosniak authorities, i.e. the SDA-party, most probably have played their part. This 
mutual experience of forced displacement shared by the Grapska IDPs and the Pan-
jik IDPs set in motion a unique interaction. It constituted the prelude to the recon-
struction of Grapska.  
 
 
                                          
39 Before the war, according to pre-war statistics, there were 48 tractors, 38 trucks, 75 two-wheel tractors, and 
210 cars in Gornja Grapska.  In addition, there were 569 cattle, 31 horses, 175 sheep and 49 goats. 
40 IMG (International Management Group) was set up to assess the damage and advise on building and infra-
structure to the UNHCR.  They established a grading system for damage assessment.  Here destruction ‘beyond 
70%’ was deemed ‘destroyed’. 
41 Right after Dayton, Scottish European Aid made a preliminary assessment of about 20,000 houses/flats in 18 
potential reconstruction towns and villages in central BiH: 54% of the houses suffered only minor damages, 
caused primarily by military action and light artillery; 38% were severely damaged, primarily from burning, 
much of it presumed to be the result of arson; the remaining 13% were totally damaged through bombard-
ment, but also through dynamiting (Murray 1995). When the IMG did their damage assessments two years 
later, their figures might be interpreted as indicating a wider destruction. 
42 Professor Hamidovic has estimated that 50 historically significant buildings were destroyed in Bosnia – after 
the signing of the Dayton Agreement (private conversation May 2002). 
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Fig.6.5.9 A displaced Serb couple living in what was once a chicken house in Grapska. Note 
the ‘new’ door and the chopped out electrical wiring. Upon return of the Bosniak owner the 
couple was evicted. 
 
 
Fig.6.5.10 They returned to nothing at their desolate place some kilometers from the village 
of Panjic in the Ozren Mountains. Their house had been totally destroyed. They are starting 
up building a new house (the construction to the left). In the summer of 2001 they lived in 
the plastic covered structure to the right. Their present situation is unknown. 
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6.5.5 AGENCY OF RETURN AND RECONSTRUCTION;  
         International Engagement And Local Agency 
 
.1) Structural opposition against return 
The term ‘agency’ refers both the social theory definition, that of acting upon one’s 
own decisions – and the concrete reference to organizations working in the field, 
e.g. UN agencies.  The latter would like see agency synonymous with ‘intentional 
actor’.  This is not, however, how Giddens defines ‘agency’ in his structuration the-
ory.  For agency to interact in reciprocity with ‘structure’, agency is defined as the 
‘actor who has a choice of acting otherwise’. This highlights day-to-day activities 
within an immediate time frame, but where the potential of acting strategically – 
and thereby make an impact on structure – is a possible option (Giddens 1984).43  
Return and reconstruction are very much strategic choices.  Displacement came 
about through structural disruption, return will bring about change in structure 
through altered institutional systems and rules which govern the day-to-day lives of 
people living together. 
 
Throughout Bosnia the displaced people were at first afraid to go back into ‘minority 
areas’ in spite of the ‘right of return’ granted in Appendix 7 to the Dayton Agree-
ment. They were afraid for their lives.44  This fear was based on distrust of institu-
tions.  These institutions constitute the ‘structure’ against which we interact as 
agency.  The Dayton Agreement endorsed an institutional system, the partition of 
Bosnia into two entities, which in its structural nature opposed the return of minori-
ties. The institutional changes necessary for minority groups to be able to return, 
came about through the intervention of ‘intentional actors’ as well as local people 
acting strategically. It was about their lives. 
 
.2) Preparing for return to Grapska 
It was not until April 1996 that Ekrem Buljabasić filled his car with foodstuff and 
flour45 and passed the invisible – yet sharply perceived - border back into Grapska.  
The foodstuff was for the destitute Serb IDPs now living in the village, but delivered 
for tactical reasons: as long as they stayed there, the houses would not be de-
stroyed. Later it was revealed that the domicile Serbs in fact had tried to move the 
Serb IDPs out in order to destroy these houses as well. Having nowhere else to go, 
the IDPs stayed put. Subsequently a formal food distribution system was estab-
lished between the IDPs from Grapska and the Serb IDPs living in Grapska. 
 
Although more Grapskanians sneaked back for short visits, at this stage there were 
no plans for organized return. The fact that many of the Grapska IDPs gradually 
had settled close to Grapska was partly in preparation for return, but also to get 
                                          
43 Giddens operate with three categories of time, “durée of day-to-day experiences: reversible time”; “life span 
of the individual: irreversible time”; and “longue durée of institution: reversible time” (reversible meaning that 
the same actions tend to be repeated and reproduced in this mode of time). (Giddens 1984) 
44 Numerous incidents were reported of people being violently attacked – some even killed – upon return to 
their former homes.  The most famous being when Muslims from East Mostar wanted to visit the graves of their 
relatives in West Mostar.  They were attacked and a number of the mourners were shot to death – by what 
later proved to be members of the West Mostar police corps. 
45 Originally donated to the Grapska communities then living in Doboj Istok and Gracanica. 
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closer to the distribution centre for provisions organized through the re-emerging 
Grapska Village Board. Some of those living further off complained about not being 
included in the distribution chain 
 
.3) International involvement 
The reconstruction of Bosnia and the assistance rendered to the displaced has in 
many ways been a game. Donors were eager to fund programs aiming at ‘perma-
nent solutions’ that would enable people to return to their former homes.46 But out 
of the simple fact that there was not sufficient funding for all destroyed houses to 
be rebuilt, some areas were selected ahead of others.  Even in the communities 
selected, only a portion of the destroyed houses were funded for reconstruction.   
This selection, arbitrary as it often was,  will carry consequences for the regional 
development of BiH, whether the selection was done with this in mind or not. Lack-
ing any overall strategy, the international housing interventions would basically be 
implemented according to choices resting on the contextual perceptions and profes-
sional capacity (or lack thereof) of the field staff of the NGOs.47 There were no 
physical or regional planners involved, making the selections as to which communi-
ties were to be rebuilt, and which ones were not, dependent on a number of seem-
ingly arbitrary determinants, however much the UNHCR and later the OHR acted as 
‘coordinators’ (Skotte 2003). 
 
Whatever the formal criteria for support, catching the attention and interest of 
”some organization” came to be a crucial first step towards local reconstruction. 
 
During their displacement the people from Grapska participated in this fight for at-
tention. Through the regional UNHCR office in Tuzla they pressed for reconstruction 
funds. UNHCR acted as something between an information broker, a project coordi-
nator and a donor.  Formally  UNHCR was the ‘Lead Agency’48 of the international 
organizations working in BiH. Still, the many NGOs acted as sovereign bodies but 
still kept close links with UNHCR both because of the funds they commanded and 
because the various donors often required a UNHCR recommendation to release 
funds to the NGOs.  These recommendations were normally issued as a matter of 
course when NGOs presented a proposal for housing reconstruction. UNHCR never 
reached the role of co-coordinator (Cutts 1999). 
 
By the summer of 1999, Murat Hurtic, a member of Grapska’s Village Board ap-
proached the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) while they were preparing a 
housing project for displaced Serbs near Zwornik. By then the Grapska call to 
UNHCR had brought off response from a large American NGO, World Vision (WV). 
                                          
46 This is well grounded in the principles of the UNHCR where ‘return’ is seen as the principal ‘durable solution’, 
with ‘assimilation’ within the country of refuge as the second solution and  ‘settlement in 3rd country’ as the 
third alternative policy towards refugees. IDPs are, in principle, dealt with in a similar manner. 
47 Made evident in a Final Report from one of the large international NGOs: “If our goal was to (…), we more 
than succeeded. However, if our goal was to (…), we did not”. 
48 As instituted by the UN Secretary General (UNSG) UNHCR were also empowered, again by the UNSG, to deal 
with ‘all people in need’, including the IDPs, which in fact is a matter for the UN General Assembly to decide, 
because the UNHCR is established to care for displaced people having crossed international borders, i.e. refu-
gees, and not those still within the country, the internally displaced. Bosnia was UNHCR’s first major arena, 
where they also took on the responsibility for protecting IDPs. 
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They presented a reconstruction project of 50 houses – the anticipated minimum to 
reach an acceptable level of security. In addition, the Municipality of Tuzla had 
agreed to fund the rough structure of 9 additional houses.  For undisclosed reasons, 
World Vision suddenly pulled out.49 This happened about the time SRSA’s Zwornik 
project stalled. There, the Serb target group refused to leave the Bosniak houses 
they occupied.  Neither did they accept to participate in the reconstruction of their 
own houses. They wanted ‘key-in-hand’. “Instead I gave them a kick in the ass”, 
said Kaj Gennebäck, head of SRSA in BiH. SRSA pulled out – with funds to spare. 
 
After SIDA and SRSA’s preliminary investigations and visits these funds, around 1.4 
mill DEM were made available for the reconstruction of Grapska, and more was to 
follow. 
 
.4) SIDA’s Approach to Housing Support in BiH 
Sweden and Norway were some of the first donor countries to provide housing sup-
port in BiH.  SIDA financed a number of housing projects as early as 1993 in the 
Tuzla region. From these initial housing projects conceived and implemented as 
emergency projects, yet permanent in nature, SIDA gradually developed a housing 
approach based on the principle of self-help.  At a seminar in February 2001, they 
summed up their housing accomplishments and policies like this: 
“Sida [has] financed reconstruction of over 8,000 homes in the Balkans since 1995, 
mainly through self-help for both private houses and apartments. Self-help is not 
used to save money. House reconstruction is an integral part of our integrated area 
programmes, an approach we started in BiH in late 1995. The money “saved” 
through self-help is better used to finance reconstruction of local infrastructure, 
community buildings such as schools and clinics, and job creation, to support a sus-
tainable return. To use self-help is not a question of money as it carries values that 
cannot be measured”. (Mossberg & Iwansson 2001;2) 
 
In implementing this strategy SIDA has channeled their funding through a limited 
group of NGOs each working in different regions of the country.50  This enables the 
organizations and their staff to accumulate knowledge and thus improve the quality 
and efficiency of their work.  In addition, this allows for donor flexibility – as shown 
with the Grapska funding case – which allows for progressive interaction between 
implementing agency and donor.  Concentration also means fewer, but larger pro-
jects, which would allow for an anticipated ‘laser effect’ to take place, i.e. a self-
generated return or reconstruction. The geographical concentration of housing pro-
jects for minority return also entails mutual security and a potential local political 
impact. 
 
                                          
49 No records are available to explain this pull-back, which again illustrates how dependent the reconstruction – 
and peoples’ future - were on what seemed like whims or reorientation of the NGOs.  Creating false hopes or 
breaking promises towards target groups had no bearing on the functionality of the NGOs, only their account-
ability towards the donor did. 
50 Cross Roads International (CRI) works out of Zenica, Caritas/Switzerland in Sarajevo, the World Lutheran 
Federation (LWF) in Bihac, and SRSA in Tuzla.  
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SIDA’s defined policy of self-help and their policy of funding but a small group of 
organizations and locations comes from their first-hand ‘field experience’ as a do-
nor.  SIDA made their decisions in Sarajevo while most other donors made their 
strategic decisions and selected their projects in their respective national headquar-
ters or – most commonly – in their respective ministries of foreign affairs.51  Per-
taining to SIDA’s large housing engagement, they staffed both the Sarajevo and 
Stockholm office with architects well-experienced in housing matters and planning.  
This may also have contributed to the apparent success of the Swedish strategy in 
Bosnia (Sandgren 1999). 
 
.5) SRSA and its principles of housing support in BiH 
SRSA is not formally a NGO. It is a part of the Swedish Civil Defense and is the 
government’s official body for accident prevention and response. About two-thirds 
of their current staff of 930 are involved in the training of personnel employed in 
the municipal fire & rescue services and in the chimney-sweeping service in Swe-
den. Its international engagement makes up around 1% of their activities. Their 
international engagement is primarily to assist in international rescue operations, 
and to a smaller extent, provide reconstruction support. For this purpose SRSA has 
recently established strategic partnerships with a number of national and interna-
tional agencies on emergency and relief issues, primarily with SIDA who is also 
their major funding source.  
 
It was initially SIDA and UNHCR that funded SRSA’s engagement in Bosnia.  Their 
work here is their largest single international project since the establishment of 
SRSA in 1988. During the early stages of the war in BiH they ran a transportation 
program, much like NRC did. Seeing the appalling housing conditions in the areas 
of IDP influx, SRSA decide to also enter the housing sector (also much like NRC 
did). 
 
The way an NGO acts in the field is highly dependent on the tactical and operational 
approach of the Head of Office. This is also the case with SRSA.  In Bosnia SRSA is 
in many ways the head of office, Mr Kaj Gennebäck. He is a building engineer em-
ployed by SRSA in 1996.  Bosnia was his first foreign engagement. The success of 
the rebuilding of Grapska rests in his somewhat idiosyncratic ways. 
 
SIDA and SRSA have set conditions for providing reconstruction funds.52 When 
these are satisfied they have pursued a policy of concentration: of bringing large 
numbers of people back so as to initiate a “social movement”. This was deemed to 
have a significant impact on: 1) physical and psychological security, 2) the charac-
ter of the environment, and 3) the social and economic multiplication effect - in-
cluding reducing unit costs of infrastructure, transport and logistics. 
                                          
51 Whereas most embassies in Sarajevo through the post war years were delegated such authorities, Norway 
still (at least up until 2003) handles almost all such issues,  “due to its political nature,” in the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs in Oslo. 
52 1. The beneficiary must already live in BiH – or in Sweden; 2. The house owner must have valid property 
rights to the plot of the destroyed house – or to some equivalent plot in the village; 3. The support not only 
applies to families. 
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SRSA has developed their own tactical approach to reconstruction along the princi-
ples of ‘assisted self-help’ as described in Chapter 2.4.  Initially this strategy was 
highly contested (UNHCR 1998). The effects of self-help on capacity building, pri-
vate sector development and cost have been hotly debated among more or less 
informed agency personnel throughout the post-war years in BiH (Mossberg & 
Iwansson 2001). From my own data53, one housing unit done through self-help 
costs about 60% of one done by contractors.  However, this figure varies from case 
to case, partly because of varying content in comparative figures, but also from 
substantive differences, e.g. pertaining to logistic input, etc. 
 
In the self-help programs run by SRSA the house owners are only given materials. 
In response, the house owners commit themselves to complete their houses within 
a given time frame (in reality proven to be a somewhat flexible requirement).  The 
amount of materials are based on a house roughly the size of the foundations of the 
one destroyed, specified on the basis of the pre-war Yugoslav quantity standard 
and SRSA’s own general building design reflecting the number of people return-
ing.54 As long as the papers are right, SRSA do not insist (as do programs financed 
through the EU) on rebuilding on the same plot, although it has to be in the same 
village.  This option has not been taken up by any minority returnees because 
building permits for totally new buildings are rarely, if ever, given by the majority 
authorities.  In further contravention of EU practices, SRSA also lends support to 
the house owner if he - at his own expense – alters or increases the size of the 
house.  About 90% the ‘SRSA-houses’ in Grapska were actually extended during 
the course of their construction. 
 
The materials provided are to be domestically produced, if at all possible. This 
means about 85%. SRSA base their purchases on nationwide tenders where prod-
uct quality, proven security of delivery, and price are the three decisive selection 
criteria. 
 
SRSA employed a technical advisor at service 24 hrs a day.55  He would, if time 
allowed, also advise on issues relating to any privately funded extensions.  He often 
did. This person would also act as a general monitoring agent, not the least pertain-
ing to local ‘kick-backs’ and corruption56.  Some additional transport within the vil-
lage was also provided, as were cement mixers, generators and hand tools. 
 
But it is the shifting of responsibilities onto the people who are to benefit from their 
support that sets SRSA approach apart from other assisted self-help programs. 
SRSA insists on dealing with the villagers through a formally organized Village 
                                          
53 Basically collected from experienced building professionals working with NPA, SRSA and SIDA. 
54This stands in contrast to housing reconstruction in Croatia during the early post-war years. There the gov-
ernment set out to finance and organize a full-sized reconstruction of any house damaged or destroyed – irre-
spective of number of returnees. 
55 LWF runs an exceptionally successful agricultural program in Tuzla – also funded by SIDA.  One of the rea-
sons for their success was held to be due to the availability of LWF advisors 24 hrs a day. “Plants don’t have 8 
hrs days”. 
56 In their previous project in Klisa near Zwornik, SRSA were thus able to uncover the fact that people had paid 
the Head of the Village Board to be placed on the list of house owners eligible for support. The project was put 
on hold until a new organization was established and new names were brought forward. 
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Committee, be it organized by the returnees directly or be it (remnants of) the for-
mer Village Board which all villages had prior to the war. Commanding a certain 
level of ‘organizational capacity’, to use Anderson/Woodrow terminology, is thereby 
a precondition for being supported by SRSA. The Village Board is delegated the re-
sponsibilities to: 
 
• develop a set of transparent selection criteria upon which the agreed number of 
beneficiaries are selected 
• obtain all the required formal approvals from the local administrative bodies 
• nominate a number of people among the beneficiaries who SRSA will authorize 
to control, confirm and sign papers regarding material deliveries 
 
No other reconstruction program is known to have transferred so much ‘real power’ 
to the beneficiaries.  The issue of selecting beneficiaries is, by other NGOs, consid-
ered both a cumbersome, complex and extremely sensitive task, as it deals with 
outright gifts of substantial proportions.  It is about choosing winners or losers. The 
NRC therefore developed a separate program, the INCOR program, to exclusively 
deal with the process of selecting worthy beneficiaries. Other NGOs have done the 
same.  
 
The shifting of responsibilities also transfers some of the administrative workload 
away from SRSA.  This has resulted in lowering their overheads to about half of the 
NGO average.57 One major international NGO working in Krajina spent as much as 
20% of their project funds on the process of selecting beneficiaries.58 
 
This transfer of responsibilities was based on a set of plain and down-to-earth 
propositions on the part of Kaj Gennebäck: “My main concern is return. I want as 
many as possible of those who want to go back – to be able to”, and further, “It is 
their future, I’m not here do what they can do better”. By not entering into the se-
lection of beneficiaries SRSA approach might be seen as insensitive to the needs of 
the most vulnerable, the women-headed households, the old, the single and those 
not able to do work on their own.  This has made one of the other NGOs SIDA 
funds in BiH retain a right to intervene if the most vulnerable are ‘de-selected’ by 
the villagers’ organization.  SRSA, however, claims that identifying ‘the vulnerable’ 
remains very difficult under all possible circumstances. ‘Female-headed households’ 
may in fact include sons and daughters, brothers and in-laws who are just as quali-
fied – and available – for doing building work as the ‘absent husband’.  The same 
goes for the old.  “So what do we know about who receives remittances from 
abroad”? SRSA’s presumption is that the people affected will have a much more 
comprehensive picture of the vulnerabilities and capacities of the applicants. In ad-
dition, SRSA relies on the reflexive self-control of the system, claims Gennebäck: as 
long as there is a large group of applicants that are not given support, this group of 
let-outs will not tolerate major misappropriations of the funds. 
                                          
57 SRSA was down to 4–5% on the cost of local staffing and administration whereas the ‘norm’ for NGOs in 
Bosnia is 10% of total project cost. 
58 According to the then Head of Office in Knin as presented at a summing-up meeting in Sarajevo Nov 2001. 
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In summing up the donor and agency policy, we see a number of principles applied 
for gaining support: 1) The principle of ‘assisted self-help’.  It is not only a matter 
of financial prudence, it is also presumed to carry “values that cannot be meas-
ured”; 2) The principle of concentration: SIDA is trying to surpass the threshold of 
critical ‘return mass’ by supporting a relatively large portion of each village, rather 
than spread the funds around; 3) The principle of engaging local agency by shifting 
responsibilities on to the assisted population; genuine participation, by any other 
name. Requiring the beneficiary to obtain all the necessary formal documents, de-
velop transparent criteria for selection and at the end choose the recipients, are all 
activities that serve similar ‘non-measurable’ qualities.  I will come back to a dis-
cussion on the qualities of these issues when closing  of this chapter. 
 
 
4.5.6. REBUILDING GRAPSKA 
For return to succeed, the people must want to go back, they must recognize a fu-
ture livelihood potential – and they must dare to return.  It is evident that ‘wanting 
to return’ was not enough to set off a return process (UNHCR 1998). To facilitate a 
return-driven reconstruction the returnees must command capabilities, i.e. human 
and social capital and material and/or financial resources, to invest in the recon-
struction effort. In addition there is security. Most of this was beyond the capacity 
of the internally displaced Grapska community. In the following I will show how 
outside agents, organizations, institutions and individuals, provided these resources 
in a way that interacted with the capital endowments of the returnees, i.e. their 
own capacities to organize (sustained by their own history), their skills at building 
and their capacity to work.  These issues will be dealt with successively. 
 
.1) Security 
House, home and security are concepts bundled together.  No wonder then that the 
issue of security took on, and still retains, such a central place in the minds of the 
Grapskanians when approaching reconstruction and return. 
 
Minority return was urged – and heavily funded – by the international agencies long 
before the Bosnian displaced felt confident or secure enough to ‘go back’ (ibid). 
During the two first post-war years out of the well over 1 million displaced within 
the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina only 153,000 had returned to their homes al-
most exclusively to their ‘own’ areas (ICG 1998).59 Merely 1125 Bosniaks and 
Croats returned to Republika Srpska during these two years.60 The International 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) operated throughout the country safeguarding those who 
did, and flagging their authority in areas where return was expected.  SFOR there-
fore patrolled Grapska in efforts to reduce the ongoing destruction.61 
 
On August 13, 1999 – almost four years  after Dayton – the UNHCR organized the 
first bus convoy back to Grapska.  Still they were attacked by stone-throwing Serbs 
                                          
59 Out of the 1.3 million refugees 208,000 had returned to BiH by the end of 1997, “though often not to their 
own homes” (ICG 1998; i). 
60 the UNHCR Gis Unit, Sarajevo, http://www.unhcr.ba/return/Tot_Minority%20_GFAP_August_2003.pdf 
61 SFOR thus prevented several houses, already wired for demolition, from being totally destroyed. 
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when passing through the neighboring village of Kostajnica. They could only stay 
for the day. 
 
When the reconstruction work started in earnest they organized groups that com-
pleted joint ‘overnight houses’, ground floors of certain houses or separate huts so 
they could work continuously and be safe from their neighbors at night. The SFOR 
set up base in Grapska and kept the village under 24-hour surveillance. The pres-
ence of the SFOR proved to be a crucial ‘tool of return’: “Without SFOR Grapska 
would not have been rebuilt, it would have been too dangerous”.  No wonder the 
local Finish SFOR commander, Captain. Matti Lauka, is held to be Grapska’s “hero 
general”.   Even today the issue of security is still relevant – “They are still 
armed”.62 The neighboring Serbs claim similar fears of the returned Bosniaks: “The 
Muslims want revenge”.  Some of the Grapskanians have postponed their return 
until the summer 2002 - insisting it is from the ‘uneasy feeling of fear’63.  Security 
was also a key issue when selecting the first group of returnees: families, prefera-
bly with no children, in houses close to each other.  The first SRSA program con-
centrated on houses within the village away from the road which prior to the war 
had been the Serbs’ ‘boulevard of provocation’. It was not until the summer of 
2000 and the second SRSA program that the houses along the road were being 
rebuilt.64  Similar stories highlighting the crucial role of the military abound 
throughout the Balkans (Hovey 2000). 
 
                                          
62 On Sept 20 2002 it was reported that the newly rebuilt mosque in Kljuc was bombed.  Fear feeds on such 
incidences – and on the rumors surrounding them. 
63 A colleague in Mostar East confessed that it took 5 years of ‘peace’ before he felt confident enough to visit 
Western part of town. And still today I know many Bosniaks who feel unease about visiting the RS part of the 
country, and who refrain from doing so – 7 years after Dayton.  
64 Still today provocation takes place, especially on days of religious importance.  On one of my visits the police 
was called to investigate Serb stone throwing and window smashing. 
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Fig.6.5.11 An aerial photograph of taken towards the core of (Gornja) Grapska. The main 
road is running along the bottom of the picture. Taken by SFOR during the summer of 2000. 
 
.2) Selecting Beneficiaries 
The Village Board set up criteria for selecting the first 80 – and the subsequent 98 
house owners to receive SIDA/SRSA funding. Prior to that 9 owners had received 
some building material from the Municipality of Tuzla. SRSA provided the necessary 
additional support. The house owners who best fulfilled the following requirements 
received materials, and technical and logistical support for reconstructing their 
houses: 
• Stayed in BiH during the war. 
• Participated in the war 
• Victims of war, social cases, lost family members, woman-headed house-
holds 
• The number of family members 
• Permissions and formal return documents in order  
• Commitment towards return 
 
There is a significant difference between these selection criteria as compared to those set 
by the international agencies in selecting worthy housing beneficiaries (cf. those em-
ployed by the UNMIK in Kosovo (UNMIK 2000)65 or NRC’s INCOR criteria66).  These are 
                                          
65 The criteria for vulnerable families shall be: 
- no access to adequate income either through a steady job, through remittances of family members 
abroad or through income-producing land or other assets 
- families with over 8 children under the age of 12 years 
- female-headed families without able bodied members 
- families with elderly, handicapped or chronically ill family members 
and: 
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“rights-based” and are operationalized within a welfare framework; the most needy are 
the most worthy. In Grapska, however, those who were primarily funded were those 
who in some way had participated in the war or at least stayed put in Bosnia during the 
war.  Those who left were disqualified however dire their living conditions were upon 
return to BiH.  In spite of being disqualified many former refugees are back in Grapska. 
They have rebuilt their houses from savings made in exile, either having saved some of 
their social benefit allowances or money earned while in exile.  The criteria and the final 
selection have been respected throughout, although some of those not living in the Gra-
canica-Doboj Istok area during the selection period claim that those who did were fa-
vorably treated.  There are no indications of favoritism, corroborated by the fact that the 
secretary of the Village Board as well as other elected members did not make the list. 
 
A number of issues are raised by these ‘war conscious’ selection criteria. Their impact, 
and reliance, upon the social and human capital of the village will be elaborated later.  
Here are some practical consequences: Grapska has a relatively low mean average age 
for her returned population – 35.53 years - compared to most other return projects. The 
average age of the return population to SRSA’s two most recent housing programs com-
prising 16 villages, 600 houses and about 2800 returnees was 54.25 years. Here other 
selection procedures were applied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6.5.12 Table showing age distribution  
among those who had returned to Grapska  
by 21 January 2002, all together 573 people. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
- if the family is facing homelessness 
- if the family is at risk (safety or health) as a result of their current living conditions 
      -      if the family is unable to fund housing reconstruction 
66 Cf. NRC project 61RN6RS197, comprising about 300 housing units implemented in the Posavina region 
1997–1998. Here, a local committee processes the applications and presents a prioritized nomination to NRC, 
who does the final pointing assessment. The selection criteria: 1) Social category of family; 2) Family with war 
victims; 3) Family with war invalids (Certificate about degree of invalidity of family members; 4) Present ac-
commodation situation (Certificate from authorized department); 5) Number of family members; 6) Certificate 
about school education; 7) Certificate about occupation and place of employment. 
 
Age Group   Number 
0 - 4 20 
5 - 9 32 
10 - 14 20 
15 - 19 29 
20 - 24 50 
25 – 29 41 
30 - 34 39 
35 - 39 32 
40 - 44 35 
45 - 49 25 
50 - 54 44 
55  -59 44 
     60 - 
     - 69 
100 
     70 - 
 
      - 85 
62 
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It is quite evident that the selection criteria favored those ‘of fighting age’ , i.e. the 
relatively young. In addition they favored those who were able to “participate in the 
war effort”, i.e. the “able-bodied” in preference over the “unabled”. This stands as 
an important feature when assessing the (re)development potential of the village. 
The fact that so many families were returning – and not only the old and vulnerable 
– plus the large investments into housing by returning refugees – has unleashed a 
housing re/construction activity by the Grapska diaspora which has not been re-
ported elsewhere – at least not in the villages. 
 
The vulnerable were not the prime target group.  However, widows, particularly 
‘war widows’, were prioritized.  These were assisted in rebuilding their house by 
relatives and friends.  On the other hand, a number of them withdrew from the 
program prior to construction.  They felt they did not command the entitlements 
(relatives, brothers, sons, remittances, physical capacity, etc) they deemed neces-
sary to rebuild – and return. They were left in displacement, for the time being, yet 
constantly looking for ‘some organization’ to help them. 
 
Contributing to the collective action of war qualifies for collective support when war 
is over. The Grapska criteria are, in effect, similar to the criteria set up by the US 
Congress (the ‘GI Bill’ of 1944, and the Housing Act of 1949) and administered by 
the Federal Housing Administration regarding housing credit after WW II (Hansen 
1949).  Similar arrangements were made in Norway at the time (Ustvedt 1978).  
 
.3) Going Back 
Returning to Grapska had become an obsession, individual experiences and memo-
ries were being reproduced and reinforced through ongoing social re/construction 
among the displaced Grapskanians. We find the same reactions among other dis-
placed communities, at least where these are not assimilated or integrated into the 
‘host communities’. Perhaps the most telling comes from third generation Palestin-
ian refugees. There is a perpetual social reconstruction of the emotional and mate-
rial degradation experienced by being forcefully expelled from one’s home (Winter 
& Sivan 1999). As news kept coming on the continuous destruction during the post-
war years, the more determined people seemed to become to go back: “This is a 
war we shall win!”.67  Returning became an extension of the war and a symbol of 
defiance. 
 
Return contains this element of contest, and contests are about confidence. This 
had already been made evident during a visit to NPA’s IDP settlement in Doborovci 
in 2000.  Here, LWF ran a very successful agriculture program. The most successful 
participant, a farmer from Eastern Bosnia, had already made a pledge of not re-
turning to his village in Republika Srpska until he had earned enough to buy two 
cars:  “I’ll show them!”.  Two year later he was back with his two cars, his portable 
greenhouses and his acquired skills of intensive agriculture. His ‘capital base’ had 
expanded during his displacement.  The benefits from the capital flow were partly 
                                          
67 “The war is not over until the reconstruction is complete” is a statement by Ayatolla Khomeini, quoted from a 
poster at the 3rd International Conference on Reconstruction, Tehran, 2–8 March 1997 
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the confidence which enabled him to return, and partly the income which would 
enable him to make good. 
 
So when, in the fall of 1999, the first 9 house owners of Grapska – duly selected by 
the Village Board – were provided with the first batch of building materials by the 
Tuzla municipality, the reconstruction became a celebratory event.  Ekrem Bulja-
basic was in that first group.  His house was reconstructed in only 27 days. “There 
were 500 people here who wanted to help me!”, he said. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6.5.13 a, b  Four stages of reconstruction. This page: a) Ekrem Buljabasic in front of his 
house in Grapska in the summer of 1996; b) in front of the house 1997 with one of the Serb 
IDPs. The clay blocks of the external walls have now been smashed (continued on next page) 
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Fig.6.5.13 c, d  Four stages of reconstruction.  c)The same house 1998, taken from down the 
road, with another of the Serb IDPs visiting.  During the summer of 1998 the house has been 
dynamited; d) by January 2001 painted the colors it used to have. 
 
.4) International Reconstruction Investments in Grapska 
By the time SRSA started organizing for the reconstruction of Grapska the inter-
agency division of labor had, for instance, resulted in SIDA having struck strategic 
alliances with a limited number of other NGOs in BiH. USAID and the LWF were 
therefore also brought into the Grapska reconstruction.  While SIDA/SRSA took on 
responsibility for housing, USAID took on responsibility for infrastuctural invest-
ments, water, sanitation, electricity, etc. LWF was focused on agriculture support. 
However, the ‘beneficiaries’ are not always aware of these organizational alliances.  
Throughout Bosnia, all international NGOs are branded as one, the “Some Organi-
260
 
 
 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE VILLAGE OF GRAPSKA 
zation”. In Grapska too, it was ‘some other organization’ that provided a few heads 
of cattle and basic farm tools.68 
 
.5) SRSA’s Material Contribution 
SRSA’s first 1999 program funded 80 houses, plus taking over the 9 houses par-
tially funded by the Tuzla Municipality. Contracts were signed in late 1999.69  Half a 
year later, another 98 houses plus a new school were funded by SRSA. In other 
words, SRSA set out to fund about one-third of the destroyed housing stock of the 
village.  This is a much higher concentration of investment than is usual in BiH 
(UNHCR 1998, Solberg 2002). 
 
The ‘formal’ reconstruction work began March 27, 2000 when 15 trucks full of build-
ing material were lined up in Grapska ready for unloading. 
 
Each selected family received materials according to drawings based on these stan-
dards: 
2-3 persons: 7x6 m, 1 floor 
4 persons 8x7 m, 1 floor 
>4 persons 8x7 m, 1½ floors (two rooms in attic) 
2 families 8x7 m, 2 floors. 
The average value of the materials provided amounted to KM 14,200 per house. 
Each house owner was apportioned his own part down to the appropriate amount of 
nails. No funding was allowed for labor, but two cement mixers and a generator 
was provided per 10–15 families, depending on the proximity of the houses. SRSA 
also covered some local transport, and a 24-ouhr in-residence technical advisor. 
 
SFOR kept close surveillance and no registered theft took place, except from a plot 
close to the Serb part of village. But again, if this was a contest, or an extension of 
the prior conflict, this was less than expected. 
 
Most of the material originated from the Federation side: clay blocks from Visoko, 
cement and joinery from Lukavać, roof tiles from Zenica, sanitary equipment 
through wholesalers in Sarajevo, etc. Only about 20% of the deliveries came from 
the RS side, primarily sand and gravel.  In the RS there was a widespread political 
and public opposition to these ‘return projects’. Building merchants therefore 
showed no particular interest in the Grapska project although they were effectively 
supplying Serb reconstruction projects. The companies on the Federation side were 
much more experienced in doing business with the international organizations, and 
were thus better prepared to act within a more transparent, above-the-table ten-
dering environment than were their RS competitors. Today (2003) this has evened 
out to some extent. 
 
                                          
68 The Board secretary was not able to identify the donor organization during my interview.  We let it rest at 
“some organization”. Later I was sent the names. 
69 By chance, I passed through the ‘moon landscaped’ village in February 2000. Some were day-visiting, busily 
cleaning their site. They were preparing for return. 
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In line with the shifting of responsibilities onto the village inhabitants, SRSA had no 
objections to the recipients making amendments to the standard re/construction 
drawings.  Almost all did.  
 
 
 
Fig.6.5.14 This is one of the houses extended beyond what the SRSA materials made possi-
ble. This was achieved with some extra financial input, with the use of recycled materials, 
and by the owner doing most of the work (The walls reveal different levels of professional 
capabilities as well as different sources of materials). 
 
.6) USAID’s waterworks and infrastructure investments 
In contrast to SRSA, USAID undertook their infrastructure work as regular tendered 
contractor work, with bills of quantity, tenders, contractors and follow-ups.  True to 
tradition, USAID had outsourced all construction management work to Parsons, a 
large US consultancy firm.70  That way, by 2002 Parsons had managed building 
works throughout Bosnia to a total value of US$ 265 million. In Grapska they man-
aged the implementation of new water and sanitation networks, and the high and 
low currency electricity networks totaling KM 1,035,000. These investments were 
merely replacing what was deliberately destroyed during and after the war by local 
Serbs.  According to the returned Grapskanians,71 prisoners of war were used to dig 
up water and drainage pipes and to sell or destroy them, and do likewise with elec-
trical cables (re Fig.6.5.9). The pump station was destroyed, so was the water tank. 
 
                                          
70 The Ralph M. Parsons Company, under their USAID contract, managed local contracting and implementation 
with Bosnian construction companies. Direct subcontractors to Parsons include: Brown & Root, PADCO (Interna-
tional Planning and Development Company), UXB (demining), Unioninvest, Riggs Bank, Metcalf & Eddy (water 
supply), and S.C. Myers (cost estimating). 
71 This is information gained from the Serb IDPs with whom the returning Bosniaks established ‘a special rela-
tionship’. 
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The work went on independently of the self-help activities of the housing construc-
tion. It was implemented by a contractor from Banja Luka, with only a few Grap-
skanians being employed.  They were late starting up due to budgetary reasons. 
The returned population therefore had to drill for water both for domestic use and 
for construction. For more than a year the houses waited for their water.  After fi-
nally being connected, the first water bills were so overstated that it soon became 
apparent that the contractor had done a leaking job.  There might be reasons for 
this, either practical, or technical; the returnees claim it was intentional. Whatever 
the cause, it exposes a structural weakness – an accountancy deficit - in managing 
building works in an aid context.  This will be deliberated upon later, but mentioned 
here because it shows how vulnerable or ‘victimized’ the villagers are made to be 
also on technical issues. The contractor is not accountable for workmanship or qual-
ity of delivery towards the end user. Their contract is with the implementing 
agency, in this case with Parsons, not the ‘beneficiaries’. 
 
It is worth noting that a piped water connection to the Serb part of the village was 
not part of the USAID program; fair enough since there was none before.  However, 
the development of the technical infrastructure has been an important arena for the 
ethno-religious interaction of Bosnia. By neglecting the opportunity to negotiate 
with the Serbs in Grapska Donja, an opportunity was missed in forging acknowl-
edged processes of reconciliation and social recovery, one likely to carry a much 
wider impact than most other ‘governance’, ‘democracy’, ‘reconciliation’ program 
financed by the international community. The Bosniaks themselves would not initi-
ate any extension, history was far too painful for that, but the international agen-
cies hold the capacity to look beyond the immediate history. They would be the 
ones to see the importance of such an infrastructural initiative.  They did not. 
 
.7) Livelihood Support 
Sustained return requires livelihood.  Today about 70% of the people in Grapska 
make a living from agriculture, mostly as sustenance farmers. Grapska has been 
re-ruralized.72  The agriculture land is fertile but subdivided into small plots. Before 
the war most of the land was used for producing vegetables for domestic use.  Now 
– initially with no seed, tools, machinery, livestock, or storage space – people are 
trying to make a living from these same plots, mostly between 5–15 da. Before the 
war there were 48 tractors73 and 75 ‘two-wheelers’ in the village, and there were 
649 heads of livestock.  Now there are 5 tractors, 5 horses and 20 heads of cattle.74 
 
                                          
72 This re-ruralization of Bosnia is a result of the prevailing policy of return.  Although the political motives were 
different, a similar scheme, the Morgenthau plan, named after the US Treasury Secretary Henry R. Morgenthau 
was made for the re-ruralizing, i.e. de-industrialization of post-WW II Germany.  However, the strategies set up 
during the war never succeeded in real life post-war Germany. 
73 Only one was saved. In the early days of May 1992 it was driven South and stored.  Everything else was 
stolen, sold or destroyed. 
74 All these figures and many more stem from the immaculate work of the Village Board Secretary, Mr Ferhid 
Hurtic. 
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Fig.6.5.15 The fully reconstructed house – with the one tractor that was saved in the village.  
 
 
During the war the land was farmed by the Serb neighbors. Some of it has been 
fenced off and not yet returned:  “We fought for it. We conquered it. It’s ours!”. 
The gardens and lawns of the village – and the graveyard75 were used to graze the 
neighbors’ cattle and for the one cow that the old displaced couple shown on 
Fig.6.5.9 brought along when they fled the Serb village of Panjik.  
 
Upon return, the Grapskanians were immediately given 20 cows76 by an RS-based 
NGO, “Zdravo da ste” (“Hi Neighbour”) in Doboj, not as a coordinated part of the 
return, but more or less by chance.  The organization later also gave cattle to the 
Serb IDPs, who let the cattle graze on village land. This caused some tension as did 
the conditions set for the keeping of the cows. The Grapskanians felt that “’Zdravo’ 
was more concerned about the welfare of the cows than they were about us!”. 
 
 LWF as part of the SIDA/SARSA reconstruction program provided some farm 
equipment: three motor cultivators for 12 families and cash support that allowed 18 
families to organize the purchase of two used tractors. 
 
“Some organization in Sarajevo”, which proved to be the “Church World Service”, a 
large NGO which spent more than 5.5 million KM in BiH in 2000, provided two 
mowers and some seed for the 2001 season, and later for the 2002 season.  The 
equivalent in seed provided was to be returned at the end of each season. But the 
amount of seed was not sufficient to cultivate the land they actually had available. 
                                          
75 Bear in mind the victorious significance of having your “cows eat grass off your enemy’s grave”. 
76 In due course the recipient was obliged to hand over the calf to the next on the list, an thus onwards.  
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Worse still, the floods in June 2001 decimated the corps considerably, just when 
they needed it the most.  The Municipality of Tuzla also provided some seed. 
 
There are all together five shops in the village.  They have received no outside as-
sistance.  One of the village bakers has rebuilt but not yet furnished his ground-
floor bakery, and the restaurant awaits completion.  There is only one unit of pro-
duction aside from farming:  one tinsmith has, through assistance from “some or-
ganization”, established a workshop on the ground floor of his rebuilt house, taking 
on work primarily from the village (“…but now the good times are over”), and for 
SRSA or other international NGOs.  And occasionally, gravel from the banks of the 
River Bosna is sold for building purposes.  However, this has proved difficult to sus-
tain because the Serb neighbors, supported by the local police, have literarily occu-
pied the best – and Bosniak owned – part of the riverbank for gravel excavation. 
 
 
 
Fig.6.5.16 a) The tinsmith’s workshop in the ground floor of his reconstructed house. 
Fig.6.5.16 b) One of the five shops in town. When this picture was taken both Serb IDPs and 
returned Bosniaks congregate at the one table outside, but never fellow Serb Grapskanians. 
 
With the building works now declining and the ‘celebration phase’ coming to a close, a re-
lentless search is going on for institutionalized income.  Because of local political realities, this 
search is primarily directed towards the international agencies still in the country.  “Some 
industry” is now called for in the way “some organization” has been called for earlier. 
 
Developing a basis for a sustainable livelihood is the one most serious challenge facing Grap-
ska, and facing the Bosnian society.  The international support for housing reconstruction has 
not led to kick-starting the economy the way rhetoric claimed (UNHCR 1998, EC/WB/UNMIK 
1999, CPCC 1998). The investments into housing in remote rural areas have probably exas-
perated, not enhanced, the prospects of (re)development of the country (Skotte 2003). 
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.8) Private Housing Investments in Grapska 
The housing reconstruction of Bosnia has been an international undertaking.  There is no 
national policy, not even entity based housing policy, nor any housing programs or central 
housing banks to service the need for housing credit. Nevertheless, there is some private 
capital available for housing investment, albeit minute compared to the needs. A substantial 
part of this stems from remittances transferred between exiled Bosnians and their domestic 
relatives.  According to The National Bank of Bosnia, these remittances stand at about 1200 
million KM per year77, the multiplier effect (and hence the development dynamics) of which 
is normally much higher than that of international aid.78 
 
In Grapska, by February 2002, there were 55 privately financed houses completed or in pro-
gress – in addition to the 187.5 SRSA-houses.  On top of that, some 36 small provisional 
houses were constructed, built and funded by people who awaited donations or other means 
of reconstructing a proper house.  Almost all the houses built from material provided by 
SRSA had been extended or altered in ways that required private funding. By and large, 
these private investments were made possible only through funds generated abroad.  Only 
the most recent investments had been paid for through local earnings, much of which 
stemmed from the circulation of the remittances. 
 
 
Fig.6.5.17 A house financed in total from money transferred from a Grapska family living and 
working in Norway.  Most of the materials used are brought in from abroad. Note the im-
ported PVC coated window frames mounted  partly to reduce annual maintenance for the 
owner living abroad. Such un-Bosnian features tends to raise the perceived status of the 
building, cf. the failed slogan of the Bosnian tile factory referred to on page 197.  
 
                                          
77 Private correspondence with the National Bank of BiH 
78 In East Timor only about 20% of the massive amount of international aid is actually spent within the country 
(Hill & Saldahna 2001). 
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There are three types of private housing investments: 1) Private houses built by 
returnees through funds accrued abroad, 2) Externally funded private houses be-
longing to exiled Grapskanians, the building of which are either administered or 
actually executed by returned relatives, 3) Extensions of SRSA-houses.  There are 
basically three sources of financial capital for these investments: 1) Funds brought 
back by returnees from abroad; 2) Family remittances; 3) Local earnings79 (much 
of which are recirculated remittances). There are about 30 persons in formal em-
ployment out of the 530 that had returned by January 2002.  Houses are funded by 
combining these resources, although remittances remain the prime financial source.  
Figure 6.5.16 shows relationships between funding and housing investments. 
 
The standard SRSA-houses were small compared to the houses they were set to 
replace: between 12,5 m2 and 17.5 m net floor area per person, about half the 
pre-war figure.80  For all practical purposes they were adequate, given the current 
situation. But almost all SRSA-houses were extended or totally changed. 
 
Basically, it was support from relatives living abroad that made the extension of 
SRSA-houses possible, either directly by receiving money from relatives abroad, or 
by earning money from working on the privately financed houses.  Lately, there has 
been some money generated locally, but this still only accounts for a small part of 
these extra investments.  Aside from those in formal employment, income is gener-
ated by way of day work, and from some of the farmers, particularly those with 
their own tractors.  
 
The reconstruction of Grapska represents a text book example of the early stages 
of capital formation, albeit highlighting different aspects than that of Mihatovici, 
presented in case II. In Grapska it may well be called ‘economic development’. 
What we see is fixed, environmental, human – and social capital being generated 
and sustained by recurrent circulation of external financial capital transformed 
through human labor.81 
 
 
 
                                          
79 Generally pensions are not a source of investment. They are too meager for that. 
80 By contrast, the current figure in Norway is about 50m2/capita. 
81 Add this to the example of capital concentration in the Mihatovici case and we see a post-war economy func-
tioning at its most rudimentary: interaction among informed actors in pursuit of profit for survival. Heinrich Böll 
covered the same phenomena in his novellas from the early post WW II years in Germany (Böll 1975). 
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          investment  
               object 
source                 
of funding 
HOUSES FOR  RE-
TURNED REFU-
GEES AND ‘GA-
STARBEITERS’  
HOUSES FOR 
GRAPSKANIANS 
(STILL) 
LIVING ABROAD 
EXTENSIONS  
TO SRSA-
HOUSING FOR RE-
TURNED IDPs 
LOCAL EARN-
INGS 
              
               5 
 
               - 
 
             20 
FOREIGN EARN-
INGS 
               
              75 
 
               - 
 
 
REMITTANCES 
               
              20 
 
             100 
 
             80 
Fig.6.5.18 shows the relationship between types of funding sources and housing investments,  
in approximate percentages.82 
Fig.6.5.19 shows how the funding was circulated.  The basis for the shading is the relationship 
between labor costs and material costs of a typical house and the origin of the materials used.  
MATERIALS PRO- 
VIDED BY SRSA 
             -             85           15 
Fig 6.5.20 Shows the origin of the building  materials provided by SRSA  
 
I have not combined the relative distribution figures above with estimates on the 
private housing investments.  They are all inference figures comprising information 
from group discussions, individual figures, and general information on building 
costs. Combining them would present absolute, yet uncorroborated, figures. 
 
Through the sources mentioned I gather that close to 1 million KM has already been 
invested in the privately funded houses.  Another half a million KM may be required 
to complete the houses already started. This is hands-on money channeled through 
the village.83 
 
Through similar operations I found that private investments close to 1,5 mill KM 
have gone into extensions and alterations of the SRSA-houses.  Some of these 
funds are in fact re-circulated from the former. 
 
                                          
82 There are no existing records available to verify these assessments, They are the aggregate of assembled 
statements collected from various sources in the village. 
83 And spent on all sorts of markets where the official organizations fear or are not allowed to tread. 
     Expenditure  
target  
source            
of funding 
LABOR 
(within Grapska) 
      DOMESTIC  
      PRODUCTS 
    IMPORTS 
LOCAL EARN-
INGS 
             20             30           50 
FOREIGN 
EARNINGS 
             30             20           50 
REMITTANCES 
 
             40             10           50 
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In Grapska the value of the material supplied by SRSA, for housing, KM 2,806,689 , 
is almost matched by the private housing investments funded through remittances 
from abroad. This is not considering the value of the self-help labor, the infrastruc-
ture investments carried by USAID, and the school investments funded by 
SRSA/SIDA. When combining all these elements of expenditure and cost, the con-
clusion would be that the international contribution towards the reconstruction of 
Grapska is almost matched by private investments and economic commitments on 
the part of the inhabitants.  
 
About half of these private investments were spent within Republika Srpska, most 
of it from the local building merchant Filux in nearby Kostajnica. Filux claim they 
also had customers come from the Federation side (the division line is 6-7 km to 
the South), “Because we are cheaper”. The argument of comparative price was 
consistently used by the house owners of Grapska as well.  The fact that so much 
‘leaked back’ into the Federation’s side, however, adds practical considerations – 
and perhaps political reasoning – into the purchase pattern as well.  The estimates 
above were compared to the annual turn-over of Filux and their assessment of 
Grapska’s relative share. The figures roughly matched.84 Total private building ma-
terial purchases in RS are around 900,000 KM +/- 100,000. 
 
Only about 20% of the building materials sold by Filux are domestically produced, 
whereas SRSA’s material provisions have an 85% domestic share. The 20–80 ratio 
was common for any locally initiated building project, according to Filux’s man-
ager.85  Producers in Croatia and Serbia are their main trading partners, but they 
also import from Italy, Hungary and Montenegro. Domestic products have a low 
public esteem – which is an attitude from pre-war days.  Appealing to the popula-
tion to “Buy Bosnian!” brings about “perverse effects” to use terminology from 
evaluation theory. The new roof tile factory in Zenica, established by a foreigner, 
had to scrap that slogan. Sales had plummeted because of it. 
 
.9) Organizing the Self-Help construction of SRSA houses 
The material, logistical and professional resources provided by SRSA required man-
power, building and organizational skills on the part of the owner.  These capabili-
ties were there. Almost all houses destroyed in Grapska had been directly or indi-
rectly built by their owners. That fact also signified an emotional link, what Ander-
son/Woodrow would call ‘motivational capacity’, for return. Many of the former 
houses were never formally registered. It was like this for most family houses 
throughout former Yugoslavia (Zegarac 1999).86 As often in Bosnia, when ‘minority 
houses’ were to be rebuilt in an environment disapproving of their reconstruction, a 
whole array of formal objections were presented. True to this practice, The Building 
Authorities from Doboj were frequently on site controlling and rejecting works al-
                                          
84 Annual turnover in 2001 was 3.5 million KM, slightly down from 2000.  Then Grapska deliveries made up 
about 25% of their turn-over.  The figure is much less now. Filux has 10–5% commission on the goods sold, viz 
more than 100,000 KM from Grapska alone. 
85 A similar figure was also uncovered in my local grocery shop pertaining to foodstuff. Only about 20% of the 
foodstuff sold was produced in Bosnia. 
86 The Chief Planner of Tuzla indicated that 10,000 illegal structures have now been built in Tuzla municipality – 
a substantial number after the war.  The figures cannot be corroborated and seem too high. 
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ready done, although there were no cases reported where these objections were 
heeded.  Their persistent presence became a nuisance more than an real obstacle, 
and by the fall of 2000 they had more or less ceased coming.  During this period 
SRSA had no formal or informal contact with the authorities on behalf of the ‘bene-
ficiaries’. 
 
There were no longer “500 who wanted to help”, as was the case with the very first 
returnees. Family links, proximity, the bartering or exchange of services, access to 
cement mixers, the rate of progress, etc. all determined how each ‘SRSA-owner’ 
organized the reconstruction works.  There was no set pattern. The socially vulner-
able, the war-widows or wives widowed during the reconstruction period, were all 
helped primarily by their extended family, but also by their immediate neighbors. 
Then there were those who had money but were unable to work themselves: “You 
buy food – they work”, one of them said.87 As far as I could uncover, no one aban-
doned their projects because of lack of resources once they had returned. Two 
families left the project by emigrating.88 
 
Among the returnees there were all together 30 masters of various trades, timber, 
masonry, flooring, plumbing, electrical works, etc.  These were called upon particu-
larly for roof constructions and for plumbing and electrical work.  The required cer-
tificates for the latter were issued, for a fee89, by an electrical firm in Doboj. During 
the construction period no ‘building contractor’ has emerged, although most 
tradesmen were hired throughout this period. They demanded DEM 50/day, those 
most respected even 60 DEM/day or more.90  In fact, the reconstruction of Grapska 
was to a large extent based on paid services, almost as much as on exchange of 
labor.  “The fact that we are brothers does not mean that our wallets are sisters”, 
was often quoted. 
 
                                          
87 Exactly the same words as expressed by the head of the NRC’s office in Tuzla 1993. 
88 During the three first months after my investigation in January 2002 three more families left by emigrating 
to the US.  They will, as do other Grapskanians living in the US, have a house in Grapska. 
89 Set higher for returning Bosniaks (KM 132) than for local Serbs (KM 75), according to Grapskanian sources. 
90 Although they were not in full employment, the weekly wages still add up to high monthly salaries, taking 
into account that no taxes are paid. A medical doctor at a local health center earns 550 KM a month, less tax. 
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Fig.6.5.21 The level of workmanship 
was excellent at least where profes- 
sionals had been employed, like in  
this case where work of the mason, 
the carpenter and the tin smith bears  
little resemblance to ‘but-it-was-war’  
quality referred to in my other two cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.10) The Houses 
The fact that ‘outside money’ played such a central role in Grapska’s reconstruction 
was just as much due to the extensions and alterations of the SRSA houses as the 
building of privately financed houses.  From my own observations, a mere handful 
of houses were built according to SRSA drawings. “95% of the house owners devi-
ated from the drawings”, maintained my key informants, “The houses were too 
small”.  Most of SRSA-houses were built to pre-war size which in effect meant in-
creasing the volume by 60–80%, sometimes even doubling it in floor area from that 
of SRSA model. In almost all cases only one floor was completed and furnished (as 
SRSA had stipulated). The extra space was left unused, sometimes even open, 
much like what was the case also before the war. 
 
Grapska rebuilt the standard two-and-a-half floor, “four quadrant”, column/beam 
‘contemporary vernacular’ that is so prevalent on the Balkans (cf. floor plan sketch 
on page 363). They are copies of the ones presented in Case I. Minor improve-
ments were instigated by SRSA through their material provisions, including double-
glazed windows, full tiling of the bathrooms and first-grade cement tiles for the 
roof.  To raise the clay blocks sidewise, as probably all SRSA owners did, lowers the 
insulation capacity of the external walls.  Consequently, heat insulation capacity 
may be lower now than prior to the war. The prospect of market-based energy 
prices obviously did not deter the owners from choosing absolute volume to lower 
future energy bills. The fact that most of the external walls are left un-plastered will 
further aggravate the insulation capacity, as the ‘dew effect’ (evaporation and con-
densation) in the walls will require more energy for heating. 
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It is worth noting that only small amounts of building materials were recycled.  This 
was the case in Grapska, as in most other places, with the exception of an EU 
sponsored program in Mostar in 1995-1996. The damage was almost total and 
most of what could be recycled had been recycled already – by the Serbs cf. Figure 
6.5.13.  Besides, cinder blocks are impossible to recycle once damaged, and much 
of the ‘war efforts’ were put into just that.  But whatever was retrievable was re-
used, mostly chimney bricks and to a lesser extent cinderblocks, cf. Figure 6.5.21. 
 
The extra floor space may be seen as a potential for future change, or different use.  
Quite obviously it will allow for future small-scale production or trade, taking care of 
housing’s forward linkages as it were. This has already happened with the shops 
and the tinsmith. I suggested that the family of one of the bored youngsters – 
whose references, ‘life style’ and interests are still linked to the town of Graćanica – 
that they should make the ground floor into a youth club. It was out of the ques-
tion.  There are neither funds nor interest for alternative usage of these vacant 
spaces, for instance to make flats that could be rented to Grapska families wanting 
to return, but who still live elsewhere. Only two families rent such flats in Grapska. 
These rebuilt, new, yet pre-war houses seem to embody so many personal projec-
tions that letting or renting parts of them (still) represented an uncomfortable op-
tion. 
 
In addition to the extensions, the other area of improvements was internal furnish-
ing, particularly furnishing of kitchens.  As the housing type has a combined kitchen 
and common room (normally covering one-and-a-half quadrants), the furniture of 
the kitchen will flag the status and aspirations of the owner more than the living 
room furniture does.91 This supports the contentions presented earlier that where 
the outer imprints seems similar, the interiors signifies one’s belonging and one’s 
aspirations. Interior furnishing may literary constitute the Goffmanian “back stage” 
setting of the family.  Hence much effort and resources have been put into the ap-
pearance of the interior furnishing.92 
 
                                          
91 In many of Bosnia’s houses there is still the formal, and thus seldom used, ‘lounge’ in which to socialize with 
guests or celebrate. At night it is often rearranged into a master bedroom. 
92 One family actually had a complete kitchen sent from the Netherlands where they stayed as refugees 1993–
1998, and where two of their children had remained and settled. 
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Fig.6.5.22 The pride of the new, often imported kitchen furnishing in a house that was being 
moved into during the summer of 2001. 
 
.11) Shearing the House in Grapska 
I have not sheared the houses in Grapska the same way that I did in the Mihatovici 
case. The reason is the same as presented in the NRC case, i.e. the different solu-
tions chosen by the different owners. In general, the housing reconstruction is basi-
cally guided by what houses people once had. Today they all have ‘lose fit’, and are 
‘open-ended’ in their design and size. Aside from their somewhat low insulation 
capacity, the houses have been rebuilt in accordance with perceived long-term stra-
tegic choices guided by the owners’ past experiences. The house, as output, is thus 
embedded with meaning, raised as a symbol as it were, reflecting the ontological 
security and future aspirations held by the ones who made the choices. I therefore 
consider making a shearing analysis of the Grapska houses beyond what is pre-
sented above to be off-target regarding the focus of this investigation.93 
 
.12) The Guiding Motives 
Why is so much of the returnees’ capital spent on their houses?  What motives or 
reasons do they give? 
 
“Don’t you ever think that this house has come cheap.  I had to forsake a university 
education for my daughter in order to have the second floor built”, stated a man 
who has built a new, rather delicate, two-story house on the foundations of his 
former home – with the second floor left unused. His former house was shot to 
pieces on May 10, 1992. Later the Serb neighbors “even sawed down my fence”.94  
Why is so much extra effort and scarce resources put into rebuilding houses beyond 
any functional needs? Consistent references were made to what had been there 
before.  That was the benchmark for what was to be. Returning to Grapska was 
returning to their old house. Building their house – as they did themselves – was 
                                          
93 Shearing Mihatovici was important because there someone else made the choices, and a shearing analysis 
would uncover the impact on future use from these very choices. 
94 When visiting the farmer three months later, even the fence was back! 
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rebuilding their old house.  This is a crucial observation as the meaning projected 
into the new building has changed by its very destruction, by the war, by the exile.  
What people have been forced to go through will directly affect the way they under-
stand and interpret the world and hence guide their own actions.  It is not only ‘re-
building the world as it was’, it is rebuilding the house in a way that make (strate-
gic) sense today. It is “Back to the Future”, a recurrent slogan in all reconstruction 
debates.  
 
 
  
Fig.6.5.23 The house rebuilt, January 2002, after it was totally demolished by artillery fire on 
May 10 1992. The efforts and sacrifices brought into its reconstruction signify its extraordinary 
ontological value. 
 
Hence the comments of getting even with their neighbors is a forceful reason be-
hind the housing priorities people made.  The destroyed pre-war house is the most 
obvious symbol of the forceful act of return. It is all about what housing does, or 
says: “What would the neighbors think if I only did one floor next to their two-story 
house”. The owner in question had one of the houses set in rows parallel to the 
main thoroughfare, cf. Figure 6.5.4. The fact that houses seemed to require a cer-
tain size to be acceptable actually entails that the concept of house also holds size 
or at least visual impact as an attribute. For the returnees it does not make sense 
otherwise. This honors the environment. ‘Keeping up with the Jones’’ and thereby 
retaining a certain scale in the urban landscape is enhancing the quality of the built 
environment.….and besides”, as most home owners said whether in Grapska or in 
Tuzla, “someone in the family might need a flat sometime in the future, who 
knows”.95   
                                          
95 This is almost ad verbatim what I remember my own father said when he started rebuilding our family house 
bombed during WW II. He rebuilt a house about the same size – containing three flats, one for the family and 
two smaller ones for his two sons to move into in due course. None did.  
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Fig.6.5.24 Entering Grapska along the main road from the South. Summer 2002. The physi-
cal assets of Grapska have been greatly replenished; compare to Fig.6.5.4. 
 
The house-as-symbol-of-the-future referred to above is similar to that observed 
regarding the houses built by Grapskanians living abroad.  They build their houses 
as a ‘virtual return’, a way of keeping all options open, of deferring existential deci-
sions. They might come back; they might move in – but then again, they might not 
– acting ideally in line with how Giddens define ‘agency’.  However, the interaction 
between these exiled post-war agents and their respective societal structures re-
enforces the exile. It is the realization of this gradual loss, or change in habitus, as 
Bourdieu would label it, that instigates these ‘virtual return investments’.  It is a 
way of reproducing the ‘objective structures’ that once molded the habitus of the 
Grapskanians. This has been a commonplace phenomenon among emigrants 
through all times. 
 
 
Fig.6.5.25 This house built by returnees is exclusively built from earnings made by the owner 
and his wife while working in Germany during the war 
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As far as it has been possible to ascertain, no villages have been able to muster the 
relative number of privately funded houses as Grapska has.  The reasons given for 
Grapska’s high level of private investment refer to the fact and the scale of return. 
Once SRSA set in motion the return program, it was possible to build; the scale of 
the program enhanced the viability of the undertaking as private investments.  
Once some started out, others followed, thereby sustaining the return process it-
self. Furthermore, these investments were claimed to be diaspora’s contributions in 
the current “war of reconstruction”, conspicuously so, as on average they are much 
larger and more grandiose than the others.  This way the private houses have con-
tributed towards changing the character of the physical environment beyond their 
number, partly by contributing to a critical mass of new buildings, but also by gen-
erally having a better external finish and a higher level of completion.96,97 
 
6.5.7 CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
In the first part of this chapter I have explored the pre-war life of Grapska as a 
necessary backdrop for understanding the process of return and reconstruction.  I 
examined how external time-space linkages (modernization, industrialization, de-
ruralization, proximity to Doboj, etc.) shaped the village, and how internal linkages 
(village organization, livelihoods, cross-ethnic relations, etc.) constituted a social 
codex, or a set of ‘habitus’ for the Grapskanians.  The events which led to the con-
flict and the war itself, violently dismantled these linkages.  These are in effect the 
lifelines of society, and it is my contention that recovery depends on the 
(re)emergence of such linkages. 
 
These linkages may be seen as the means of interaction between the capital modes 
in my analytical filter. Societal recovery depends on this interaction. How the fixed 
capital provision made by SRSA will contribute towards recovery depends on how 
their material contribution through interaction enriches the other capital modes, 
and what long-term benefits may be drawn from them.  
 
.1) Environmental capital 
Environmental capital comprises the land and the man-made (and man-destroyed) envi-
ronment. The land, what we normally understand as ‘the environment’, has suffered degra-
dation and destruction. The Serb neighbors made large areas of agricultural land into gravel 
pits. Some of the fields are still occupied and so are the gravel pits along the river.  Some of 
their forests have also been chopped down.98 
 
                                          
96 Currently the biggest house in Grapska is owned by a refugee working for a multinational company in Tan-
zania, married to a Grapska woman.  It stands empty.  One of the other large houses is owned by a Grap-
skanian plumber living in Horten, Norway. About 60,000 KM has already been invested in its construction. It 
stands empty, not yet fully completed (Summer 2002). 
97 I have observed similar reconstruction phenomenon taking place in Southern Lebanon in areas devastated 
by the Israeli occupation. Large empty houses owned by absent (refugee) Lebanese who claim their piece of 
land and flag their successes to previous fellow villagers.  Similar investments, albeit without the backdrop of 
war, are taking place in West Africa from their diaspora in the US (Goffe 2002). And of course, this has been a 
much observed and documented phenomenon throughout the whole of the Balkans since the 1960s. 
98 Not to any significant extent, the decimation of the forests is in fact primarily a social capital depletion rather 
than an environmental one. 
276
 
 
 
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE VILLAGE OF GRAPSKA 
The housing program has impacted both kinds of environmental capital.  It has enabled the 
returnees to cultivate the land and draw benefits from it.  Some of these earnings have gone 
back into financing housing extensions.  Compared to the large agricultural potential of the 
land, however, these assets have been ignored: by default in the case of the international 
agencies, and intentionally, in the case of the returnees.  They put their efforts and financial 
means into strengthening the fixed capital of their houses – and the symbolic flows drawn 
from that, rather than invest in means of increasing harvests. Then again, they were never 
farmers in the first place. 
 
 
Fig.6.5.26 The new landscape of Grapska. January 2002. It is quite evident from this picture  
even for outsiders to acknowledge the fusion of environmental and fixed capital modes. 
 
Fig.6.5.27 This is what it looked like the first time I passed through, January 2000. Again it 
was impossible to distinguish the ‘natural environment’ as separate from the ‘built-up envi-
ronment’  
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The new housing has changed the overall environmental experience of the village. 
The landscape is changed. It carries a new meaning: most obviously that of antici-
pation and hopes for future development for the village people, but also an unam-
biguous shout of “We’re back!” These signals are attuned to the ‘newness’ of the 
structures, which invariably make the remaining ruins look old. The latter are 
gradually losing their terror as they are overtaken by weeds and trees. Time will 
eventually blur the meaning of these man-made and man-destroyed structures. But 
for many years still, the ruins of the brother’s house or the remnants of the house 
of the killed neighbor will remain powerful ‘war memorials’99.  They constitute ‘ob-
jective structures’ of hatred, violence, and degradation and act as obstacles in 
processes of reconciliation (Galtung n.d.). Eventually though, they will be rendered 
meaningless (Winter & Sivan 1999).  This is the ‘entropy of memory’.100 
 
The dense physical, cognitive, and even existential effect of the housing program in 
Grapska has thus made an immense contribution towards replenishing the envi-
ronmental capital of the village, and the flow, or effects, are recognized by the vil-
lagers and the surrounding communities.  The housing program has enabled the 
returnees to tap slightly from the environment that once gave rise to the settle-
ment, i.e. the good agricultural land.  This land has a sustainable flow potential that 
invariably will help replenish the other societal assets of the village. We are envi-
sioning contributions towards recovery. 
 
.2) Fixed capital 
Fixed capital is where the housing programs have made their most obvious contri-
butions. Its impact on recovery depends on its capacity to interact and enhance 
other capital modes and assure that the flows are beneficial to the people of the 
village. The housing project has allowed for this. It was not merely a matter of 
building houses appropriate to the functional needs of the returnees.  Taking over 
the reconstruction, it became a venture of recreating the village, affecting as we 
have seen, the environmental capital, but also, as will be subsequently shown, the 
human and social capital modes. The shape of the houses as fixed capital was 
guided by the past, yet in a reflexive way stemming from people’s recent experi-
ences of war. References are easily made to the conceptual Figure 1.2.1. 
 
 
Each completed SRSA house was a significant personal investment due to the pri-
vately funded extensions. The level of risk involved in these investments subsided 
with the growing number of houses.  This also helps explain the high number of 
‘houses of virtual return’ financed by members of Grapska’s diaspora. The fact that 
so much private funding has been channeled into housing rests on the confidence of 
permanent return due to the high number of returnees and the large investments 
both by SRSA/USAID and the returnees themselves. One feeds on the other. 
 
                                          
99In cognitive psychology they are referred to as ‘objects of rehearsal’, which allow the public or the person to 
rehearse the events which the memorial commemorates or signifies. 
100 But memory is sometimes reconstructed – and reinvented.  Remember Kosovo Polje! 
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The houses are in general too big for their present function.  This will easily allow 
for future changes and adaptations in line with internally or externally driven needs 
and opportunities. 
 
When SRSA announced their return program one of the first reconstruction works 
was actually the reconstruction of the mosque, the first building to be totally de-
stroyed almost 8 years earlier.  The funding for its reconstruction, much of it done 
by paid labor, was financed by the diaspora. The mosque stands as the most con-
spicuous and convincing example of fixed capital interacting with human and social 
capital. The internal linkages are apparent. Without the external investments into 
housing as fixed capital, no mosque would have been built. 
 
.3) Human capital 
Human capital refers to the capacities, the capabilities, knowledge, skills of the 
people of the community. The flow refers to the ability to use these capacities. 
Through the Village Board’s selection criteria, the returning Grapskanians were rela-
tively young, able-bodied, and most of them were also highly motivated. Many of 
the returnees were well qualified.  A number of their 80 pre-war university gradu-
ates returned, and so did 30 of their master tradesmen.  Their skills were called for. 
The combination of the ‘assisted self-help’ approach and the remittance funded pri-
vate housing created a market of sorts, which allowed the tradesmen to enjoy a 
period of high demand.  Some of the workmanship executed in Grapska is of excel-
lent quality.  But also the building skills of the non-professionals, of those who once 
contributed to building their own houses, were reactivated through the self-help 
strategy.  This approach enabled SRSA to fund 187.5 houses.101  Only about 125 
houses would have been built with the same funds if done by a contractor.102  And 
the multiple impact on the other capital modes, and thus on the prospect of recov-
ery, would have been significantly lower. 
 
The medical doctor, himself a Grapskanian, confirmed reduced use of medicines 
among the village population compared to what it was when still living in Doboj 
Istok. Anecdotal evidence supports this, “… and now I’ve even stopped using medi-
cine!”.  The epidemiological status of the village was described as one of normal 
prevalence and scale of illnesses relative to the age groups of the population.  It 
may therefore be inferred that the housing program – and the way it has been im-
plemented – has positively impacted the physical and psychological well-being of 
the population. Assessed in conjunction with the age composition, this directly im-
pacts Grapska’s potential for recovery. 
 
Self-confidence constitutes part of the flow from human capital. The villagers deal 
with the RS authorities in Doboj “only if we have to”, and they had to as part of 
SRSA’s approach. In other return and reconstruction programs contact with local 
authorities was normally taken care of by the NGO involved, but not so in Grap-
                                          
101 At the very last run-through of the text I learned that the SRSA, as their last project in Bosnia, has funded 
another 75 houses in Grapska (November 2003). 
102 Using the 60% figure presented earlier. 
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ska.103  This has taken some of the ‘mystique of power’ away from the Serb nation-
alist authorities.  Confronting them as the Grapskanians had to, has strengthened 
the human capital of the returnees - and eroded part of the symbolic capital base of 
the Serb nationalist authorities.  This confrontation was reported by RRTF (1999) 
and presents a different perception of relative power.  In effect, it was the Grapska 
IDPs, through their collective approach, who may have held the upper hand.104 
 
.4) Social Capital 
Social Capital is a concept that is almost branded.  It is the ‘missing link’ of development 
(Grootaert 1998), the ‘glue of society’ (ibid), and the basis for the new institutionalism 
(Maskell et al. 1998, Putnam 1993). Whereas the other capital modes may be replen-
ished, even in some cases be provided for from the outside, social capital is thoroughly 
endogenous. It only accumulates from within.  This is where the “ownership of develop-
ment programs” approach and “recipient responsibility” strategy have their theoretical 
nest, closely related as they are to the endogenous growth theory (Romer 1994).  It is 
how the international housing programs affect the social capital accumulation which is 
the ultimate test on its recovery contribution. 
 
The organizational strength of pre-war Grapska and their capacity to retain a legitimate 
village organization during displacement is the social capital base onto which the housing 
program was founded. It was possible to retain and extend that base because most of 
the displaced villagers lived close to each other, and close to Grapska. The former was 
also instigated by international support, not the least from their own diaspora. All this 
ensured and required a high level of social trust.105  Living together and acting together 
gave social strength, a strong resolve of return, fueled by uninterrupted ‘psychological 
rehearsals’, and undoubtedly a certain patriotic peer pressure. The importance of these 
social capital components cannot be overstated. 
 
SRSA responded to the strength of  the returnees by delegating to the inhabitants the 
most important decisions on reconstruction: who shall receive free materials and thereby 
be able to return. The selection process enhanced social capital formation as did the 
re/construction strategy of self-help. “It would have weakened the organization; it would 
have weakened the village – or the spirit, if the houses were to have been built by con-
tractors – while the villagers stood watching”, commented the Chairman of the Village 
Board, Safet Buljabasic. 
 
In addition to the reconstruction strategy, the way of going about the reconstruction 
works, there is also the social capital formation stemming from the physical planning 
strategy, i.e. where to build at what stage. The village is fairly compact, yet the two 
SRSA phases concentrated on different areas. This was done for security reasons as well 
as for logistic and practical reasons. In both cases, interpersonal contact and social de-
                                          
103 These third party go-betweens are either NGO staff using translators, or English speaking young university-
educated Bosnians employed by an NGO. 
104 “Mr Paravac, (Mayor) of Doboj (…) would not like to stand too tall advocating the return of Bosniaks to his 
neighborhood. (…) The Bosniaks who wish to return to Grapska are all old acquaintances with Mr Paravac, as 
they all grew up together.  It is very difficult for him to say no to them” (RRTF 1999). 
105 Active or passive (acting in trust, because breaking it would be a lesser good). 
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pendency were required components of the reconstruction process. All for the good of 
what Safet Buljabisic called “the village spirit”. 
 
The social capital status in Grapska has only focused on the Bosniak part of the village. 
The post-war relationship between the returnees and their neighbors has not been di-
rectly affected by the reconstruction. They remained firmly separated, in spite of occa-
sional chance encounters. Although interaction is inevitable, it was not sought after. 
There was absolutely no social trust between the groups. The social capital within the 
Greater Grapska has been totally eroded because of the war. There were no signs that 
the housing investments, seen as replenishment of fixed capital had any rub-off effects 
on any of the other capital modes of Greater Grapska. Reconciliation is definitely beyond 
housing.  
 
Yet. Some signs of interaction has been taking place, instances of cooperation where 
both groups had benefited. This was the case where the Bosniaks cleared a small canal 
across the agricultural fields, for which they needed support, and a machine, from the 
municipality. The latter was arranged by their Serb neighbors. The benefit was mutual. 
Tasks like these could be replicated. To dilute the tension between the groups, replenish-
ing the fixed and environmental capital that previously had been beneficial to both par-
ties should have been supported by the international agencies, not only housing 
re/construction. But this is also a contentious strategy. The experience in Mostar where 
this was the chief strategy, did not bring much supportive evidence. Replenishing social 
capital takes more than international funding. More than anything reconciliation is time 
bound. 
 
6.5.8. REESTABLISHING THE LINKS 
The responsibility of developing Grapska is in the hands of the Grapskanians. Their ex-
pulsion and their return show for all the world to see that their lives also depend on oth-
ers.  Their capital assets not only have to interact within the village, they have to link up 
to asset bases in communities outside Grapska to ensure recovery.  Hence the concept 
of “geographical capital” (Bird et al. 2002), which by combining the four capital modes 
allows for a geographical106 analysis of the community. This uncovers Grapska’s devel-
opment potential as a function of its location, close to Doboj and other population cen-
ters in the region.  That one quality outshone all others when explaining why some for-
mer – and initially dying – mining communities in Yorkshire, England, thrived whereas 
others dried out (Stafford et al. 2001). 
 
The Swedish housing programs in Grapska have been implemented in a way that 
has helped strengthen all the asset bases of the village. Add to this their strong 
geographical capital.  This would normally indicate a high probability of develop-
mental success. But reestablishing external links to the splintered political and so-
cial environment of the region and the country constitutes a developmental chal-
lenge beyond the reach of individual housing programs. 
                                          
106 or external linkage based. 
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7 COMPARING CASES 
 
The cases were chosen on merit of time, space and agency; when the project was 
executed, where it took place, and who managed and/or implemented it. These 
criteria respond to new wars taking place in a contiguum, i.e. the same conflict ex-
ists at different stages at different times in different places. The international hous-
ing response follows suit. 
 
My research challenge is to find out how international housing projects impacted 
the recovery processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do that through posing sub-
questions relating to housing’s three primary attributes: housing as physical object, 
symbol and strategy. The following comparison will therefore be a relational pres-
entation on how time, place and agency impacted the housing projects’ physical 
solution, symbolic content and strategic support on economic and institutional ca-
pacity (re)construction. The conclusions drawn from these comparisons will finally 
be analyzed so that valid claims can be made on internationally funded housing’s 
capacity to enhance long-term recovery of a society ravaged by war.  
 
It is important to state that conclusions from qualitative research do not come out 
as a sum of added figures or ‘findings’. Such a maneuver would, in effect, be in 
contravention of the epistemology of this research approach. In qualitative research 
the conclusions are argumentative, not additive (although arguments add to each 
other), much like in legal practice and judgment. The arguments have to build on 
the evidence uncovered, be consistent and intra-supportive, and yet able to con-
vincingly explain possible inconsistencies. Hence I do not make a three dimensional 
matrix out of this three-case comparison and then filter these findings through my 
four-layered analytical filter expecting to find the answer at the end.1   
 
Earlier I have made a case for not treating time and space as distinct qualities, be-
cause time takes place; action takes place in time. In real life they are mutually 
dependent and one exists only by means of the other. In the following, I retain the 
analytical distinction but by using the term ‘place’; hence time, place and agency.  
 
What follows are 9 sections defined by the matrix below. These are interrelated, yet 
somewhat static findings. They are elements that make up societal capitals, or are 
the outcome of their interaction and subsequent flows. It is within such a frame-
work that is it possible to assess the dynamics of the housing programs, indeed, 
what these housing programs do to support recovery. 
 
 
                                          
1 The futility of such a multidimensional and, in essence, mechanistic exercise may be exemplified by 
referring to a large building project I was once involved in. There were those who held the opinion that a 
large hospital renewal project would have its design solutions projected through a computer-supported 
investigation of the functional qualities of each room of the existing hospital, and set against various sets 
of functional parameters. In the realized design a number of leaps of faith or creative presumptions were 
made, which in retrospect proved both rational and logical, and to a certain extent rested on the inter-
pretation of the functional qualities presented in the initial computer-supported investigation.  
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Fig 7.1 The relationship between research issues (1 – 3) 
        and criteria for choice of cases (A – C) 
 
 
7.1 HOUSING AS PHYSICAL OBJECT 
 
7.1.1 INTERACTING WITH TIME; 1/A 
Technical solutions as well as workmanship were affected by the temporal context 
in two ways: 1) access to building materials, and 2) level of emergency as per-
ceived by the planners and builders.   
 
The availability of building materials is obviously a function of production and 
logistics, which again are critically affected by the war. But even when Tuzla was 
isolated and production was down, there were building materials still available from 
building merchants and from private citizens eager to sell. Stocked materials were 
available since no one but the international organizations were doing building 
works. When materials were again available it was primarily as imports.  This is 
most obvious in Grapska where the privately financed houses were more lavishly 
built, and as such used much more imported material like PVC-coated aluminum 
windows, chosen not least for their perceived status.  
 
War’s shredding of social contracts and perversion of the rule of law seemed to 
have rubbed off on the laws of physics, prevailing standards of workmanship and 
contractual responsibilities.  “Because it was war”, was the recurrent explanation 
given when these issues were raised. The effect of this is most evident in the case 
of Mihatovici where technical solutions were chosen on merit of lowest possible cost 
and construction time.  6-–7 years on the effects of these choices contribute 
significantly to the present unsustainable conditions of the settlement. Leaking 
roofs, cracked floor boarding, subsiding structures, highly inadequate sound 
insulation and storage space. The first phase of NRC’s shelter program showed  
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similar traces, but since the owner overlooked the work, it never reached that Miha-
tovici’s level of ‘war quality’, except where the house owners were absent as in 
Kiseljak Breze. One of the houses there has been heavily damaged over the years 
due to bad detailing and sloppy workmanship. NRC seemed to have acknowledged 
this by cutting the contractor’s liability period, or the formal guarantee period, from 
24 to 6 months. The nearsighted focus on the emergency also made the planners 
downgrade the provisions for future alterations and alternative use. None of the 
above applies to Grapska. By 1999 this “but-it-was-war” syndrome had 
disappeared.  
 
During the war years the emergency culture that guided both the program strategy 
and project tactics was extended into the implementation phase. In the most 
extreme cases it is as if construction was exempted from laws of building physics, 
and the basic traits of workmanship, as were most other rules guiding human 
action in war.  
 
7.1.2 INTERACTING WITH PLACE; 1/B 
The physical solutions necessarily reflect the qualities of the site, of the physical 
place. The most significant issue, however, and the one which has been evident in 
all three cases, is the impact of location. It seems difficult to overstate its impor-
tance.  
 
The NRC houses and the houses of Grapska were similar and basically built within 
the ‘contemporary vernacular’ mould.2 Mihatovici was different, yet the floor plans 
retained much the same structure. It was the number of flats of this settlement and 
the size of the required plot, combined with local political bias that located the set-
tlement on the Sicki Brod brownfields, separate and far from the city proper. The 
settlement layout was based on an imported, idealistic garden city suburb model 
previously not realized in Bosnia.  Due to political circumstances, management pol-
icy, and somewhat illusory site plan, Mihatovici today bears no semblance to a gar-
den city suburb.3  
 
The NRC scheme physically connected onto the existing urban infrastructure, in fact 
onto existing houses, thereby enhancing the environmental frame that already ex-
isted. This is even more evident in Grapska where the renewal totally changed the 
environment. It recreated the place. The new houses now outnumber the still re-
maining ruins, thus enhancing the environment in a way that was unimaginable in 
the late 1990s (when I first visited Grapska). 
                                          
2 This is a ‘style’ prevalent in most private housing throughout BiH. However some placed throughout 
Republika Srpska it is possible to discern a kind of ‘Serb vernacular’, i.e. with unambiguous Byzantine 
and sometimes Greek references, most prominently in houses built by people whose earnings were 
made during the war.  Greek columns are also brought to prominence by their counterparts in the Fed-
eration.  
3 Some of the other shelter projects built in the region are much worse set than Mihatovici. With few 
exceptions they are remotely located, isolated, and in the case of Grab Potok in Banovici municipality, 
beyond the edge of collapse. 
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7.1.3 INTERACTING WITH AGENCY; 1/C 
The decisions to build and the way the work is organized and carried out is the 
work of agency, in whatever sense of the word: agency as the capability ‘to do oth-
erwise’, or understood as an ‘implementing agency’, an NGO by any other name.  
Both are characterized by having the power of choice, making decision on where 
and when and how the housing project is to be realized.  
 
The three NGOs4 approached their housing challenges differently. Only in the case 
of Mihatovici was this approach a result of a pronounced ideological policy. NPA 
wanted to do ‘settlements or new villages ‘in solidarity with the IDPs’.5 This was a 
decision made at HQ in Oslo. The other two organizations shaped their approaches 
more pragmatically in the field – partly by default, partly by circumstance, but most 
significantly by what I call “professional intuition” (or lack thereof) of their field per-
sonnel. They were the ones, and this refers to personnel from all three organiza-
tions, who developed project proposals and thus made the crucial decisions on 
place and approach to housing (re)construction. This is clearly evident in the way 
NRC’s Lars Silseth devised the ‘Tuzla model’.  It could never have come from HQ, 
and it would have been very difficult for a non-professional to make this into a fea-
sible emergency project. Later heads of office altered some of Silseth’s initial tactics 
to comply with changing conditions and from practical experience gained.  
 
In a similarly idiosyncratic yet reflexive way Kaj Gennebäck of SRSA ran his organi-
zation’s reconstruction projects. SRSA sought to concentrate their projects geo-
graphically as well as making them big, i.e. include large numbers of houses and 
thereby also change the physical (not to say the social) character of the chosen 
village. SRSA transferred the process of selecting beneficiaries, the clearing of legal 
formalities, as well as the overall implementation activities to the agency of the 
beneficiaries. Their choices and priorities resulted in a built environment that was 
totally different from what would have been the case if SRSA’s standards were ever 
built. The agency of the villagers was also able to release resources from many 
others who thereby contributed towards the rebuilding of Grapska. Later, NRC also 
shifted to a self-help approach. There was no evidence of this lowering the level of 
workmanship, it was just as often the other way around. 
 
NPA’s settlement schemes, of which Mihatovici was one, left all operational deci-
sions to the field. Their first principal officer in Tuzla had no experience in housing 
construction, which was therefore left to their Mihatovici’s project manager, the 
former technical director of the largest construction firm in Bosnia. His terms of 
reference was to build for as many DPs as possible, as quickly as possible and as 
cheap as possible. We have seen how this impacted the technical solutions and the 
long-term prospects of the project. 
                                          
4 SRSA by definition is not an NGO, it is an offshoot of Sweden’s Civil Defense.  In the field, however, it 
acts similarly to any NGO and has been treated as one in this research. 
5 For reasons of ideological conviction NPA would not follow NRC, because that meant assisting house 
owners rather than the IDPs, according to NPA. 
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The head of office is the one responsible for an organization’s tactical and some-
times strategic decisions. These decisions are made in the field and make the one 
responsible the fulcrum of any NGO. This invariably led to disputes between HQ and 
field offices. It happened in my cases, as it did in all other major NGOs I got to 
know.6   
 
How what came to be was basically the result of decisions made in the field.7  
 
 
7.2 HOUSING AS SYMBOL 
 
7.2.1 INTERACTING WITH TIME; 2/A 
Meaning changes over time. Things come to mean different things as time passes. 
So is also the case with the housing built in BiH. Housing was a most concrete, and 
practical contribution, but during the emergency phase the notion of “dignity” for 
the displaced was also pronounced as a rationale behind the both NRC and NPA’s 
housing initiatives.  
 
How symbols are time dependent comes out differently for these two projects. 
From what little information I got from former NRC tenants some did indeed ex-
perience the flats as allowing them a more dignified existence, while others were 
humiliated by living in other people’s home in such an ‘undignified manner’.  Either 
way, the housing projects came out as symbols carrying meanings that guided 
peoples’ actions, even to the point of causing physical damage. With the IDPs long 
gone, the war related meaning of the NRC flats has also vanished. They are now 
merely ‘normal houses’ carrying whatever meaning people place in them. 
 
Not so with Mihatovici. In practical terms, it is now officially labeled a ‘Collective 
Center’, the very institution it was built to replace, and which it indeed did replace. 
Time has changed all that, partly because of its capacity and uniform population, 
partly because of lack of maintenance, which signifies a somewhat dilapidated at-
mosphere. It is not the symbol of community initially envisioned by NPA. The grind-
ing reality of time has changed all that. 
 
The symbolic meaning of the reconstruction of Grapska is immense. Not only is it 
the material fulfillment of a consistent effort that lasted seven years of displace-
ment.  It is also an exercise in rebuttal against their Serb neighbors. The houses 
(built much larger than any functional requirements would call for), are yelling: 
“We’re back.  Your destruction was in vain”! It is for all to see – or hear. This con-
notation will necessarily wane over the years. Pending livelihood  
                                          
6 By the time I did my fieldwork, many donor nations with embassies in Sarajevo channeled their fund-
ing directly to the local NGO offices, thereby circumventing the organization’s HQs.  
7 One reason persistently claimed for the conflict with HQ was grounded in their lack of compatible pro-
fessionals. Because of this there were no organization-wide building management routines; each head of 
office had their own. A change of officer equaled change in routines. This was a general trait among all 
International NGOs involved in construction work in BiH throughout the post-war years.  
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opportunities, and in common with the NRC houses, these houses will in due course 
become ‘normal housing’ and stand as symbols of different sets of meanings.  
 
7.2.2 INTERACTING WITH PLACE; 2/B 
These three housing projects carry different symbolic relationships to their respec-
tive places. NRC contributed by completing the ‘traditional two-story urban housing’ 
that was already located in the slopes surrounding Tuzla.8 Although, or because, 
the location was predetermined the place carried totally different meaning for the 
house owner and the displaced tenants.  For some tenants and their hosts the op-
portunity for rural IDPs to live in the city deflated some of the traditional ru-
ral/urban bias, and a number of the displaced came to embrace the modes of urban 
life. For them, the place took on a new meaning, as the prospect of return to their 
former homes grew dimmer and/or more unlikely. 
 
In the Croat village of Kiseljak-Breze the political symbol of place caused the loss of 
large investments, plus time and effort on the part of NRC’s staff. It highlights the 
difficulties in working in areas of violent conflict where territory, or place primarily 
carries symbolic powers, which was what the war for the most part was about. 
 
Mihatovici was located out of sight on the Sicki Brod brownfields for politically sym-
bolic reasons, leaving its residents at a non-address outside the city proper. The 
settlement is easy to spatially and morphologically define – and hence conceptual-
ize as a separate no-status entity, a “refugee camp” as the road sign proclaims. 
There is no status associated with living in the settlement.  Incidents have occurred 
where school children have hidden this fact from others when in Tuzla. There is no 
detectable communal identity among most of its residents, although there are obvi-
ous bonds among the younger population, among those who have grown up in the 
settlement. For them NPA’s ‘new village for the displaced’ might carry some signifi-
cance. 
 
The Grapska case was different. Returning to Grapska, coming home, proved the 
ultimate act for most of the returnees. The violent loss in 1992, the struggle 
throughout the years in displacement, culminated in the reconstruction of most of 
the village, gave evidence to the power of place way beyond what the other cases 
could muster.9 The many hundreds of Grapskanians that have permanently emi-
grated has more than any confirmed that ‘housing in place’ is saturated with mean-
ing guiding action: more than 50 houses are being built and paid for by families 
living abroad: these are not for rent, not for permanent residence, at best  
they may be future summerhouses, but foremost they are tangible links back to 
Grapska: They are symbols.  
                                          
8 According to Muslim traditions urban housing was to be located on slopes to allow all houses to have a 
view and thereby open the valley floors for collective activities (Grabrijan 1984). 
9 It is worth noting that over the years a number of former inhabitants have settled permanently else-
where in BiH to rid themselves of the perpetuating uncertainty about a future return to Grapska. Also, 
for families with younger members, returning was not such a self-evident act; the young do not place 
the same symbolic content into returning to one’s ‘place of origin’. 
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7.2.3 INTERACTING WITH AGENCY; 2/C 
All three cases were outcomes of symbolic, i.e. political acts ‘of the Norwegian (and 
Swedish) people’. Without this public engagement, and the subsequent government 
funding, there would have been no projects to implement. This became evident 
when politicians visited Bosnia in the early post-war years. 
 
Whereas the Mihatovici settlement was raised on ideals brought along from Nor-
way, the other two projects emerged much more pragmatically, more prosaically as 
it were, without much ideological content.  In line with the village image of Miha-
tovici, NPA made substantial efforts to organize the residents of Mihatovici in ways 
that would help them regain some control over their lives. But with NPA’s loss of 
management responsibilities their programs evaporated.   
 
The other two projects made their beneficiaries create the symbols. They did so by 
transferring the responsibilities of implementation to the house owners, through 
assisted self-help housing.10  For the NRC house owners this meant control, the 
capacity to influence some of the solutions, but foremost it meant access to real 
money. The symbolic meaning was embedded in the finished house, be it envy or 
honors.  
 
SRSA’s approach to Grapska’s reconstruction made the returnees create powerful 
symbols. They materialized through a series of decisions made by the returnees 
themselves: 1) their elected representatives decided on who were to receive build-
ing materials, 2) wrangles for legal approvals from the local (Serb) authorities were 
waged by the returnees themselves, and 3) from the building materials they re-
ceived from SRSA, and with the exception of a few cases, they built their houses as 
improved copies of their pre-war houses: “We’re back - to stay forever!”  All this 
took place because SRSA’s Head of Office, in cooperation with Sida, set in motion a 
reconstruction process that allowed the agency of the local population to induce so 
much of their own meaning into the rebuilt houses. They stand as symbolic stakes 
in their own future, in the recovery of their village. 
 
 
7.3 HOUSING AS STRATEGY 
 
7.3.1 INTERACTING WITH TIME; 3/A 
All three projects called for the use of ‘local resources’. This follows from the basic 
assumption that using what is locally produced enhances local economic  
 
(re)generation. This is true to a certain point only. For (re)generation to take place 
it must be accompanied by production. Expending stocks for building housing does  
                                          
10 NRC changed to self-help as early as 1994, after Phase I, whereas SRSA, in line with the strategy of 
Sida, almost exclusively practiced an assisted self-help housing approach for all of their housing pro-
grams. 
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not make much more of a contribution towards economic (re)generation than does 
money handouts. This was very much the case during and immediately after the 
war, i.e. pertaining to NRC housing and the building of Mihatovici.  Grapska was 
different.  By the end of the 1990s basic building materials were again being pro-
duced in Bosnia. 
 
What NRC used for building, apart from what they brought in on convoys, was pro-
duced prior to the war in what now had become ‘foreign’ countries, or in Bosnian 
factories since destroyed or closed. In addition, much was traded on the black mar-
ket. What was evident was that even at these times materials were available, but 
not in such a way as to ‘trigger recovery’ as is often presumed. Much the same was 
the case in building Mihatovici. 
 
These early projects made a point of supporting (the formation of) local contrac-
tors: NRC the small contractors, NPA the big ones. This took place during a period 
when thorough structural adjustments were taking place, and during a period with 
severe economic hardships, no economic infrastructure, or any production worth 
mentioning. None of the contractors made any investments or made any long-term 
economic dispositions as a result of their housing contracts. The only strategic out-
come of these two housing projects may have been to sustain a minimum activity 
on the part of the engaged contractors so they survived the war as viable compa-
nies. This certainly represented no ‘kick-start’ of the economy. Mihatovici’s ‘forward 
linkages’, i.e. the informal trade that emerged in the settlement, represent no sig-
nificant seed activity for economic development. With Grapska built four years later 
it was different. 
 
The intermediate years had re-opened the borders for trade in building materials, 
and basic production was on the increase in BiH. This enabled SRSA to tender for 
Bosnian-produced building materials in their deliveries to the self-help builders in 
Grapska. This was not necessarily the practice of other INGOs. Probably out of 
pragmatic reasons – as controlling the place of origin was notoriously difficult, most 
organizations loosened their locally-produced requirement, including NRC and NPA, 
and made their choice on the basis of price, as did most of the private builders, 
including those in Grapska. SRSA did not. Of the DM 2,8 million they spent on 
building materials in Grapska, 80% originated in Bosnia. 
 
The early housing interventions were unable to play any significant role in develop-
ing a building industry in BiH because of the war and the absence of financial and 
industrial infrastructures. When these were reestablished, as when Grapska was 
rebuilt, special efforts had to be made to ensure that nationally produced goods 
were used. Otherwise international funding for housing and  
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building construction was spent on often cheaper, tax-free11 imports, because free-
trade policies prevail even in the benevolent world of the NGOs. The re-
development potential embedded in the multiplier effects are thus pulled from un-
der the feet of the very society one is set to assist. 
 
7.3.2 INTERACTING WITH PLACE; 3/B 
The (re)developmental processes initiated or strengthened by the projects were 
different for each of the three cases, of different order as it were, much of it de-
pending on place. The Tuzla cases were primarily urban development projects, 
whereas Grapska additionally set in motion processes impacting local economic and 
political realities. 
 
NRC located their housing investments in areas already part of Tuzla proper. It 
supported not only private property owners, but the overall pattern of urban devel-
opment set (or at least approved) by the local authorities long before the war. By 
technically connecting onto existing infrastructures and visually enhancing what 
was already there, the NRC intervention was spotlessly integrated into the urban 
fabric of Tuzla. On the other hand, Mihatovici was not, in spite of its location being 
decided by local political authorities. Its infrastructures are separated from the rest 
of Tuzla, and its access road, water distribution network and sewerage system are 
highly unsustainable regarding both quality and capacity.  For that reason alone 
there is no possibility, miracles aside, whereby Mihatovici may be part of a coherent 
urban development scheme, in spite of its primary school and health center. When 
adding all this to its social and economic malaise the Mihatovici project seems to 
have started a series of self-perpetuating processes pointing towards regression. 
 
SRSA’s reconstruction project in Grapska set in motion other sets of processes, the 
most obvious being that of recreating most of the physical environment.  SRSA as-
sisted in reconstructing almost half of the village’s pre-war housing stock, a figure 
much higher than in most village reconstruction programs in BiH. This was a stra-
tegic move so powerful that it set in motion a number of private investments by 
Grapskanians living abroad and thus not eligible for SRSA support. More than 50 
houses were built by private funds, confirming the power of hope, the power of 
place. 
 
In the rebuilding of Grapska millions of KM in private funds were spent on housing 
in addition to the materials provided by SRSA. This activated local markets – in 
both entities, i.e. irrespective of ethnic affiliation. Perhaps one million KM were 
spent on materials purchased in Srpska, “because they were cheaper”.12 The effects  
                                          
11 The NGOs have made agreements with the Bosnian government (similar to those of the UN agencies) 
of not paying tax or duties on any imports used for their work or projects in BiH. By 2003 these agree-
ments were being renegotiated. 
12 SRSA tendered for materials all over BiH, but deliveries from Srpska were sparse, partly because of 
the practice of ‘commissions’, which immediately disqualified the bidder, and partly for political reasons. 
Many Serb businesses were initially not providing materials so as to enable Muslims to return.  However, 
since they came anyway, this reason for not bidding was no longer pronounced.  
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were primarily the reestablishing of commercial markets; a step towards normalcy. 
If the linkage between a functioning economy and peace is to be trusted, this would 
also have been a step in that direction, recovery by any other name. Yet they were 
only tiny steps. 
 
Forging peace is beyond housing, but the large number of Bosniaks assisted in re-
turning to Grapska (as part of a pronounced SIDA/SRSA policy) is bound to have 
political consequences, not least in future local elections.  In selecting ‘worthy’ vil-
lages for reconstruction, and ‘committed’ villagers for return, strategic locations and 
sufficient numbers are crucial parameters on the road towards democratic co-
existence and ultimate peace. 
 
7.3.3 INTERACTING WITH AGENCY; 3/C 
The power vested in gifts, vested in international NGOs, normally ignores the agency of 
the people assisted, displaced, destitute and in dire need of these very gifts. This is how 
emergency relief is conceived, and this is the basis for the Norwegian housing strategies 
during the 1993–1996 period. They came out different on the ground because they ap-
plied different tactics and operational approaches. Sida funded the reconstruction of 
Grapska in a different time/space context, which opened for a different strategy born to 
completion through the idiosyncratic regime of SRSA in Tuzla. I have earlier argued that 
recovery is a reflexive activity on the part of the primary actors, i.e. members of the 
affected societies. For recovery to be sustained the primary actors must secure agency in 
the processes initiated by these international gifts. My three cases show different levels 
of such participation – and different effects because of it.  
 
In Grapska the extraordinary transfer of responsibilities to the village board, on 
selecting beneficiaries and securing necessary political and formal approval from 
the local (Serb) authorities, enhanced the institutional recovery of the village. So 
did the license given to the house owners in using the materials provided in which-
ever way they saw best when rebuilding their houses. SRSA’s approach depended 
on the agency of the village population in implementing their project. In terms of 
‘what housing is capable of doing’ the prospect for a beneficial recovery for Grapska 
may well be at its practical maximum. 
 
NRC did not engage the primary beneficiaries at all. The displaced were in the classical 
relief fashion objectified and not involved in any aspect or phase of the project, they 
were not even contract partners. The house owners were. The project revolved around 
their very house, their home and property. It was their commitment, not that of the 
beneficiaries, which sustained this project.  NRC’s major contributions towards recovery 
lies in the agency of the house owner. The displaced tenants were back “on the street” 
and filed into some new shelter queue as soon as their 30-month contract ended. The 
NRC case shows that the field-based tactics may bring about long-term results quite 
different from those set for the immediate intervention, i.e. that of protecting the dis-
placed population. Instead, the program turned out to protect the interests of private  
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house owners. But sustainable it is, and a most efficient emergency shelter project it 
was, though hardly in the way envisioned.  
 
The agency of the local political leadership was activated in locating Mihatovici at the 
very edge of the municipality, which in turn has proved to be the settlement’s dominant 
liability. As in the NRC case, this shows the short planning horizon employed on perma-
nent housing construction during periods of crisis. This is all the more extraordinarily as 
all people involved knew that permanent housing normally lasts several lifetimes. While 
NRC had the house owners to safeguard the project, NPA attempted instead to organized 
and thus empower the settlement residents. This folded once NPA handed the manage-
ment over to the municipality. Without a communal commitment and responsibilities on 
the part of the residents, community never emerged. The very idea of establishing a 
‘village for displaced people’ based on a ready-made model fell through for the same 
reason. 
 
The conceptual underpinnings which made permanent housing no different from other 
emergency goods sent into Tuzla may also be the outcome of an “emergency culture”, 
sustained through strong social networks that emerge among expat staff.13 Here, issues 
regarding their ‘common destiny’ and mutual challenges were constantly debated. Al-
though views differed somewhat, the experiences and prevailing perceptions of the 
situation were much the same regarding such issues as the pervading uncertainty, lack 
of amenities (in spite of ‘Biblioteka’14), erratic logistics, entangled bureaucracy, the 
UNHCR, and the ineptness of their respective HQs. All these issues played their part 
when tactics were developed.  But there were some whose very own insights, under-
standing and stubbornness enabled them “to do otherwise”.  Restarting production at 
the dry milk factory in Tuzla was set in motion by Jo Kvalvåg, of the Norwegian Church 
Aid’s local Head of office. Getting the commercial farms running was another of his pro-
jects.  In both cases, these interventions broke the prevailing relief attitude, which up 
until then had entailed bringing in dry milk powder and foodstuff on UN convoys.  
 
I close this chapter by highlighting the role of the local field staff, the importance of 
their ‘professional intuition’ and the social context that may hone and reproduce 
their attitudes, including their prejudices, their understanding and ultimate actions 
on the ground. All of my cases carry deep personal imprints of the organization’s 
local head of office. The crucial outcomes, those that are deemed to support recov-
ery and those that seem to erode it, are embedded in those personal imprints. The 
respective NGOs and their HQs are, aside from the Mihatovici case, somewhat dis-
tant.15   
                                          
13 Much the same way industrial clusters are sustained (Maskell et al. 1998). 
14 One of the watering holes/restaurants catering for international staff safely located in the basement 
of a private house 
15 They are but ’large filing cabinets’ as one of the expats once said, ‘run by archivists and auditors’. I 
personally contest that. None of my Norwegian NGOs had anything that looked like proper project ar-
chives. “During the war HQ was only there to say yes. There was nothing they could do”, said another. 
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8  RE-APPROACHING THEORY AND PRACTICE OF  
    HOUSING RE/CONSTRUCTION  
 
8.1 REVISITING THEORY 
 
Theories of post-war housing, i.e. theories on the role of housing in current post-
war contexts hardly exist. Theories in post-war housing, i.e. theories on how to go 
about implementing post-war housing in today’s settings are just as sparse. Hous-
ing is something people or organizations do in the field, not something they reflect 
upon and write about.1 Davis (1978, 1981, 1995), Barakat (1994), and Zetter 
(1995) all point to this latter fact. But most importantly, and this also affects some 
of the writers above, the writing on post-war housing is to a large degree based on 
reference to and evidence from natural disasters and from traditional, international 
wars.  Another issue is that much of what is written also lacks empirical basis as far 
as housing goes; it is just stretched to cover ‘the shelter sector’, cf. Post-Conflict 
Housing and Peacebuilding (CPCC 1998). In addition, there are the evaluation re-
ports. Depending on their terms of reference and the capacity and professional 
competence of the evaluation team, this is probably the closest we get to theories 
in post-war housing. 
 
What follow are my small contributions.  They will primarily cover theories ‘of’ post-
war housing re/construction, but also bring in issues dealing with theories ‘in’ post 
war housing, although these will come as recommendations in Chapter 8.3. What 
follows below is based on my findings and will follow the structure of my theory 
chapters in Part Two. 
 
8.1.1 HOUSING AS PHYSICAL OBJECT 
What I found in all of my cases, but primarily in my wartime cases, was a tendency 
to neglect common peacetime practices of good workmanship – even basic laws of 
physics. Physical construction is contextualized beyond anticipation. This is exposed 
in three ways:  
• The ‘but-it-was-war’ syndrome. Planning, design and execution was carried out 
under an emergency regime where the principal objective was to solve a tempo-
rary shelter need – fast and cheap. Long-term – inevitable – physical deteriora-
tion was not taken into due account, nor were the consequences of location. 
They have now become apparent. 
• The density of people. Maximizing the number of people living on the premises 
– inevitably – lead to breakdowns, destruction and forced deterioration – if con-
structed for ‘normal’ use. This ‘material logic’ was ignored, but soon became 
evident. This is apparent when imagining daily life when 30 people live in the 
houses like the ones presented in Figure 6.3.2 & 6.3.3. 
• Lack of accountability. A building contractor stands accountable to the commis-
sioning NGO, not to the beneficiary for whom the house is built. In two of my  
                                          
1 I have earlier presented my failed attempts to collect case stories on housing from the NGOs that are 
undertaking housing re/construction in present post-war settings. 
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cases, and supported by data from subsidiary cases, this tends to lower the 
quality of the work, or what the beneficiaries perceive as good workmanship.2  
In conflict areas, bad workmanship may also be an intentional political act.3  
 
8.1.2 HOUSING AS SYMBOL 
Home is a matter of choice, or better still, home is a matter of discovery. This is 
how ‘home’ was presented in the introductory chapters. My research reconfirms the 
fundamental importance people place in their chosen home. Grapska is a very case 
in point. At first it seems to fulfill all the clichés. Whatever the reasons, there is an 
undisputable fact that Grapska was reestablished because most of its inhabitants 
intensely wanted to go back, and restart life just there, to reestablish and reconfirm 
their habitus as it were. Rebuilding their houses was reestablishing part of the ob-
jective structures that brought about this wish to return. The houses therefore were 
rebuilt not only as functional objects but just as much symbolic objects, to signify 
their return in the face of their antagonists and to reinstate the order that had once 
provided their ontological security.4  
 
Grapska is, relatively speaking, well endowed with geographical capital. ‘Going 
back’ therefore is rational both in terms of regaining one’s ontological security, as 
well as aiming at a future livelihood. But those whose long displacement had forged 
new allegiances, given meaning to new places, will not return. This was more obvi-
ous in my other cases. The young inhabitants of the Mihatovici settlement would 
even have preferred to forge a life for themselves there instead of ‘going back’ to 
places with little or no ‘geographical capital’, hence with no social or economic fu-
ture. The war has accelerated the process of urbanization, and the donor policy of 
reconstructing remote villages with no economic future, reveals a lack of under-
standing of social dynamics, that can only be explained by a blind adherence to the 
principle of return as the only ‘durable solution’. Two major changes take place in 
the aftermath of ‘ethnic cleansing’, however despicable: 
• the place of expulsion is irrevocably changed, both external and internal 
linkages are severed. It has become a different ‘place’.  
• Displacement means different environments that people may adjust to in 
ways that does not make ‘going back’ a preferable choice.  
The principle of return as the most durable solution does not necessarily hold true 
for internally displaced people of today’s wars. It depends on the capital base of the 
place of expulsion. On the basis of such a capital assessment returning to Grapska 
does make sense, going back to Samari makes little sense, and going back to some 
of the remote mountain villages from where the Serb IDPs seeking refuge in  
                                          
2 For all practical purposes this was why many of the NGOs opted in favor of assisted self-help. In this 
way a contractor would be accountable towards the owner, not towards ‘some organization’. 
3 The water leakages in Grapska may be explained that way. USAid intended it to be a ‘reconciliatory’ 
motion to commission a Serb contractor for the reconstruction of the waterworks in Bosniak Grapska. 
Inadequate monitoring by the commissioning party and inadequate workmanship on the part of the 
contractor led to leakages. The returning Grapskanians had to pay KM 2000 extra before the leakages 
were discovered and tended to. The Grapskanians reckoned it was sabotage. 
4 The disappointment voiced upon the reconstruction of the burnt-down villages rebuilt in Northern Nor-
way after WWII was rooted in this issue. The places were modernized beyond recognition. 
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Grapska came from, makes no sense at all. Not only to an observer, but to the 
people expelled. However sad or heartless it may sound. 
 
Housing reconstruction as a means of return is only viable when people find such 
choices strategically meaningful. For many of the former Srebrenica inhabitants 
now living in Mihatovici, return was seen as meaningless as having to leave. Their 
former house, or whatever is left, is a symbol of a past life.5  
 
All these cases are covered by Rapoport’s loose-fit definition of home (environ-
ments) as ‘a system of settings’. The system will allow for different choices depend-
ing on what system people are able to be part of, or deem most strategically mean-
ingful for themselves and their future, i.e. their children.  
 
8.1.3 HOUSING AS STRATEGY 
Housing constructed during the war or immediately after the war provided much 
needed shelter for IDPs, but it did not contribute towards economic recovery in any 
other way than as a distribution channel of purchasing power.  No production to 
speak of was initiated; no lasting investments to speak of were made, or were at all 
possible, either for producers or for building contractors. 
 
After the emergency phase a formidable part of what was invested in housing went 
to pay for imported building materials. There were a complex set of reasons for 
this, many of which are generic to countries ravaged by war: open borders, no sys-
tem of customs collection (besides, all international organizations are customs ex-
empted), destroyed domestic production plants, loss of skilled manpower, lack of 
financial institutions, -  and cross-border trading run by cartels often monopolizing 
transport and often involving politicians. Even before the war Bosnia had the added 
disadvantage of lacking production facilities for all but the most basic building com-
ponents.6  
 
A country ravaged by internal wars has regional allies: Kabila in Congo had the 
Uganda government, Taylor in Sierra Leone had Cotê d’Ivoire, Bosnian Croats had 
Croatia, and the Bosnian Serbs had Serbia. For them there was no such thing as 
‘Think Bosnian!’7  In these areas, therefore, demand for building materials would be 
directed towards the production facilities in their virtual ‘motherlands’. The notion of 
‘multiplier effect’ needs some geographical demarcation to make sense. For a coun-
try with no common national identity, such a demarcation remains illusive, which 
was also the case for the Bosniaks. In my only post-war case, it was SRSA, not the 
Bosniaks, who ensured that most of the funds were re-circulated at least once 
within the country (thereby doubling the effects on the economy). By 2000 most  
                                          
5 “Many refugees have returned to towns synonymous with ethnic cleansing.  Many have not, and it’s 
unlikely they will return soon”, is how Tim Judah starts his article in Transition Online, February 5, 2004. 
He ends his piece like this: “Watch this space.  This story has many years left to run.” 
(http://www.tol.cz/look/BRR/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=9&NrIssue=1&NrSection=4&NrArticle=11547). 
6 According to Professor Reshad Begtic of the University of Tuzla (conversation April 2001). 
7 Cf. my story on the concrete tile factory in Zenica, page 197. 
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NGOs had long since removed their initial clause on primarily using domestic prod-
ucts. It proved too difficult to control and besides, ‘open borders’ is a policy in line 
with the reigning economic dogma.  
 
My cases have given strong evidence in support of aided self-help as a strategy for 
recovery. Both the latter phases of the NRC project and that of Grapska show how 
engaging the will, ability and resources of the house-owners constitute a pledge, a 
long-term commitment in line with the reflexive nature of recovery.  In Grapska it 
allowed for a larger number of houses to be completed (within the funds made 
available) thereby raising the return momentum. The perceived quality was secured 
by the owner commissioning the work and being assisted by the managing NGO.  
 
My cases show aided self-help as a spillover rich strategy for the re/construction of 
one’s own house. This is in line with what others have documented before, albeit in 
more peaceful circumstances (Turner & Goetze 1967, Turner & Fichter 1972, Harris 
1999b, De Soto & Abbott 2002). Reports on successful self-help programs in urban 
apartment blocks (SIDA 2001) show that this model applies beyond rural settings 
and rural populations, as has been claimed (UNHCR 1998). I return to this as a 
prospective field for further research at the end of the following chapter. 
 
Housing seems not to carry any ‘peace building’ capacities. There was nothing in 
my research to corroborate a claim that housing would ‘heal the scars of ethnic 
cleansing’.8 Elsewhere (Skotte 2003), I have claimed that what guides the donor-
led physical rebuilding of BiH is a long-term strategy to undo the cleansing and the 
Dayton partition, and in grand national engineering projects, to reestablish a multi-
ethnic Bosnia through housing reconstruction.9 My research does not register any 
direct peace dividend.  Spatial affinity is reestablished between their houses, which 
– if they are inhabited10 – will inevitably lead to personal contact. But compared to 
reestablishing mutual arenas or structures beneficial for both parties, housing re-
construction instead reestablishes the distinction between them.  In pre-war Bosnia 
the societal linkages that defined local multi-ethnic communities were those defined 
by the commons, like schools, roads, shops, health centers, water systems, etc, 
which disintegrated through loss of mutual trust, in much the same tragic way as 
Hardin described “The Tragedy of the Commons” some 40 years ago (Hardin 1968). 
From this it follows that peace is given a better chance when supporting these in-
teracting institutional structures – rather than housing.   
 
 
 
                                          
8 As claimed in a picture caption accompanying an article by Paddy Ashdown in Developments, Fourth 
Quarter 2002; 6-7. 
9 This does not come explicitly, but emerges as the ultimate consequence of the policies that guide the 
reconstruction efforts and one which has been discussed among major donor nations, according to Pro-
fessor Adelman of York University (private conversation, February 2003). 
10 OHR/RTTF’s Housing Verification & Monitoring Unit shows disturbing numbers of houses remaining 
uninhabited (http://www.rrtf-hvm.org/). 
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8.1.4 HOUSING AND THE NEW WARS 
The vigor and extraordinary importance paid to the reconstruction of housing and 
the rationale people present for doing so, reveals housing’s innate symbolic 
strength as a personalized object and as a constituent of place, of what gives place 
part of its meaning. This is all in line with the basic texts presented in Chapter 2.3.  
 
Recognizing the power of place and the personal and intimate character of the 
dwelling, looting and eventually destroying it, is to administer the ultimate humilia-
tion and punishment to the residents and owners. In present-day identity wars, the 
killing and destruction is individualized, partly to punish, and partly to cleanse terri-
tories. Israel has practiced this in a systematic way since 1967,11 and through their 
guidance, the US forces have taken up that practice against members of the anti-
US factions in Iraq.12  
 
In the identity wars of today houses are ‘killed’; their symbolic meaning sought 
obliterated.  They are also destroyed for functional and territorial reasons. In Bos-
nia these destructions continued many years after the war was formally over. It 
happened on both sides for the express purpose of making return impossible. No 
doubt the total destruction in Bosnia is substantially larger than was registered dur-
ing IMG’s 1995–1996 assessments.  
 
8.1.5 THE INTERNATIONAL HOUSING RESPONSE 
My findings add to what has been written before (cf. Zetter 1995, UNHCR 2000a) 
on housing being conceived as ‘shelter’, i.e. a temporary solution to what is per-
ceived to be temporary needs – but solved by permanent means, built as ‘tents in 
Concrete’, as it were.   
 
What comes forward in my research is the pivotal role of the implementing agent, 
the head of the NGO’s local field office.  He – because it has been men throughout 
– actually runs the activities, and often very independently of the organization’s 
HQ. When scrutinizing my three cases, their role in effect questions the very nature 
of the “NGO-thing”. In the field, the “channel” was perceived as not much more 
than an under-sized funding cable. In the best of cases, certainly not all, the local 
officer in effect did not need HQ other than for funding and to have somewhere to 
send his reports.  None of the organizations I worked with had staff with any par-
ticular insight into, or professional experience about, housing. They became experts 
by means of the professionals sent on short-term contracts to head the field offices 
where housing projects were being implemented. 
 
The strategic guidance provided by UNHCR was not generally appreciated as being 
any better or sounder than the NGO’s own. Hence there was no broadly accepted  
 
                                          
11 Until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq provided financial assistance to the Palestinian families 
of the destroyed houses.  
12 ‘Israel hired to train US killer team for Iraq’, reads the headline on the front page of The Weekly 
Guardian, December 14, 2003, where this clandestine collaboration is revealed. 
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hierarchy or UNHCR coordination among the expatriate community in Tuzla (Cutts 
1999). As one senior NGO officer said: “If we were to follow the UNHCR directives, 
we wouldn’t have been able to do anything for the people here”. Fred Cuny said the 
same (cf. interview with Cuny in Merrill 1995). This only emphasizes the impor-
tance placed in people rather than their organizations when in the field. This again 
makes any local ‘international community of aid workers’ into a major force in forg-
ing as well as reproducing guiding perceptions on what to do, and how to do it.  
 
 
8.2 REVISITING THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH AND APPLIED 
      METHODS 
 
When analyzing what has been done by virtue of its effect on recovery, I have done 
so by applying what I called the ‘capital neighborhood approach’. It is a way of un-
derstanding how the various findings presented in Chapter 7 interact in support or 
in opposition to each other. It is a way of uncovering the dynamics initiated or sus-
tained through international housing interventions.  These cannot be fully presented 
by the findings themselves. In real life there is a rich and wide interaction between 
them. As stated Chapter 2.2.4 we live in an ‘everything-is-connected-to-
everything-else’ understanding of the world.13 This is the backdrop to the ‘capital 
approach’ of society, my ‘analytical filter’.  
 
When foreign funding, i.e. financial capital, is transformed into fixed capital, and to 
some degree environmental capital, a number of other transformations affecting 
human and social capital take place as a matter of course. This is a very basic ob-
servation, part of which was embedded in Keynes’ economic theories of the 1930s, 
and applied by the US government in their New Deal policies. It may well be ex-
plained in the structure – agency duality of Giddens (1984) as well. The concept 
rests on the presupposition that capital modes cannot be substituted. This makes 
the interaction between them determine the (re)developmental effect of any inter-
vention. As for housing, this interaction can emanate from the way housing is being 
planned and implemented (backward linkages), or emerge from the way houses are 
used once built (forward linkages).  
 
In filtering my findings I have found that housing projects which directly enhanced 
or extended the environmental capital were those in which human and social capital 
was replenished the most.  This would entail that where the housing project makes 
up part of a ‘place’ as perceived by the primary actors, the immediate impact of the 
housing project on people’s physical and social well-being seems all the stronger. 
This is a conclusion supported by (inverse) evidence from Mihatovici and Grapska. 
Also, the NRC case supports this when branding the house owner the primary ac-
tor; it does not if we label the IDPs the primary actor.  
 
 
                                          
13 In effect, this contradicts the controllable order of modernism (Johnson, 2001). Maclennan also ap-
plies such a perspective in his writing on housing (Maclennan & Pryce 1998). 
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‘Place’ is a point in space endowed with meaning, with ‘reputation’ as Tuan says 
(1980; 6). Pertaining to the IDPs of the NRC project, they preferred to live in Tuzla 
rather than in the surrounding municipalities. In that sense, Tuzla and the NRC 
neighborhoods also had a reputation for them. The houses as fixed capital, how-
ever, were not able to rub off lasting human or social gains onto the IDPs, beyond 
enabling them to stay alive with some small measure of dignity, i.e. retaining a 
small but crucial measure of their human capital. In effect, many of the IDPs were 
to become more vulnerable as they were later evicted, and sent onwards to some-
body else’s ‘place’.  
 
Places then depend on their ‘reputation’, which means that, like reputations, places 
change. This in turn allows for physical planning, i.e. the ‘creation of new places’.  
The capital approach explains the creation of new places on the strength of social 
and human capital to impose meaning into new things and landscapes, i.e. into 
fixed and environment capital.  This has been persuasively shown in recent cases of 
Israeli settlements in Palestine (Segal & Weizman 2003). There are numerous cases 
where the strength of IDPs’ social capital has created ‘new places’, realized in con-
junction with and defined by physical interventions, be it in Greece (Hirschon 
2000), in Kenya (Andreasen 1987), or in Pakistan (Hassan 1999).  
 
What my cases uncover is the ‘special relationship’ between replenished fixed capi-
tal (housing) and environmental capital (site), and their impact on the re-formation 
of human and social capital. It is the meaning attributed to the houses and the lo-
cation that determines how well they replenish or sustain the other capital modes. 
This was in fact experienced and documented decades ago in urban renewal pro-
jects, like the Boston West End demolition (Porteous & Smith 2001), and subse-
quently brought into the theory and practice of physical planning (Forester 1989, 
Sager 1994). My cases show that it also holds true in the context of post-war hous-
ing re/construction, and that this relationship is important in contributing towards 
recovery.  
 
In effect my findings questions the division between fixed capital and environmental 
capital, the way the Yorkshire research used it on the recommendations of the 
World Bank (Stafford et al. 2001). As explained in the introductory chapter on my 
analytical filter, Chapter 5.2, the choice of capital modes will depend on the issues 
under investigation. Since housing may be defined as both fixed and environmental 
capital, and since meaning is invariably infused in a similar way into both of them, 
(which is not the case with the other two capital modes, in fact they are source of 
these projections), the initial concept sketch Figure 5.2.1 would explain the interac-
tion and the processes of recovery better if it only had three nodes: fixed (physical 
and environmental), human and social capitals. 
 
Using the capital approach in trying to understand the dynamics of recovery has 
been helpful. However, beyond the number and nature of capital modes, there is 
another simplification which has been uncovered. It underestimates values. NRC did  
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not start out in Tuzla to help house owners relatively unaffected by the war. They 
went in there because of the homeless. Yet when filtering the data from the NRC 
scheme, the outcomes of the intervention proves a definite contribution towards 
recovery: by having provided long-lasting support to the house owner, not to the 
homeless.  Such conclusions do not come forward from the analytical approach di-
rectly, but must accompany the analysis. I submit this prior to presenting my 
sketch on the outcomes of my three cases, cf. Figure 8.3.1, .2, & .3 below. 
 
 
Fig.8.2.1 a/b The initial four-legged version on which my analysis have been based, above. 
And the three-legged version that combine the material capital modes, fixed and environ-
mental, into one, below. 
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The figure that has accompanied most chapters ends here.  I have marked a ‘recovery zone’ on the 
figures below showing how the findings from each of the cases make up a ‘zone’ on the cross-hairs of 
capital modes. They are intentionally blurred since these are made up from imprecise, qualitative con-
stellations of findings.  Based on these findings the figures show what my investigations claim to be the 
recovery potential as it stood when I did my fieldwork during the winter of 2001-2002. 
 
 
Fig.8.2.1 Case I The NRC Housing Scheme  
 
Fig.8.2.2 Case II The NPA Housing Settlement 
 
Fig.8.2.3 Case III SRSA’s Return Project to Grapska     
                           
It is imperative to acknowledge that the cross/hairs figures on the right are not 
quantitative figures. They are argumentative figures born out of my qualitative data 
collected to uncover the recovery potential of the cases in question. 
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8.1.3 METHODS 
The theme is overpowering. It is about war and the slow and arduous road, not 
back, but forward from the pre-war references that have been painfully twisted and 
bent by the experience of war and violence. In order to come up with material 
deemed relevant for responding to the research question, ‘How do internationally 
funded housing projects implemented in war-ravaged areas affect the recovery 
processes of the societies assisted?’, I had to address this in a qualitative manner. 
My own experience has now confirmed that no alternative approach would enable 
me to uncover how the primary actors14 interact with the housing process. This in-
teraction is, in fact, a constituting part of the wider recovery process when recovery 
is conceptualized as reflexive development. 
 
Housing is a physical object, which acts upon and is acted upon by forces of nature. 
This is best handled, as I did, in assessing the quality from a practitioner’s point of 
view, in what could be called a ‘field-based visual appraisal’. This is the way the 
practitioners in the field at the time of construction also worked. Besides, in analyz-
ing floor plans, site layouts and urban issues, these were based on mature profes-
sional experience: my own. 
 
The third element in my investigation, that of housing as a strategic contributor 
towards economic and social recovery, could have been investigated far more in-
tensely. But time did not allow for that, and hard facts are difficult to come by in an 
economy where all financial transactions, at least until 1998, were ‘cash in hand’. 
Through confidential interviews and open access to the NGOs I was able to piece 
together an understanding of housing’s impact on the regeneration of the national 
and/or local economy.  Funds for housing and buildings construction make up – 
depending on what post-war year – between 20% and 30% of ODA to BiH,15 but 
not much is know about its true impacts on the national or regional economy. I call 
for this to be further investigated when suggesting issues for further research.  
 
                                          
14 I now use this term so as to include the house owners (and not the tenants) in the NRC project. 
15 Cf. OHR, Sarajevo, Economic Newsletter, Vol. 1 & 2, www.ohr.int 
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8.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 
 
In forging a practical approach to housing re/construction in war affected areas 
there are three basic premises: 1) housing with its symbolic and strategic capacities 
is about permanent physical structure that will outlast the contingent needs that 
called for its urgent re/construction; 2) recovery is an indigenous endeavor; an act 
of reflexive development on the part of the affected society; and 3) internationally 
funded housing will always be exogenous assistance, which at best will support lo-
cal agency. In combining the premises the first one touches upon issues pertaining 
to professional planning and construction, the second on tactical issues handled by 
the ‘implementing agency’ primarily in the field, and the third on policies and 
strategies set by donors and NGO headquarters.    
 
Policy and practice is about resources and agency, i.e. about resources, choices and 
who makes them. In the following I will revisit the ‘agency’ column in my compar-
ing-cases matrix Figure 7.1 and turn my empirical conclusions into normative rec-
ommendations. There is no seamless link between the two. It entails ‘leaps of faith’ 
of sorts, firstly on trusting that the empirically based explanations are valid, and 
secondly on trusting that explanations derived from bygone events within a defined 
setting can underpin assumption on future action in a different setting.  Yet this is 
what planning is about. 
 
8.3.1 THE OBJECT 
.1) Local material resources 
There seems to be a buffer of available resources for housing re/construction, how-
ever marginalized the region. This is because housing construction, under normal 
circumstances, is a major, ongoing, low-tech activity in all societies. With war clos-
ing down production, materials are stocked by producers, merchants and by private 
citizens. I present this to defuse the notion that displaced people of war-affected 
societies can only be sheltered by ready-made foreign housing gifts, however in-
genious their design and ‘adaptability’. If they are not taken over by local agency 
such housing gifts normally obstruct rather than support the course to recovery. 
 
Appropriate housing solutions,1 may be achieved through improvisation – the ca-
pacity to choose opportunities available in an uncertain situation – and by using the 
building resources and local know-how that are bound to be available.  
 
.2) Management 
In war and post-war settings the perceptions of time, urgency and mandate (“as 
many, as cheaply, as quickly as possible”) may distort peoples’ sense of physical 
realities pertaining to building physics and workmanship standards. Within a short 
time deficiencies emerge that hardly will be repaired or improved upon because of 
                                          
1 Housing that is “warm, dry and dignified” to quote Sam Mocbee (Dean & Hursley 2002). 
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the prevailing economic situation.2 By the time they emerge, the implementing 
NGOs are beyond responsibility or reach.  
 
There is an astonishing lack of building management routines within organizations 
working with housing construction. They seem to change with each manager-in-
charge, and thus differ in time, between field offices, and between organizations. 
Although this signifies the independence of the field, and the power of their head-
of-office, it also opens up for possible malpractice and inventive bookkeeping. 
 
Organizations should introduce a basic TQM3 framework, a norm for building man-
agement, which would enhance efficiency and transparency, including routines for 
contracts, document handling, for (advance) payments, for liability claims, for trac-
ing decisions, etc. Such a regime would be unrelated to whoever happened to man-
age a field office, although would have to consider the prevailing practice of the 
country in question. 
 
There should be a uniform cost reporting regime among NGOs to allow for reliable 
cost analysis and cost comparisons pertaining to housing projects undertaken. Ac-
knowledging the difficulties in coordinating NGO actions in the field, at least infor-
mation on cost figures and implementation strategies should be exchanged be-
tween NGO. New software is being developed to accommodate such exchange (see 
http://www.coincide.info). 
 
.3) The Manager 
My cases all reveal the pivotal role of the field office and the manager-in-charge. 
The challenges of working with the highly sensitive issue of housing re/construction 
within a high uncertainty context requires a broad set of qualifications. From my 
studies, what comes out as the key requirement is “professional intuition”.  It is the 
combination of lived life (which in effect means people of age),4 confidence in one’s 
‘gut feeling’ combined with the capacity to improvise, and an extensive experience 
in professional planning and building. It is tedious to yet again state that housing 
re/construction is more than bricks and mortar. This requires experience beyond 
construction. Add to that the ability to work within the context, i.e. work on longer-
term contracts, - and there is nobody to fill the position. Neither people nor organi-
zations come in those sorts of combinations. I will touch upon this in 5.3.3 below. 
 
Managing the tactical level office in high uncertainty areas, i.e. the field, requires 
capacities to seize opportunities and avoid risks not detectable by HQ or donor. This 
requires people with ‘professional intuition’. 
 
                                          
2 Countries ravaged by ‘new wars’ are being impoverished, and normally remain poor (Haughton 1998). 
3 Total Quality Management is the redeeming term 
4 When Northern Norway was rebuilt and renewed, complaints were made concerning the age of the 
planners. Young ambitious architects who were in it to change the world did not meet the expectations 
of the population who were looking for ‘adults’.  Forty years later, one of the displaced told me some-
thing to the effect that ‘older people would at least acknowledge our aspirations’. 
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There is nothing in my cases indicating that local staff, as such, would be better 
suited to manage housing re/construction programs or projects.  In areas of iden-
tity conflicts the very quality of being an outsider empowers the manager. But 
managers are easily fooled. The ‘language game’ sees to that. 
 
.4) Construction 
In the light of the endless settings where home environments and housing are to be 
(re)created or new ones established there are principles and approaches needed 
rather than case-bound empirical references: theory by any other word.  
 
Reconstruction opens up for opportunities of renewing institutions and the physical 
environment. This is, however, countered by an equal call to bring the train of his-
tory back on track, to reestablish the continuity of history, the perceived order as it 
were. There is no ‘right’ way of resolving this conflict. It is a conflict that lies at the 
very heart of recovery as reflexive development.  It affects the aspirations embed-
ded in housing re/construction.  These may be different regarding the bearer of 
housing gifts and the beneficiaries who are to receive them. This difference is con-
ditioned by: 1) the capacity or power of the bearer of gifts’ to execute, and 2) the 
beneficiary’s capacity and/or willingness to maintain and accept what is brought in.5  
Adding this to the generic issues of building, I would present the following ‘ought 
tos’: 
 
• If there is no local and institutionalized policy on housing,6 housing 
re/construction should follow in the footsteps of what was there before. Re-
construction is an exceptional opportunity for renewal and improvement, but 
this is only possible where there is an institutional commitment – and capac-
ity - to uphold and maintain what is being introduced.7 This is not to be 
taken lightly. 
• Under emergency conditions or under conditions perceived as urgent, con-
struction should strive for simple, basic solutions in line with what local arti-
sans do well. All projects should be physically linked up to existing infra-
structures or form extensions to existing infrastructures. 
• There is no such thing as an ‘emergency house’ (or tent of concrete): ‘emer-
gency shelter’, yes, but not ‘house’. Houses are conceived as permanent 
structures capable of responding to changing needs over time, and are in 
need of upkeep. Even in ‘un-normal’ times houses should therefore be struc-
tured as ‘normal houses’ in anticipation of oncoming changes.8 They should 
be structured in line with the ‘shearing layers model’ presented in Chapter 
                                          
5 In the 1990s the secondary school system in Zambia was endangered by the fact that the school build-
ings were literally falling to pieces.  They were built in the 1960s and 1970s, funded by NORAD, but in a 
way and with buildings materials that were alien to the prevailing maintenance traditions (lecture by 
Professor Michael Lloyd, Røros, Norway, 1996). 
6 In BiH, with a third of its housing damaged or destroyed during war, there were no housing policy 
documents issued by any political level as of March 2002, six-and-a-half years after the fighting stopped. 
The foreigners did all the housing re/construction – but sporadically and with no planners (Skotte 2003). 
7 This is the opposite of what Hasic & Roberts recommended in Open House International (1999). 
8 There are probably no finer examples of emergency-built permanent houses than the Swedish-built 
housing sent to Norway and Finland during WW II (Rikskommittén 1942). I was born in one. 
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2.2. In order to escape the fallacy, and unnecessary cost, of ‘double recon-
struction’, all ‘emergency shelter’ should be built – either – as structures 
that may be improved and extended into permanent housing, following the 
principles above, or as structures that due to their siting (e.g. in the middle 
of streets) or materials (e.g. paper tubes or canvas) are temporary in both 
the perceptual and physical sense.  
• Houses normally last lifetimes. They should be planned for accordingly. The 
single most important issue on post-war housing is location, i.e. where new 
housing is being built, or destroyed ones reconstructed. The effects of war 
lead to different future possibilities from those perceived before violence 
erupted. Yet there are some basic planning constants, like the generic dy-
namics connected to locations of sought-after resources, institutional and 
administrative centers, to lines of communication, etc which necessarily will 
affect and cause future changes. The endemic weakness of war-affected in-
stitutions and economies require committed considerations as to where 
housing is being (re)constructed, i.e. how they are linked up to these struc-
turing resources and institutions. It is about being able to assess the present 
and likely future ‘geographical capital’ of a location. This issue cannot be 
overstated.9 
 
8.3.2. THE TACTICAL APPROACH 
Housing is about agency. My cases tell me that for displaced people, housing, per-
haps more than any other issue, is saturated with symbolic powers. For the return-
ing Grapskanians it was an existential (yet perhaps temporal) manifestation of be-
ing reconnected to their own lives, however distorted by war. For many in Miha-
tovici the settlement symbolized social marginalization unknown to most of them 
before the war, whereas the NRC houses symbolized for most of the owners and 
tenants the chasm between the haves and the have-nots of war.  There is no way 
of circumventing meaning being infused into housing. What housing projects mean, 
what perceptions they create or reproduce, is beyond the donor or NGO. Meaning is 
the fundamental basis for action. That is why instilled meaning will determine the 
potential recovery powers embedded in housing. In order to maximize these pow-
ers, agency or decision-making powers must be shifted from provider to the people 
for whom re/construction funding is being provided. This has both policy and practi-
cal implications: 
 
• There seems to be no better way of achieving this than through aided self-
help. That is a conceptually coherent and well-tested tactical approach to 
housing. This approach shows its particular strength in these three areas: 1) 
it lowers the unit cost by lowering the labor cost input,10 which means more 
housing units per unit international funding; 2) it strengthens the social 
                                          
9 No one knows yet if the grand ‘Imidugudu’ resettlement program will succeed in Rwanda. It was de-
cided by the national authorities that scattered farmsteads were to be ‘centralized’ into new villages 
where services may be provided. So far, it has had detrimental effects on farming efficiency (UNHCR 
2000a). 
10 The difference in unit cost is not that big in post-war setting because of extraordinarily low salaries. 
In BiH, about 20% of total cost was allotted to labor, in Norway a comparable figure would be 50%. 
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bonding in the community, as all members are involved in ways that create 
interdependence; 3) by taking on the responsibility of re/constructing your 
own dwelling in what has been, or what will be your community, you make a 
strategic investment in your own future, which entails sustained action to 
secure that very investment.  
• Not all houses in war-torn societies will be reconstructed through interna-
tional funding. Funding will set limits. In addition to the embedded planning 
issues briefly touched upon above, there is a call for spatial concentration. 
Aside from obvious security reasons and logistics, it is about creating or rec-
reating places that sustain themselves through a sufficiently strong material 
and social momentum. It is about creating a ‘laser effect’ that is recognized 
also by others to act upon.  
• Housing is too personal a symbol to enhance reconciliation between former 
antagonists. There is absolutely no reference in my own work nor in any of 
the other projects I know of in BiH that indicate that housing in any dimen-
sion has had any impact on the relationship between former antagonists – 
except that it physically brings people closer together.11 This will invariably 
lead to increased contact, although the world is full of examples that physi-
cal proximity is by no means sufficient to secure interdependence or even 
interaction between people who perceives themselves as of ‘different origin’. 
 
8.3.3 THE STRATEGY 
Identity wars bring the dwelling to the very center of conflict. Dwellings are looted 
and destroyed in recognition of their symbolic character – their identity. Houses are 
being desecrated and killed. These realities make up the ‘field’ for any war – and 
for any international housing intervention. The proclaimed goals of these interven-
tions are cast wide, not only to shelter, but to contribute towards social, political 
and economic recovery, towards peace and, as was the case in BiH, towards ‘rees-
tablishing a multi-ethnic society’. All these reasons comprise an overall aspiration of 
contributing towards societal recovery. On the basis of what I have found out about 
what housing actually has done to the recovery processes in BiH, the following 
three sets of recommendations are put forward on strategic issues.12 
 
.1) Local Agency 
Recovery comprises processes of reflexive development. This requires the decisive 
participation of local agency for two reasons. First, they are the ones who have 
‘been there before’, both in place – and time; they have experienced that the very 
web of society has been torn apart; they have experienced violence, hardship and 
personal loss.  What they see as meaningful action of reconstruction is affected by 
these past and recent experiences. Outsiders may perceive the situation differently 
and forge reconstruction strategies that insiders may not recognize. Second, local 
                                          
11 In BiH, the Dutch used SFOR’s ‘hot spots’ area indication as one of their chief location criteria for 
housing reconstruction, based on the assumption that housing investments and the funds that followed 
would ‘calm things down’.  
12 This applies in principle to the donor level, particularly in environments were NGOs work in the ‘Wil-
sonian’ tradition. Where NGOs work more independently, strategies are set by themselves. But since 
these distinctions are becoming more blurred, they apply to both. 
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actors will be the ones sustaining the various acts of re/construction in the future. 
These will not be sustained if they are not accepted as meaningful or deemed rele-
vant. 
 
Any housing intervention must be organized in ways that engage the agency of the 
people for whom housing is being funded.13 This is the only way to ascertain the 
necessary spillover from housing investments onto other societal capitals, a neces-
sary prerequisite for sustained (re)development.  This shift of responsibilities from 
provider to provided implies two other changes: 
 
1) The practice of housing as free gifts (to the randomly lucky few) must be al-
tered.  Attaining funding or materials for housing re/construction must entail 
a contractual commitment based on some sort of collateral, ‘sweat equity’, 
or through bartering in services. 
2)  Some sort of housing policy guidelines will have to be developed in order to 
frame the housing reconstruction, and allow for long-term strategic choices 
to be made.14 The characteristically weak institutions of war-affected coun-
tries must be assisted in these matters. 
Judging from BiH, structures were there but were circumvented by the international 
agencies for reasons of efficiency – and for “not taking sides” in the conflict.15  
 
.2) The NGO String 
In practice the NGO ‘channel’ works more like a ‘string’ with two semi-independent 
units at either end. The field taking on tactical and operational, and at times strate-
gic challenges, and HQ active in lobbying governments for funding, running public 
relations campaigns and handling accountancy and auditing. In principle, my inves-
tigated cases could well have been run by their respective field offices and linked to 
some government directorate like Norad or Sida. All the emergency programs were 
government funded anyway.  Whatever the realities on the ground, the ‘NGO thing’ 
will prevail – for public and political reasons. So the focus is on organizational im-
provements. Some recommendations follow that aim at upgrading the ‘string’ into a 
housing ‘channel’. This is sought realized through professional overlap between the 
two nodes: 
 
• The NGO headquarter forge a strategic partnership with an established 
housing co-op.16 That way, the ‘non-government – non-market’ nature is re-
tained. The HQ level can now work out organization-wide housing and shel-
                                          
13 This does not refer to the illusive participation referred to in most NGO reports, but participation 
where responsibilities for choices are shifted from provider to provided. 
14 In BiH it is foreigners working for UN agencies and NGOs, people with no training nor previous ex-
perience in planning, not to speak of knowledge about Bosnia, that out of almost arbitrary considerations 
are deciding on where housing is being rebuilt. No physical planners are involved, either international or 
local.  The local planning authorities are concerned, in principle, but their capacity is overstretched as it 
is, and besides, it is not their revenue being spent.  
15 During the war, Tuzla’s urban planning unit spent their time planning a holiday resort on a nearby 
lake, ‘The Modradc Riviera’.  
16 In Norway, this could be The Norwegian Federation of Co-operative Housing (NBBL) or similar organi-
zations. 
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ter policies, develop strategies, support the tactical level and work out stan-
dard routines for the operational level. Raising the professional housing pro-
file would allow HQ to assist the field in their ongoing work – and vice versa. 
The string would widen. Alternatively, HQ could establish their own housing 
& shelter unit, but given the fluctuating nature of programs, the people in-
volved would most likely cover other sectors, which is what is there already.  
 
• Provide incentives for expatriate field staff to stay on. There is a dire need to 
attain some sort of organizational loyalty between short-term field staff and 
their organization – or vice versa.17  Former staff should be retained on a 
roster, and (bi-)annual brush-ups should be undertaken as a means of 
maintaining skills and interest, and of being professionally and organization-
ally updated.  
 
• Cleanse the channel for empty words. There are two aspects of this: 1) 
there should be a requirement to rid reports of jargon words, which disguise 
rather than clarify the situation in the field. Several writers have commented 
upon the same as my investigations have uncovered: the lack of substantial 
and reflected information provided in field reports and in reports passed on 
to donors. Instead they are full of NGO-speak;18 2) the reports from the 
field, from projects and on achievements should be more true to what takes 
place. The situation in the field is often much more difficult and complex 
than presented in initial proposals and subsequent feedbacks to HQ and to 
donor.19  Tactics have to reflect context, which in turn may result in other 
achievements than initially proposed. By not reporting comprehensively, 
outdated strategies set by misinformed HQ/donor will be maintained.20 
 
• State donors should delegate their strategic decisions on support to the 
field, i.e. to the respective embassies. This is a way of strengthening the ‘aid 
channel’, of enhancing learning and understanding, and it is a way of ensur-
ing that strategies reflect the contextual flows.  
 
 
8.3.4 THE DONOR 
Within the ‘Wilsonian’ tradition, and in particular in Scandinavia where governments 
fund most of the emergency activities of the NGOs in full, governments have a 
strong impact on strategies of assistance. Housing reconstruction became a high 
                                          
17 There is a surprising number of field employees bearing grudges against their former NGO employer. 
This is a general attitude recorded by staff of ‘my’ organizations, but it applies as a general phenome-
non, observed in other organizations and by other people.  
18 The lingo of the ‘development sector’ is also very much promoted by the donors. The field of emer-
gencies is anything but clear or neatly defined, actions are taken in highly volatile contexts, outcomes 
are uncertain, and the frame of reference is often shaped by domestic politics.  Such circumstances 
favour a vague terminology. But a vague terminology inhibits learning and improved practices. The 
evaluation of UNHCR’s housing program in Rwanda brought that to head (UNHCR 2000). 
19 Often Final Reports to donor read like the Project Proposal + the Auditor’s report.  
20 Outdated strategies being upheld could also be explained by field staff opposition, either because of 
‘established field routines’ or – which lies at the heart of the structural division between strategy and 
tactics – the field staff is too close to the ground to acknowledge the bigger strategic picture.  
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profile strategy of assistance in the Balkans for two reasons: firstly, it tended to the 
immediate shelter needs of the ethnically displaced, secondly, it was seen as a 
means of securing territorial return of the displaced. The latter was part of a joint 
international attempt to nullify the consequences of the war and reestablish the 
multi-ethnicity of the region. Housing was assumed to be able to achieve results 
beyond its shelter function: my work in Bosnia has shown that it does, but perhaps 
not in the way assumed.  
 
If housing is to support long-term recovery the overall strategy has to consider a 
number of associated issues: 
 
• Housing support should be provided in a principled way, not by chance as is 
the case today. Societal recovery is a collective effort and support should 
enhance a sense of fairness among the people who have lost their property. 
That one family gets their house rebuilt for free while the neighbors get 
nothing seems meaningless in view of what they both have gone through – 
and the cost involved. Donor conferences should institute a system of dam-
age compensation. This way reconstruction would be a more dynamic enter-
prise where investments would be made where displaced people saw their 
future aspirations best served.21 This could be institutionalized in various 
ways and in ‘mixed formats’ with possible credit schemes, etc., cf. recom-
mendations under 8.3.1.  
 
• Support programs should be established to assist physical planning institu-
tions in furnishing planning guidance on long-term housing investments. 
What is called for is strategic recovery options, if not plans, realistic in re-
flecting the funds pledged or provided by international donors. Bosnia is an 
extreme case in point where no economic or physical planning existed to 
underpin the reconstruction of villages or regions.22 It has all come about at 
the discretion, albeit with some guidance from IMG and RRTF, of each of the 
more than one hundred international agencies and organizations that 
worked on housing reconstruction in the country.  
 
• Housing re/construction should be carried out in ways that maximize its high 
multiplier potential. For each builder employed, several more23 would be en-
gaged in the production, in transport and in services – if, and only if, the 
house is built from domestically produced materials. It should be a condition 
for funding that a given percentage of its total cost, say 80%, should be 
domestically produced. In war-ravaged countries production plants for build-
ing materials are often closed, in which case materials are imported. The re-
                                          
21 Strategic considerations are not part of the reconstruction activities in BiH. Consequently, more than 
10,000 of the reconstructed houses are left empty, looted or abandoned according to the Housing Vali-
dation and Monitoring Unit (HVM)  of RTTF/OHR, Bosnia (conversation with Ms. Hughes (HVM), March 
2003). 
22 I only know of Sida employing architect planners in their embassy to develop strategies on recon-
struction locations. Grapska was a village within what they stated as a viable area for re-development.  
23 At least one more and perhaps as many as five, all depending on circumstances (Habitat-ILO 1997). 
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covery powers of housing is thus lost in support of economic development in 
neighboring countries. This leads to the additional recommendation: 
 
• Instigate programs for the production of building materials. As for long-term 
recovery, this is probably more important than support for  housing 
re/construction. Experience from BiH shows that nothing is being invested 
during war due to lack of investment capital, capital goods, and general 
poverty. But more importantly, not much was invested afterwards either 
since imports were cheap, and trade was the preferred sector of investment. 
Lacking local production facilities and lacking preferential purchase policies, 
much of the enormous international housing gifts provided were in fact aid-
ing the neighboring countries. Under such circumstances housing is robbed 
of some of its most basic recovery powers.   
 
• Housing re/construction should be conceived as a community affair rather 
than a series of individual housing projects. This would entail the funding of 
community-wide livelihood projects, extending beyond the sort of ‘start up 
package’ provided to returnee families in BiH.24 The focus is on projects be-
yond housing, but which are parts of the ‘housing network’ required to sus-
tain housing investments. For instance, in my case, Grapska, materials for 
two houses would buy two used tractors.  
 
The last two issues are for governments only: the first one is on domestic polices 
towards refugee return. All my cases reveal the extraordinary importance played by 
the diaspora in providing economic support to people, and in funding private in-
vestments in their country of origin.  
 
• Government should refrain from immediately returning refugees from coun-
tries ravaged by war because of their important role in providing support, 
through remittances, to their relatives and to needy people in their home 
country. Their contribution towards their (former) homeland’s recovery is 
deemed more effective than traditional ODA, and definitely so if compared to 
the refugees being sent back to add to the burden of the local economy. One 
of the most glaring facts of post-war societies is their devastating unem-
ployment.  
 
My case from Grapska convincingly showed that without the physical security pro-
vided by SFOR, people would not have dared return to rebuild their village, There-
fore: 
 
• In post-war reconstruction settings the presence of international military 
forces may be necessary in creating the level of security required for hous-
ing re/construction to be carried through. Military forces should act to neu-
tralize and reverse the ‘culture of violence’ caused by the preceding conflict. 
In my case the division of labor was almost absolute between the security 
                                          
24 KM 1500 in seeds and manual tools. 
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forces and the reconstruction forces. It is my recommendation that this divi-
sion is upheld. International assistance to secure peace and support the re-
covery processes of war-torn societies is profoundly difficult and represents 
an immense professional challenge. Each should therefore do what each 
does best. 
 
Throughout this thesis the incongruity between the emergency culture of the field 
and the permanent nature of housing has been a recurrent theme. This leads to a 
final recommendation: 
 
• When in doubt, stick to tents, or at least stick to genuinely temporary ar-
rangements until housing can be provided within a local settingin line with 
its potential powers. The most wasteful contribution would be to erect hous-
ing that ignored its long-term nature, but merely focused on temporary, ur-
gent needs. The Bosnian experience show that such houses are either aban-
doned or left for the marginalized part of the population. Such are tents of 
concrete.  
 
 
8.4 COLORING THE WHITE SPOTS; A Call For Further Research 
 
My own arena for research has been broad, linking as it does housing, new wars 
and international response. Throughout my work, both while working in the field 
and when analyzing my data, I have felt the inherent need to know more. When I 
failed to meet these calls it was either because I did not have the time to pursue 
them, - or I discovered that there was nothing there.  
 
The field of post-war recovery has large white areas of vacant research ground. I 
hasten to add that there has be an extraordinary expansion particularly within the 
field of political science during the last decade, which – in the prevailing manner of 
their discipline – has primarily focused on quantitative aspects of internal wars, 
through which researchers seek the wars’ probable causes and try to identify issues 
that may prevent them from breaking out (Berdal & Malone 2000, Nafziger et al. 
2000, Stedman et al. 2002, Collier et al. 2003). At the other end, within the tradi-
tional social sciences of sociology, human geography and anthropology, much im-
portant work on the plight and agency of refugees and displaced people has been 
coming forth (Malkki 1995, Harrel-Bond & Voutira 1995, Zetter 1999, Kibreag 
2002). With links to both arenas, but with an emphasis on international (humani-
tarian) interventions and the concepts guiding them, run the works of Kaldor 
(1999, 2001), Macrae (2001), Duffield (2002) and others. In spite of this there is 
still a number of key issues that needs tending to in order to understand the dy-
namics – or paralysis – of recovery. These issues could favorably be  investigated 
as multi-disciplinary research in which housing re/construction could be the mediat-
ing issue given its importance both to the societies affected by internal wars – and 
the high funding volume involved on the part of the donors.  
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The following presentation contains mere inception sketches, yet they touch upon 
themes that have appeared to me and my contacts in the field as important: 
 
8.4.1 AIDED SELF-HELP HOUSING. 
 In post-war reconstruction settings where the arena is reigned by NGOs, old argu-
ments are incessantly repeated, unsubstantiated claims bravely presented, and cost 
comparisons made between non-comparable figures, and so forth.  There is more 
to the self-help housing approach than I have uncovered, such as its true capacity 
building powers on issues of trade skills, management, labor time, organizational 
structuring, and not least on cost and cost determinants. In addition what is not 
looked into at all is the psychological and social regenerative powers of self-help in 
war and disaster ravaged contexts. I have made a tiny contribution through my 
Grapska case, but self-help housing’s wider re/developmental impact needs further 
investigation. All the more so since the World Bank has advocated against it as a 
‘development strategy’ (World Bank 1993).  
 
8.4.2 THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INTERNATIONAL HOUSING INVESTMENTS  
The large sums allotted to housing re/construction in areas of war are in effect 
regular housing investments, and as such act upon the local economy in certain 
ways. We know little about the course of the funds once spent. The World Bank’s 
Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit claims that “Aid is considerably more 
effective in augmenting growth in post-conflict situations than in other situations, 
but the pattern of aid matters, [ however] this is based on judgment rather than 
quantitative analysis” (CPRU/WB 2002;1). My small peek into the impacts of these 
investments reveals a blurred picture affected by what Duffield (2000) called 
‘transborder trade’; I see imports rather than domestic production, I see tied aid, 
and by the absence of financial institutions, I see an opaque economic culture 
based on payments in cash. In Bosnia most of the reconstruction works that took 
place from 1992 to 1997 were paid for in cash brought in by field officers in bags 
and briefcases. Tens of millions of DEM were channeled into the economy this way. 
It is not only the “pattern of aid” that matters, it is probably also the “pattern of the 
economy”. To get to grips with this calls for methodological approaches best han-
dled by the professional insight of social economists. I see this as one of the major 
fields for future research on post-war recovery. 
 
8.4.3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF REMITTANCES FROM ABROAD 
These remittances from Bosnians in exile to their relatives in BiH has surpassed net 
ODA to Bosnia-Herzegovina during the post-war years. My Grapska experience 
showed how these remittances were re-circulated within the community in ways 
that invigorated the economy and enhanced the environment. But it also showed 
that remittances were more likely to be spent on imports than were, at least in case 
of Grapska, the funds provided by the aid agency.  Aside from their economic im-
pacts, the remittances are also manifestations of the refugees’ psychological at-
tachment to the ‘old country’. And the other way around, these remittances and 
their tangible results in the BiH, also stand as expressions of the international in-
terdependence, globalization, by any other name, that is taking place at the grass-
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root level, the impact of which is yet to be fully exposed. The world-wide impacts of 
international remittances is now being gradually acknowledged (Kapur & McHale 
2003), but remittances may prove to play a distinctive role in countries ravaged by 
factional wars; , besides their affecting the economy, they may also strengthening 
the respective identities of the parties in conflict. 
 
8.4.4 LONGITUDINAL STUDIES ON THE PEOPLE DISPLACED THROUGH  
‘ETHNIC CLEANSING’ 
Through my interviews I was often given horrific stories on violent expulsions. The displaced 
went through crucial ‘life events’ which altered their outlook and their subsequent actions. 
Their core aspirations and their life strategies were forever changed. So how did it go? Based 
on social and anthropological research similar to that of Bringa (1995) done prior to the 
1992-1995 war could be used as a basis for such longitudinal studies. The communities in 
question could be followed into the war, and into the complex processes of post-war recov-
ery. What were the determining issues in choices of return, of staying put, or emigrating? 
Such follow-up research could document and help explain the war based changes and, in the 
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, help clarify how the concept and practice of ‘multi-ethnicity’ has 
changed. These are core concepts in understanding identity wars.  
 
8.4.5 PHYSICAL RECONSTRUCTION AS RECONSTRUCTION OF SELF 
This is a heading formulated by terms used in crisis psychology. In the terminology I have 
used throughout this thesis this would be referred to as interaction between (the replenish-
ment of) fixed and human capital. Although war and violent displacement are major stress-
ors which are bound to have serious impacts on people’s health and capacity to act, they are 
superficially and speculatively handled, if handled at all, by most agencies working in the 
field. Some NGOs, NPA among them, established a number of centers in Bosnia to help the 
most severely traumatized. But the number of cases far outnumbered the capacity of these 
centers, which gradually had to reduce their intake in line with the drying up of international 
support. From my experience what is required are appropriate methods of helping people 
with war traumas, or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in situations where the num-
bers of cases far exceed the capacity of required treatment.25 Treatment has to take place 
by proxy, as it were.26  Building houses and (re)creating material environments are both 
physical activities which might serve as a vehicle, or method, of treating people who have 
been psychologically wounded by the war. This is already taking place irrespective of its 
therapeutic powers, although tactics may be shaped by the agents’ own psychological specu-
lations.  I would like to see the field of crisis psychology do research in the field of housing to 
find out if there are ways of combining methods of treatment with the act of  housing 
re/construction. What we need to know is if housing is able ‘to do’ this, and in case, 
how it is to be done. 
                                          
25 There are documented work being done on treatment methods for people having been psychologically 
scarred by war, see Heidi Holland’s work in Mozambique (2001), but these are not directly linked to, or 
made part of other programs, say on re-housing. 
26 In both my cases from Tuzla displaced families, yet total strangers, were set to live together at a 
level of intimacy reserved only ones own family. If people who knew each other, and had been through 
the same ordeals together, were to share space, chances are that their shared experience would allow 
them to exchange feelings in a way the could have therapeutic effects. This is a mere example as I have 
scant knowledge of psychological therapy. 
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ADDENDUM  
 
 
During the night when the manuscript was submitted the most obvious proposal for further 
research, the one I plan to pursue was left out. 
 
The Challenges of War Related Forced Urbanization 
The current wars lead to forced urbanization.  Most conflicts are identity conflicts fought to 
gain control over exploitable natural resources in rural areas. This presses 'the otheres', the 
displaced into the cities for reasons of security, but also to gain access to what international 
organizations may provide in terms relief, and possible employment of sorts. 
 
These movement to urban centers of  ethnically homogeneous groups hold certain 
characteristics that merits further investigation. How is their anticipated strong social 
capital transformed into the other capital modes in their plight to reestablish community in 
a totally new setting where the other capital modes are either non-existent or rendered 
irrelevant.  
 
Whereas my present thesis investigated the effects of replenishing fixed capital on  the 
other societal capitals, and analyzing their composite impacts on the recovery process, what 
is suggested here is the opposite.  How does social and human capital  facilitate the 
formation of fixed and environmental capital? Or simply: how do the migrants forced into 
urban areas because of identity wars shape their environment, and how are they assisted? 
 
Hans Skotte 
24 April 2004 
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10 APPENDICES 
 
10.1 CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
 .1) Lists made prior to Case I – later modified1 
 .2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents2 
 
10.2 CONTRACT DOCUMENTS FROM A SINGULAR NRC Tuzla Model case 
 .1) Picture of the house 
 .2) Floor plans as executed by NRC 
 .3) Contract between Tuzla Municipality and house owner 
 .4) Contract between NRC and house owner 
 .5) Appendix to contract 
 .6) NRC’s Technical Specifications and Performance Requirements 
 
10.3 CONTRACT DOCUMENTS FROM A SINGULAR CASE IN GRAPSKA 
 .1) Agreement between house owner and SRSA 
 .2) Enclosed drawing 
 
10.4  IMG’S APPRAISAL SHEET FOR GRADING DAMAGES TO HOUSING 
 
10.5  IMG SUMMARY ON DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION OF BiH DWELLINGS 
 
10.6 IMG’s STANDARD FOR HOUSING RE/CONSTRUCTION OF 1998 
 
10.7 UNHCR’S STANDARD FOR HOUSING REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCTION  
 
                                                 
1 The following four set of interview forms were made prior to investigating CASE I. The idea was to 
learn from these interviews when going into the second and third case. This was also how it came to 
work. Within only a few interviews the questions were modified and reduced, partly as a result of a 
reflexive process, partly on the advice of Steinar Kvale (1999). His advice on inquiry is to first address 
the “what”, seek the ‘facts’ (as perceived), then find out how the issue was handled, say, on how people 
organized their when living in overcrowded settlements, or how they were able to paid for their housing 
extensions. Finally we ask for their reasons, their response on the ‘why’ question. So rather than all 
these pages, by the end of my field work my questions spun around these three basic questions. 
2 This set-up was made prior to going to the field. When encountering the realities, the set-up was much 
simplified. Basically holding on to the substance of the headlines 
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10.1CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
     .1) Lists made prior to Case I – later modified 
AGENCY/INTERVIEWEE date/place 
 
organization: 
 
name of interviewee: 
 
 
relation to project: 
 
 
position/period in post/ age bracket/gender 
 
 
 
professional background/previous experience relevant to pw housing 
 
 
 
AGENCY DATA in the year(s) in question – and –at the time – recent change 
 financial turnover  
 
 staff size 
 
 
 key sectors of competence – then/now 
 
 
 
 previous relevant experience; BiH, housing projects 
 
 
 
 link from these to present project 
 
 
 
 
 professional assistance on housing issues 
 
 
 
  
 policy on cooperation on professional matters 
 
 
 
 
 Staff capacity building policy/seminars/feed-back routines/library services 
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10.1CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
     .1) Lists made prior to Case I – later modified 
IDP/TENANT date/place 
 
AGENCY: 
 
1.PERSONAL DATA 
.1 address 
 
.2 name of interviewee: 
 
.3 identified as benficiary by whom – on what criteria 
 
 
.4 former/present occupation - means of income 
 
 
 
.5 family size/age bracket/ – CHANGE since displacement: 
 
 
 
.6 Pre-displacement place and type of residence 
 
 
.7 Time and circumstances of displacement 
 
 
 
 
2. PRESENT RESIDENCE 
.1 area, shared facilities, no of rooms, part of potential flat area.  CHANGE  
 
 
 
  
.2 flat services, water, electricity, heating – CHANGE during occupancy 
 
 
 
  
3. INTERACTION PERSON/RESIDENCE 
.1 period of occupancy 
 
 
.2 present/former rent per month 
 
 
 
.3 CHANGES within flat - or in external/internal common areas, initiated by tenant 
 
 
 
 
4. CONDITIONS SET BY AGENCY ON ISSUES PERTAING TO PLANNING 
AND IMPLEMENTATION MODES, POST-PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND TO 
ORIGIN OF BUILDING MATERIALS.  
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10.1CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
     .1) Lists made prior to Case I – later modified 
HOUSE  OWNER date/place 
 
PROJECT AGENCY: 
1. HOUSE OWNER DATA 
.1 address 
 
.2 name of interviewee: 
 
.3 identified as benficiary by whom – on what criteria 
 
.4 family size /age bracket: 
 
.5 former/present occupation, means of income.  previous house building 
experience  
 
 
.7 house formally registered by authorities, in whose name  
 
8. rationale/initial plans for house 
 
 
2. HOUSING DATA 
.1 physical data: building size, no of flats, materials, potential for over-all 
extention 
 
 
.2 re to urban structure, roads, utilities, schools, markets, placees of employment: 
 
 
 
.3 reconstructed, rental area; part of potential flat area 
 
  
.4 Owner-initiated CHANGES during or post project period 
  
 
 
3. INTERACTION RENTAL SPACE/TENANTS 
.1 tenants during project period, family size , period of tenancy 
 
 
 
.2 tenants post project period  
 
 
 
.3 voluntary or contractual participation by tenant into physical changes 
 
 
 
.4 present/former rent per month 
 
 
 
4. CONDITIONS SET BY AGENCY ON ISSUES PERTAING TO PLANNING 
AND IMPLEMENTATION MODES, POST-PROJECT MANAGEMENT OR TO 
ORIGIN OF BUILDING MATERIALS 
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10.1CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
     .1) Lists made prior to Case I – later modified 
 
KEY PROJECT DATA place/date 
 
1. AGENCY  
 
2. INITIAL PROJECT APPLICATION DATA 
.1 PROJECT RATIONALE; FORMULATED PROJECT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
 
.2 INCEPTION; APPLICATION DATE TO (WHAT) DONOR 
 
.3 BUDGET  FINAL ACCOUNT 
 TIME/FUNDS TIME/COST 
 
.4 TARGET GROUP/DIRECT BENEFICIARIES  
 NOs AS PER APPLICATION/AS PER COMPLETED PROJECT 
 
 CHANGE – EXPLANATION FOR POSSIBLE DEVIATION 
 
 
.5 DBs IDENTIFIED BY WHOM 
 
.6 ON WHAT CRITERIA - DEFINED BY WHOM?  
 
.3 DB INVOLVEMENT INTO PLANNING/BUILDING/MANAGEMENT; WHEN AND HOW 
 
 
7. PLANNING 
.1 LOCAL PROFESSIONAL TEAM ENGAGED, why were these chosen? 
 
 
.2 PLANNING GOALS AND MANDATE SET BY AGENCY 
 
 
.3 ‘REALTIONSHIP’ TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES, how ‘manifested in practice’? 
 
 
.4 ‘EXIT STRATEGY’, MANAGEMENT SUPPORT, HANDING-OVER TO WHOM, WHEN? 
 
 
8. BUILDING  
.1 CONTRACTORS names and trade, pre-war/present turnover 
 
 
.2 TENDERING AND/OR SELECTION PROCEDURES, ROLE OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
 
 
.3 NOs OF LABOR EMPLOYED. WHAT CATEGORIES (“war vet.s”, “refugees”, self) 
 
 
.4 PLACE OF ORIGIN OF (MOST OF) MATERIALS USED  to be further investigated 
 
 
9. CONDITIONS SET BY AGENCY ON ISSUES PERTAING TO PLANNING AND 
IMPLEMENTATION MODES, POST-PROJECT MANAGEMENT OR TO 
ORIGIN OF BUILDING MATERIALS 
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10.1CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
     .2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents 
1
GUIDING THEMES WHEN INTERVIEWING SECONDARY AGENTS, 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES, NGOS, LOCAL AUTHORITIES, 
CONTRACTORS AND ‘FUNCTIONAL OTHERS’ 
 
 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
1A) Do the project in any substantial way change ’normal practice’? 
 
1A.1 How did it all start,? Background? Historical references? 
 
1A.2 Prior professional experience, building, housing, urban planning?  
 
1A.3 Conceived, formulated as a continuation of previous practice?  
 
1A.4| In what way was this new? Sector, elements of input? 
 
1A.5 Why was this NGO chosen/awarded this project? 
 
1A.6 Earlier experience with these types of projects – in areas of war?  
 
1A.7 Organizing the project – in principle – like any other building project?  
 
 
1B) General political agreement about the project? 
 
1B.1 Political consensus about this type of intervention? Sources of doubt? 
 
1B.2 Media? Any activities directed at ensuring press support? 
 
  
1C) Scale of the intervention, degree of change 
 
1C.1 Choice of scale, relative to other projects. Why the the chosen scale? 
 How did the scale affect the way it was treated? Handled? Political importance? 
  
 
1D) Level of attention and interest focusing on this particutlar project 
 
1D.1 How many other projects competed for attention – within the area? BiH? Other 
’hot-spots’?  A ’prestige case’? Entrance project – for subsequent contracts?   
 
 
1E) The symbolic dimention of the project 
1E.1 Project seen as political manifestation? – what about the subsequent political 
attention, control, evaluation, feed-back – used in subsequent political 
manouvering? 
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10.1CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
     .2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents 
2
1F) Are those directly affected involved in any decisionmaking? 
 
1E.1 Who were they, and how were they involved? At what stage, to what extent? 
For what purpose? – or – why not?  
 
1E.2 Local authorities as ’the participating body’ – who, why, for what purpose? – 
why not more? – or less?  
 
1E.3 Reference to participation as a prerequisite for development: Reasons why – 
why not end-user ’participation’ was deemed relevant? 
   
2 INITIAL INPUT 
 
2A) (un)ambiguity in political statements and goals formulation 
  
2A.1 Formulations from one level to the next: from donor to NGO etc?  
 What overriding policy formulations guided the project? 
 The clearity of the terms used – allowing for several courses of action, and/or 
different priorities?  
 Could the project have been implemented in several ways – by other actors? 
 
 
2B (Techincal) Complexity of the policies to be pursued 
 
2B.1 Logistics: How the materials, manpower, communication, weather – and 
fighting affected the formulation of the projcet and the choice of 
implementation strategies? 
 
2B.2 Who – how many – interacting agents were involved? 
 
2B.3 Who were the ’contolling parties’, donors, other agencies, UNHCR, local 
authorities?  Reporting to whom – frequency? 
 
 
2C The Validity of the ‘Program Theory’ 
 
2c.1 Envisioned goals/anticipated achievements by the intervention?   
 What were the primary goals?  What options were available – why this one? 
What if nothing was done – or something ‘totally different’?  
 How did the envisioned ’indirect’ effects influence the tactics and operations 
chosen? 
 
2C.2 How was adaptibility for future change handled? Re choice of site, location, 
technology and construction, Future end use?  
 Who decided, on what grounds, What financial conciderations was involved?  
Role of UNHCR, and local/central authorities? 
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10.1CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
     .2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents 
3
 
 
 
 
3 IMPLEMENTATION (from decision to act – until output is complete) 
 
 a) Local 
authorities 
Political level 
Bureaucratic 
level 
b) Local 
networks 
ref. organization 
old and new local 
power networks 
Political/ethnic 
stongmen 
c)Implementin
g agencies 
Main NGO 
UNHCR 
co-oper. NGOs 
 
d)Local 
business 
interests  
directly involved 
indirectly involv 
War profiteers 
e) Primary 
Beneficiaries 
owner, tenants, 
gender, children 
1.COMPREHENS
ION 
Understand what 
this is about; the 
major goals, 
long-term, peace 
     
2.ABILITY 
command of 
resources 
 
 
    
3.WILL 
public choice 
theory – (ego) 
Regulatory 
capture theory 
commitment 
 
 
    
 
 
 
4. ADDRESSEES –initial situation – subsequent slide/evolution 
 
4A.1 Comprehension.  
How were the addressees informed, made to understand the goals of the 
project? How did they see the intervention? 
 Intervention as long-term, contribution towards reconcilliation, peace?  
 
4A.2 Will.  
 Willingness to ‘sacrifice’ in order to take part. Commitment?  
What would they rather do? Options? 
Professional or social ethos?  
 
4A.3 Resources.  
 What did they command?    
 What were their contributions? 
 
4A.4 Organization.  
Collective or individual relationship to project?  
How did it relate to ethnic division?   
 Key people, initiators?  
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10.1CHECKLIST FOR INTERVIEWS 
     .2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents 
4
4A.5 General state of Affairs.  
 
4B Formative moment. 
The right – or – wrong time.   
How did intervention  - in time – affect the response from the addressees? 
What are current ‘time potentials’? 
 
4C  Regulatory capture strategies.  
How did addressees try to capture project on own terms (dependency?  
coping strategies?)? – try to camuflage other benefits/justify needs? – outright 
undermine project? 
 
4D Free riders 
 Were the addressees about to solve their housing problem on their own? 
 What options were in question? 
 
 
5. MONITORING AND CONTROL 
  
5.1 How was the project to be evaluated?  
 What were the key indicators?  
 Reported to whom? 
 Report procedures; from HQ, field? 
 What happened? 
 
 
6. OTHER POLITICAL OR POLICY PRIORITIES, OTHER INTERESTS  
 
6.1 Other –competing- priorities or agendas within the local political apparatus? 
 
6.2  Competition among NGOs on housing, on funding? 
  different agendas within agency? 
 
6.3  Support or obstruction from other international/local bodies, army/S/UnproFOR?  
 
6.4  UD-Emergency - Norad relationship, how was this relationship perceived, or 
activated? 
 
 
7. MARKET – and subsequent change 
 
7.1 What expectations were expressed initially by the key actors in supporting the 
local market?  
  ’Market’ depends on communication (transparency-information flow) 
  – how was that acieved? 
 What are the key market differences then-now?  manifested how? 
 
7.2 What was the ”market” at the time of intervention 
-how and when did it change.  Driving force for change? Manifested how?  
 
 Economic communication, banking system?, credit system? DM? Cash? 
 
 Materials production, availability, source? Loss, theft, sihponing?  
 
 Labour, salaries, selection criteria of staff. 
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     .2) Guiding Themes When Interviewing Secondary Agents 
5
 
 Logistics, transport, fuel, organization, co-ordination 
 
7.3 Who were the actors, how were they identified?  
   Old – new power structures,  always the same ones? Outsourcing? Black mail? 
 
8. PREVAILING CONDITIONS at the time of intervention – and onwards  
 
8A IN the Field: 
8A.1  Anticipations on the course of the war or the emerging peace/normality 
 Security issues, food delivery, provisions, public services 
 
8A.2 How the situation affected the spesific actors involved – their personal  
  references. 
 
8A.3 Perspectives on time. How did these manifest themselves in personal choices. 
 
8A.4 Experience of time passed.  History, WWII, future, children, asppirations 
 
8A.5 How do the project fit these personal perspectives?  
 
8A.6 How were information about the general situation obtained/disseminated  
 
 
 
8B In the donor/expat/NGO community 
8B.1 Perpectives on input, anticipation of impact on the overall situation 
 
8B.2 Agency build-up and organizational inertia. Data on actual activity over time 
 
8B.3 Scale of media coverage, official policy, in support of these types of  
  intervention. 
 
8B.4 Role of private interests in exporting hardware, tied aid? 
 
These points will be raised to illuminate the situation as it was at the time of 
the implementation – but – they will also be raised to describe the situation 
to-day and thus show the change having taken place.  
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The ‘NRC house’ for which the following five documents were issued  
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